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Abstract 
Chiquitano and the State: Negotiating Identities and Indigenous Territories in 
Bolivia 
2010 by Katinka Weber 
 
This thesis analyses how Chiquitano people engage with the state and to what effect, 
based on ethnographic fieldwork carried out between September 2006 and August 
2007 in the Bolivian Concepción, San Javier and Lomerío municipalities, in the 
eastern Bolivian lowlands. It focuses on the most contentious areas of Chiquitano-
state relations, namely the emergence of the Chiquitano social movement, the 
struggle for territory and territorial autonomy and participation in the local state 
bureaucracy. While Chiquitano interact with the state in order to protect their socio-
cultural communal reproduction, this thesis finds that in many ways the Chiquitano 
organisation acts as part of the state and replicates its neo-liberal multicultural 
rhetoric. The state remains the main shaper of forms of political engagement and 
collective identification (such as indigeneity), resonating with Fried’s (1967) and 
Scott’s (1998) notions that the state implies some sort of process, one of 
‘restructuring’ and ‘making legible’. Consequently, this thesis argues that from the 
Chiquitano perspective, the election of Bolivia’s first indigenous president in 2005 
and his radical state reform project through the 2006-2007 Constituent Assembly, 
has not fundamentally transformed previous patterns of indigenous-state 
engagement. It posits that the more successful resistance continues to reside, perhaps 
more subtly, in comunidades’ socio-cultural relations.  
 iii 
Table of Contents 
Abstract ii 
Table of Contents ii 
List of Maps, Figures and Photos v 
Acronyms and Abbreviations vii 
Glossary of Frequently Used Spanish Terms xi 
Acknowledgements xiv 
I Introduction 16 
II Chiquitano and the State: Conceptualising the State and Citizenship 48 
Theories of the State 49 
Citizenship Practices & the Citizenship ‘Tool’ 62 
Bolivia’s Neo-liberal Multicultural Citizenship Regimes 67 
Conclusion 84 
Interlude: The State for the Chiquitano 87 
III Methodology: Of Multi-Sitedness, Shifting Positionalities and the Politics of 
Research 109 
What I Set out to Research, Why and How 110 
Researching the Chiquitano ‘Governance’ System: A so-called Multi-Sited 
Ethnography 114 
Two further Sites: Research with the CGTI-MV and CEJIS Teams 123 
Positionality/ Positioning in a Multi-Sited Context 147 
The Politics of Fieldwork and Writing about it 160 
Conclusion 163 
IV History of the Chiquitano: Ethnogenesis, Land Loss and Citizenship 165 
Pre-Jesuit Contact: The Early Conquest 168 
The Jesuit Period (1692-1767) 172 
The Post-Jesuit Period 186 
Independence and the Rise of the Republic 191 
The Rubber Boom, Chaco War and the Santa Cruz – Corumbá Railway 199 
The 1952 Revolution and Agrarian Reform 203 
Conclusion 211 
V Ethnic Politics and the Multiple Meanings of ‘Indigenous’ in Bolivia 214 
The Challenge of Contemporary Bolivian Ethnic Movements 217 
Chiquitano Modes of Group and Self-Identification 234 
Conclusion 262 
 iv 
VI Monte Verde: The Long Struggle and Meanings of Territory 264 
Constructing ‘Indigenous Territories’: Laws and Legal Discourses 265 
The Chiquitano Land Struggle 1973 – 2007 270 
Territorial Management and Planning 283 
Chiquitano Constructions of Territory and Monte Verde 295 
Conclusion 300 
VII Chiquitano in the Municipal Sphere 302 
Political Manoeuvrings: the 1995, 1999 and 2004 Municipal Elections 304 
Chiquitano Comunidades and the LPP 329 
Conclusion 341 
VIII Conclusion: Chiquitano, the State and Prospects for Future Engagement 344 
Appendix 1 List of Workshops, Focus Groups and Interviews 354 
CGTI-MV Project Workshops 354 
CEJIS Project: Workshops, Focus Groups, Interviews 354 
Semi-and unstructured interviews outside projects (Formal and Informal) 359 
Appendix 2 Methodological Matrix for Workshops in Chiquitano Comunidades 362 
Bibliography 368 
 
 v 
List of Maps, Figures and Photos 
List of Maps 
Map 1: Bolivia ........................................................................................................ 25 
Map 2: Santa Cruz Department, Chiquitanía and Ñuflo de Chávez Province ....... 27 
Map 3: Drawn Map of Palestina, TCO Monte Verde........................................... 242 
Map 4: The TCO Monte Verde and Chiquitano Comunidades............................ 275 
 
List of Photos 
Photo 1: Zebus Crossing the Road ....................................................................... 26 
Photo 2: Concepción Mission Church .................................................................. 87 
Photo 3: Southern Side of Concepción Main Square ........................................... 88 
Photo 4: A Street in the ‘Chiquitano Area’ of Town............................................ 89 
Photo 5: Hugo Banzer Suárez Statue.................................................................... 92 
Photo 6: Side View of Concepción Mission Church............................................ 93 
Photo 7: The CICC Headquarter (Central)......................................................... 105 
Photo 8: The Massaí Families’ Kitchen ............................................................. 120 
Photo 9: Part of the Massaí Families’ Housing Complex, Comunidad Palestina ....
 .............................................................................................................. 121 
Photo 10: Path to Chacos of Comunidad Palestina .............................................. 121 
Photo 11: Plantain Grove in the Comunidad Palestina......................................... 122 
Photo 12: VIth March of Indigenous People of the Lowland, Santa Cruz........... 123 
Photo 13: The Constituent Assembly Autonomy Commission, Sucre................. 123 
Photo 14: CGTI-MV Research Workshop in Palestina, TCO Monte Verde........ 128 
Photo 15: CGTI-MV Workshop in Puerto San Pedro, TCO Monte Verde.......... 128 
Photo 16: Reflexive Team Meeting, CEJIS Office Concepción .......................... 132 
Photo 17: Women-Only Focus Group, Comunidad Palmira................................ 135 
Photo 18: Co-Facilitating a Workshop in Las Abras............................................ 138 
Photo 19: Comunarios in Plenary in Makanaté.................................................... 138 
Photo 20: Sociodrama in the Comunidad Las Abras............................................ 140 
Photo 21: Interviewing Key Informants ............................................................... 141 
Photo 22: CGTI-MV Team Clearing the Path to Monte Verde ........................... 143 
Photo 23: The Mission Church of San Ignacio de Velasco.................................. 175 
 vi 
Photo 24: Evo Morales Being Dressed as Yaritú ................................................. 183 
Photo 25: Evo Morales as Yaritú.......................................................................... 183 
Photo 26: Don Adriano’s Family, Palmira ........................................................... 240 
Photo 27: Houses in Candelaria............................................................................ 243 
Photo 28: School Building in Candelaria ............................................................. 243 
Photo 29: Church in Palmira, Lomerío................................................................. 244 
Photo 30: Chiquitano Band .................................................................................. 252 
Photo 31: Brewing Chicha ................................................................................... 253 
Photo 32: Wearing a Tipoy ................................................................................... 254 
Photo 33: Cattle Ranch, San Javier ...................................................................... 257 
Photo 34: Comunidad Palestina, TCO Monte Verde ........................................... 257 
Photo 35: Esteban Massai..................................................................................... 273 
Photo 36: Evo Morales at TCO Monte Verde Ceremony .................................... 283 
Photo 37: Mayor Justo Seoane ............................................................................. 313 
Photo 38: Workshop in El Carmen....................................................................... 320 
Photo 39: Orchids in El Carmen........................................................................... 321 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please note that all photos in this thesis are by the author unless specified. All photos by the author are 
licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License. 
Exceptions are picture 24 and 25 of Evo Morales by Katinka Weber, which are licensed under a 
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License. To view a copy of this license, visit 
http://creativecommons.org; or, send a letter to Creative Commons, 444 Castro Street, Suite 900, 
Mountain View, California 94140, USA. 
 vii 
Acronyms and Abbreviations 
ADN Acción Democrática Nacionalista 
(National Democratic Action) 
ALAS Asesoría Legal y Asistencia Social 
(Legal Consultancy and Social Assistance) 
APCOB Apoyo para el Campesino-Indígena del Oriente Boliviano 
(Support for the Indigenous Peasant of the Bolivian East) 
APG Asamblea del Pueblo Guaraní 
(Assembly of the Guarani People) 
BOLFOR Programa de Manejo Forestal Sostenible 
(Program for Sustainable Forestry Management) 
CABI Capitanía del Alto y Bajo Izozog 
(Captaincy of the Alto and Bajo Izozog) 
CANOB Central Ayorea Nativa del Oriente Boliviano 
(Central of Native Ayoreos of Eastern Bolvia) 
CEADES Colectivo de Estudios Aplicados al Desarrollo Social 
(Collective of Applied Studies on Social Development) 
CEDIB Centro de Documentación e Información Bolivia 
(Documentation and Information Centre Bolivia) 
CEJIS Centro de Estudios Jurídico Investigación Social 
(Centre for Legal and Social Studies) 
CEPAC Centro de Promoción Agropecuaria Campesina 
(Centre for the Promotion of Peasant Farming and Stockbreeding) 
CEPAD Centro para Participación y Desarrollo Humano Sostenible 
(Centre for Participation and Sustainable Human Development) 
CEPEM-B Central de Pueblos Étnicos Mojeños del Beni 
(Central of Ethnic Mojeño People of the Beni) 
CEPIB Central de Pueblos Indígenas del Beni 
(Indigenous Central of Indigenous Peoples from the Beni) 
CGTI-MV Comité de Gestión del Territorio Indígena de Monte Verde 
(Management Committee of the Indigenous Territory of Monte 
Verde) 
CICC Central Indígena de Comunidades de Concepción 
(Indigenous Organisation of Communities of Concepción) 
CICOL Central Indígena de los Comunidades Originarios de Lomerío  
(Indigenous Organisation of Communities of Lomerío) 
CIDDEBENI Centro de Investigación y Documentación para el Desarrollo del 
Beni 
(Investigation and Documentation Centre for the Development of the 
Beni) 
 viii 
CIDOB Confederación Indígena del Oriente, Chaco y Amazonía de Bolivia 
(Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of the West, Chaco and 
Amazonia) 
Also: Central Indígena de Pueblos y Comunidades Indígenas del 
Oriente Boliviano 
(Central of Indigenous Peoples and Communities of Western 
Bolivia). 
CIMA Comisión International del Medio Ambiente 
(International Commission for the Environment) 
CIMAR Centro de Investigación y Manejo de Recursos Naturales Renovables  
(Investigation Centre for the Management of Renewable Natural 
Resources) 
CNTCB Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia 
(National Trade Union Organisation of Bolivian Peasants) 
CIPCA Centro de Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado 
(Peasantry Investigation and Promotion Center) 
CIP-SJ Central Indígena de Paikonecas de San Javier 
(Indigenous Organisation of Paikonecas of San Javier) 
CIPYM Consejo Indígena de Pueblo Yuracaré/Mojeño  
(Indigenous Congress of the Yuracaré/ Mojeño People) 
COB Central Obrera Boliviana 
(Bolivian Workers’ Confederation) 
COICA Coordinadora de Organizaciones Indígenas de la Cuenca 
Amazónica (Coordinating Body for Indigenous Organisations of the 
Amazon Basin) 
CONAIE Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador 
(Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador) 
CONAMAQ Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyo 
(National Council of the Ayllus and Marcas of Qullasuyo) 
CONFENAIE Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de la Amazonía 
Ecuatoriana  
(Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian 
Amazon) 
COPNAC Central de Organizaciones de los Pueblos Nativos Guarayos 
(Coordinating Body for Guraryos Native People) 
CORDECRUZ Corporación de Desarrollo de Santa Cruz 
(Santa Cruz Development Corporation) 
CPESC Coordinadora de los Pueblos Étnicos de Santa Cruz 
(Coordinating Body for the Ethnic People of Santa Cruz) 
CPIB Central de Pueblos Indígenas del Beni 
(Organisation of Indigenous Peoples of the Beni) 
CPTI Centro de Planificación de Territorios Indígenas 
(Planning Centre for Indigenous Territories) 
 ix
CSCB Confederación Sindical de Colonizadores de Bolivia 
(Union Confederation of Colonizers of Bolivia) 
CSUTCB Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de 
Bolivia 
(Single Union Confederation of Bolivian Peasant Workers) 
CV Comité de Vigilancia 
(Oversight Committee) 
DED Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst  
(German Development Agency) 
DMI Distrito Municipal Indígena 
(Indigenous Municipal District) 
FAM Federación de Asociaciones Municipales 
(Federation of Municipal Associations) 
GANPI Gran Asamblea Nacional de los Pueblos Indígenas 
(National Assembly of Indigenous Peoples) 
GTZ Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit 
(German Technical Development Agency) 
IDT Instituto Departamental  de Tierras  
(Departmental Institute of Lands) 
ILO International Labour Organisation 
IPSP Instrumento Político por la Soberanía de los Pueblos 
(Political Instrument for the sovereignty of the Peoples) 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
INRA Instituto Nacional de La Reforma Agraria 
(National Institute of Agrarian Reform) 
Inwent Internationale Weiterbildung und Entwicklung gGmbH  
(Capacity Building International) 
KFW Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau 
(Instituto de Cedito para la Reconstrucción) 
(Credit Institute for Reconstruction) 
LDA Ley de Descentralización Administrativa  
(Administrative Decentralisation Law) 
LPP Ley de Participación Popular 
(Law of Popular Participation) 
MAS Movimiento al Socialismo 
(Movement Towards Socialism) 
MINGA Asociación de Grupos Mancomunados de Trabajo 
(Association of Mancommunal Work Groups) 
MNR Movimiento Revolucionario Nacionalista  
(Nationalist Revolutionary Movement) 
MST Movimiento Sin Tierra 
(Landless Movement) 
 x
NGO Nongovernmental Organisation 
OICH Organización Indígena Chiquitana 
(Chiquitano Indigenous Organisation) 
OTB Organización Territorial de Base 
(Territorial Base Organisation) 
OXFAM Oxford Committee for Famine Relief 
PADEP Programa de Apoyo a la Gestión Pública Descentralizada y Lucha 
contra la Pobreza 
(Programme for the support of the Decentralised Public Management 
and Fight against Poverty) 
PDM Plan de Desarrollo Municipal 
Municipal Development Plan 
PEI Programa de Educación Bilingüe 
(Bilingual Education Programme) 
POA Plan Operativo Anual  
(Annual Operating Plan) 
or Programa Operativo Anual 
(Annual Operating Programme) 
SAN-TCO Saneamiento Especial de Tierras Comunitarias de Origen 
(Special Indemnification of Original Communal Lands) 
SENALEP Servicio Nacional de Alfabetización Educación Popular 
(National Service of Popular Education Alphabetisation) 
SNV Netherlands Development Organisation 
TAN Tribunal Agrario Nacional  
(National Agrarian Tribunal) 
TCO Tierra Comunitaria de Origen 
(Original Communal Land)  
UJC Unión Juvenil Cruceñista  
(Young Men’s Civic Organisation) 
UN United Nations 
VAIO Vice Ministerio de Asuntos Indígenas y Originarios 
(Vice Ministry for Indigenous and Originary Affairs) 
VAIPO Vice Ministerio de Asuntos Indígenas y Pueblos Originarios 
(Vice Ministry for the Affairs of Indigenous and Originary Peoples) 
WTO World Trade Organisation 
WWF World Wildlife Fund 
ZFD Ziviler Friedensdienst 
(Civil Peace Service) 
 
 xi
Glossary of Frequently Used Spanish Terms 
alcalde político A post introduced into comunidades and ranchos during the 
1953 agrarian reform with the function of representing 
indigenous/peasant communities before the state (or vice 
versa), looking after the communal infrastructure as well as 
organising other aspects of communal life. The cabildo 
assisted in these tasks.  
cabildo Authority system originally introduced through the Jesuit 
Mission system. Today a cabildo is composed of anything 
between two and twelve comunarios (depending on the 
number of people that live in the comunidad) who are elected 
by their fellow comunarios generally for a certain period (3-5 
years). The cabildos’ tasks are administration, organising 
communal work efforts and upholding the justice system. In 
some comunidades, it also (or exclusively) has religious 
functions.  
cacique Members of cabildos are often called cacique. It is also a term 
used to denominate the leaders of some of the Chiquitano 
organisations. 
camba ‘Camba’ was a once derogatory term used for indigenous 
peons. Today many residents of Santa Cruz department use the 
term to express their lowland origin or residence, in 
juxtaposition to highlanders (kollas). The term has been 
appropriated to express Cruceño regionalist sentiments. 
central The term can refer to the Chiquitano organisations, to the 
people who run the organisation, and is also used to describe 
the actual building where they meet. 
chaco Field, plot, allotment. 
kolla A (generally derogatory) term for people from the Bolivian 
highlands. 
 xii
comunario/a A ‘comunario’ is a man who lives in a ‘comunidad’. A 
‘comunaria’ is a woman who lives in a comunidad. 
comunarios Corresponding to the Spanish use of male/female nouns, the 
term is used to denote groups composed of men, or men and 
women who live in, or are from a comunidad. ‘Comunarias’ 
refers to a group of females. 
comunidad A place where Chiquitano comunarios live communally; also 
the group of people that live together in Chiquitano 
settlements. 
Concepceño elite The white and mestizo economic and political elite of 
Concepción. Members of the elite are predominantly members 
of the three most powerful Concepceño families. 
Concepceño Here used to refer to the white and mestizo population of 
Concepción. Although it should be noted that also Aymara, 
Quechua, Chiquitano (or other) residents, at times identify as 
Concepceño. 
corregidor Administrative officials named after the Spanish colonial 
officials that used to administer the cantón. Serving under the 
corregidores were agentes (‘agents’), who had quasi-judicial 
and quasi-executive functions at the grassroots level. Today 
‘corregidor’ is the term for provincial legal agents in charge of 
settling disputes in the cantón, and appointed by the 
departmental prefect. There are assistant corregidores 
(‘corregidor’ or ‘sub-corregidor’) in each comunidad, in 
charge of conflict-mediation that mediate the authority in the 
comunidades. 
Cruceño elite The term generally refers to the departmental business and 
agro-industrial elite of Santa Cruz department.  
Cruceño Here used to refer to the white and mestizo population of Santa 
Cruz department. However, also Chiquitano, Aymara, 
Quechua or Guaraní people (or any other) resident of Santa 
Cruz department at times might identity as Cruceño. 
 xiii 
empadronamiento Generally used to refer to debt servitude. More recently: 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
In order to answer the question how Chiquitano people engage with the state and to 
what effect, I carried out ethnographic fieldwork between September 2006 and 
August 2007 in the Bolivian Concepción, San Javier and Lomerío municipalities. 
The municipalities are situated in the Chiquitanía region, Santa Cruz department in 
the eastern Bolivian lowlands. One the one hand this thesis focuses on how 
Chiquitano-state interaction leads to antagonisms, that stem from the need to interact 
with the state in order to protect their lifeways, while resisting the homogenising and 
assimilating pressures that this entails (Sider, 2003). This is most obvious in the areas 
of self- and group-identification (especially indigeneity), political organisation and 
territoriality. Chiquitano comunarios (people that live in, or are from a comunidad) 
attempt to challenge and interact with the state on a political level and through their 
organisations. This thesis finds that in many ways the Chiquitano organisation acts as 
part of the state and replicates its neo-liberal multicultural rhetoric. The more 
successful resistance continues to reside, perhaps more subtly, in the comunidades 
social relations and modes of identification. This thesis questions whether from the 
Chiquitano perspective, the election of Bolivia’s first indigenous president in 2005 
and his radical state reform project through the 2006-2007 Constituent Assembly, 
has really transformed previous patterns of indigenous-state engagement.  
Missing the State in the Eastern Bolivian Lowlands 
Much literature has emerged on state-citizen relations in Bolivia, especially with 
respect to changes in Bolivian citizenship regimes since the 1990s (e.g. Albro, 2010; 
Canessa, 2005, 2007a; Goldstein, 2004; 2003; Kohl, 2003b; Lazar, 2004a, 2008; 
McNeish, 2008; Postero, 2007). Along with other very recent contributions 
(Brathurst, 2005; Lepri, 2006; Postero, 2007), this thesis seeks to contribute to this 
literature by focusing on lowland Bolivia, in contrast to the heavily researched 
highlands or valley regions. By shifting the gaze towards indigenous people in the 
lowlands, I also seek to contribute to the growing literature on Amazonian peoples 
political struggles (e.g. Conklin and Graham, 1995; Jackson, 1995; Rosengren, 2003; 
Rubenstein, 2001; Sawyer, 1997; Veber, 1998), and substantial body of literature on 
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indigenous rights struggles throughout Latin America (Maybury-Lewis, 2002; 
Sieder, 2002; Urban and Sherzer, 2001; Van Cott, 1994a, 2005; Warren and Jackson, 
2002; Wearne, 1996; Yashar, 2005). My thesis diverges from studies that treat 
indigenous organisations as a type of intermediary between indigenous communities 
or urban residents and the state, while acknowledging that they at times take over it’s 
functions (e.g. Falcon, 1994; Lazar, 2008; Nugent, 1994a, 1994b; Postero, 2007). 
Instead, I argue that Chiquitano organisations may act as part of the state, along with 
NGOs and other organisations.  
To allow for a consideration of the diverse actors that historically and 
currently form part of state power, this thesis conceptualises the state as a power 
structure, that is an ongoing accomplishment and made meaningful through 
particular imaginative and symbolic devices that lead to its legitimisation (Abrams, 
1988; Comaroff, 1998; Gupta and Ferguson, 2002). Such a view accords ‘centrality 
to the meanings of the everyday practices of bureaucracies and their relation to 
representations of the state’ (Gupta and Sharma, 2006: 277). Accordingly, to account 
for this fragmented nature this thesis conceptualises citizenship as a set of practices 
(also see Jelin, 2003; Lazar, 2008; Ong, 1999; Salman, 2004; Sassen, 2002; Sawyer, 
2001; Yuval-Davis, 1997). 
Most publications addressing Bolivian state reforms, social change or state-
citizen relations produced by anthropologists, historians and sociologists alike, has 
focused on the highland areas (e.g. Grindle and Domingo, 2003; Hylton and 
Thomson, 2007; Klein, 1992). The relative absence of studies regarding these 
relations when it comes to the lowland areas suggests a lack of understanding with 
respect to what constitutes the state in this area. The following comment by historian 
Herbert S. Klein highlights why historical and other accounts concentrate primarily 
on the highlands:  
Although some two-thirds of Bolivia’s territory consists of tropical and semi-tropical 
lowlands, from the Pacific coasts deserts of the Atacama region (until this recent 
past) in the west, to the vast stretches of eastern lowlands and floodplains forming 
parts of the Amazonian and Pilcomayo river basins in the east, humanity has been 
concentrated in the highlands from the remotest times until today. … While the 
lowlands may have offered better soils and the potential for a richer life, the 
inaccessibility until modern times rendered them useless to all but a small number of 
semi-nomadic hunters and gatherers isolated from significant contact with major 
centres of advanced civilisations. On the other hand, the high plateau was well 
articulated with the dense populations and advanced culture areas of coastal and 
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central Peru. Thus, despite it limitations, the broad expanse of its arable lands, its 
potential as a major grazing zone, and its deposits of accessible minerals made the 
Bolivian highlands the logical centre for human settlement (1992: 3-4, emphasis 
added).  
Along with others, he perceives the lowlands as ‘marginalised from state building 
and the expansion of economic markets’ (Yashar, 2005: 62, also 191-193). In 
contrast, the highlands were the focus of colonial and republican economic 
exploitation, along with being the site for the development of state administrative 
structures. Conversely, people who discuss the state and its administration do often 
not consider the populations within the lowland national territory. 
However, the lowlands were not deemed ‘useless’ by everyone. While 
employees of the colonial or republican state were indeed absent from the missions 
and Chiquitano settlements over long periods of time, indigenous individuals did not 
escape their influence: Encomenderos, priests, tradesmen or entrepreneurs filled the 
gaps in administrating the populations. While Spanish colonisers concentrated on 
establishing a colonial administrative structure in the highlands, Jesuit missionaries 
were granted the right to convert ‘uncivilised’ eastern lowlanders to Christianity and 
pacify the various groups. They attempted this from 1692, through setting up mission 
settlements. Not only did this provide a buffer zone of protection against Portuguese 
attacks, the hope was also that the ‘reduced’ groups could be made functional to the 
colonial economy (see de la Peña, 2005: 720; Freyer, 1997: 13; Krekeler, 1993: 81-
85). Another form of indirect government in the lowlands, (like the highlands), were 
encomiendas ‘through which the monarchy authorised conquistadores to appropriate 
for themselves and redistribute to their followers grants of Indians from whom they 
had the power to exact both labour and tribute’ (Radding, 2005: 125). 
The Jesuit Mission period (1690-1767) had a profound impact on the 
Chiquitanía region, sparking off an ethnogenesis and shaping the socio-political and 
economic practices on the peoples living in the region. It has been well documented 
by the Jesuit priests themselves. Historians have addressed the period either through 
focusing solely on the mission times and immediate pre- and post-Jesuit presence 
(e.g. Radding, 2006b; Tomichá, 2002), or in the context of constructing a history of 
Santa Cruz department up to more recent times (e.g. Finot, 1978; Radding, 2005; 
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Roca, 2001; Tonelli, 2004).1 Also, the limited numbers of anthropological studies on 
Chiquitano people overwhelmingly emphasise the Jesuit and immediate post-mission 
period (see Balza Alarcón, 2001; Freyer, 1997; Krekeler, 1993; Schwarz, 1994). 
Seeking to highlight the Chiquitano ethnogenesis sparked through the mission 
system, they focus on descriptions of Chiquitano ‘culture’, on the economic and 
political practices of groups’ resident in and around the missions, in order to 
highlight continuities to present times. However, they draw conclusion on the back 
of little recent ethnographic data. Exceptions are the studies by Burkhard Schwarz 
(1994) and Roberto Balza Alarcón (2001) that mainly examine Chiquitano patterns 
of spatial occupation, and Jürgen Riester’s (1976) treatment of Chiquitano culture, 
which address the mission period more briefly and rely on ethnographic data. 
In contrast, more sparsely documented are the socio-economic and political 
practices of people at the eve of the arrival of Spaniards in the region, along with the 
effects of colonisation.2 Similarly, although post-Jesuit priests, administrators and 
travellers elaborated numerous reports and accounts, few scholars have addressed life 
in the ex-missions and surrounding Chiquitano settlements (or the lowlands in 
general) from the 1800s onwards and into republican times. Additionally, indigenous 
people virtually ‘disappear’ as significant actors in writings about the Chiquitanía 
(and the Santa Cruz department in general) that deal with the nineteenth century and 
into the 1950’s (Lema, 2006a: 47). While historians and anthropologists have amply 
explored the contested meanings of postcolonial political practices and ways in 
which indigenous communities renegotiated their relationships to the state in the 
Bolivian highlands during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Kicza, 2000a; 
                                                 
1
 The missions have also been of interest to those writing about the mission architecture. See, for 
example, the work of Antonio Eduardo Bösl (1988). Some of the Jesuit and Franciscan missionaries’ 
accounts have been published. See, for example, the work of Fransico Burgés (1726), Julian Knogler 
(1970), Martin Schmidt (1981), Juan Patricio Fernández (1994) or Lucas Caballero (1933). 
2
 Authors who address the mission period often include a brief account of the initial Conquest and 
summarise the different lifeways of groups resident in the area at the time of conquest (from 1530 
onwards) (Krekeler, 1993; Radding, 2005, 2006b; Riester, 1976; Schwarz, 1994; Tomichá, 2002; 
Tonelli, 2004). Excepsions are the works by Mario Arrien (2006) and ethnographer Bärbel Freyer 
(2000) who focus on Chiquitano groups socio-political, cultural and economic practices before the 
arrival of the missionaries (which they reconstruct through the use of eighteenth century sources) and 
the changes introduced through residence in the reducciones. 
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Kuenzli, 2009; Larson, 2004; Platt, 1984, 1993; Rasnake, 1988; Stern, 1987; 
Thomson, 2002), this is not the case for the lowlands.3  
Historian Cynthia Radding reasons that this is because the ‘changing political 
and social structures within communities and the wider Creole society, their relations 
of mutual dependency, and their different points of reference to the institutions of the 
state’ were less discernible than in the highlands (2005: 282). Instead, most studies 
on this period in Santa Cruz department generally concentrate on the region’s 
economic growth, development initiatives launched by private or governmental 
actors, and the region’s incorporation into the wider Bolivian nation, for example, 
through settlement initiates, the establishment of military outposts and 
communication routes (García Jordán, 2001; Radding, 2005; Roca, 2001). In this 
literature, Chiquitano and other indigenous peoples feature primarily under the term 
‘workforce’ for agricultural activities, the rubber boom in the Amazon region or the 
north of the department.4 
Exceptions are excellent and detailed contributions by Cynthia Radding 
(2001; 2002; 2005; 2006a; 2006b). Radding focuses on such themes as the mission 
and secular mission history, emphasising changes triggered in ecology and 
environment, settlement patterns, and economic, social and political practices of 
Chiquitano peoples. She highlights the negotiated character of such changes, as well 
as continuities to the present day.5 Further, her work she sheds light on the 
commercial mission activities, which have connected the settlements with forest 
communities in the lowlands, the wider Andean colonial society, and later, the 
republican socio-political sphere. Radding also addressed the emerging citizenship 
regimes in the Chiquitanía and the Santa Cruz region in general, which have, as in 
                                                 
3
 Discussions addressing the highlands have focused on ‘the material and ceremonial dimensions’ of 
‘tribute payment, public works, and the fiesta-cargo system of religious and political office holding at 
the village level’ (Radding, 2005: 281). See, for example, the studies by Sinclair Thomson’s (2002) of 
political practices in Aymara communities during the colonial and republican periods, Roger 
Rasnake’s (1988) on divisions among socio-cultural and political roles in Yura in Potosí’ , or Tristan 
Platt’s (1984; 1993) work. 
4
 For example, José Luis Roca (2001) emphasises the importance of economic processes, the 
fluctuations of the internal market, the rubber economy, alternative responses of the local economy 
and, in the political sphere, regionalism. His description does not cover the socio-political and 
economic affects on the department’s population. 
5
 Especially insightful is Radding’s (2005) comparatative history of Chiquitos (Bolivia) and the 
Sonoran Desert (Mexico) – two colonies on the frontiers of the Spanish empire – focused on the 
relationship between human societies and the landscape they live in, as well as create. 
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other Latin American countries, been closely tied economic patterns, landholding 
regimes and discourses around race.6 
Some recent studies focus on Santa Cruz’s autonomy claim, which has 
caused much political debate, public protest and some violent clashes over the past 
ten years. They provide a largely economic analysis of the region post 1950 in order 
to explore the roots of regionalism (Antelo, 2003; Peña et al., 2003; Plata Quispe, 
2008; Soruco et al., 2008). For example, the edited volume by Ximena Sorruco, 
Wilfredo Plata and Gustavo Medeiros (2008) examines the emergence of Santa Cruz 
economic elites and the different boom and bust cycles of agricultural commodities 
(mainly rubber, soya, cotton, to a lesser extent cattle ranching and sugarcane 
cultivation) and natural resource extraction (gas, oil and logging). Lowland 
indigenous people feature in this literature, but again solely in their role as a cheap 
workforce in Cruceño economic boom and bust cycles.7 However, more recent 
contributions on lowland peoples socio-economic systems and political practices and 
state engagement have somewhat counteracted this trend (see Brathurst, 2005; Lepri, 
2006; Postero, 2007).8 
Situating Chiquitano People  
Chiquitano have had a long-standing engagement with international and state actors. 
After the Jesuits followed secular mission administrations, the rubber barons, railway 
                                                 
6
 Another exception to be mentioned is the study by historian Oscar Tonelli (2004), who covers the 
region’s history in some detail until recent times, albeit providing only a brief coverage of the period 
1880-1920. 
7
 However, some studies addressing the emergence of the departmental autonomy claim not only 
focus on the claims’ historic routes, but regard the political mobilisation of Bolivia’s indigenous 
population in the 1990s as a key factor, as this ‘directly challenged the privileged position of 
economic elites within the national political institutions’ (Eaton, 2007: 71, also Gustafson, 2006). 
Anthropologist Bret Gustafson (2006) also adds other factors behind the rise of the ‘elitist’ and ‘civic’ 
autonomy movement in Santa Cruz. It is not only a ‘response to the growing strength of the 
indigenous-popular and nationalist power’ (2006: 351), but is also the expression of a ‘new urbanism’ 
in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, which ‘responds to a crisis of social, political and economic power of the 
traditional elite’ (2006: 419).  
8
 Valuable contributions wih respect to lowland people have been made in other aspects, such as self-
identification and group formation, kinship and ethno-botany. See Isabella Lepri (2005; 2006) and 
Daniela Peluso and Miguel Alexiades’ (2005; 2009) on the Ese-Eja; Allan Holmberg (1969[1950]) on 
the Sirono; Jürgen Riester on the Ajoreode (1997), Chimanes (1993) and Chirriguano (1994); Laura 
Brathurst (2005) on the Tacana. On the Chiquitano, see Riester (1968; 1970; 1971; 1976) and the 
recent contribution ‘La voz de los chiquitanos: historia de comunidades de la provincia Velaso’ 
(2006b). With this edited volume a group of historians and anthropologists have intended to address 
the lack of ethnographic accounts and historic analysis of the Chiquitanía region, intending to shift the 
focus to the very Chiquitano comunidades (in contrast perhaps, to the more prominent focus on the 
missions themselves).  
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constructors, and the owners of estancias (cattle ranches) and haciendas who all 
claimed their share of Chiquitano labour. The Chiquitano ethnic identity emerged 
initially with the arrival of the Jesuits and resettlement of different group’s resident 
into the mission compounds, which sparked an ethnogenesis in each mission (see 
Chapter IV). After the departure of the Jesuits, Chiquitano communities emerged 
outside the mission settlement. While these maintained their internal governance 
structures, comunidades have generally had links to the state bureaucracy and other 
state actors which imposed labour demands (or outright enslavement, in the case of 
the rubber boom) (Radding, 2005; also see Riester, 1976: 125-129). 
It is precisely their long historical engagement with state actors which, to a 
certain degree, differentiates Chiquitano socio-political and economic practices, as 
well as the way that Chiquitano remember and construct their history, from those 
Amazonian people for whom this is a more recent process, and often linked to the 
defence of their living spaces and livelihoods against colonisers, logging, mining, or 
oil exploitation interests.9 The latter include, for example, the Shuar (e.g. Rubenstein, 
2001) or Huaorani (e.g. Ziegler-Otero, 2007) in Ecuador; the Pajonal Asheninka (e.g. 
Veber, 1998) and Matsigenka (e.g. Rosengren, 2003) in Peru; the Kayapó (e.g. 
Turner, 1988; Turner and Fajans-Turner, 2006) in Brazil and Tucanoans in south-
eastern Colombia (e.g. Jackson, 1995, 2001). 
Instead, the Chiquitano situation is more comparable to other native peoples 
who have experienced life in mission settlements or rubber areas (see Hill, 1988b; 
Radding, 2005; Taylor, 1999), or those living in central and highland South America 
and the Western Amazonia, like the Canelos Quichua, the Lamista Quechua, the 
Cocamilla of the Peruvian Bajo Urubamba river (Gow, 1991, 1993), as well as the 
different groups living in the Putumayo foothills, Colombia (Taussig, 1987). 
Dissimilarities between the former and these latter groups materialise in various 
areas, whose discussion would exceed the scope of this thesis. Relevant to the 
argument forwarded here, however, is that the organisational structures of the latter 
groups are often more hierarchical and centralised, contrasting with those of more 
egalitarian groups, who have experienced more recent relations with the state (see 
Brown, 1993; Clastres, 1989; Rosengren, 2003; Rubenstein, 2001).  
                                                 
9
 Note that this is not about ‘contact’, which many groups have had for centuries, but indigenous-state 
relations.  
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As its linguistic root suggests, it was with the arrival of the Spanish that the 
term ‘Chiquitano’ started to circulate to denominate previous separately named 
groups (see Chapter IV). Scholars generally give three different accounts regarding 
its origins. The first points to the Spanish conquistadores coining the term when they 
saw the small entrances to Chiquitano huts (chiquito = small) (Krekeler, 1993: 26; 
Riester, 1976: 122). The second claims it derives from the Guarani word tapuy miri, 
which Krekeler (1993: 26) translates as ‘small enemy’ and Radding (2005: 139) as 
‘slaves of small things’, which resulted in the use of the term ‘chiquito’ (small).10 
The third points to an anonymous eighteenth century source, that attributes the 
name’s origin to the Chiquitos word chiqui-s (egg or testicle). The author proceeds to 
explain ‘that the Indians thus named (perhaps by others) strove to change their 
designation to M’oñeyca, meaning “the men” or “the people”’ (see Radding, 2005: 
140). These interpretations are debatable. What has been established, however, is that 
the term was already in use by 1595 when the Spanish settlers employed it to 
denominate the different groups they encountered (Freyer, 1997: 10). More recently, 
Chiquitano leaders have sought to adopt a new name for self- and group 
identification, one selection being the term besiro, meaning ‘correct speech’ or ‘the 
right way’ (Radding, 2005: 140). At the time of fieldwork, many Chiquitano leaders 
and comunarios used the term besiro for the Chiquitano language. 
Most Chiquitano today live in the Ñuflo de Chávez, Chiquitos, Velasco and 
Ángel Sandoval provinces of Santa Cruz department (Krekeler, 1993: 27). Together 
with the Germán Busch and Guarayos provinces, these comprise the region ‘Gran 
Chiquitanía’. The entire region presents a high diversity of forest (bosque), savannah, 
and wetland vegetation.11 While the region can be described as ‘sub-tropical’, with a 
rainfall that ranges between 1,000 and 1,600 millimetres, temperatures can vary 
significantly throughout the year. The average is 24˚C, but from around March to 
August temperature can plummet to about 3˚C with cold winds (the so-called ‘sur’) 
and heights reaching up to 38˚C in the hot and humid months (see Radding, 2005: 
                                                 
10
 Radding records that this version goes back to early Spanish sources that point to tribal wars 
between Chiriguanos and Chiquitos. The former feared the Chiquitanos’ use of lethal poisonous herbs 
(2005: 139). 
11
 According to Radding, ‘bosque’ is generally understood ‘as uncultivated forestland for gathering or 
for clearing gardening plots’ (Radding, 2005: 37).  
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35).12 Census data indicates a rise in the total self-identified Chiquitano population 
from 72,500 according to the 1992 census (McDaniel, 2002: 70), to 112,271 in 2001 
(Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 2001). Therefore, the Chiquitano constitute the 
largest of the 36 different ethnic groups resident in lowland Bolivia (McDaniel, 
2002: 70).13 
Travel from the departmental capital Santa Cruz de la Sierra to the main 
fieldwork site in Concepción (the capital of Concepción municipality), required 
taking the bus – the main mode of transport connecting the cosmopolitan city with 
provincial towns. The bus travels northeast via El Pailón, where it crosses the Rio 
Grande on the street that leads to San Ignacio de Velasco and proceeds to San Matías 
at the Brazilian Border (see Map 1, below). The 290 km of road to Concepción is 
paved; the travelling time to neighbouring San Javier is about five and a half hours, 
with a further thirty to forty minutes to Concepción. Around San Julián and El 
Pailón, the bus travels past the many small shops and businesses that sprawl along 
the main traffic routes, especially where obstacles to moving traffic might force 
travellers to take a break. That the small businesses are overwhelmingly owned by 
highland immigrants, is testament to the large amount of highland-lowland migration 
that Santa Cruz has seen over past decades.14 Past El Pailón, there are occasional 
settlements along the road, but the scenery becomes increasingly dominated by 
agricultural fields and large cattle ranches, dotted with white zebus and some shade 
trees: testimony to that cattle ranching is one of Santa Cruz’s main economic pillars. 
Landownership, cattle and cropping are an important source of status and wealth 
among the Concepceño elite. Towards San Javier, the otherwise very flat landscape 
                                                 
12
 Radding further describes the region as follows: The Chiquitanía is located ‘approximately within 
fifteen and nineteen degrees latitude (north-south) and fifty-eight and sixty-four degrees longitude 
(east-west) between the tributaries of the Amazonian and Paraguayan river basins and the Andean 
highlands. … Comprising 370,621 square kilometres (143,098 square miles), its geography centers on 
the western portion of the Brazilian Precambrian shield, forming low outcroppings of mesas, buttes, 
and ranges that extend form southeast to northwest’ (Radding, 2005: 35). 
13
 For purposes of comparison, the 2001 census recorded 78,438 Guarani, and 43323 Mojeño people, 
which are the two other relatively numerous ethnic groups in the eastern Bolivian lowland area and 
the Chaco region (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 2001). 
14
 On highland–lowland migration see MacLean Stearman (1985), Urioste and Kay (2005), Gustafson 
(2006).  
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gives away to rolling hills, in which San Javier is located. Then the street slopes 
down towards the small town Concepción, where the terrain becomes even again.15 
Map 1: Bolivia 
 
Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/americas/bolivia_pol93.pdf 16 
                                                 
15
 Concepción municipality is less hilly than both the neighbouring San Javier or Lomerío 
municipalities, its elevation varying between 250 and 485 meters above sea level. The ex-mission 
settlement Concpeción itself is at 380m (Gobierno Municipal de Concepción, 2007b: 13).  
16
 Courtesy of the University of Texas Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin.  
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Photo 1: Zebus Crossing the Road 
 
Zebus crossing the road on the ascent to San Javier (approaching from Santa Cruz de la 
Sierra) 
Together with the San Javier and Lomerío municipalities, Concepción municipality 
is situated in Ñuflo de Chávez province (see Map 2, below).17 The municipalities of 
Concepción and San Javier incorporate savannah areas which are largely deforested, 
except for shade trees. They are dotted with cattle ranches and small human 
settlements, some dry forest and tropical rain forest (bosque húmedo).18 In contrast, 
the neighbouring municipality of Lomerío is almost exclusively covered by savannah 
and dry forest (bosque secco). Concepción municipality has a population of around 
18,900 inhabitants, with a rural population of around 10,200. While some Chiquitano 
                                                 
17
 The Ñuflo de Chávez province, along with those of Angel Sandóval, and Velasco, formed part of 
Chiquitos province which was formerly the largest in Santa Cruz department and the country, an 
original province of Bolivia created at independence (1825). Ñuflo de Chávez province was founded 
on 16 September 1915 during the Presidency of Ismael Montes, and Concepción established as its 
capital. Previously, the territory belonged to the Velasco and Chiquitos provinces. The province was 
initially created with three municipal sections, Concepción, San Javier and San Julián, later followed 
by the establishment of the municipalities of San Ramón, San Antonio de Lomerío y Cuatro Cañadas 
(Gobierno Municipal de Concepción, 2007b: 2-3).  
18
 According to the municipal survey, tropical rain forest covers 40 per cent of the surface of 
Concepción municipality, compared to around ten per cent in San Javier (Gobierno Municipal de 
Concepción, 2007b: 11). 
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in Concepción municipality live in the small town (and ex-mission settlement) of 
Concepción, which they often refer to as ‘el pueblo’ (here: the village), Chiquitano 
comprise most of the rural population and live in forty-two legally recognised 
‘indigenous communities’, or in other words, Chiquitano ‘comunidades’ (Gobierno 
Municipal de Concepción, 2007b: 3-4, 49-51).19  
Map 2: Santa Cruz Department, Chiquitanía and Ñuflo de Chávez Province  
 
Source: Map by Patricia Heyda (in Gustafson, 2006: 358).20 
In general, comunidades are located at varying distances from Concepción, from 
twenty minute walks to six hour pick-up drives. Most have a population between 150 
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 Apart from the forty-two (generally Chiquitano) indigenous communities, three communities exist 
which are in the process of ‘consolidation’. All these communities are distributed across the two 
cantons that the municipality comprises: Concepción and San Pedro. Additionally to these cantons, 
the municipality contains one indigenous district: Zapocó. Within Zapocó live around 330 Ayoreode 
people (Gobierno Municipal de Concepción, 2007b: 3-4, 60). The figures that the municipal 
government of Concepción provides with regards to languages spoken in the municipality are as 
follows: the most common language is castellano (82.99 per cent), followed by chiquitano (also: 
bésiro) (12.66 per cent), and the ayoreo language zamuci, accounting for 4.35 per cent (2007b: 75). 
20
 Used by permission of Patricia Heyda, Washington University in St. Louis. 
ÑUFLO DE 
CHÁVEZ 
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and 300 people. While the smallest contain around 50 inhabitants, and the largest 
(one of which is Candelaria, founded in the 1960s), holds around 500 inhabitants 
(Gobierno Municipal de Concepción, 2007b: 51-52). Except for the comunidades 
located within the Monte Verde territory, which comprises most of the forested area 
of the municipality and also part of the neighbouring San Javier and Guarayos 
municipalities, comunidades are enclosed by non-Chiquitano owned cattle ranches 
and large-scale food crop producing estates. This attests to the encroachment of such 
properties on Chiquitano settlements. However, Chiquitano comunarios rely on a 
access to land and forest as they generally obtain their main stables (rice, yucca, 
maize, beans and plantain) from their chacos (fields), which Chiquitano clear 
through slash and burn techniques, and from their forest gardens.21 Where 
Chiquitano have the possibility, they also collect forest fruits and undertake hunting 
and fishing for meat. As will be addressed in the following chapters, the increasing 
land shortages Chiquitano have suffered presents one of the main reasons for their 
political organising. It underpins demands for legal title to the Monte Verde territory, 
which Chiquitano of Concepción, San Javier and Lomerío have claimed as their own.  
While comunarios largely rely on their land for subsistence, they may also 
sell surplus produce for cash to merchants who travel to the comunidades. More 
commonly, they take foodstuffs to the closest market town, i.e. Concepción or San 
Javier. Some comunidades engage in communal animal husbandry projects, 
generally cattle ranching or keeping sheep, to generate extra cash. Chiquitano rely on 
such income to purchase items they do not produce themselves, such as sugar, salt, or 
coffee. Money is also needed to send children to college in Concepción, or to pay for 
hospital bills. Several comunidades undertake communal projects with the aim of 
buying medical equipment or improving infrastructure. Consequently, Chiquitano 
life is in many ways (not only economically, but also politically and socially) closely 
connected to the municipal capitals, as well as other comunidades.  
In this thesis the term ‘comunidad’ is not translated as community or 
settlement, to highlight that a comunidad forms a certain type of Chiquitano 
community, and to make a distinction to the concept of ‘indigenous community’ as it 
                                                 
21
 For a more detailed description of Chiquitano agricultural techniques, see Balza Alarcón (2001: 
212-217). 
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appears in Bolivian legal codes.22 Chiquitano comunarios describe their 
comunidades in terms of a Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl (a feeling of belonging 
together), where several families live together, possess communal land, work 
collectively and follow communal norms. A more detailed description of the 
meanings comunarios attach to ‘being a comunario’ features in Chapter V.  
An important aspect of the comunidades is their organisational structure to 
organise work, uphold and enforce norms or rules. While their exact formation 
varies, most comunidades count with a cabildo of between two and twelve members, 
a corregidor and a Organización Territorial de Base (OTBs – Territorial Base 
Organisation). Their roles include the administration of communal affairs and 
arranging communal work efforts, overseeing religious ceremonies and upholding 
the norms of the comunidad. OTBs also have the role of liaising with non-
comunarios, such as members of different levels of the Bolivian state administration, 
NGO workers, or sometimes business people. All these authorities are elected by 
comunarios for fixed terms, with periods in office, electorate composition and form 
of election, varying among comunidades. The role of OTBs in Bolivia’s state 
administrative structures and the responsibilities of communal authorities will be 
addressed more extensively in Chapter VII.  
While for most Chiquitano in the municipality, comunidades are the more 
immediate political, economic and social sphere, like many other lowland (and also 
highland) peoples, another important aspect of Chiquitano life are their grassroots 
organisations. Each organisation involves the Chiquitano that live within the 
boundaries of the respective municipality. The Central Indígena de Comunidades de 
Concepción (CICC – Indigenous Organisation of Communities of Concepción) dates 
from 1985. Centrales were first established in response to sub-prefectural labour 
tributes, to mobilise against their continued exclusion from basic rights, as well as 
abuses perpetrated by local white and mestizo town dwellers, cattle ranchers and 
patrones (bosses). Two further organisations were founded in the region: the Central 
Indígena de los Comunidades Originarios de Lomerío (CICOL – Indigenous 
                                                 
22
 It should be pointed out that some of the literature regarding Chiquitano people, refers to the 
aforementioned Chiquitano settlements as ‘rancho’ (e.g. Schwarz, 1994: 37). However, Chiquitano 
comunarios themselves make a difference between the two terms, referring to ranchos as Chiquitano 
settlements which are or were tied to agrarian enterprises. While Chiquitano ranchos were tied to 
cattle farms and agrarian enterprises via a system of patronage (empadronamiento) until the late 
1970s, at the time of fieldwork no ranchos existed in Concepción, and as no mention was made of 
their existence, it is unlikely that they existed in San Javier or Lomerío. 
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Organisation of Communities of Lomerío) in 1982, followed by the Central Indígena 
de Paikonecas de San Javier (CIP-SJ - Indigenous Organisation of Paikonecas of 
San Javier) created in 1992 (ALAS et al., 2001: 18). Today, many Chiquitano and 
NGO workers simply call the CICC, CICOL and CIP-SJ ‘la organización’ (‘the 
organisation’). Together, the three organisations represent 117 comunidades (CGTI-
MV et al., 2006a: 8).23 
The organisations are headed by the ‘centrales’, the group of people who run 
the organisation.24 These are elected Chiquitano leaders and hired técnicos (here 
translated as ‘technicians’; i.e. support staff and expert personal employed by the 
central). Their meeting place in Concepción comprises a small building in a part of 
town predominantly inhabited by Chiquitanos. The CIP-SJ has its meeting place in 
San Javier, while the CICOL is sited in San Antonio de Lomerío. Since their 
foundation, the role of the centrales has been to assist the Chiquitano population in 
political, organisational, and economical matters, to pass on information and provide 
support in resolving their general problems. 
Citizenship and the ‘Indian’ Challenge 
Viewing the state as multi-sited and emphasising the actors and bundle of practices 
that constitute it, also has repercussions on the way we may conceptualise 
‘citizenship’. It requires a re-thinking of Thomas Humprey Marshall’s (2009 [1950]) 
often cited definition, which stresses individual ownership of a set of rights and 
duties, bestowed upon full members of ‘a community’, read: the nation (state).25 In 
order to locate state actors and analyse citizen’s interaction with them, attention has 
to be shifted to the set of practices that comprise such interaction. This thesis 
therefore emphasises ‘citizenship’ as a set of practices, a view shared with 
anthropologists (e.g. Holston and Appadurai, 1999; Lazar, 2008; Lukose, 2005; 
Salman, 2004; Salman and de Munter, 2009; Sawyer, 2001), as well as certain 
political scientists and sociologists, who stress the participatory and negotiated 
                                                 
23
 Notably, this thesis focuses primarily on the Organisation in Concepción (Chapter V). While I draw 
on data regarding the CIP-SJ and CICOL or statements from comunarios from the respective 
municipalities for comparative purposes, the emergence of the other organisations are beyond the 
scope of this thesis and will be addressed elsewhere. 
24
 In its third meaning, ‘central’ can also refer to the CICC’s headquarter. 
25
 Although he does not specifically mention this, he writes with respect to ‘England’ and  mentions 
that a sense of citizenship implies a ‘sense of community membership’, in his case this sense is 
‘national consciousness’ (2009 [1950]: 151). 
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dimension of citizenship and democracy (e.g. Foweraker, 1995, 2001; Foweraker and 
Landman, 1997; Jelin, 2003; Yuval-Davis, 1997). This also involves recognising the 
multi-tiered, or rather multi-dimensional, nature of citizenship. The experience of 
citizenship may vary between individuals belonging to one type of community, as 
they may engage in different practices and interact with different state actors.  
Nevertheless, it is the (lack of) substantive rights as citizens that many groups 
and individuals have struggled with in Latin American countries (Alvarez et al., 
1998; Dagnino, 2003, 2005; Sawyer, 2001). Since the late 1980s and 1990s, Latin 
American popular actors (from trade unions, to women’s’ movements and human 
rights activists) have employed the language of ‘citizenship’ to demand equal rights 
(Alvarez et al., 1998; Dagnino, 2003, 2005; Escobar and Alvarez, 1992; Foweraker, 
2001; Foweraker and Landman, 1997). Moreover, they moved beyond this to 
demand the recognition of the pluralist character of society (the political relevance of 
cultural, gender, class, race, etc.). They struggled for ‘differentiated citizenship’ and 
the recognition of minority rights, including group rights, deemed necessary to break 
entrenched power-structures (Kymlicka, 1995; Kymlicka and Wayne, 2000; Leydet, 
2009: 6; Little, 2002).  
Thus, citizenship (and discussions around it) provides a reference point for 
debate about how a de-facto participation in society can actually be achieved and 
what this should look like. It also provides a ‘tool’ which those demanding inclusion 
or redefinition can rally around (Dagnino, 2003). Marshall (2009 [1950]: 150) 
himself pointed out that citizenship contains an ideal of what ‘should be’ everyone’s 
rights, thus acting as guide for the direction in which social and political change 
should move (Lister, 2005: 476; McKinnon and Hampsher-Monk, 2000: 1).  
Demands for collective rights and more inclusive citizenship regimes are 
particular relevant in countries like Bolivia, where a small Creole elite controlled 
government from republican times until December 2005, when Evo Morales, 
Bolivia’s first indigenous president came to power (Lazar, 2008: 6).26 Notably, 
according to the most recent Bolivian Census, the Bolivian indigenous population 
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 I follow Deborah Yashar’s definition of citizenship regime: ‘citizenship regimes define who has 
political membership, which rights they possess, and how interest intermediation with the state is 
structured. The state, in general, and citizenship regimes, in particular, play a key role in formally 
defining the intersection between national politics, political membership, and public identities’ (2005: 
6, emphasis in original). She adds that ‘as citizenship regimes have changed over time, so too have the 
publicly sanctioned players, rules of the game, and likely (but not preordained) outcomes’ (2005: 6). 
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amounts to 62 per cent (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 2001). Local and national 
organisations representing indigenous peoples all over Latin America, their NGO 
allies and actor in international governing bodies such as the UN, have developed a 
common discourse around the ‘recognition as peoples entailing the constitutional 
recognition of multiethnic or plurinational character of the state, the demand for 
territory, and the demand for autonomy or self-determination’ (Assies, 2000: 8). 
Organisations’ demands are also often framed in terms of the recognition to ‘cultural 
difference’, encompassing the right to land and titles, freedom from human rights 
abuses, preserving their languages and ‘cultural practices’ (including customary law) 
(Brysk, 1994: 33; Postero and Zamosc, 2004a: 15). Land rights are especially crucial 
for minority groups (often Amazonian peoples) whose very livelihood and survival 
depends on territory and the resources within (Postero and Zamosc, 2004a: 16; Van 
Cott, 1994b: 16). The claim for ‘land’ encompasses the others.  
The first of such ethnic movements emerged in 1964 in Ecuador with the 
Shuar Federation (Rubenstein, 2001; Whitten et al., 1997), followed by other 
powerful mobilisation all over Latin America, most prominently in the Ecuadorian 
highlands, Guatemala, Colombia, Mexico and Bolivia (Assies et al., 2000; Postero 
and Zamosc, 2004b; Van Cott, 1994a; Warren and Jackson, 2002; Wearne, 1996; 
Yashar, 2005). Together with other social movements, indigenous organising gained 
momentum during the late 1970s and 1980s, as Latin American countries moved 
from dictatorships to democratic political regimes. Local and national indigenous 
organisations have developed strong international connections, leading to the 
emergence of a pan-American alliance and links to the international indigenous 
rights arena (Brysk, 1994, 1996, 2000; Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Increasingly, these 
dynamics fed back into national and local political spheres and asserting ‘Indianness’ 
became an important tool to assert the right to ‘self-determination’ and ‘culture’ 
within nation-states (Jackson, 1995, 2001; Maybury-Lewis, 2002; Warren and 
Jackson, 2002). 
In Bolivia, indigenous actors have also challenged prevailing citizenship 
regimes. The first contemporary movement to emerge in Bolivia was the highland-
based ‘Katarist movement’ (kataristas). It was formally consolidated through the 
1973 Manifesto of Tiwanaku, which marked a separation from the economic 
orientation of the state-organised peasant organisations. Instead, leaders stressed 
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‘cultural identity’ as a unifying political force and developed a ‘cultural and ethnic 
ideology’, which made clear reference to the ethnic basis of the discrimination 
suffered by native peoples. Katarista leaders’ began demanding organisational 
independence, democratic rights, equality and recognition of the multitude of 
indigenous cultures (Behrendt, 2000: 6; McKee, 1999: 1; Ströbele-Gregor, 1996: 75-
76; Van Cott, 1994b: 9). While Katarism as an organisational force did not sustain 
political momentum or unity, it brought indigenous matters to political attention, 
leading presidential candidate Sánchez de Lozada (MNR) to choose Aymara Víctor 
Hugo Cárdenas as his vice-presidential running mate in the 1993 elections (see Albó, 
1996: 4; McKee, 1999: 3; Yashar, 2005: 24-25).  
In the Bolivian lowlands the ethnic organisational drive did not start until the 
Izoceño-Guaraníes organised in 1979. It was a reaction to increased pressures on the 
lands they occupied and resources they depended on (water, fauna and flora), 
triggered by colonisation and development projects, as well as to several laws 
promulgated in the 1970s, which granted private concession to exploit natural 
resources.27 Izoceño-Guaraní leaders began contacting other groups in the Chaco and 
Santa Cruz region (including Chiquitano peoples) to form a regional alliance in 1982, 
the Central Indígena de Pueblos y Comunidades Indigenas del Oriente Boliviano 
(CIDOB – Central of Indigenous Peoples and Communities of Western Bolivia). 
The CIDOB became the largest umbrella organisation in the Bolivian lowlands, 
representing more than thirty indigenous peoples in the Tarija, Cochabamba, Pando, 
Beni and Santa Cruz departments (ALAS et al., 2001; Yashar, 2005: 198-199). The 
lowland movement achieved visibility through the 1990 ‘March for Territory and 
Dignity’ from the Amazon lowlands to the La Paz, which protested against the 
destruction of lowland peoples’ living spaces and launched territorial demands. This 
led to the recognition of ‘indigenous territories’ as an official concept, and Bolivia 
became one the of the first Latin American countries to ratify ILO Convention 169 
on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (Albó, 2002: 77; Ströbele-Gregor et al., 1994: 
106). The emergence of ethnic movement in Bolivian is subject of Chapter V. 
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 These included the Ley Forestal (Forestry Law), Ley de Fauna y Vida Silvestre (Fauna and Wildlife 
Law) and the Ley Mineral (Mineral Law) (Yashar, 2005: 198), which had most impact in lowland 
areas.  
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State Responses: Neo-liberal Multicultural Reforms 
Indigenous organisations’ demands have generally been phrased in terms of the 
recognition of the multi-ethnic nature of the country and ‘group rights’, implying the 
recognition of ‘special status’. All over Latin America, governments have responded 
to indigenous demands and pressures from international organisations like the United 
Nations, by ratifying the ILO Convention 169 (1989), which recognises some form 
of ‘self-rule’, as well as the right to retain customs, institutions and customary law, if 
need be, promoted through constitutional reforms (for example, Brazil, Colombia, 
Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Bolivia). Reforms largely aimed at providing some 
degree of self-determination with regards to territories, education and law, by 
acknowledging customary practices and traditional authorities (Assies, 2000; Sieder, 
2002; Van Cott, 1994a, 2000, 2005; Yashar, 2005). Also, the Bolivian government 
reacted to pressures for reform from domestic and indigenous organisations. Their 
demands converged with the interests of elite groups in the country, who sought to 
counter the problem of political exclusion, political and economic instability, and 
enhance state domestic and international legitimacy (Van Cott, 2000). The 
government of Sánchez de Lozada (1993-1997), instituted a series of multicultural 
constitutional and legislative reforms in the 1990s, starting off with the recognition 
of Bolivia as a ‘multiethnic’ and ‘pluricultural’ nation.  
These reforms were partly aimed at expanding citizenship to include 
previously ‘marginalised’ indigenous peoples, and partly at off-setting the negative 
impact of the neo-liberal reform package instituted in the mid-1980s – hereafter they 
are also referred to as the ‘second generation of neo-liberal reforms’.28 The legal 
reforms that were supposed to spearhead this change were the 1994 Ley de 
Participación Popular (LPP – Popular Participation Law), the National Institute of 
Agrarian Reform (INRA) Law and the Intercultural Bilingual Education Law. The 
administration especially promoted the LPP as a way to actualise citizenship and 
stabilise political democracy, by opening up the municipal level of the state 
administration to electoral competition, increasing citizen participation in municipal-
level political processes and budgeting (Behrendt, 2000; Blanes, 1999a; Faguet, 
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 The ‘first generation’ neo-liberal reforms were launched in 1985, when the Movimiento 
Revolucionario Nacionalista (MNR – Nationalist Revolutionary Movement) ended the state-led 
development model that had been established more than thirty years earlier, by introducing the New 
Economic Plan (NEP), a neo-liberal reform package (see Healy and Paulson, 2000: 5-16). 
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2003; Lema et al., 2001; Van Cott, 2000). This was, again, part of a wider trend in 
Latin America, where international development agencies promoted decentralisation 
policies with participatory elements at municipal level (Assies, 2000; Cammack, 
1994: 186; Gray Molina, 2002; World Bank, 2002).29 
The outcomes of these reforms have been hotly debated in academic and 
development agency literature, in terms of their effects on indigenous populations, 
expansion of citizenship and resource distribution. Opinions moved from earlier 
optimistic opinions (Van Cott, 1994b; Wearne, 1996) by those whose prime focus 
was increase in participation and a change in resource distribution in favour of local 
needs (Faguet, 2001; Gray Molina, 2002), to more critical voices who pointed to 
dependence of successes on local conditions and difficulties in policy 
implementation (Assies, 2000; Faguet, 2003; Hiskey and Seligson, 2003; Rowland, 
2001; Sieder, 2002). Outright criticisms have, among other things, focused on the 
reform’s promotion of a ‘universalist, Western state model’ (Blanes, 1999b; Calla, 
2000; Lema et al., 2001).  
Recent scholarship has argued that what governments achieved through such 
‘neo-liberal multiculturalism’ (Hale, 2002), is an expansion rather than delimitation 
of their discriminatory powers (Hale, 2002, 2004; McNeish, 2006, 2008; Postero, 
2007; Povinelli, 1998). Charles Hale (2002; 2004) has called this the ‘indio 
permitido’ (‘permitted Indian’) syndrome, a way for governments and international 
institutions to use cultural rights to divide and domesticate indigenous movements. 
The reforms offer a limited recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights – one in which 
‘indigenous citizens’ can be functional to the governmental agenda. Such reforms 
adhere to the neo-liberal format of passing over responsibility for resource allocation 
to private individuals and groups. Indigenous citizens solve their own local problems 
(ideally limited to resource distribution and deliberations over infrastructure 
projects), which appears to resonate with a degree self-determination. While certain 
rights are enjoyed, others remain unaddressed (Hale, 2002, 2004; McNeish, 2006, 
2008; Postero, 2007; Povinelli, 1998). Furthermore, ‘while indigenous culture is now 
‘permitted’, the interests and demands of the native populations remain subordinate 
                                                 
29
 Another prominent case being the participatory budget in Porto Alegre, Brazil (see, for example, 
Abers, 1998; de Sousa Santos, 1998; Souza, 2001). 
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to those of the mestizo/ ladino (mixed race) society, the dominant national identity, 
and the wider international community’ (McNeish, 2008: 45-46).  
Popular Opposition to Neo-liberal Multiculturalism 
However, this ‘divide and incorporate’ tactic has not been entirely successful in 
Bolivia. Instead, opposition emerged to the neo-liberal restructurings that 
accompanied the 1990 reforms. Moreover popular actors framed their challenge to 
the government and its policies by drawing on the very indigenous label and some of 
its legal content through which the government sought to institutionalise indigenous-
state relations. On the one hand, this is linked to the fact that highland and lowland 
movements had increasingly become aware that to gain access to the neo-liberal 
multicultural rights framework, concerns had to be presented in the language of 
indigeneity. On the other, it is influenced by the pan-American and global indigenous 
movement and its allies, paralleling the situation in other countries where ethnic 
movements have used the ‘indigeneity’ rhetoric, and the ‘strategic essentialism’ that 
this may entail, to express their grievances and demands (Albro, 2005; Canessa, 2006 
also Brysk 1994, 1996, 2000).  
McNeish and Postero posit that it is implicit in the concept of ‘indio 
permitido’ that these policies gave rise to critiques of their shortcomings and 
ambiguities (McNeish, 2008: 38; Postero, 2007: 16-17). On the one hand, they 
provided political openings at local and national level, which indigenous peoples 
took advantage off in order to influence local politics and decision-making. But soon 
they realised that the spaces remained narrow and fraught with limitations (McNeish, 
2008: 45). The reforms did not sufficiently alter structural inequalities and failed to 
provide for real participation and oversight, thus heightening discontent among 
indigenous groups, and other ‘excluded or downwardly mobile sectors’ (McNeish, 
2008: 48; also Postero, 2007: 6). Another set of reasons for growing discontent was 
linked to the neo-liberal economic project and auctioning off of state-owned firms, 
which led to rising prices for consumer goods and resources and laying-off of 
workers. Grievances were also caused by coca eradication policies, which threatened 
the destruction of livelihoods of growers in the Yungas and northern highlands.  
The most prominent protests that thus ensued were the ‘water wars’ against 
the privatisation of water supplies, in Cochabamba in 2000; the tax riots and ‘gas 
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war’ of 2003 and the 2005 protests demanding the nationalisation of hydrocarbons. 
These mobilisations spawned the involvement by a broad range of actors, from urban 
neighbourhood federations (most prominently those of El Alto), market vendors 
associations, students, trade unions, miners federations, Aymara and Quechua 
communities, coca growers from the Chapare and Yungas, to the middle class 
(Assies, 2003; Crabtree, 2005; Hylton and Thomson, 2005, 2007; Kohl and Farthing, 
2006; McNeish, 2006, 2008; Postero, 2005, 2007). Also lowland people protested. In 
September 2000 the Chiquitano staged a protest against a pipeline that would run 
through the fragile eco system of the Chiquitano dry forest. While they did not 
manage to derail the project, they received monetary compensation (see Postero, 
2007: 202-204). In 2002, Chiquitano and other lowland groups participated in the in 
the national march or the Constituent Assembly.30 
While these mobilisations involved many different movements, organisations, 
and probably individuals belonging to neither, authors remark that the protests have 
been portrayed as ‘indigenous’ mobilisations by the domestic press and movement 
spokespersons alike (Albro, 2005; Canessa, 2006; Lazar, 2008). This indicates how 
much the indigeneity rhetoric has taken the political centre stage. While the fact that 
Bolivia’s ‘indigenous’ population formed the core of protesters helped promote this 
interpretation (Postero, 2007: 4), this image was consciously fostered by certain 
movement leaders. During the 2000 ‘water war’, the primarily creole and mestizo 
middle class organisers strategically framed their protest against privatisation as an 
indigenous issue, by pointing to water’s sacred nature, link to ‘traditional beliefs’ and 
usos y costumbres. This not only meant that they could demand water as a right 
according to the multicultural state reforms, which recognised existing usos y 
costumbres, but also broaden their popular appeal to urban and rural Quechua 
speakers and the international press (Albro, 2005: 435; Canessa, 2006: 248; Laurie et 
al., 2002).  
Additionally, Aymara leader Felipe Quispe (also called the Mallku), leader of 
the Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti (MIP – Pachakuti Indigenous Movement) who 
took a prominent role mobilising his support base of Aymara from the highlands 
around La Paz during the ‘gas war’, and Evo Morales and his party Movimiento al 
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 Notably, since 1990, Chiquitano have regularly engaged in protest marches, generally with the 
objective or altering the INRA legislation and advance their territorial claims. 
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Socialismo (MAS – Movement Toward Socialism), have framed their political 
projects in terms of ‘indigenous issues’. Quispe’s ‘indigenous’ rhetoric is radical and 
‘racialised’, his project being aimed at overhauling the Bolivian nation-state through 
an ‘Indian revolution’ (Canessa, 2006: 149, 251). While this initiative found limited 
support, the far more successful project has been that of Evo Morales and MAS, 
whose ascent paralleled the mobilisations and strengthening of indigenous and 
popular movements (Albro, 2006: 409, 419).  
The MAS project is based on the use of ‘indigeneity’ for an inclusive political 
rhetoric (Albro, 2005; Canessa, 2006). Through this message MAS seeks to reach out 
to a broad popular base, by aligning indigenous issues with an anti-globalisation 
discourse, one that stresses the defence of national resources against global forces 
(especially US interests) (Canessa, 2006: 50-52). It allows for national and 
international coalition building and to articulate urban with rural concerns (see 
Chapter V). As anthropologist Andrew Canessa notes, in the national domain 
Morales presents: ‘national issues that affect everyone … as indigenous issues … 
offering a language of political engagement for a much broader public’ (2006: 254). 
Further, Morales is ‘well aware of the strategic uses of the language of indigeneity. 
… At the root of this is an understanding of the power and appeal of the globalised 
idea of indigenous people as authentic and as victims of injustice’ (2006: 253).  
Some authors see the increase of indigenous identification and emergence of 
this new kind of political activism in Bolivia in positive light. For example, Postero 
posits that ‘the current forms of challenge combine historical struggles against racism 
with new indigenous subjectivities and rationalities’ (2007: 6). This challenge, she 
notes, is formulated in ‘the language of citizenship, rights, and democracy, reflecting 
both Bolivians’ experiences and their frustrations with the neo-liberal and 
multicultural reforms of the 1990s’ (2007: 5). She argues that thus emerge new kinds 
of citizenship practices and demands for changes in the meaning of citizenship. This 
she refers to as ‘postmulticultural citizenship’: 
First, new protagonists are drawing attention to the ways Indians and the poor have 
been excluded from political participation in Bolivia’s multiethnic society. … 
Second, Bolivia’s new activists are pushing beyond traditional notions of substantive 
rights to rethink what they consider their rights to be. Central to this is an 
understanding that the political arena must be redefined to include not only questions 
of access to power, but also contestations over cultural meanings embedded in the 
unequal and hierarchical organisation of social relations (2007: 6-7). 
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What supports such a positive outlook and confirms that this new activism has 
gained significant public acceptance is, of course, Evo Morales’ election as President 
in 2005 and re-election in 2009, as well as the fact that he managed to adhere to his 
campaign promise to hold a Constituent Assembly in 2006-2007, aimed at radically 
altering the role of the state to provide for different routes to regional and ethnic 
autonomy (Albro, 2010; McNeish, 2008; Postero, 2007). The new Bolivian 
Constitution that was born out of the long and conflictive negotiation process was 
finally accepted by the Bolivian public by referendum in January 2009. According to 
Albro, the constitution presents a ‘historical transformation’ and a ‘landmark in the 
effort to decolonize public administration in this country’ (2010: 72). 
Although McNeish is also largely positive about the MAS project, he is more 
cautious and points out that while with the indigenous political victory of the MAS 
and Evo Morales, there remains significant opposition from the ‘traditional elite’ 
especially in the Santa Cruz department, and political parties (2008: 51). He suggests 
that:  
… while the government is fulfilling its pledges to reform the structure of land and 
resource ownership in the country, the ongoing public debates seem to indicate that 
the broad political platform of the MAS is crumbling at its edges as worker and 
peasant organisations express their frustration with the pace and scope of policy 
implementation (2008: 52). 
The ratification of the Constitution has certainly not dampened many of the social 
tensions that the country has faced. At the time of writing, rifts were emerging 
among sectors of society that the MAS project had sought to unite. In some sectors, 
quarrels emerged among peasant and indigenous organisations over land, resources 
and access to new levels of ‘autonomy’ as provided by the new constitution.31 
Against this backdrop, criticisms of the MAS project were rising, indicatively from 
previous supporters. 
Important for the Chiquitano case, the MAS political project faced much 
opposition from white and mestizo agro-industrial elites of the lowland before, 
during and after the Constituent Assembly. More specifically, from the political 
leaders and Civic Committees of the lowland departments Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando 
and Tarija, known as the media luna (‘half crescent’). These actors have articulated 
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 See various articles in news bulletins by Fundación Tierra (e.g. 15 September 2009a; 15 September 
2009b). 
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demands for departmental autonomy since the 1990s and calls had intensified in 
response to the growing strength of the Bolivian indigenous movement and other 
popular sectors. In Santa Cruz department, elites wealth depends on soya cultivation 
and, to a lesser extent, cattle ranching, cotton and sugarcane cultivation (Urioste and 
Kay, 2005: 45-46). Apart from resenting that the indigenous movement challenges 
their traditionally privileged position within national political institutions, they are 
especially opposed to redistributive land reform which Evo Morales has been 
promoting (Eaton, 2007: 71; Gustafson, 2006: 360; Urioste and Kay, 2005: 45-47). 
They are hostile to the MAS stipulation that natural resources will belong to 
‘citizens’ or the central state, and maintain that prefectures should have control over 
resources within their boundaries.  
Therefore, they have pre-empted the acceptance of the ‘indigenous first-
people peasant autonomy’ (‘autonomía indígena originaria campesina’), alongside 
departmental, regional, municipal autonomies by celebrating the ratification of their 
own ‘autonomous statutes’ (which, it should be added, had not gone through a public 
consultation process). Tellingly, the chosen date to do so coincided with the MAS 
government’s celebration of the final draft of the new Bolivian Constitution on 14 
December 2007 (Plata Quispe, 2008: 155-157). The Santa Cruz statutes contradict 
the Constitution approved in Oruro and lays claim to departmental jurisdiction over 
the management of natural resources. It envisages ‘indigenous territories’ as a form 
of agrarian property that can be recognised as indigenous municipal districts, but 
entities that should be subordinated to departmental regulations (Plata Quispe, 2008: 
161). Clashes between the supporters of the new constitution and departmental 
claims have been ongoing. 
The Multiple Meaning of Indigeneity in Bolivia 
As demonstrated above, the label indigenous and indigeneity in Bolivia as elsewhere 
carry multiple meanings. These meanings matter precisely because ‘being 
indigenous’ (or for the matter, ‘originario’) in Bolivia has through the 1990s neo-
liberal multicultural reforms become a rights and resource-bearing identity and is 
closely linked to citizenship rights and practices. Further, it links the struggles of 
different groups’ to global support networks and facilitates alliance building with 
powerful NGO allies and others who find themselves in similar situations (Canessa, 
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2007b; Kenrick and Lewis, 2004; Maybury-Lewis, 2002; Merlan, 2009: 204; Olesen, 
2004; Warren and Jackson, 2002). Also the Chiquitano case shows a clear link 
between multicultural state policies and the spread of the ‘indigeneity’ marker for 
groups and self-identification (CICC et al., 2007). The CICC was originally founded 
as ‘peasant’ movement, but CICC leaders adapted the term ‘indigenous’ as part of 
the organisations name, parallel to the leaders’ decision to claim the Monte Verde 
territorial title and participate in the 1995 municipal elections (CICC et al., 2007). 
Through adopting the label, Chiquitano leaders aimed to stress their entitlement to 
rights as ‘Bolivians’ and ‘indigenous peoples’. 
However, more recently, new meanings have become attached to the 
‘indigeneity’ in Bolivia (Albro, 2005; Canessa, 2006, 2007a; McNeish, 2008). 
Through the articulation of a more inclusive urban-based indigeneity as articulated 
through the MAS political project, ‘indigeneity’ and ‘indigenous issues’, previously 
marginal to the Bolivian political sphere, have taken centre stage (Albro, 2005; 
Canessa, 2006, 2007a). This, in turn, filters through into the area of self-
identification, which is evidenced, by the increase of indigenous self-identification 
among urban dwellers in the 2001 Census. Many of those who declared themselves 
‘indigenous’ comprised Aymara migrants to the city, who in the past would have 
been likely to start identifying as ‘mestizo’ to mark their increasing disassociation 
from rural culture (Canessa, 2007a: 199). This indicates that in contemporary 
Bolivia, ‘indigenous’ has replaced the twentieth century’s ‘mestizo’ as the ‘iconic 
citizen’ (Canessa, 2006: 255). Even urban creoles or mestizos self-identify as 
‘indigenous’ to express their support for the MAS political project. This not only 
includes those who may be able to claim a degree of indigenous decent (which, as 
Canessa points out, in a country like Bolivia is ‘the vast majority’), but also some 
individuals who are children of European immigrants (2007a: 208).  
Notably, the 2001 Census also showed a de-coupling of ‘indigeneity’ from 
‘language’, which according to definitions circulating in the international indigenous 
rights arena (see, for example, the 1989 ILO Convention 169) is seen as one of the 
key indicators for ‘indigeneity’. While only 49.4 per cent indicated that they spoke 
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an indigenous language either as mother tongue or second language, many more 
Bolivians self-identified as indigenous (Canessa, 2006: 256).32 
Views on this development are mixed. Anthropologist John McNeish 
perceives this increase in indigenous self-identification as a positive development 
and a ‘sign that the idea of the indigenous is expanding into social sectors that, in the 
past, would never had considered the possibility of identifying with what has always 
been a negative, highly racialised category’ (2008: 49). However, others have 
pointed out that the rise of indigeneity as political tool should not detract from the 
fact that the term’s meaning varies starkly according to who employs or articulates 
the concept (Canessa, 2006, 2007a). National, regional or local leaders may employ 
it differently, they may alter their discourses according to the audience, and attach 
very different meanings to the term than other urban or rural people who may or may 
not identify as indigenous (see Albro, 2010; Canessa, 2006: 242). For example, 
Canessa (2006) points to the case of Pocobaya, an Aymara speaking highland 
community whose inhabitants associate ‘indigenous’ with less civilised lowland 
peoples. 
But ‘lowland Indians’ might also not so readily be labelled ‘indigenous’ 
either. Some Chiquitano reject the label for self-identification outright. Comments by 
some Chiquitano reveal that while they may accept ‘indigeneity’ for indio-permitido 
style claims-making and to establish a difference to Concepceño white and mestizo 
‘others’ deemed as ‘more privileged’ and therefore not eligible for special rights 
(most importantly, to communal land and to a territory), they consider the term as 
unacceptable for the purpose of self-identification. They are aware that although 
communicating with the state through the language of ‘indigeneity’ carries benefits, 
it also entails certain pitfalls (Suzman, 2003: 399-400), namely their continued 
subordination to ‘white’ ideas, concepts and policies. In their eyes, ‘indigenous’ has 
simply come to replace other labels (such as ‘indio’) in their function of categorising 
and subordinating Chiquitano, revealing additional layers of the meaning of ‘being 
indigenous’ in Bolivia. A further discussion of these meanings features in Chapter V.  
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 Canessa remarks, that this confirms what is true for many Chiquitano, as well as many others who 
self-identify as indigenous, namely that ‘language is a very poor indicator of indigenous identity’ 
(Canessa, 2006: 256). In line with many other international and national actors who link ‘language’ to 
ethnicity’, some Chiquitano perceive that speaking chiquitano would identify them as ‘true 
Chiquitanos’ (see Chapter V). For example, Focus group 1: San Miguelito Sur, 9 March 2007. 
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Chiquitano and the State: Antagonisms and Paradoxes 
What this latter point reveals is how the engagement of Chiquitano activists and 
comunarios with the state leads to antagonisms (see Sider, 2003). Anthropologist 
Gerald Sider (2003) makes a compelling argument that the European onslaught has 
confronted Native American peoples  
… with an unavoidable and irresolvable antagonism between their past and their 
present. This antagonism is usually forced on Native Americans by their 
vulnerability in a larger society that simultaneously insists both on the “otherness” of 
dominated peoples and on their compliance with a larger set of constantly changing 
standards, laws, and practices (2003: 9).  
Such ‘antagonisms’ are visible in different areas. Sider highlights, for example, 
contradictions between ‘continuity and tradition’, between ‘work and production’ 
and those that ‘have become completely enmeshed in native social organisation’ 
(2003: 9-16).  
Antagonisms become apparent, for example, when individuals or their 
political organisations take on state-recognised forms of organisation and phrase 
their demands in a way that resonates with the official legal framework and 
citizenship regime (for example, by stressing ‘indigeneity’), while on the other hand, 
they struggle against the ‘assimilation’ that this entails. My argument here draws on 
Morton Fried’s (1967) and James Scott’s notions that the ‘state’ implies some sort of 
process, one of ‘restructuring’ and ‘making legible’, which is for Scott ‘a central 
problem for statecraft’ (1998: 2). The aim at increasing ‘legibility’, is to simplify the 
‘classic state functions of taxation, conscription, prevention of rebellion’ (1998: 2). 
Albro, who has recently also turned to Scott to describe the Bolivian scenario, holds 
that ‘state efforts to standardize legal language and to consolidate particular 
citizenship rights are among the most important ways that states keep track of their 
subjects’ (2010: 72-73; see also Friedlander, 2006; Sider, 2003). 
Increasing the ‘legibility’ of population, territory and, we may add, resources, 
must necessarily be reifying, as it involves a process of legal codification. In turn, if 
citizens want to engage with the state to advance claims around rights or resources, 
they must fit into state defined categories to be ‘legible’ from the side of state actors. 
This not only restricts the population to using state terminology, but also state 
organisational forms. A similar case has been made by a number of Amazonian 
anthropologists when explaining the emergence of ethnic federations among 
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Amazonian peoples in response to state pressures (Brown, 1991; Rosengren, 2003; 
Rubenstein, 2001). As Albro points out, in the case of ‘indigeneity’ this renders 
‘some forms of indigenous identity more “legible” than others’ (2010: 72), i.e. state-
sanctioned forms, which are in turn, linked to the enjoyment of indigenous 
citizenship rights (also Conklin and Graham, 1995; Povinelli, 1998). A further 
consideration of this issue, alongside a conceptual clarification of the uses of ‘state’ 
and ‘citizenship’ in the context of this thesis, forms the subject of Chapter II. 
Chapter III provides the methodological discussion regarding the multi-sited 
ethnographic fieldwork I carried out from September 2006 until August 2007 mainly 
in the eastern Bolivian municipality of Concepción. My research of Chiquitano-state 
relations was necessary multi-sited, reflecting the multi-sited character of the state 
itself. The chapter reflects on this, the advantages and difficulties in carrying out 
research as part of research teams, as well as on the challenges of side-taking in a 
research environment with entrenched power structures.  
A thread running through the different chapters of this thesis is that state 
impositions do not go uncontested from the side of Chiquitano comunarios. Apart 
from the attempt to challenge and interact with the state on a political level and 
through their organisations, Chiquitano resistance continues to reside in the 
comunidades social relations and modes of identification. Chiquitano history shows 
the emergence and reproduction of social relations in the face of empadronamiento 
(forced labour on haciendas) and displacement, as Chiquitano settlements continued 
to re-emerge and exist. The historical aspects of Chiquitano-state relations and of 
different Bolivian citizenship regimes are the subject of Chapter IV.  
In the Chiquitano case, this paradoxical relationship with state actors 
becomes especially obvious, when considering three interlinked areas: self- and 
group identification, territoriality and local political participation. Chapter V 
addresses the first area, self-identification. The Chiquitano case demonstrates that 
while the use of the term ‘indigenous’ does not preclude pragmatism and agency 
from the side of those who employ it, it should not be forgotten that adopting such an 
essentialising state-sanctioned label entails dangers. Indeed, in a municipality like 
Concepción, where white and mestizo Cruceños have controlled access to politics, 
land and other resources, ‘indigeneity’ has been the only tool available to gain access 
to certain rights, such as land titles and access to the political sphere. The chapter 
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addresses this, together with the above-mentioned criticisms that some Chiquitano 
reserve for the label, in the broader context of the rise of Bolivian ethnic movements 
since the 1960s and the emergence of the Chiquitano organisation of Concepción. 
Chapter VI addresses how Chiquitano-state interactions have given rise to 
antagonisms with respect to Chiquitano future visions regarding the Monte Verde 
territory.33 Jointly with their sister organisations in San Javier and Lomerío, the 
Chiquitano organisation of Concepción has been struggling for the territory since the 
mid-1990s. The mobilisation for Monte Verde was primarily fuelled by the above-
mentioned INRA Law, passed in 1996 as part of the Bolivian government’s neo-
liberal multicultural policy. The Law stipulated that Monte Verde, along with other 
lands claimed by indigenous groups, could gain status as Tierras Comunitarias de 
Origen (TCO – Original Communal Lands). It inspired Chiquitano leaders to 
formulate their political project in terms of indigeneity to be able to legally lay claim 
to the territory.  
This prolonged dispute has left its mark on Chiquitano territoriality. This 
becomes obvious, not least when considering that many Chiquitano not only 
construct the land as ancestral (compare Hill, 1988a; Reeve, 1988), but also as 
‘indigenous territory’ that will be ordered according to ‘zones of use’ and whose 
resources will be ‘sustainably exploited’, reflecting terminology of the INRA law. 
Paradoxically, in order to ‘keep’ the territory and justify the claim, Chiquitano 
leaders and comunarios have to construct in a way that state actors accept it. While 
some leaders and comunarios embrace the sustainability logic, others mistrust the 
emphasis on productive projects.34  
Chapter VII focuses on a third type of Chiquitano-state relation: Chiquitano 
involvement in municipal politics. Chiquitano have taken advantage of the 1994 
decentralisation reforms and participated in local elections, with the main aim of 
gaining political leverage in order to advance their territorial claim. The Chiquitano 
central of Concpeción managed to get their candidate, Justo Seoane, elected as 
                                                 
33
 This struggle is particularly noteworthy, because it’s lengthy and conflictive nature and because the 
territory has formed the centre of Chiquitano-state engagement over the past fifteen years. It has 
repeatedly received press coverage and the legal process has been documented in significant detail by 
CEJIS (1999; 2000; 2001; 2006) in the organisation’s publication series ‘Artículo Primero’ . 
34
 Chiquitano share these dilemmas with many other peoples in South American countries where 
‘modern resource management schemes’ might actually distort indigenous peoples ‘territorial vision’ 
that might be based in ‘relational spaces’ rather than a space ‘divided into zones of utility’ (see García 
Hierro and Surrallés, 2005: 10-11). 
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mayor in the 2005 poll and Chiquitano comunidades have gained access to the local 
political sphere through their OTBs. Nevertheless, power politics in the locality 
remained entrenched, and paradoxes have merged in two main areas. The first is 
visible in the way that once in power, Chiquitano politicians found that they had to 
articulate their projects in the language of neo-liberal multiculturalism which 
overlapped with that of the local elite: the marginal Chiquitano communities have to 
be ‘developed’ and turned into market producers.  
Secondly, Chiquitano politicians have participated in the local election since 
1995, and in 1999 and 2004 through MAS affiliation. This paralleled the situation of 
other indigenous candidates throughout the country, who needed to be formally 
registered with a political party to be able to participate.35 This posed a problem for 
Chiquitano, because the Concepceño elite (like the rest of the Cruceño elite) was 
strongly opposed to the MAS project from the start, especially fearing that MAS 
proposals for land reform would fuel Chiquitano claims for land and resources. This 
fear was heightened during the Constituent Assembly debates, especially when the 
lowland umbrella federation, CIDOB, started to demand ‘indigenous autonomies’. 
The Concepceños’ rhetoric fused the above factors into a scenario in which they 
perceived Chiquitano to be in ‘cahoots’ with ‘left-wing highland indios’. In 
consequence, Chiquitano people engaged in ‘political activities’ were seen as trouble 
makers, and that ‘being indigenous’, and especially a politically active ‘indígena’ in 
Concepción was automatically linked to the Morales project. At the end, the local 
political elite managed to derail the Chiquitano project completely, by ousting mayor 
Justo Seoane through a coup-style manoeuvre in August 2007.36 The chapter 
therefore argues that the ascent of the MAS and developments in the Bolivian 
national political sphere has not necessarily lead to the advancement of ‘indigenous 
rights’, in Concepción this rather served to provide further ammunition and 
justification to delegitimise Chiquitano claims in the eyes of Concepceños.  
The third part of the chapter focuses on the introduction of new state 
structures in the form of OTBs into the comunidades, here the evidence suggests that 
                                                 
35
 Nearly indigenous candidates participated in the elections through allegiances to one or another of 
the larger existing parties  because the electoral court had rejected the application to attain ‘legal 
personality’ of Indian parties (Behrendt, 2000: 14; McKee, 1999: 5) 
36
 See El Deber (6 September 2007). The term ‘Concepceño’ is employed to refer to the white and 
mestizo population of Concepción. The white and mestizo economic (and political) elite are also 
referred to as the Concepceño elite. The elite are predominantly members of the three most powerful 
Concepceño families.  
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Chiquitano comunarios have resisted homogenising tendencies. Instead they have 
made the structure functional to their communal organisations. Evidence suggests a 
levelling effect on communal power structures, than creating a hierarchy which 
increased state interaction might suggest (see Clastres, 1989; Fried, 1967, 1975; 
Rosengren, 2003; Rubenstein, 2001). 
In sum, while Chiquitano have enjoyed certain successes in gaining access to 
the local political sphere and to communal and territorial titles, it is generally state 
actors who have had the final word on the terms of this engagement. I argue that this 
means that the ‘indio permitido’ has indeed not been circumvented in Bolivia. It 
continues to exist, especially in those parts of the country where the state 
bureaucracy is controlled by individuals whose interest it to keep ‘Indians’ out of the 
political sphere and away from controlling resources, especially land. Despite this, 
resistance resides, more subtly, in the Chiquitano comunidades which keep 
reproducing Chiquitano social relations and beings (cf. Conklin and Morgan, 1996). 
Finally, this thesis throws up the question of whether it is ever possible, that 
‘indigenous people’ can be incorporated into the state power structure in a 
meaningful way, i.e. one that truly accommodate ways to secure Chiquitano 
sociality. 
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Chapter II 
Chiquitano and the State: Conceptualising the State and Citizenship 
This chapter outlines the conceptual framework employed throughout this thesis. To 
shed light on the different state actors that Chiquitano comunarios in Concepción 
Municipality interact with, it problematises the treatment of state and civil society as 
dichotomous – a view that hides the close connection between civil society actors 
(Foweraker, 1995; Foweraker and Landman, 1997; for example, McAdam et al., 
1996; Offe, 1985; Tilly, 2004). It posits that a conceptualisation of the state as a 
power structure (Abrams, 1988) facilitates the analysis of civil society – state 
relations, as it allows for an examination of the processes that constitute the local 
political arena. It reveals this as a sphere of intense interaction between diverse 
international, national and local actors that might all act as part of the state. As the 
case of Chiquitano demonstrates, multiple actors, such as local governmental agents, 
the Chiquitano social movement (the central) and NGOs at times form part of the 
state. They are all also at times involved in the process of making Chiquitano socio-
political and economic practices and the land they live on, more ‘legible’ (Scott, 
1998: 2). 
The first part of this chapter focuses on conceptualisations of the state. 
Especially pertinent when considering the emergence of new forms of organisation 
and modes of identification among Amazonian people, is Scott’s (1998) notion of 
‘legibility through simplification’, which resonates with Morton Fried’s notion that 
‘the state is devoted to expansion – of its population, of its territory, of its physical 
and ideological power’ and that states, ‘quickly set about converting its environing 
societies into parts or counterparts of itself’ (1967: 240).1 Philip Abrams (1988) 
abandons the idea of the state as a ‘thing’ and argues that what actually expands, is 
the state idea and organisational forms, rather than its territory.  
Such notions help explain why interaction with state actors in the case of 
Amazonian populations has often resulted in the creation of more hierarchical (or 
‘taproot’) structures (Rosengren, 2003). Nevertheless, the section also highlights that 
populations may resist attempts to make them legible, or re-structure their forms 
                                                 
1
 Also see Fried (1975). 
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organisation, in diverse ways. This may be subtle and take the form of re-shaping, or 
attaching new meanings (or labels) to organisational forms. 
The second part of this chapter addresses the concept of citizenship. Viewing 
the state in such a fragmented way, as located at different sites, and embodied by 
various actors, signifies normative definitions of citizenship (i.e. Marshall, 2009 
[1950]) have to be rethought. In order to analyse citizen’s interaction with the diverse 
state actors, this thesis views citizenship as a set or practices. Furthermore, attention 
needs to shift from the nation-state as the sole political community to other 
communities that are relevant to peoples’ citizenship practices. Still, I argue that this 
should not shift attention entirely away from normative conceptions of citizenship 
that focus on ‘rights and responsibilities’. After all, citizenship provides an important 
tool that citizens employ to address state actors and demand changes to prevalent 
citizenship frameworks. In the case of indigenous peoples, this has entailed demands 
for ‘special rights’ and collective rights into state’s citizenship frameworks. 
The penultimate section of the chapter addresses the Bolivian neo-liberal 
multicultural citizenship regime, which transformed the citizenship practices of many 
indigenous groups, as they intended to make use of the new sets of rights. It follows 
the arguments of authors that such policies entail an expansion, rather than 
delimitation, of the states discriminatory powers (Hale, 2002, 2004; McNeish, 2006, 
2008; Postero, 2007; Povinelli, 1998). The final section of the chapter provides a 
brief overview over the citizenship practices Chiquitano of Concepción municipality 
may engage in. This is followed by a description the state actors Chiquitano 
comunarios in Concepción municipality engage with on a regular basis.  
Theories of the State 
Current debates on the state have been influenced by the writings of Max Weber, 
Alexis de Tocqueville and Karl Marx. According to Weber (1994) the modern state 
monopolises the means of legitimate physical violence over a well-defined territory 
(which may include the armed forces, civil service or state bureaucracy, courts and 
police). Moreover, the legitimacy of this monopoly is of a very special kind – a 
‘rational-legal’ legitimacy, based on impersonal rules that constrain the power of 
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state elites.2 The toquevillian perspective percieves the state as an autonomous 
structure of power in its own right, with distinct properties of its own, that cannot be 
reduced to any single set of social interests outside the state (Nugent, 1994a: 334). 
Skocpol summarises Alexis de Tocqueville’s view: 
… states matter not simply because of the goal-oriented activities of state officials. 
They matter because their organisational configurations, along with their overall 
patterns of activity, affect political culture, encourage some kinds of group formation 
and collective political actions (but not others), and make possible the raising of 
certain political issues (but not others) (1985: 21). 
In turn, Karl Marx saw the modern state as emerging out of bourgeois interests and 
saw the state as opposed to civil society – it is made up of (bourgeois) administrators 
who look after their own interests, i.e. they ‘administer the state against civil society’ 
(1992: 111). Consequently, Marxist scholars generally assert that state formation in 
modern states can be explained primarily in terms of the interests and struggles of 
social classes, and the state as tool in the hand of capitalist classes (see Skocpol, 
1985: 25-27). 
Political scientist Theda Skocpol’s views of the state are mainly inspired by 
Weber and de Tocqueville. She reads the state as an autonomous actor while paying 
attention to the ‘capacity’ of states to implement official goals ‘especially over the 
actual potential opposition of powerful social groups or in the face of recalcitrant 
socioeconomic circumstances’ (1985: 9). From this perspective, ‘the investigator 
looks more macroscopically at the ways in which the structures and activities of 
states unintentionally influence the formation of groups and the political capacities, 
ideas, and demands of various sectors of society’ (1985: 21). Consequently, 
analysing forms of collective action through which groups make political demands 
(or political leaders seek to mobilise support), gives an indication of the different 
ways in which states ‘conduct decision-making, coercive, and adjudicative activities’ 
(1985: 22). While this is a useful notion, allowing inferences about the nature and 
goals of states, describing a state as a fixed entity, or a certain set of formal and 
informal institutions or agencies, leaves much to the imagination of what these 
institutions or agencies actually entail and how they function. 
                                                 
2
 Criticism of this perspective has come from writers who noted that this definition of state clashes 
with realities in countries where states may not have a complete monopoly over the means of 
legitimate physical violence over a definite territory, or their legitimacy may not be adequately 
described as ‘rational-legal’ (for example, Evans et al., 1985). 
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In this regard, Marx-inspired sociologist Philip Abrams’ (1988) perspective is 
more insightful. He criticises political sociology and some Marxian perspectives for 
researching the separation of state and civil society and argues for a move away from 
the perception of the state as a distinct entity apart from society. This, he argues, 
serves to ‘collapse the identity of state rather than clarify it’ (1988: 60). He notes 
that: ‘both academic and practical political research tend towards the conclusion that 
there is a hidden reality in politics, a backstage institutionalisation of political power 
behind onstage agencies of government … and that it may plausibly be identified as 
“the state”’ (1988: 63). His view holds that the reification of the state as a ‘thing’ 
should be abandoned while the state ‘idea’ should be taken ‘extremely seriously’ 
(1988: 75). According to Abrams, the state: 
… is a third order object, an ideological project. It is first and foremost an exercise 
in legitimation – and what is being legitimised is, we may assume, something which 
if seen directly and as itself would be illegitimate, an unacceptable domination … 
what is legitimised is, insofar as it is legitimated, real power (1988: 77-78). 
He makes a distinction between the state-system (‘a palpable nexus of practice and 
institutional structure centred in government and more or less extensive, unified and 
dominant in any given society’) and the state-idea (‘projected, purveyed and 
variously believed in different societies at different times’) (1988: 82). Further, he 
argues that: 
The state comes into being as a structuration within political practice; it starts its life 
as an implicit construct; it is then reified – as the republica, the public reification, no 
less – and acquires an overt symbolic identity progressively divorced from practice 
as an illusory account of practice (1988: 82). 
The question remains why states require to be imagined in a certain way and why 
they seek to shape populations in a way that is functional to the state. Here it is 
insightful to draw on Morton Fried’s (1967) and James Scott’s (1998) notions. Both 
emphasise that states aim at expansion and making society ‘legible’.3 Marxist Fried 
described the ‘state’ as a specific type of stratified society, a ‘complex of institutions 
by means of which the power of the society is organised on a basis superior to 
kinship’ (1967: 229). The state is then:  
                                                 
3
 In fact, Fried does not dismiss ‘state’ as a term, as he notes others have done. He argues that: ‘it is 
not a matter of determining the “true” meaning of a word but stating clearly what that word is to mean 
in our usage and why it is advantageous to use it that way’ (1967: 229).  
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a collection of specialised institutions and agencies, some formal and others informal 
that maintains an order of stratification. … The state must maintain itself externally 
as well as internally, and it attempts this by both physical and ideological means, by 
supporting military forces and by establishing an identity among other similar units 
(Fried, 1967: 235).4 
He takes the Weberian view the state must establish and maintain sovereignty, which 
may be considered the identification and monopoly of paramount control over a 
population and an area’ (1967: 237). Sophistication brings the realisation that this 
can be created through legitimacy, i.e. controlling sources of information and means 
of communication, rather than a reliance on ‘naked power’ (1967: 238). This notion 
also underlies the indio permitido (Hale, 2002, 2004) and the Bolivian neo-liberal 
multicultural reforms, which aimed to create state legitimacy and establishing 
hierarchical structures at the periphery. Fried further notes that ‘more than any other 
from of human association, the state is devoted to expansion – of its population, of its 
territory, of its physical and ideological power’ (1967: 240).  
This resonates with James Scott’s (1998) argument that the emergence of the 
‘modern state’ meant increasing attempts at legibility and simplification in areas such 
as weights and measures, cadastral surveys, population registers, the invention of 
freehold tenure, standardisation of language and legal discourse, the design of cities 
and organisation of transport. He argues that sedentarisation is the ‘state’s attempt to 
make a society more legible, to ‘arrange’ the population in ways that simplifies the 
‘classic state functions of taxation, conscription, prevention of rebellion’, this 
                                                 
4
 Fried disputes Hoebel’s claim that the state (like political organisation) is universal, and sets out to 
describe the differences between kinds of societies in terms of their political structures. He describes 
what he calls ‘egalitarian society’, ‘rank society’, ‘stratified society’ and ‘the state’. He does not deny 
‘power’ or ‘politics’ in any of the different types of society, but points to the multiple ways that they 
are constituted. Apart from the title of the book, he also sees the emergence less in terms of a ‘natural 
evolution’ towards states, but in a shift away from kinship relations as a prime organiser. This occurs 
as a result of weakening bonds of kinship in the face of an enlarged population, and in a shift from 
ways of containing power to a move of power concentration. As he notes: ‘it is the task of maintaining 
general social order that stands at the heart of the development of the state’ (1967: 230). 
 53 
legibility he sees as ‘a central problem for statecraft’ (1998: 2).5 However, this does 
not mean that a population’s relation to the state cannot be productive or must 
necessarily be oppositional. As the notion of indio permitido and spread of 
‘indigeneity’ as mode of identification under neo-liberal multicultural reforms show, 
states might also foster the formation of communities, ‘identities’ or organisations 
(Anderson, 1991; Fried, 1975; Nugent, 1994a; Sider, 1987) 
The Ethnography of the State 
Taking up some of the above ideas, anthropologists have highlighted the symbolic 
nature of the state, which like communities (see Anderson, 1991; Cohen, 1985a), 
need to be imagined: ‘The state system is a congeries of functions, bureaus, and 
levels spread across different sites. Given this institutional and geographical 
dispersion, an enormous amount of culture work has to be undertaken to construct 
“the state” as a singular object’ (Gupta and Sharma, 2006: 281).6 This work involves 
circulating governmental and popular representations of the state through the mass 
media, political mobilisation and rumour. Such representations may be created by 
elections, wars and national crises, but also everyday material objects like money, 
certificates that bear the stamp the state (Gupta and Sharma, 2006: 278-279).  
These practices also serve to establish state actors as somehow above the 
ordinary citizen. They foster an imagine of the state as entity with spatial properties 
of verticality and encompassment to produce a ‘taken-for-granted spatial and scalar 
image of a state that both sits above and contains its localities, regions, and 
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 Scott notes, that such schemes have generally failed, because the ‘designed or planned social order is 
necessarily schematic and it always ignores central features of any real, functioning social order’ 
(1998: 5). Furthermore, he argues that ‘formal schemes of order are untenable without some elements 
of the practical knowledge that they tend to dismiss’ (1998: 7). Notably, Foucault disagrees with 
attempts to deduce the modern activities of government from ‘essential properties and propensities of 
the state, in particular its supposed propensity to grow and swallow up or colonise everything around 
itself’ (Gordon, 1991: 4). Foucault holds that the state has no such inherent tendencies as the state has 
no essence. Instead, he sees the nature of the institutions of the state as ‘a function of changes in 
practices of government, rather than converse’ and maintains that ‘political theory attends too much to 
institutions, and too little to practices’ (Gordon, 1991: 4). However, viewing the state as a ‘power 
structure’ (constituted by a set of practices) and a symbolic construction does not distract from the fact 
that this power structure might be able to shape populations or individuals in certain ways, and most 
likely in a fashion that is functional to the state.  
6
 This also means that a construction of a state as a singular object can never be achieved. As Benei 
notes: ‘regardless of what goes on within the state pyramid, what most social actors experience is the 
fragmentary nature of the nation-state’s project in the production of the nation, the region, or the 
locality’ (2006: 295). 
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communities’ (Gupta and Ferguson, 2002: 982).7 Authors have called this the 
‘spatialisation’ of the state or as ‘spatial practice’ (Gupta and Ferguson, 2002: 981-
982; Lefebvre, 1991; Rubenstein, 2001). Such images of stacked, vertical levels 
permeate descriptions of many political processes. For example, institutions of global 
governance such as the IMF and the WTO, are commonly viewed as being ‘above’ 
national states, as much as states are seen ‘above’ the grass-roots, or ‘local’ level 
(Gupta and Ferguson, 2002: 990). 
This imagery also has specific implications for the idea of ‘civil society’. 
Gupta and Ferguson note that it often involves ‘a quite specific, if often 
unacknowledged, image of vertical encompassment, one in which the state sits 
somehow “above” an “on the ground” entity called “society”’ (2002: 982). Western 
political theory has opposed civil society to the state. 8 Prominent sociologists, 
political scientists and historians often seen it as ‘non-state, non-market and non-
family’ zone, or ‘intermediary entity’, in which social movements, institutions or 
other types of formal or informal association are located (see Diamond, 1994: 5; 
Rueschemeyer et al., 1992: 29; Volk, 1997: 16; Waisman, 1999: 43).9  
However, such imagery can be problematic. Firstly, the supposed location of 
international actors ‘above’ the state may hide the way that transnational 
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 Verticality ‘refers to the central and pervasive idea of the state as an institution somehow “above” 
civil society, community, and family. Thus, state planning is inherently “top down” and state actions 
are efforts to manipulate and plan “from above”, while “the grassroots” contrasts with the state 
precisely in that it is “below,” closer to the ground, more authentic, and more “rooted”’ (Gupta and 
Ferguson, 2002: 982). While encompassment is the notion that ‘the state (conceptually fused with the 
nation) is located within an ever widening series of circles that begins with family and local 
community and ends with the system of nation-states. This is a profoundly consequential 
understanding of scale, one in which the locality is encompassed by the region, the region by the 
nation-state, and the nation-state by the international community’ (Gupta and Ferguson, 2002: 982).   
8
 For Hegel, ‘the state was literally “mind objectified”, and civil society precisely the intermediary 
between the foundational natural particularity of the family and the ideal universality of the state. The 
state was therefore “higher” than civil society (ethically as well as politically) and also encompassed 
it’ (Gupta and Ferguson, 2002: 983) 
9
 There are, of course, other issues with such often broad and vague civil society definitions and ‘non-
state, non-market and non-family’ - notions. For example, Larry Diamond goes on to say that ‘it 
excludes individual and family life, inward-looking group activity (e.g. for recreation, entertaining or 
spirituality), the profit-making enterprise of individual business firms and political efforts to take 
control of the state’ (1994: 5). The notion of the supposed ‘inward looking’ nature such certain groups 
is problematic. For example, reasons for participation in sports or religious groups can be complex. It 
might be tied to constraints that individuals experience to participation in other entities. One scenario 
is that participation in a women’s football team might challenge the prevailing gendered rules of 
behaviour existing in a society. There is nothing to suggest that getting together in supposedly 
‘recreational settings’ does not involve a reflection on the wider political sphere of the country, or 
personal constraints in everyday live. There is also an issue regarding Diamond’s public and private 
dichotomy, a topic amply discussed in feminist literature and research on women’s movements (for 
example, Thornton, 1991; Wright, 1997). 
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organisations such as the IMF, World Bank and ‘First World’ governments often 
work closely together. Or rather, as Gupta and Ferguson point out, such actors 
actually ‘rule’ ‘Third World states’ through imposing policies on ‘Third World’ 
states against a backdrop of structural adjustment (see Gupta and Ferguson, 2002: 
992). Secondly, it hides the role Western development agencies, charities, 
transnational grassroots organisations and voluntary organisations may become 
involved in governing populations, as well as providing services to people at the 
‘local level’ and therefore taking over the role as welfare providers (Gupta and 
Ferguson, 2002: 990; Gupta and Sharma, 2006: 280).  
Furthermore, a perceived state-civil society dichotomy created through such a 
vertical state imagery, hides the close connection between civil society actors (such 
as social movements) and governments, a close connection that many scholars 
concerned with social movements have long acknowledged (Foweraker, 1995; 
Foweraker and Landman, 1997; for example, McAdam et al., 1996; Offe, 1985; 
Tilly, 2004).10 For example, social movements may emerge as a reaction to the 
failure of institutionalised forms of interest mediation (parties, parliaments, etc.), or 
due to state enablement, for instance when governments promote corporatist 
structures (Foweraker, 1995: 62, 66). Additionally, in the Latin American context, 
social movements often develop close contact with (especially local) state 
administrations, because they are the main source of scarce resources (Foweraker, 
2001: 842). As addressed below, an overlap between civil society and state functions 
has also been fostered through the restructuring of civil society-state relations as part 
of neo-liberal policies (Foweraker, 2001: 850 see also Cammack, 1995 and Taylor, 
1998). 
Apart from social movements, there are a host of other so-called civil society 
organisations, whose activities make it difficult to judge where civil society ends and 
the state starts: non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the supposed ‘paragons of 
development action’ (Macdonald, 1995: 32).11 These proliferated in developing 
countries throughout the 1980s, when multilateral and bilateral development 
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 Variously, authors see such close links as either necessary and desirable or detrimental (see Offe, 
1985). 
11
 In terms of defining NGOs, there is a consensus among authors that the generally agreed basic 
definition of ‘non-governmental’ and ‘non- profit’ is very vague (Fisher, 1997: 442; Krut, 1997: 7). 
As Krut notes: ‘due to its loose meaning, the term (NGO) can be used quite loosely to describe any 
association of people, from youth groups to the Mafia’ (1997: 8). For attempts to define NGOs, see 
Macdonald (1995: 32), Clarke (1998: 36-37) and Murphy and Bendell’s (1999: 5-6) 
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agencies used them to channel increasing amounts of funding (Clarke, 1998: 37).12 
The concerns of NGOs are diverse: from the promotion of human rights, to issues 
around democratisation and service delivery.13 That NGOs may not be so non-
governmental becomes clear when considering that governmental and international 
agency policies and financial backing has encouraged the growth of many NGOs, 
and they often function as quasi- sub-contracted agents of governments in carrying 
out development policies (Gideon, 1998: 311-112; Grugel, 2000: 95; Hulme and 
Edwards, 1997: 964).14 Other close ties between governments and NGOs exist in 
areas such as policy making, service provision at local level (as NGOs often take 
over service provision), the sharing of information and even exchange of personnel 
(see Gupta and Ferguson, 2002: 993).15  
Indeed, as can be observed in the case of the Chiquitano organisations and 
their NGO allies, not just the NGO-state distinction is increasingly blurred. Social 
movements may share personnel with NGOs and the local state administration, while 
NGO-social movement everyday practices are often tightly interwoven. In sum, 
when paying attention to the practices state and civil society actors engage in, the 
state may look like civil society and vice-versa (Gupta and Ferguson, 2002: 991). 
Actors spatialised as ‘international’, ‘national’, ‘or ‘local’ may engage in very similar 
practices and can simultaneously constitute the state with respect to certain 
population. 
                                                 
12
 They earned this reputation due to their alleged efficiency, small size and commitment for helping 
‘the poor’, as well as closeness to the ‘grassroots’. This portrays them as ‘people-to-people 
organisations capable of creating direct links between people in the ‘North and South’ and a tool for 
‘providing a human face to the problems of development’ (Macdonald, 1995: 32). Also Ewig (1999: 
76).   
13
 For a discussion of the ‘evolution’ of the agenda of the European ‘NGO community’, see Grugel 
(2000: 87-88)., Macdonald (1995) and Ewig (1999: 86)  
14
 Authors have also questioned the supposed non-profit nature of such organisations. As NGOs 
expand they increasingly resemble businesses, especially larger and international NGOs, which 
manage funds, employ staff and pay wages ‘which a medium sized company would envy’. The 
Economist (27 January 2000). Also see Murphy and Bendell (1999: 5).  
15
 For example, Bebbington notes that due to crisis instigated by lack of financial sustainability, 
increasing dependency, staff loss and legitimacy crisis, Andean NGOs seem to be in a process of 
institutional transition, shifting towards implementing programmes designed by governments and 
donor agencies. Thus, the difference, between them and commercial subcontractors becomes blurred 
(1997: 1759). In term of information sharing, between governments and NGOs, see The Economist 
(27 January 2000). 
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The State, Legibility and Amazonian Peoples 
The notions of Abrams (1988), Fried (1967; 1975) and Scott (1998) are especially 
pertinent when considering issues of group formation and political articulation 
among Amazonian peoples. The process of extending state sovereignty into 
Amazonian areas has taken place through diverse state actors, whose activities 
generally involved making Amazonian peoples functional to the countries’ political 
economy. During colonial and republican times, this meant that the generic ‘Indian’ 
sufficed as denominator for the workforce in many geographical areas. This changed, 
especially during the twentieth century, with the arrival of missionaries, bilingual 
education projects and increasing struggles for communal and land titles. Ethnic 
identities gained new importance, as rights to land, resources and distinct treatment 
by state authorities in areas such as education, became linked to membership in 
distinct ethnic groups: ‘tribal boundaries and affiliations emerged as powerful 
political categories’ (Brown, 1993: 316).  
The notions of ethnic identities that consequently emerged from colonial to 
contemporary times are often essentialising, as they are based on a what 
anthropologist Dan Rosengren calls the ‘taproot model’, a ‘Western geo-political’ 
perception of Amazonian society as ‘an ethnic mosaic formed by autonomous and 
self-reproducing groups’ which disregards the ‘links that interconnect the various 
groups’ (2003: 222). It also assumes an organic link ‘between people, place, and 
language’ (Rosengren, 2003: 222). This may contrast starkly with the ‘rhizomic 
model’ that more closely describes many Amazonian groups’ modes of self-other 
distinction, which is based on:  
a nonbounded and expansive relational identification process with multiple points of 
rooting. The rhizomic metaphor provides a perspective on society that stresses 
similarities and links, as well as the complementarity of differences; culture is, in 
accordance, associated with history and no crucial distinctions are made in regard to 
origins (Rosengren, 2003: 223). 
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In such models, speaking the language and descent are often subordinate to following 
the rules of sociability.16 
Through portraying themselves as distinct ethnic entities, indigenous people 
could engage with the state and, in turn, the state extended its sovereignty and 
policies over the now ‘legible’ peoples. Thus, through creating ‘difference’, the state 
paradoxically ‘claims sovereignty over an undifferentiated subject’ (Rubenstein, 
2001: 287). This can be exemplified by considering the case of the Ecuadorean 
Shuar. As Rubenstein describes, interaction with Salesians in the twentieth century 
sparked the conversion of Shuar into ‘citizens’. While Salesians began to established 
a difference between Shuar and non-Shuar through their differential treatments of 
Catholics and those to be converted, the establishment of a Shuar reserve in 1935 
‘codified’ the ethnic boundary. The reserve created a clearly defined Shuar region, 
and allowed for the defence of ‘Shuar land’ against non-Shuar settler ‘intrusion’ 
(Rubenstein, 2001: 279). This resembles the Chiquitano situation, where the land 
struggle led to the adoption of the ‘indigeneity’ marker for group-and self-
identification, a more exclusive Chiquitano identity (see Chapter V), and the 
identification of a defined ‘Chiquitano territory’ (see Chapter VI). 
The emergence of such ethnic identities has frequently gone hand-in hand 
with the development of ethnic movements that formed to demand or defend land 
and resources. While such movements are portrayed as a way to ‘defend indigenous 
peoples’ rights, as in the case of other civil society groups attention has to be paid to 
the way in which these may ‘constitute the state’. To exemplify this point, we may 
refer again to Rubenstein’s study of the Shuar. The Shuar Federation was established 
in 1964 with the help of a Salesian Priest who saw the need to create an institution to 
deal with missionaries, local settlers and government. Apart from having the 
responsibility of building infrastructure and chapels, the organisation soon took on 
the role of organising education, registering births and in general, ‘to provide an 
                                                 
16
 Rosengren describes for the case of the Matsigenka, who live in the montaña of southeastern Peru 
whose engagement with state actors is relative recent, that the two models coexist, but conflict with 
each other. He compares this to the situation of the Kayapó of central Brazil, concluding that the: 
‘frequent disruptions within Amazon ethnopolitical movements are produced by the imposition of an 
alien mode of defining social groups, which conflicts with fundamental tenets in Amazonian world 
views. Accordingly, the organizational problems follow from neither bad leadership nor from peoples’ 
irresponsibility and indifference as they, in these conflicts, usually act in accordance to locally 
expected norms of behaviour’ (2003: 236-237). Note that Tim Ingold (2000, Chapter 8) puts forward a 
similar argument. 
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institutional basis for economic modernization’ (2001: 280). Consequently, the Shuar 
moved from a rhizomic to a hierarchical taproot model (Rosengren, 2003) – from an 
egalitarian social organization to one with a democratically elected leadership. It thus 
became what  Morton Fried calls a ‘secondary tribe’: a ‘socio-political phenomenon, 
brought about by the intercession of more complexly ordered societies, states in 
particular’ (1975: 114).  
Chiquitano history also demonstrates the simultaneously coercive but 
enabling nature of state power. As will be addressed in Chapter V, the Chiquitano 
central of Concepción emerged in 1985 due to state pressures in the form of 
excessive demands for Chiquitano labour, allied to white and mestizo encroachment 
on their land. Their organisational efforts were facilitate by union organisers who 
provided valuable political experience. Chiquitano also received support from 
departmental development corporations, NGOs and indigenous umbrella groups 
whose foundation preceded that of the central. Like the Ecuadorean Shuar 
Federation, the Chiquitano central of Concepción is hierarchically structured and 
interacts with different state levels. It carries out many of the functions that the sub-
prefecture and municipality fulfil for non-Chiquitano citizens in the locality. It 
provides legal aid, registers births, organises identification documents and arranges 
diverse productive and infrastructural projects. It has also been the main legal entity 
to take forward the claim for a Chiquitano territory. In short, like the Shuar 
federation, it often functions as a state institution. 
The Chiquitano case also shows that populations might structure themselves 
in a state-like manner in order to interact with the state, or to be taken seriously by it. 
The organisations are ‘state like’ and hierarchical, or ‘fractal' to the state, which 
simultaneously facilitates interaction with other elements of the ‘state’ power 
structure – the state cannot ‘see’ or engage with rhizomic organisational forms.17 
This becomes obvious when considering the comment of Chiquitano comunario 
Tomás Parachai, from the small comunidad San Juan de Limones in San Javier 
Municipality, regarding the transformation of communal organisational structures in 
response to the 1994 Law of Popular participation (to be discussed below):  
                                                 
17
 In a way states can only see organisational forms that are ‘fractal’ to it, i.e. that to certain degree 
resemble its own organisational form. An analogy might be the nature of the military hierarchy, where 
each brigade has the same conformation as the next level; this is supposed to simplify communication 
(and control) amongst the different levels. The idea of ‘fractal’ was coined by Benoît Mandelbrot in 
1975 and derives from the Latin fractus (‘broken’, ‘fractured’), see Mandelbrot (1982). 
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Well a comunidad is where there are various families and all the families get 
together and plan and choose their leaders and so like this they are recognised [by] 
the municipality, or [by] an organisation. Through the authorities, the very 
comunidad … represents itself, and so they say that “they are a comunidad that is 
organised”, or “it is organised so that we take [the comunidad] into consideration”.18 
Group Formation and Identification: Pressures, Negotiations and Pragmatism  
Nevertheless, as Gerald Sider notes, ethnic group formation (‘the creation of cultures 
and peoples’) is more complex, less planned and more resistance permeated. It 
involves a process of ‘create and incorporate’, as well as distancing in which both, 
resistance and collusion take their variant shapes (1987: 11, 17). Sider argues that 
acquiring a deeper understanding of the history of ethnic group formation, involves 
an appreciation of ‘the paradoxes, contradictions, and disjunctions’ that can be seen 
in the process (1987: 4). At stake is ‘not simply the creation of ethnic identities 
within domination, but the creation and self-creation of peoples who genuinely stand 
apart, outside-as well as within’ (1987: 23). After all, internal group dynamics and 
agency might aim to resist state pressures, or divert the pressures by transforming 
them.  
This can be exemplified by considering the areas of external- and self-
identification. While colonial authorities employed rigid racial labels to denote 
different population groups to facilitate social control and maintain the social 
differences necessary to ensure the workings of the colonial economic system, the 
emerging ethnic identities remain fluid. No matter how hard state actors try to create 
identities, cultures, or organisational forms, they may not resonate with the groups 
they are trying to identify, nor can such categories be essential. There is no essential 
‘culture’ and ‘identity’ or some ideal cultural purity which can be ‘dressed up’ and 
then eventually ‘be unearthed’ (see Gow, 1993; Veber, 1998). In Raddings’ words, 
they are ‘processes of becoming’ (2005: 121).  
Hanne Veber proposes that instead of viewing ‘change in native culture … as 
involving processes where the distinct characteristics of the original native are 
gradually dissolved’ we can conceive it via recourse to new social movements 
                                                 
18
 ‘Bueno, una comunidad es donde hay varias familias y dentro de todas las familias se reúnen y 
planifican y ponen su dirigentes para que así mismo sea reconocida, o sea al municipio, a una 
organización. Mediante las autoridades que la misma comunidad pone entonces la persona va y se 
presenta, entonces ya dicen que ellas ya son una comunidad que también se han organizado, o esta 
organizada entonces para tomarla en cuenta’. Workshop: Candelaria, 11 May 2007. 
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theory, which helps seeing ‘these phenomena as socially constructed and 
continuously negotiated processes and action systems through which the world is 
being reimagined and reshaped’ (1998: 382-383). As Alberto Melucci posits:  
Collective identity is an interactive and shared definition produced by several 
interacting individuals who are concerned with the orientations of their action as 
well as the field of opportunities and constraints in which their action takes place. … 
Collective identity formation is a delicate process and requires continual investments 
(1989: 34-35, italics in original) 
Additionally, if we perceive collective identities, and the communities they stand for, 
as socially constructed and shared definitions, attention has to be paid to how such 
identities and communities are experienced by its members.19 For example, in the 
case of the Chiquitano, colonial administrators realised that they ‘could not reduce 
colonized peoples to one homogenous category’, such as ‘los naturales’ (‘the 
natives’), but had to ‘deal with multiple and shifting ethnic polities in negotiations 
for trade and labour, and in warfare’ (Radding, 2005: 160). After all, ‘cultural 
identities and political affiliations changed over time through concurrent patterns of 
congregation and migration that brought different linguistic and kin groups into the 
pueblos’ (Radding, 2005: 137). Consequently, in the Chiquitanía a number of other 
categories continued to be used in mission records and those of provincial governors. 
Among these were: Manazica, Manapeca, Paiconeca, Paunaca, Mococa, Morotoca, 
Zamuco, Covareca, Piñoca, and Guarañoca (Radding, 2005: 124).20  
Also the way that contemporary Chiquitano employ the label for self-
identification and expressing commonalities and groupness demonstrates how 
‘colonized people reworked these categories into cultural identities that connoted 
lines of commonality and affiliation, as well as boundaries of difference and 
exclusion – expressed through territorial claims, linguistic patterns and societal 
                                                 
19
 Such a view also fares well with the symbolic approaches of Anderson, Barth and Cohen. Symbolic 
approaches conceptualise the boundary of communities as the ‘mask’ (or in other words the 
‘identity’), presented by a community to the outside world (Anderson, 1991; Barth, 1969; Cohen, 
1985a). The various members of a community ascribe different and shared meanings to it (or 
‘symbols’). Viewing the collective identity as a common boundary of a community ultimately 
constructed out of diverse symbols, allows us to recognise that community members attach their own 
meanings to communities and identities just as they attach distinct meanings to the respective 
symbols. As Cohen notes, it is the ambiguities of symbolic discourse that allows members to unite 
behind it (1985a: 20, 89). Some of the analysis in this thesis is inspired by this approach. 
20
 Some of these are still in use today, albeit with variations in spelling: e.g. Paikoneka and Moncoca: 
On similar lines as Radding, Schwarz argues that ‘shared identities’ emerged within each mission 
settlement, rather than being ‘constituted at a global level of the whole of the Chiquitanos’ (1994: 34-
36). While this is a reasonable statement, it ignores that there was also a movement of groups between 
missions (see Radding, 2005: 68-69). 
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norms’ (Radding, 2005: 121). In short, while the state has the potential to transform 
modes of identification, it is not the only ‘identifier’ that matters; such identifications 
and categories states produce may be contested (see Brubaker and Cooper, 2000: 16; 
Hale, 2009: 323). In Chapter V, this case will be made for the ‘indigenous’ label. 
Chiquitano ascribe their own meanings to the term and use it for certain purposes, 
while it is not deemed an appropriate label for self-identification by all. In a way, 
such forms of resisting state pressures add another dimension to Scott’s (1985) 
concept of ‘everyday resistance’.21 
Another example of such resistance can be found in the area of Chiquitano 
political and communal organisation. As noted, Chiquitano communal authority 
structures have changed in relation to the prevalent model of Indian-state relations. 
However, while the Chiquitano adopted elected councils, or cabildos, as introduced 
through the mission systems, they ‘moulded these offices to their own purposes’ 
(Radding, 2005: 162-163) (see Chapter IV).22 In recent times this has also been the 
case with the organisational structures that Chiquitano comunidades adopted through 
the Law of Popular Participation (see Chapter VII). Therefore, while Chiquitano 
history demonstrates negotiated and pragmatic processes of accommodation, it also 
shows how resistance resides ‘in their social relations to each other and in the culture 
that grows out of, and expresses, these social relations’ (Sider, 1987: 20).  
Citizenship Practices and the Citizenship ‘Tool’ 
To view the state in such a fragmented way and as an ongoing accomplishment, 
while paying attention to the practices that constitute it, also affects how we may 
conceptualise citizenship. Authors broadly emphasise three different dimensions or 
aspects of citizenship. Firstly, the legal status, which emphasises the framework of 
political and social rights that allows citizens to participate in the political process 
(see Foweraker and Landman, 1997; Taylor, 1998: 27).23 Secondly, they stress 
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 This is, of course, a far more subtle form than the social movements that rise against intrusion in  
Habermas’(1981; 1989) lifeworlds. 
22
 Nancy Postero also makes this point with relation to Guarani leaders. Leaderships models and ‘ideal 
leadership model’ depend on the ‘political and economic contexts as well as the dominant models of 
state-Indian relations’ (2007: 96). 
23
 Taylor points out that these are citizenship rights derived from a normative statement of democracy 
and conversely accepted to be fundamental for the effective functioning of democracy. A further 
fundamental attribute of citizenship is seen to be sovereignty, or ‘the maintenance of the integrity of 
the self-determined individual’ (1998: 25). 
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citizenship as involving ‘membership in a political community’, which entails a 
‘distinct source of identity’. Thirdly, there is the perception of citizens as political 
agents, who actively participate in a society’s political institutions (Leydet, 2009: 1). 
Thomas Humprey Marshall’s (2009 [1950]) famous definition focuses on the 
first two dimensions: ‘a status bestowed on those who are full members of a 
community [read: the nation]. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the 
rights and duties with which the status is endowed’ (2009 [1950]: 149-150).24 
Second: ‘citizenship requires… a direct sense of community membership based on 
loyalty to a civilisation which is a common possession. … Its growth is stimulated 
both by the struggle to win those rights and by the enjoyment when won’ (2009 
[1950]: 151). According to Marshall, citizenship also contains an ideal of what 
‘should be’ everyone’s rights (2009 [1950]: 150).25 While the ideal may be hard – or 
impossible – to achieve, it acts as a guide for plotting the direction in which social 
and political change should move (Lister, 2005: 476; McKinnon and Hampsher-
Monk, 2000: 1; Sassen, 2002).  
In turn, the perception of citizens as political agents has been emphasised by 
republican concepts of citizenship. This goes back to the Athenian model of 
democracy, as described in the writings of Aristotle and others. Elements can also be 
found in republican Rome and the Italian city-states and workers’ councils; its 
elements were also emphasised by writers such as Machiavelli and Rousseau (Lazar, 
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 He differentiates these rights into different categories by providing ‘an account of the development 
of citizenship in Britain; how civil rights were introduced in the eighteenth century, political rights 
followed in the nineteenth century and social rights in the twentieth century’ (Lister, 2005: 475). 
‘Civil rights’ include personal liberties, the right to own property and other rights associated with 
individual freedom. Political rights are those that enable individuals to participate in the exercise of 
political power and social rights refer to a certain level of economic wellbeing and a share in society. 
Marshall states citizenship should be seen as a unified concept when he talks about the practical 
interconnections of citizenship rights. He realised that the ‘political rights, the right to participate in 
the exercise of power either directly or indirectly, is dependent upon both civil rights, in terms of 
individual freedoms and social rights, in terms of levels of literacy and material well-being’ (Lister, 
2005: 477).  
25
 Authors have regularly adopted Marshall’s influential definition. For example, Catriona McKinnon 
and Iain Hampsher-Monk advocate moving away from a purely rights-based definition and note that: 
‘Citizenship comprises the qualities and conditions – and also the ideals – in and through which 
individuals who share membership of a political community can act as political equals’ (2000: 1). 
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2008: 5; Leydet, 2009: 2-3; Magnette, 2005).26 Later, the republican model 
‘influenced the revolutions in America and (in part) France, both of which were 
inspirational for early republicans in Latin America. Through the nineteenth century, 
it was sustained by Hegel and de Tocqueville, and the most distinguished twentieth-
century proponent of civic republicanism was Hannah Arendt’ (Lazar, 2008: 5). Its 
key principle is civic self-rule, through such practices as rotation of offices. Notably, 
Aristotle characterised the citizen as an individual capable of ruling and being ruled 
in turn. Citizens are primarily ‘those who share in the holding of office’ (Aristotle 
quoted in Leydet, 2009: 3).  
Anthropologists draw on these latter conceptions, while tending to find more 
problems with Marshalls’ definition. As anthropologist Sian Lazar points out, in the 
Latin American context a view of citizenship that awards centrality to the nation is 
problematic, as citizenship has historically had a very local dimension, with 
citizenship being granted on the basis of demonstration of ‘loyalty to the local 
community’ – the community often being formed by a ‘town’ (2008: 27). In fact, as 
many authors remind us, creating and maintaining a community is a laborious and 
difficult task, especially if they are as large as the ‘nation’ (Anderson, 1991; Cohen, 
1985a; Latour, 2007: 34-37; Lazar, 2008: 5; Melucci, 1985: 792; Tilly, 1984: 305). 
Further, in this regard, citizens can only claim rights from government institutions 
and legal agents, if they have knowledge of those rights and are aware that they exist 
(Salman, 2004: 856-857).  
In the case of Chiquitano comunarios, it can be assumed that they have only 
during the late 1960s developed a sense of the ‘national community’. The trigger was 
the rise of rural unions in the area, which recruited Chiquitano. Another factor 
consisted of the activities of Chiquitano organisations, whose creation went 
alongside workshops aimed at educating comunarios about their current ‘marginal 
position’ in Bolivian society, along with raising awareness about the rights they 
could potentially enjoy (ALAS et al., 2001; CICC, n/d). Even so, citizenship 
practices for most Chiquitano are focused towards local state actors, such as the 
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 As Lazar summarizes: ‘Aristotle considered the state to be an aggregation of its citizens, and the 
citizens to be those eligible to participate in office, or government’ (2008: 5). Also see Magnette 
(2005: 10-19). This idea also feature in Rousseau’s social contract, where he stresses that the citizen 
co-authors laws via the ‘general will’: ‘Active participation in processes of deliberation and decision-
making ensures that individuals are citizens, not subjects’ (Leydet, 2009: 3). Also see Magnette (2005: 
87-93). 
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Chiquitano Organisations, the various NGOs operating in the area and the Catholic 
Church. In Chiquitano everyday lives, it is certainly their local comunidades which 
they are striving to be a full member of, rather than the hard-to-imagine Bolivian 
nation.  
More useful then, is a view of citizenship that emphasises citizenship as a set 
of practices and stresses the participatory and negotiated aspects of citizenship. Such 
a view has been taken by authors from the anthropological camp, along with a 
number of and some political scientists and sociologists (Holston and Appadurai, 
1999; Jelin, 2003; Lazar, 2008; Lukose, 2005; Ong, 1999; Salman, 2004; Salman and 
de Munter, 2009; Sassen, 2002; Sawyer, 2001; Yuval-Davis, 1997). For example, 
Jelin notes that the concept of citizenship ‘refers to a conflictive practice connected 
with power that reflects struggles over who will be able to say what in the process of 
identifying the problems of the community and the way in which they will be 
tackled’ (2003: 314). Lazar adopts a similar view, emphasising the ‘bundle of 
practices’ of state-citizen encounter which ‘make someone a full members of a given 
community’, which does not have to be the nation state (2008: 5). Like Marshall, she 
emphasises the process rather ‘than the end result itself’ (2008: 5).  
As Ritty Lukose (2005) notes, viewing citizenship in this way provides 
anthropologists and other social scientists with an analytical tool. By paying attention 
to citizenship practices, more light can be shed on the question of how changes in 
citizenship regimes have impacted on populations and their imaginations of 
citizenship, feelings of belong and modes of identification. This, in turn, can indicate 
a lot about the political system. Consequently, for many anthropologists: ‘the 
framework of citizenship has become a lens through which to explore the changing 
and dynamic processes of sovereignty, belonging, and politics at the interface 
between nation-states and transnational movements of capital, labour, media, and 
commodities ’ (Lukose, 2005: 509). 
However, the lack of substantive rights has been the focus of struggle for 
many Latin American. Since the 1980s and 1990s, diverse Latin American popular 
actors, from trade unions, left parties, to a multitude of grassroots movements 
(including women, those organised around access to services, environmentalists, 
human rights activists and ethnic minorities), have employed the language of 
citizenship in their political struggles. They have employed it as a ‘tool’ to make 
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demands and a focal point to rally around and link their diverse struggles (Alvarez et 
al., 1998; Dagnino, 2003, 2005; Escobar and Alvarez, 1992; Foweraker, 2001; 
Foweraker and Landman, 1997). In consequence, citizenship (and discussions 
surrounding it) has provided a reference point for debate about how a de-facto 
participation in society can actually be achieved and what this should look like – i.e. 
it functions as Marshall’s ‘ideal’ (2009 [1950]: 150). 
In this process, talk of ‘citizenship’ signals that ‘the general demand for equal 
rights embedded in the predominant conception of citizenship has been extended and 
specified in accordance with the demands in question’ (Dagnino, 2003: 211). A 
challenge to prevalent citizenship regimes does not only come from those who seek 
to include those previously excluded, ‘so that all people become “full members” (a 
universal category of citizenship)’ (Lazar, 2008: 6), but also from those sceptical that 
a universal citizenship model would lead to an extension of citizenship to marginal 
and excluded groups (including women and indigenous people). Critics proposed that 
to break the entrenched power-structures, not only the pluralist character of society 
had to be recognised and respected, but ‘differentiated citizenship’ was needed, to 
acknowledge the ‘political relevance of difference (cultural, gender, class, race etc.)’ 
(Leydet, 2009: 6), and allow for the recognition of special minority rights, including 
some form of group rights (Leydet, 2009: 6, see also Kymlicka 1995, Kymlicka and 
Wayne 2000, Little 2002). A ‘strong emphasis has been placed on citizenship’s 
cultural dimension, incorporating contemporary concerns with subjectivities, 
identities, and the right to difference’ (Dagnino, 2003: 211, also Alvarez et al. 1998, 
Dagnino 2005, Escobar and Alvarez 1992).  
In sum, as sociologist Saskia Sassen notes, prevalent citizenship regimes are 
challenged by those they exclude, and their demands for inclusion and everyday 
practices ‘partly produce’ citizenship (2002: 11).27 In Bolivia, like other Latin 
American countries where citizenship regimes have been exclusionary and until 
recently the formal political sphere was heavily controlled by a small Creole elite, 
demands for collective rights and more inclusive citizenship regimes are particular 
                                                 
27
 In the Latin American context, the transition of many Latin American states to ‘democracy’ since 
1980 has been linked to social movement activity  (Foweraker, 1995; Foweraker and Landman, 1997). 
Foweraker and Landman (1997) argue that social mobilisation under military regimes comprised part 
of a struggle for rights, which did not cease at the moment of transition. According to Held, 
citizenship was a result of ‘the way in which different groups, classes and movements have struggled 
to gain degrees of autonomy and control over their lives in the face of various forms of stratification, 
hierarchy and political oppression’ (quoted in Foweraker and Landman, 1997: 2). 
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relevant (Lazar, 2008: 6). Equally relevant is an analysis of the everyday ‘citizenship 
practices’ involving citizens and different state actors, which shed light on the 
prevalent citizenship regime ad nature of the Bolivian state.  
Bolivia’s Neo-liberal Multicultural Citizenship Regimes 
The Sánchez de Lozada administration (1993-1997) produced fundamental change to 
Bolivia’s citizenship regime as set up after the 1952 Revolution (see Chapter IV), by 
rewriting the constitution to recognise Bolivia as ‘multiethnic’ and ‘pluricultural’ 
nation.28 Lozada implemented a range of reforms that were aimed at countering the 
negative impact of the neo-liberal reform packet instituted in the mid-1980s, by 
addressing problems of political exclusion, instability, and enhancing state domestic 
and international legitimacy (Van Cott, 2000: 32). Bolivian governments (mainly 
under the MNR’s Víctor Paz Estenssoro) had implemented neo-liberal reforms since 
1985 to tackle the economic crisis under way since the 1970s. This was produced by 
complex problems involving mismanagement of a state-led economy, international 
recession and hyperinflation (see Grindle, 2003b; Healy and Paulson, 2000: 5-16; 
Klein, 1992; Kohl, 2003a; Kohl and Farthing, 2001, 2006). As in other Latin 
American countries that implemented similar reforms at the time, this had large 
human costs. The dismantling of state-owned enterprises and bureaucratic state 
apparatus, heightened unemployment and this, combined with a reduction in social 
expenditures such as housing and health, increased social and economic hardship 
(see Arze and Kruse, 2004).29 Such a situation prompted authors to suggest that neo-
liberal restructurings served to undermine the universal and equal nature of 
citizenship Latin America-wide, as they reduced the state’s role as grantor as social 
rights (Cammack, 1994; Taylor, 1998). 
This links back to Marshall’s (2009 [1950]) conception that civil, political 
and social rights must be treated as a ‘unified concept’, as he recognised that political 
rights (the right to participate in the exercise of power), is dependent upon both civil 
rights (individual freedoms) and social rights (literacy and material well-being). Lucy 
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 Article I of the Bolivian Constitution subsequently read as follows: ‘Bolivia, free, independent, 
sovereign, multi-ethnic and multicultural constituted as a United Republic, adopts representative and 
participatory democracy as its form of government, based on the union and solidarity of all Bolivians’. 
29
 The most notable among these measures was the dismantling of the Bolivian Mining Corporation 
(COMIBOL), leading to the redundancy of more than 20,000 workers (Arze and Kruse, 2004: 24). 
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Taylor points to the fact that neo-liberal interpretations of citizenship take the 
emphasis away from political agency and towards freedom and equality of the 
individual before the market (1998: 25).  
Lozada’s reforms, nevertheless, did not divert from the neo-liberal course and 
are therefore often referred to as the ‘second generation of neo-liberal reforms’.30 
Legislation that aimed to carry the ‘multicultural’ trend, included the 1994 Ley de 
Participación Popular (LPP – Popular Participation Law), the 1996 National 
Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA) Law and the Intercultural Bilingual Education 
Law. The laws intended to expand citizenship to ‘marginalised’ indigenous peoples 
whose ‘social and cultural vulnerability’ had increased, not only through the austerity 
measures and rollback of state services, but also the growing exploitation of natural 
resources and commodification of land (McNeish, 2008: 36).  
Pressures to adopt such reforms came from various sides. First, there was 
growing domestic pressure from politically mobilised indigenous groups, who 
demanded the government address the above-mentioned issues. The first to organise 
were highland groups in the 1960s: the Katarists. They stepped up their 
organisational efforts through their 1973 Manifesto of Tiwanaku, in which they 
proposed an ‘alternative model of state-society relations based on the recognition of 
ethnic difference’ as ‘the solutions to chronic political instability and endemic 
poverty’ (Van Cott, 2000: 128). They expressed this desire through the idea of 
‘pluriculturality’ and ‘unity in (ethnic and cultural) diversity’ (Van Cott, 2000: 129). 
From around 1986, lowland indigenous movements started occupying a prominent 
role in challenging the Bolivian state. The Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas del 
Oriente, Chaco y Amazonía (CIDOB – Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of the 
Orient, Chaco and Amazonia) started to develop legal proposals to incorporate the 
rights of ‘indigenous peoples’ into the constitution. Pressures resulted in the fact that 
after the 1990 ‘March for Territory and Dignity’, the government accepted that use 
of the term ‘indigenous territory’ in official documents, and ratified the ILO 
Convention 169 in 1991 (Albó, 2002: 77; Balza Alarcón, 2001: 35; Lacroix, 2005: 
74; Ströbele-Gregor et al., 1994: 106). (See Chapter V). 
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 The first generation of neo-liberal reforms was launched in 1985, when the Movimiento 
Revolucionario Nacionalista (MNR – Nationalist Revolutionary Movement) ended the state-led 
development model that had been established more than thirty years earlier, by introducing the New 
Economic Plan (NEP), a neo-liberal reform package (see Healy and Paulson, 2000: 5-16). 
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Pressures to incorporate indigenous demands also heightened in the 
international sphere throughout the 1980s. Domestic claims were greatly 
strengthened by international organisations (such as the UN and the World Bank) as 
they pushed for the recognition of ethnic diversity and to bring indigenous peoples 
under the umbrella of state and international institutions. The UN firmly established 
‘native’ peoples as subjects of rights in the international legal order and had passed 
the ILO Convention 169. By the end of the decade, the UN had instituted a 
permanent Forum on Indigenous Peoples, with offices throughout the world. This, in 
turn, significantly empowered indigenous groups to raise claims against states, which 
consequently inspired NGOs to step up ‘their efforts to introduce the ideas of “rights-
based development” in Bolivia’ (McNeish, 2008: 39).  
Additionally, NGOs, human rights organisations, along with large 
international actors such as the World Bank and UN increasingly saw a need to off-
set the negative effects of neo-liberal reforms. The solution was believed to lie in 
increasing citizen participation in development and political life. In this vein, 
development agencies promoted ‘participatory development’ and ‘rights based’ 
strategies. In particular, the World Bank in the 1980s promoted decentralisation 
policies with participatory elements as a way to increase citizens’ involvement and 
promote the inclusion of different population groupings (e.g. based on ethnicity of 
religion). This was supposed to make government more accountable and citizen 
oriented and, consequently, enhance state legitimacy diminishing problems and 
tensions (Assies, 2000; Cammack, 1994: 186; Gray Molina, 2002; World Bank, 
2002).31 The Bolivian Government promoted the LPP with these aims in mind: by 
increasing popular participation in municipal-level political processes and budgeting, 
citizenship and a more stable political democracy would be attainable (Behrendt, 
2000; Blanes, 1999a; Faguet, 2003; Lema et al., 2001; Van Cott, 2000). 
Another domestic pressure group clamouring for political reforms comprised 
the Regional Civic Committees. While opposed to indigenous claims, they had been 
lobbying for political and administrative decentralisation since the restoration of 
democracy in 1982. Pressure from this source led to the direct election of mayors, 
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 For evaluations of the practicalities and effects of decentralisation see, for example, Adams (2003), 
Faguet Furniss (1974), Kälin (1999), Litvack et al. (1998) , Llambí and Lindemann (2001), Lockwood 
(1998), Willis et al. (1999). For articles by economists that include some critical views on 
decentralisation, see Schneider (2003) and Treisman (1999). A prominent case is the participatory 
budget in Porto Alegre, Brazil (see, for example, Abers, 1998; de Sousa Santos, 1998; Souza, 2001). 
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counsellors and the approval of the Statutory Law of Municipalities in 1985, which 
recognised municipalities as independent local governments (see Finot, 1990). In 
1991, diverse political actors, including political parties, Civic Committees, 
syndicates, and neighbourhood organisations, made progress in developing a 
proposal for a decentralisation law. In 1992, the Senate approved the draft of the 
proposed law despite the reservations of the House of Representatives, and it came to 
form part of the 1994 Reforms (Seemann, 2003: 13; Thedieck, 1994).  
As can be expected, these reforms significantly impacted on the Bolivian 
citizenship regime and Bolivians’ citizen practices. The recognition of Bolivia as a 
‘multiethnic’ and ‘pluricultural’ nation entailed the Bolivian state’s recognition of 
the ‘juridical personality of the indigenous and peasant communities’ and their 
organisations (Article 171.II of the Bolivian Constitution).32 Significantly, through 
Article 171, the government recognised the ‘social, economic and cultural rights of 
the indigenous … to their original communal lands [Tierras Comunitarias de Origen 
or TCOs], guaranteeing the sustainable use and exploitation of the national resources, 
their identity, values, languages and costumes, and institutions’ (Article 171.I). 
Lastly, it recognised the right of indigenous and peasant authorities to exercise 
‘administrative functions and apply their own norms as alternative solution to 
conflicts, according to their customs and procedures, if these do not contradict this 
Constitution and the laws’ (Article 171.III). Thus, it enshrined the figure of 
‘indigenous people’ as a rights- and resource-bearing identity in Bolivian Law, 
granted territorial rights and a degree of self-determination. 
The decentralisation process instigated on 20 April 1994 by the MNR 
government, in conjunction with the LPP, restructured the formal aspects of citizens’ 
participation in their localities. Similar to the decentralisation reforms implemented 
in other Latin American countries, it aimed to ‘refocus public decision making from 
the national capital to local areas, and from central to municipal levels of 
government’ (Rowland, 2001: 1374). The LPP ‘municipalised’ the country by 
establishing new municipalities and expanding existing ones to around 320. It 
allocated funds to them according to the number of their inhabitants and handed them 
responsibility in areas such as rural development, healthcare provision and local 
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 This article was included in the Bolivian Constitution through Law 1617, passed on 6 October 2005.  
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infrastructure (Calla, 2000; Faguet, 2001; Grootaert and Narayan, 2001; Seemann, 
2003).  
The LPP introduced two mechanisms to institutionalise civil society oversight 
and participation in the municipal sphere. The first comprised the Comités de 
Vigilancia (CVs – Oversight Committees), created to ‘monitor’ the performance and 
spending of municipal government (Calla, 2000: 80)33 They were also to serve as a 
mechanism to channel citizen demands, new project proposals and oversee the 
spending of popular participation funds, complete with the power to remove corrupt 
officials or withhold municipal funds (Faguet, 2001: 4; Grootaert and Narayan, 2001: 
7). CVs are elected by the Organizaciones Territoriales de Base (OTBs - Territorial 
Base Organisations) in each municipality (Behrendt, 2000: 4).  
OTBs formed the second mechanism to institutionalise relations between 
civil society and the state. These are legally recognised grassroots entities, i.e. 
territorial organisations, indigenous organisations, peasant organisations and 
neighbourhood councils, which would provide further oversight, as well as constitute 
a vehicle for channelling national resources for sustainable development to local 
communities. They were also supposed to be involved in a process of defining the 
needs of the municipality, and collaborate with local government to develop a five-
year strategic plan upon which expenditures would be based. In total, the government 
recognised over 15,000 grassroots organisations, along with 1,600 OTBs (Behrendt, 
2000: 4-6; Gray Molina, 2002: 8; Grootaert and Narayan, 2001: 7; Seemann, 2003: 
15).  
Naturally enough, implementation varied significantly from municipality to 
municipality. In some cases, citizens took advantage of these opening and the 
reforms led to increased expenditure on ‘pro-poor initiatives’, increased citizen 
participation and oversight (see Faguet, 2001; Gray Molina, 2002). In other 
instances, municipal politics and recourses remained under the control of local elites, 
who managed to co-opt CVs and block oversight. Most OTBs remain unable to 
articulate joint projects, while the discrimination and marginalisation of elected 
indigenous people continues (see Behrendt, 2000; Blanes, 1999b; Lacroix, 2005; 
Lema et al., 2001). 
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 Also called ‘Watchdog Committees’ (for example, Seemann, 2003: 13), or ‘Vigilance Committees’ 
(for example, Faguet, 2001: 4). 
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Indigenous candidates across Bolivia have also sought to take advantage of 
the new political openings at the municipal level by participating in municipal 
elections. The 1995 elections showed that such strategies proved successful. Of the 
1,624 municipal council members elected, 464 were indigenous (28 per cent of the 
total).34 In the 1999 elections a significant increase in the number of indigenous 
candidates (including many women) occurred. However, this did not translate into 
automatic election success. Indigenous individuals faced difficulties in the 
registration and voting process, due to the distance of their residences from polling 
booths, illiteracy and other bureaucratic problems. Additionally, according to the 
1992 Census, more than 50 per cent of Bolivian women were not registered to vote 
(Albó, 1996: 20). 
Another reason for the lower election figures related to the fact that highland 
and lowland indigenous groups had worked to create a joint organisation (a ‘political 
tool’), for which they hoped to get official approval. In March 1995 the CSUTCB, 
CIDOB (Central Indígena del Oriente Boliviano) and other indigenous 
representatives organised a conference in Santa Cruz entitled Instrumento Político - 
Tierra Territorio to created the  Instrumento Político - Asamblea por la Soberanía de 
los Pueblos (IP-ASP) as a representative body (McKee, 1999: 5). The Federation of 
Campesinos of Cochabamba (FSUTCC) defined the instrumento politico (political 
instrument) as ‘a means and an end; both a tool for political participation and a new 
form of governing body for the country’ (McKee, 1999: 9-10). The leaders hoped to 
circumvent the rule that individuals had to run as candidates affiliated to one of the 
legally registered parties, which the electoral law demanded.35 Relying on the 
established larger parties often compromised a candidate’s agenda, as they had to 
strike bargains to get onto the party list. To compound matters, when elected, 
candidates’ alternative agendas were often sidelined due to the parties’ political 
manoeuvrings.  
However, the ‘political tool’ leaders (Evo Morales and Alejo Véliz) began to 
clash personally in 1998 and Evo Morales formed a breakaway group, entitled the 
Instrumento Político por la Soberanía de los Pueblos (IPSP – Political Instrument 
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 It has to be noted, however, that there were great departmental variations. While Oruro registered a 
high of 62 per cent of indigenous concejales, La Paz recorded a surprising low of 13 per cent 
(Behrendt, 2000: 14). 
35
 This aspect of electoral law changed after the 2004 elections. Civil society organisations could now 
register themselves if recognised by the National Electoral Court (Lacroix, 2005: 9).  
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for the Sovereignty of the Peoples), which would in 1999 become the MAS. Neither 
group managed to gain legal recognition as political party and both allied with 
existing parties – this factionalism negatively affected indigenous participation at this 
juncture (Albó, 1996: 20; Behrendt, 2000: 14; McKee, 1999: 5-6). This scenario 
changed in the 2004 municipal elections, when the government allowed the 
registration of candidates that were not registered through parties but through legally 
recognised indigenous or peasant organisations. Nevertheless, many candidates still 
ran on the MAS ticket, hoping to gain wider support from a broader base.  
There was another area where Lozada’s reforms sparked the activity of 
indigenous citizens. As noted, after the 1990 ‘March for Territory and Dignity’ the 
Bolivian government made some concessions to the countries’ indigenous groups by 
ratifying the ILO 169 Convention. Significantly, it introduced ‘indigenous territory’ 
into the Bolivian legislation and took steps to legally recognise eight ‘indigenous 
territories’. These were, however, never consolidated through legal titles, due to a 
lack of political will from the involved government officials (Balza Alarcón, 2001: 
33-35). Even so, in 1994, territorial claims gained renewed vigour as the government 
recognised the right of indigenous groups to lay claim to TCOs. It was not until 
1996, when another march (for ‘Territory, the Right to Political Participation and 
Development’) departed Santa Cruz to head for La Paz, that the government finally 
passed Law 1751 (the INRA Law) – the legislation that would make it possible for 
indigenous groups to claim the TCOs (Balza Alarcón, 2001: 45, 47-50; Flores, 2006: 
3).36 This, in turn, meant that engaging with the state bureaucracy and the INRA 
office to drive forward their claims to territorial rights became one of the main 
aspects of engagement with the state for groups seeking to gain legal titles over their 
territory. 
In sum, the neo-liberal ‘multicultural state’ project had its pitfalls. 
Importantly, obstacles to indigenous political participation remained due to structural 
inequalities and continuing discrimination against indigenous candidates. In many 
areas, the reforms never achieved real participation and oversight, leading to a lack 
of trust in government and parliamentary institutions. The territorial promises long 
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 Law 1715 reaffirmed the constitutional provisions of article 171 and guaranteed the rights of 
indigenous peoples to their TCOs, as well as the sustainable use of renewable natural resources within 
them. Similarly, the law established that preference should be given to indigenous peoples’ rights on 
their lands, over those of others in cases of overlapping or conflicting rights. See Chapter VI.  
 74 
remained unfulfilled. By 2006, claims for fifty-six TCOs in the lowlands had been 
filed, but only 31.9 per cent of the area claimed had been titled (Romero Bonifaz, 
2006: 212, 220). Moreover, as will be addressed in Chapter VI, the mechanisms set 
up by INRA to establish size, location and governance of the territories proved 
severely flawed on several levels. Lastly, these reforms did not signify that 
successive governments abandoned the neo-liberal economic project of coca 
eradication policies, the auctioning off of state-owned firms, which led to rising 
prices of consumer goods and laying-off of workers. All this would fuel the protests 
that would shake the country from 2000 onwards, give impetus to the ascent of the 
MAS party and underpin the 2006 Constituent Assembly. 
Indigenous Citizenship or: the Multicultural Menace 
The seemingly flawed nature of these reforms also stems from the fact that the very 
legislation only partially responded to the demands of Bolivian indigenous 
movements. In line with a neo-liberal agenda, the laws endorsed ‘a substantive, if 
limited, version of indigenous cultural rights’ (Hale, 2002: 487). Anthropologist 
Charles Hale (2002; 2004) has called the resulting framework the ‘indio permitido’ 
(‘permitted Indian’). While the government that embrace neo-liberal multiculturalism 
launch ‘reforms in language and educational policy, anti-discrimination legislation, 
devolution of responsibility for governance to local institutions … these initiatives 
also come with clearly articulated limits, attempts to distinguish those rights that are 
acceptable from those that are not’ (Hale, 2002: 490). Certain rights are enjoyed and 
others remain unaddressed: no further demands are to be raised and the status quo of 
the economic paradigm and state power are not to be questioned.  
At a first glance, these reforms seemed to respond to indigenous demands. 
Indigenous citizens could, to a degree, solve their own immediate problems, which 
appeared to resonate with some aspects of cultural rights and self-determination. It 
provided enough room for the neo-liberal citizen to take up the responsibility for 
resource distribution and aspects of his/her own development (Hale, 2002, 2004; 
McNeish, 2006, 2008; Postero, 2007). However, at the same time, the government 
offered fewer services and funding. As Postero remarks, the reforms were aimed at a 
more efficient and conflict-free economic system: ‘citizens engage in deliberations 
over local projects rather that ‘fighting in the national government over large issues 
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of resource allocation’ (Postero, 2007: 16). In line with Abrams (1988) notion of the 
state, the ideology of these policies promoted an expansion of the state at the local 
level and attempts to draw citizens into resource-distribution processes, assuming 
that citizens are willing participants.37 
Consequently, recent scholarship has argued that what governments achieved 
through such ‘neo-liberal multiculturalism’, is an expansion rather than delimitation 
of their discriminatory powers (Hale, 2002, 2004; McNeish, 2006, 2008; Postero, 
2007; Povinelli, 1998). In practise, this means that those who ‘conduct themselves 
within this logic and are appropriately “modern” and “rational” are rewarded and 
empowered’, while ‘unruly, conflict-prone Indians … are condemned to the 
racialised spaces of poverty and social exclusion’ (Postero, 2007: 16). The 
implication is that ‘indigenous communities, rather than being destroyed, become, 
alongside other entities of civil society, mechanisms for remaking the Indian as 
similarly self-made, but also governed citizen-subjects’ (McNeish, 2008: 46). As 
McNeish argues, ‘while indigenous culture is now ‘permitted’, the interests and 
demands of the native populations remain subordinate to those of the mestizo/ ladino 
(mixed race) society, the dominant national identity, and the wider international 
community’ (McNeish, 2008: 45-46). 
Further, this presents a profound menace to many indigenous groups, as it 
provides states with tools to ‘structure the spaces that cultural rights activists occupy: 
defining the language of contention; stating which rights are legitimate, and what 
forms of political action are appropriate for achieving them; and even, weighing in 
on basic questions of what it means to be indigenous’ (Hale, 2002: 490). 
Consequently, the logic of the indio permitido entails the notions of Fried (1967) and 
Scott (1998) that the ‘state’ implies some sort of process, one of ‘restructuring’ and 
‘making legible’. 
This becomes especially obvious in the question of what it means to be 
‘indigenous’. Through the neo-liberal multicultural framework, the term has gained 
new significance, as it is through adopting this label and other ‘indigenous’ markers 
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 Celina Souza calls this mindset the ‘voice’ -current of participation (2001: 174; also see Thiel, 
2003: 179). All in all, the ‘voice’ current sees participatory practices as a rather instrumental way for 
improving policy effectiveness and gaining access to information about the real needs of citizens 
(Abers, 1998). In contrast, those who view participation as ‘empowerment’, argue that ‘in a 
democracy, people should deliberate collectively and determine government decisions, to the extent 
possible, directly rather than through elected representatives’ (Hammond, 2003: 5). 
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that previously marginalised ethnic groups are able to access the rights framework. 
The term has particular relevance with regards to land rights, as the INRA Law 
reserves TCOs for ‘indigenous’ and ‘originary’ peoples. To gain access to these 
special rights, you have to portray yourself – and more importantly your group – to 
the state as ‘indigenous citizens’. In turn, the status depends on the states recognition. 
Consequently, as Elizabeth Povinelli points out, such policies ‘empowered states to 
prohibit and (de)certify cultural difference as a right – and resource – bearing 
identity’ (1998: 582). 
The way that many nation states define indigeneity is heavily influenced 
through meanings that circulate in the international rights arena. As noted, it was the 
fact that domestic ethnic groups reached out beyond their nation-states and created 
links to actors in the global indigenous rights arena, which pressured national 
governments to ratify international indigenous rights conventions (see Kymlicka, 
2009; Merlan, 2009; Sissons, 2009: 326).38 The ‘indigenous’ label acquired specific 
meanings in this arena, which then filtered back into the nation states. On the one 
hand, the label provided local and national movements with a collective identity that 
they adopt (often in combination with other more visible markers) to make claims 
against nation-states and assert self-determination and to gain solidarity from other 
groups and allies (Albó, 1996: 2; Brysk, 1994, 1996, 2000; Canessa, 2006; Jackson, 
1995, 2001). On the other, states started to incorporate the terminology in their legal 
frameworks. Consequently, the meanings that many nation-states have attached to 
‘indigeneity’ heavily draw on those articulated in the international indigenous rights 
arena, such as those articulated in the ILO Convention 169.  
Several definitions of ‘indigeneity’ have emerged in the international sphere 
that drop in and out of popularity over time. Broadly, definitions can be categorised 
into those based on certain fixed criteria, and those that are ‘relational’, although 
these often intersect in some ways. Under the relational rubric fall definitions such as 
that of David Maybury-Lewis: ‘indigenous peoples are defined as much by their 
relations with the state as by any intrinsic characteristics that they may possess’ 
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 One of the reasons for this is that the stimuli for internationalisation of the ‘indigenous’ category 
originated principally in the settler states Australia, the United States, Canada, New Zealand and (non-
settler state) Scandinavia (see Kymlicka, 2009; Merlan, 2009; Sissons, 2009: 326). As ‘otherness’ was 
only permitted, as long as it was compatible with dominant liberal democratic values, groups reached 
out to ‘higher authority’ in order to overcome them (2009: 304). 
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(quoted in Merlan, 2009: 305).39 This view is based on the recognition that modes of 
identification evolve in relation to other ‘identities’ (or modes of identification) and 
‘cultures’ (Wilson, 1995: 3).40 In contrast, the definition featured in the ILO 
Convention 169 from 1998, is based on certain ‘criteria’. It drew on the working 
definition that Martínez Cobo designed for the United Nations in 1986 (Saugestad, 
2004: 264).41 It defined indigenous peoples as ‘(a) “tribal” people whose social, 
cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national 
community; (b) people descended from populations that inhabited the country, or 
parts of it, at the time of conquest or colonisation; (c) people retaining some or all of 
their own institutions’ (quoted in Merlan, 2009: 305). Merlan notes that the current 
emphasis of the UN is on social mobilisation and that neither ‘intrinsic properties nor 
relational ones are foregrounded’ (2009: 305).42 That the meanings that circulate in 
the international sphere adhere largely to a liberal rights framework (Kymlicka, 
2009; Merlan, 2009; Povinelli, 1998: 582), is testimony to the way that authorities 
like the UN subsystems are ‘not independent of states or of liberal democratic 
universalist values and procedural forms’ (Merlan, 2009: 320).43  
While the Bolivian legal system does not define the notion of ‘indigenous’, it 
is nevertheless outlined in Article 1 of the LPP:  
The human collectivity descended from populations settled prior to the conquest and 
colonization, and who are found within the current borders of the State; possess 
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 Also in 1994, Rodolfo Stavenhagen (Former UN Special Rapporteur and anthropologist) delivered 
an influential and relationally oriented definition: ‘indigenousness, independently of biological or 
cultural continuity, frequently is the outcome of governmental policies imposed from above and from 
the outside’ (in Merlan, 2009: 305).  
40
 According to Barnard, ‘what most defines indigenous people according to this view is the relation 
of dominance of one group over another [presumably in the political sphere] and especially the 
relation of groups to the state, where the state is perceived as protecting the values of non-indigenous 
over indigenous peoples’ (2006: 2). In fact, many of the respondents to Kupers’ article, point to their 
preference for a ‘situational understanding’ of ‘indigenous people’, as they argue that this can 
overcome the ‘essentialism’ that is otherwise attached to the category or concept of ‘indigeneity’ (see, 
for example, Barnard, 2006: 2; Kenrick and Lewis, 2004: 263). 
41
 In his ‘Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations’ Martínez Cobo 
(1986) defined indigenous communities, peoples, and nations as ‘those which have a historical 
continuity with preinvasion and precolonial societies that developed on their territories, consider 
themselves as distinct from other sectors of societies now prevailing in those territories … and are 
determined to preserve and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic 
identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples’ (in Merlan, 2009: 305). 
42
 For a more comprehensive – but concise – summary of definitions of ‘indigenous’ and ‘indigeneity’ 
that circulate in the international sphere see Canessa (2007b: 202-203). 
43
 According to Kymlicka, this became obvious when indigenous advocates did not contest or 
transcend liberal democratic states’ insistence that indigenous governments comply with international 
human rights standards during the negotiations for the latest UN conventions: the 2007 UN ‘Draft 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (2009: 324). 
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history, organization, language or dialect and other cultural characteristics, through 
which they identify themselves as members, recognizing themselves as belonging to 
the same socio-cultural unit, maintaining a territorial link through the administration 
of their habitat and their social, economic, political, and cultural institutions (quoted 
in Canessa, 2007b: 203-204). 
Among the (many) problems that arise from these notions, one arises from the 
emphasis on ‘tribal’ people or collectivities who need to be ‘different’ from the 
mainstream society. This means that individuals have to prove that they all adhere to 
one collective identifier and form a bounded group, so that they are liable for rights, 
possibly sparking off processes of group formation (as addressed above). However, 
as the Chiquitano case shows (Chapter V), such groups with homogenous boundaries 
might be hard to create or maintain. A second problem stems from the ‘priority’ 
criterion for land occupation. What happens if groups move around between different 
areas, or have been displaced from lands they formerly occupied? What happens if 
different land claims might overlap? What happens to ‘European’ settlers on the 
land?44 Such issues, incidentally, caused some problems during Bolivian processes of 
titling indigenous lands (see Balza Alarcón, 2001: 53-54, Chapter VI). 
Despite their problematic nature, such conceptualisations have not only 
influenced governments and international agencies, but also anthropologists. This has 
led to criticisms regarding the essentialising ways in which the term may be 
employed by these actors. In the academic sphere, one of the concept’s most 
vehement critics is Adam Kuper, who started off a heated debate by questioning its’ 
usefulness as an analytical category. He suggested that it is a ‘new name for (very) 
“primitive people”’ and criticised that, ‘policy makers assume that they are dealing 
with descendants of hunter-gatherers and they commonly fall back on some sort of 
racial classification’ when it comes to identifying indigenous people (2006: 148). 
Furthermore he criticised the fact that the indigenous rights movement and it’s 
supporters identify indigenous people’ ‘as facing a common situation (“relegated to 
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 Adam Kuper raises similar issues in his criticisms of the ‘indigeneity’ concept (see Kuper, 2003: 
392). 
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reserved territories or confined to inaccessible or inhospitable regions”, “doomed to 
extinction” and so on)’ (2003: 390).45  
Sidelining this occasionally confusing and contradictory debate, we can agree 
with Kuper to the extent that some people may indeed wield the term with the 
connotation that indigenous people are ‘very primitive people’. Nevertheless, this 
thesis is concerned with the different meanings of ‘indigeneity’ and their effects, 
rather than engaging in a debate about how the term should be defined academically, 
or with regards to its usages in domestic or international rights frameworks.46  
Indeed, a number of authors have pointing to the problematic aspects of 
linking rights to such essentialising notions of indigeneity, and it’s use for political 
claims making (e.g. Conklin, 1997; Conklin and Graham, 1995; French, 2004; 
Jackson, 1995; Povinelli, 1998; Ramos, 1994, 1998). While multicultural discourses 
stress recognition of difference and equality, such notions of indigeneity are often 
based on a reductionist framework in which ‘specific indigenous histories, memories, 
and practices’ are irrelevant’ (Povinelli, 1998: 585). This renders ‘some forms of 
indigenous identity more “legible” than others’ (Albro, 2010: 72; also Conklin and 
Graham, 1995; Povinelli, 1998). I.e. more ‘authentic’ ones, expressed through 
special dress or language, or those organised in hierarchical ‘legible’ structures. 
Authors have noted that this may lead to the creation of hierarchies in which some 
‘identities’ are deemed to be more ‘indigenous’ than others, and therefore more 
worthy of special treatment, support and rights. Others might be excluded from 
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 Authors’ responses to Kuper fell into different camps. While some agreed with him (Robins, 2003: 
398), others rejected his criticism and accused Kuper of blaming the victim (Asch and Samson, 2004: 
261; e.g. Dahre, 2006: 147; e.g. Ramos, 2003: 397), generalisations about and inaccurate analysis of 
the history of the ‘indigenous movement’ (e.g. Kenrick and Lewis, 2004; Ramos, 2003; Turner, 
2004), poor argumentation (e.g. Ramos, 2003: 397-398; e.g. Turner, 2004: 264) and for disregarding 
‘the point of differential power’ and ‘social location’, which might legitimate ‘indigenous’ peoples 
claims (Plaice, 2003: 397; e.g. Ramos, 2003: 397; also see Suzman, 2003: 399). 
46
 Of course, a body of literature has engaged in the way that academics and legal frameworks should 
or should not define ‘indigeneity’ and ‘indigenous people’. See Kupers’ (2003; 2006) arguments and 
the arguments of those who responded to his criticisms of the usages of the term by policy makers, the 
indigenous movements and academics (e.g. Asch and Samson, 2004; Dahre, 2006; Kenrick and 
Lewis, 2004; Plaice, 2003: 397; Ramos, 2003; Robins, 2003; Suzman, 2003; Turner, 2004). The 
debate is an important one. It may have severe consequences to the individuals and groups labelled or 
self-identified as ‘indigenous’. Nevertheless, I see the role of academic researchers in analysing the 
different meanings attached to the concept and the implications that this may have, rather than 
deciding who should be labelled how and why. This is especially the case when groups have/ have not 
chosen to identify as ‘indigenous’. As anthropologist Peter Gow fittingly noted, albeit in another 
context: ‘ the last thing we should do is to decide in advance what such people are, and then 
interrogate them for their failure to live up to our images of them’ (1993: 341). 
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qualifying for such rights altogether (e.g. Conklin, 1997; Conklin and Graham, 1995; 
French, 2004; Graham, 2002; Jackson, 1995; Ramos, 1994, 1998).  
Apart from governmental actors, also others are complicit in this legibility 
project. For example, NGOs are also often interested that their ‘grassroots’ clients fit 
into certain ‘identity boxes’ which allow them to pitch their project to their funders – 
consequently, to receive NGO support, people have to act up to their and their 
funders (western) vision’s of what an ‘authentic indigenous group’ constitutes. They 
are therefore complicit in constructing a ‘hyperreal Indian’, a mould that fits the 
organisations needs and western moral and aesthetic criteria of what ‘Indians’ should 
be like (Ramos, 1994, also Conklin, 1997; Conklin and Graham, 1995).47 
For the ‘indigenous’ groups and individuals such state engagement tends to 
be antagonistic. While it generally lies at the heart of indigenous struggles that they 
seek to preserve the continuity of their everyday lives (especially in the case of 
Amazonian peoples) or to overcome everyday racism, exclusion and discrimination 
from the political system, they are forced to ascribe to new denominators, adapt 
state-recognised forms of organisation and phrase their demands in a way that 
resonates with the state legal framework and citizenship regime (see Sider, 2003: 
21). As will be discussed in Chapter V, this is also the case for Chiquitano people in 
Concepción municipality. Chiquitano struggles to secure the continuity of their 
communities can only do so by adhering to state discourse – which threatens to 
undermine this very goal. However, the chapter also shows that the state legibility 
project was not entirely successful: while the term has also found a broader use 
among Chiquitano leaders and wider circulation among comunarios, some 
Chiquitano see the label as unfit for self-identification.  
Post-multicultural Citizenship 
The question arises whether Hales’ ‘indio permitido’ can actually be overcome. In 
the current climate, opinions range from positive (Postero, 2007) to more cautious 
(McNeish, 2008). There has been optimism from some authors, who point to the 
organisational vigour in the country since 2000, the election of Bolivia’s first 
indigenous president, the holding of a Constituent Assembly with the scope of 
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 This resonates with what Sider calls the ‘contradiction between deception and self-deception 
whereby the Europeans wind up parroting their own fantasies of the other’ (1987: 7). 
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fundamentally altering the role of the state and the country’s citizenship regime. 
They also point to the debates surrounding the recognition of regional and ethnic 
autonomies. Postero (2007) and McNeish (2008) point to the criticisms that emerged 
due to the limitations of the multicultural neo-liberal reforms. McNeish notes that 
citizens grew increasingly weary of what they perceived as the government attempts 
to ‘cajole’ them into ‘a prescribed methodology of participation in public policies 
that remained controlled by the state’ (2008: 38).48 In other words, they were aware 
of the pitfalls of the state legibility project that they had to subject themselves to gain 
rights (cf. Fried, 1967; Hale, 2002, 2004; Scott, 1998). However, despite this, the 
system remained flawed and exclusive. Important issues of contention were control 
over natural resources (as could be seen in the Gas and Water Wars), while these 
were linked to broader questions of productive and consumption rights (such as the 
cost of services, wages, property and exclusion), fused with challenges to global 
capitalism (McNeish, 2008: 48; Postero, 2007: 17). 
McNeish and Postero posit that it is implicit in the concept of ‘indio 
permitido’ that these policies gave rise to critiques of their shortcomings and 
ambiguities (McNeish, 2008: 38; Postero, 2007: 16-17).49 Postero and McNeish point 
out that to mount these challenges, actors (among them indigenous citizens, 
neighbourhood associations, and workers organisations) drew on the new political 
and institutional channels that the Lozada reforms had created. Citizens utilised them 
to ‘break with the polarised political culture of the past and generate a more complex, 
and also more nuanced, political culture in which a primary aim is to rethink the 
representativity and responsiveness of state structures’ (McNeish, 2008: 48). Two 
examples of this are, firstly, the neighbourhood groups which had been organised in 
response to the LPP and that formed the backbone to the October 2003 uprisings in 
El Alto; and secondly, the way that the MAS’s strength ultimately grew through  
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 McNeish holds that, ‘the formulation of municipal development plans was heavily influenced by 
external consultants belonging to the Regional Development Corporation – CORDES. The duties of 
these consultants included facilitation and training in participatory methodologies to help local people 
articulate needs, perceptions and priorities. However, they were also required by the government to fit 
local priorities into a standard format to be presented to departmental authorities’ (2008: 38). 
49
 McNeish develops Hale’s thesis. Rather than solely referring to a project of neo-liberal governance 
and control, McNeish argues that recent events reveal the partial failure of this project, and thus the 
thesis also articulates a critique of the shortcomings and ambiguities of these reforms. He argues that 
‘as much as the idea of the indio permitido criticises the shortcomings of the neo-liberal reforms, it 
also points to the causes and shape of the recent mass protests against government economic policies 
and the subsequent political shifts in both Bolivia and Guatemala’ (2008: 34). 
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participation of its candidates in the municipal elections that the LPP had 
implemented (Postero, 2007: 17). 
Consequently, the reforms facilitated the creation of new strategies and 
political formations. For Postero, that ‘neo-liberal multiculturalism’ led to the 
emergence of a public that raised its demands in ‘the language of citizenship, rights, 
and democracy, reflects both Bolivians’ experiences and their frustrations with the 
neo-liberal and multicultural reforms of the 1990s’ (2007: 5). The outcome, she 
maintains, is that a ‘new state of political activism’ is forcing radical changes in the 
meaning of citizenship, as actors question the status-quo of access to power, unequal 
social relations and re-consider what their rights should be (Postero, 2007: 6). 
Postero (2007) calls these newly emerging citizenship practises ‘post multicultural 
citizenship’. McNeish coincides with Postero in arguing that current political 
activism in Bolivia, is actually seeking ‘something better’ rather than something 
‘radically different’, or even an overthrow of the state: ‘a new social pact between 
the state and the people’ (McNeish, 2008: 52). Contemporary protesters strive for a 
true recognition of cultural and regional identities and a renegotiation of the ‘terms of 
trade’ (McNeish, 2008: 51).50 
However, McNeish is more cautious than Postero, pointing to ongoing 
opposition from traditional elite and parties, especially in the Eastern Lowland 
regions (2008: 51). He also points out that there has not been a clear break with the 
neo-liberal economic model: ‘Since taking power, the Evo Morales government has 
been extremely careful to balance its radical discourse of economic nationalism with 
pragmatic efforts to remain in favour with foreign investors’ (2008: 52). He adds that 
while the Water and Gas Wars were sparked by rejections of global economic 
policies (the free trade model and granting of concessions by the government), 
protesters did not oppose the idea of modernisation or the notion that it is worthwhile 
to take advantage of new opportunities in the international market (2008: 51).  
Drawing on evidence from the Chiquitano case, this thesis suggests that in 
Concepción municipality, the ‘indio permitido’ still persists and I question whether 
                                                 
50
 Notably, this is also an argument put forward by political scientist Deborah Yashar (1998; 1999; 
2005), who notes that this is not only the case in Bolivia, but also other Latin American countries that 
have lived through similar trajectories of state reform and indigenous organising.  
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the contradictions arising from indigenous engagement with the state can actually be 
overcome.  
Chiquitano Citizenship 
Chiquitano citizenship practices may be directed towards the national government, 
departmental institutions, local municipal governments, or other individuals that 
represent the state in the locality. Chiquitano comunarios or their representative’s 
interactions with the state generally evolve around gaining access to productive or 
infrastructure projects, or to arrange the maintenance of paths leading to their 
comunidades. Comunarios look favourably upon those actors who adhere to their 
promises to deliver projects or resources – which means that they might also give 
their signatures to their political campaigns.  
For people whose political manoeuvring has centred on clientelist 
relationships in their localities, there has been a remarkable continuity in these 
practices over the past century. Thus, perspectives like that of Cammack who 
emphasises the weak Latin American party system and exclusive tactics of political 
leaders for creating ‘democracy without citizenship’ (1994: 193), are less relevant in 
areas were meaningful formal political participation is a very recent phenomenon and 
one prone to clientelism. The way that the Chiquitano approach these local state 
actors, means such citizenship practices may not look very different from the 
traditional patron-client relationships so prevalent in the Chiquitanía since republican 
times. Hierarchies along ethnic and family lines, clientelism and servitude have been 
entrenched in local social relations, while indigenous and mixed-race popular classes 
excluded from formal citizenship rights, have fought to exercise such rights on local 
issues, as well as joining shifting political alliances with caudillos and political 
parties (Radding, 2005: 181-282). Viewing citizenship as a set of practices, therefore 
allows for emphasis on ‘the ambiguities of citizenship as these are lived in the 
cultural politics of everyday life’, as well as the expansion of what ‘constitutes the 
proper domain of citizenship’ (Lukose, 2005: 509). Also other authors have argued 
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that such clientelistic practices can be described as political relationships or 
citizenship practices (see Auyero, 2000; 2002; Lazar, 2004b, 2008).51 
While for many Chiquitano, engagement with state bureaucratic and NGO 
actors has been closely linked to access to projects, resources and land, rather than 
the exercise of political rights per se, citizenship and its exercise featured 
prominently in the discourses and statements of Chiquitano leaders. The 
multicultural rights framework Chiquitano can access as ‘indigenous citizens’ 
inspires their political actions and rhetoric. Still, rather than valuing political 
participation per se, it is, above all, the prospect of land titles which has inspired 
Chiquitano leaders to get involved in the local political arena.  
As addressed in Chapter V, Justo Seoane, Chiquitano Mayor in Concepción 
at the time of my fieldwork, described that leaders decided to combine the territorial 
with a political strategy, because they realised that they needed to participate in the 
municipal government in order to have more political leverage on the territorial 
question. While he also mentions access to health and education, he stressed that the 
basic political vision of the central was ‘to get the landowners, the hacendados out of 
local power’.52 The basic premise of the Chiquitano struggle is to secure the 
continuity of life of Chiquitano comunidades in the face of resource depletion and 
land-loss. Therefore, access to land has been the nodal point of Chiquitano-state 
interaction, especially since 1994, when the central of Concepción, San Javier and 
Lomerío decided to jointly claim the territory of Monte Verde. 
Conclusion 
This chapter outlined the conceptual framework employed in the thesis. It suggests 
that a conceptualisation of ‘state’ as power structure allows for the problematisation 
of the civil-society – state dichotomy. This also allows for a closer look at the 
processes involved in creating the state and a more detailed analysis of what 
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 For example, Javier Auyero (2000; 2002) has stressed the political dimension of the clientelist 
practices which members of Argentinean Peronist networks engage in. Sian Lazar (2004b; 2008) has 
also argued that citizenship in the Bolivian city of El Alto might involve clientelist practices, 
especially in a pre-election environment, when neighbourhood associations attempt to trade votes for 
projects or goods that might serve the collectivity of the neighbourhood. She argues that clientelism is 
engaging with the state via the politician  
52
 ‘…de sacar los propietarios, los hacendados de este poder local…’. Interview: Justo Seoane 
Parapaino, Concepción, 17 July 2007. 
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citizenship practices local populations engage in. Morton Fried’s notion that ‘the 
state is devoted to expansion’ (1967: 240) and Scott’s argument, that the ‘modern 
state’ attempted to make a society more ‘legible’ (1998: 2) help explain the nature 
and success of Hale’s (2002; 2004) indio permitido. It sheds light on how and why 
indigenous organisation at times act as part of the state, and how state activity 
impacts on the way that groups of the population can self-identify and organise. 
While this thesis emphasises citizenship as a set of practices, I argued that the 
normative aspect of citizenship remains important, as it provides an important tool, 
which people employ to address state actors and to demand changes to the prevalent 
framework of rights. In Bolivia, as in other Latin American states, citizenship is 
closely linked to ‘indigeneity’ – after all the special rights instituted under the neo-
liberal multicultural framework are reserved for those who self-identify and are 
officially recognised as indigenous or originario. In turn, Chiquitano leaders have 
come to employ the neo-liberal multicultural citizenship framework as a tool to 
organise their political campaigns, claim rights to territory, education and healthcare. 
As will be discussed in Chapter V, stressing ‘indigeneity’ became a tool to gain 
access to these rights and position Chiquitano in the wider sphere of the struggle for 
rights in Bolivia and Latin America as a whole.  
However, as authors have pointed out, this also means that states make the 
population, in this case the Chiquitano, more ‘legible’ through pressuring groups into 
taking up a state-sanctioned identity. This renders a significant part of a group’s 
cultures and histories invisible. Furthermore, while recognising certain rights the 
government denies other aspects of local indigenous struggles. Different state actors 
are complicit in creating this indio permitido-condition state bureaucratic bodies, 
NGOs allied to indigenous groups like the Chiquitano and even the Chiquitano 
leaders themselves.  
Lastly, the issue arises about how Chiquitano-state relations might changed 
and evolve further under the government of Evo Morales and MAS. This thesis 
suggests that in the locality of Concepción, the change in government has not led to a 
fundamental alteration in the relations as defined by the multicultural state reforms. 
Following the introduction of the conceptual framework, the next section introduces 
some key actors that form part of the state for Chiquitano comunarios. The 
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subsequent chapter introduces the methodological tools employed during fieldwork 
and the fieldwork setting. 
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Interlude: The State for the Chiquitano 
Among state actors in Concepción municipality are certain members of the 
Concepceño elite, the municipal government, some members of the sub-prefecture 
and prefecture, employees of several NGOs operating in the locality, Church actors, 
as well as the Chiquitano central itself. The following attempts to provide a clearer 
picture of the power structure that Chiquitano living in Concepción and the 
surrounding comunidades encounter. 
The power structures in Concepción are to a certain extent, mapped onto the 
spatial characteristics of the town. The centre forms the plaza with its imposing 
mission church complex and the two important state administrative institutions – the 
Mayor’s office and the Sub-prefecture’s office located on either side. Also around 
the main square are located several artisan shops, selling Chiquitano woven goods 
and wooden artefacts, a mission museum, a wood workshop, a shop and workshop 
producing and selling embroidery and weavings run by catholic nuns, a Cotel 
telephone shop, a hotel and several restaurants. After all, the church is a UNESCO 
world heritage site and Concepcion’s’ main tourist attraction, however, most tourists 
will not venture far from the main square.  
Photo 2: Concepción Mission Church 
Concepción mission church, with protesters demanding Indigenous autonomies, 30 June 
2007. 
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The unpaved red dust streets run in a grid pattern, which means that buildings 
form blocks, with patios out the back. As will be discussed in Chapter IV, this layout 
is a heritage from the Jesuit Mission period. While the buildings close to the main 
square are well build and generally well kept buildings, resembling those around the 
main square, some blocks further away are less elaborate (see Photo 3, below). This 
is partly because several of the houses closer to the square a have rooms to rent to 
tourists, and because the more affluent Concepceños live there. The population that 
lives in blocks closer to the plaza are predominantly European descendant whites or 
mestizos. 
Photo 3: Southern Side of Concepción Main Square 
 
The central and northern area of town, contrast with what I refer to as ‘Chiquitano 
area of town’. This starts about five or six blocks towards the south-east of the main 
square. Here, Chiquitano families live in most houses and the casas comunales 
(communal houses) are also located there. These are buildings paid for by the 
Church, which house Chiquitano students that study in Concepción, or any 
comunario who comes to Concepción and needs a place to stay. Most of the 
comunidades have their own communal house. Generally, houses in this area of town 
are less elaborate – with the exception of the newer buildings occupied by some of 
the NGOs and the one large hotel located towards the west of this area. The 
Chiquitano organisations and the NGOs cooperating with them (see below) all have 
their offices in this area. The Comité de Gestión del Territorio Indígena de Monte 
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Verde (CGTI-MV – Management Committee of the Indigenous Territory of Monte 
Verde) (see Chapter VI), is the exception and it’s office is in a different part of town 
– around three blocks north of the plaza close to Concepción’s hospital. 
Photo 4: A Street in the ‘Chiquitano Area’ of Town 
 
Apart from Chiquitano also other ethnic groups live in the municipality. The total 
indigenous population is 53.3 per cent. Apart from 5061 Chiquitano (34.9 per cent of 
the municipal population), the 2001 Census counted 321 Quechua Originarios (2.2 
per cent of the overall population), 90 Aymara Originarios (0.6 per cent), 87 
Guaranies (0.6 per cent of the overall population), 85 Mojenos (0.6 per cent) and 143 
(1 per cent) ‘other originary native’ among which are also Ayoreo people. Most 
Ayoreo people (around 330 in total) live, however, in Zapacó TCO and Indigenous 
Municipal District (DMI), which lies in the South of Concepción Municipality (see 
Gobierno Municipal de Concepción, 2007b: 3-4, 60; Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística, 2001).  
While Ayoreo have their own communal house directly next to that of the 
CICC headquarter, there is no frequent interaction between CICC leaders and 
Ayoreo visitors to and residents in the communal house. The CICC will, however, at 
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times coordinate with the Ayoreo federation to arrange transport to political 
activities, such as marches.53 Quechua and Aymara people live at the south-western 
outskirt of Concepción, in an area rich with small businesses (from general- to 
clothing- and hardware stores) and close to the only gas station in town. Several 
small businesses (again, small general stores or second hand clothing stalls) closer to 
the main square are also owned by Quechua and Aymara people.  
The Concepceño Elite 
The more affluent part of Concepción’s society also play a politically a mayor role. I 
call them ‘Concepceño elite’. According to Lacroix, the three most important and 
largest families are the Suarez, the Castedo and the Antelo who came to the area with 
the rubber boom. He observes that ‘they have maintained permanent interparty 
fighting that hides a fairly equal distribution of power. Every one of these large 
families maintains strong relations with related powerful families in Santa Cruz’ 
(2005: 46). This connection is especially visible during the yearly carnival 
celebrations, when many Santa Cruz families come to stay with their relatives in 
town. There are also several families of German decent. Some attracted two or three 
generations ago by the agricultural and cattle ranching opportunities, others are 
descendants of Jesuit Priests. 
The Concepceño elite displays pride in their European decent and their 
‘modern’, city-oriented outlook on life. This also involves regarding the Chiquitano 
population as lazy, backward and in need of development. A summary of a 
conversation I had with two Concepceño men (one of them my landlord) one warm 
evening in November 2006 outside a karaoke bar, exemplifies such attitudes. The 
men blamed Chiquitano for not being interested in money and ‘refusing to become 
developed’. They also repeated another common stance, namely that they did not see 
why the Chiquitano should have more land, if they were not putting it to ‘proper 
use’: they did not have a lot of cattle and were not planting crops in commercial 
quantities. Another common stereotype aimed to discredit Chiquitano political 
leaders. They maintained that the indigenous leaders were corrupt and that they were 
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 While this thesis does not cover the relationship between Chiquitano comunarios and other 
indigenous or originario groups in the municipality in depth, I acknowledge that this topic deserves 
more attention in a future study. The present study focuses more on the relations of Chiquitano and 
other groups via the lowland umbrella organisation. 
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exploiting the communities. Some Chiquitano leaders, they told me, owned land in 
the TCO Monte Verde and other places. They added that these leaders were 
clandestinely quite rich and kept on enriching themselves ‘abusing the trust of the 
comunarios’.54  
Discrediting Chiquitano leaders is not just talk. The concepceño elite are 
clearly interested in destroying confidence in Chiquitano leaders as they seek to 
maintain hold of the local political arena – and keep Chiquitano out of it. This was 
painfully evident in 2007, as they staged a successful coup against Chiquitano Mayor 
Justo Seoane (see Chapter VII). Lacroix delivers a damming verdict summarising his 
fieldwork experience in 2003. He notes that the elites have established  
… a caste system, in which it is hard to enter if you do not fulfil certain criteria: 
European blood, economic resources, and ambition for power. We could add 
dishonesty, because these families frequently act illegally (systematic embezzlement 
of funds in the political and economic institutions, illegal appropriation of lands, 
illegal commerce, quickly resorting to violence etc) and they live in secured 
impunity from the local institutions. From the cattle ranchers’ association to the 
barrios, all the organisations are directed or controlled by three powerful families 
(2005: 46, my translation).  
Further, he notes that members of the local Civic Committee (Comité Cívico) hold 
posts in all local institutions, while the Committee itself remains closed to 
Chiquitano people. Chiquitano leaders participation in elections for the Committee 
have so far been unsuccessful (2005: 47). As CICC President Manuel Peña pointed 
out: 
Generally, the Civic Committee is against us, is against the indigenous movement. 
There are problems above all with regards to the issue of land, the Original 
Community Land. The Civic Committee has lend itself to supporting the 
businessmen, calling the people to a paro cívico (strike) to mobilise against the 
indigenous central and their demands, against the rights of communal lands. This 
Committee supports the cattle ranchers (in Lacroix, 2005: 47, my translation). 
An interesting fact is that Concepción is the birthplace of former Bolivian right-wing 
dictator Hugo Banzer Suárez.55 This is a matter of pride for the local elite, which is 
testament to their political stance. The house where he was allegedly born has been 
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 Field note: Concepción, 6 November 2006. 
55
 Hugo Banzer Suárez held the Bolivian presidency as dictator from 1971 to 1978 and a second time 
as elected President from 1997 to 2001. He is the founder of the conservative party Acción 
Democrática Nacionalista (ADN – National Democratic Action).  
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turned into a museum and a giant statue was erected for him on one of the main street 
crossings just outside town. It features Banzer with a Chiquitano-style carved pillar. 
Photo 5: Hugo Banzer Suárez Statue 
 
Giant Banzer statue erected on the outskirts of Concepción, Bolivia. Author in the photo for 
a sense of scale.  
Photo by Lewis Taylor 
The Catholic Church in Concepción 
Apart from the Concepceño elite, the Catholic Church plays an important role in 
Concepcion’s’ social and political life and that of many Chiquitano comunidades. 
Travellers to Concepción, as well as to other ex-mission towns in the Chiquitanía 
mission circuit, cannot easily miss this importance. After all, their centres are formed 
by a plaza and the visually striking Mission Church with adjacent priests’ living 
compounds and wooden bell towers.  In Concepción, these lie to the eastern side of 
the church (see photos 3 and 6). The Parish owns many of the houses close to the 
main plaza, some of which it rents out to businesses such as cafes, restaurants or 
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souvenir shops. Like the mission church, these buildings are painted with brown, 
ochre and black ‘Chiquitano’ designs around their base, windows and door frames. 
Wooden pillars support the overhanging roofs, which are welcome for shade or 
refuge against torrential downpours, which might occur from October until March - 
the wettest and hottest months in the lowlands in the Eastern Lowlands in general.  
Photo 6: Side View of Concepción Mission Church 
 
Concepción Mission Church, with protesters demanding indigenous autonomies, 30 June 
2007. 
The priests and local bishop play an important religious role in Concepción and the 
comunidades. At times, they visit comunidades for the patron-Saint festival but also 
train comunarios in delivering church services in their own comunidades. Further, 
they are among the actors which provide productive and infrastructure projects to 
Chiquitano comunidades. These range from financing the installation of wells and 
health posts to loans and technical support for cattle and weaving cooperatives.  
The Church owns several artisan workshops which produce goods that are 
sold as ‘Chiquitano’ artefacts and they train Chiquitano in the production of these 
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objects. While the church helped set up small weaving projects primarily for women 
in a few comunidades, most artisan goods are produced in Concepción by the 
workers affiliated to the Asociación de Artesanos de Concepción (Associations of 
artisans of Concepción). The association provides technical assistance, credit and 
commercialises the goods. 80 per cent of all artisanal goods are bought by the Parish 
who then exhibits and sells them in their own shops. 20 per cent are sold in the 
artisan shops in other ex- missions (Gobierno Municipal de Concepción, 2007b: 67). 
The Church also supported comunidades in building chapels and new school 
buildings. In the TCO Monte Verde it was supporting the comunidades Palestina and 
Makanaté in building new adobe family houses to replace the ones made of wood 
and mud. In such projects, the Church helped with raw materials and the comunidad 
provided the manpower (‘dar aporte’). Comunario Miguel stated with regards to the 
projects that the Parish had supported in his comunidad Candelaria, one of the larger 
comunidades outside the TCO Monte Verde: 
I rather thank this institution that is the Parish because they were the ones that were 
helping, because of them we have the large school, we have a parish home, that we 
are also using as school rooms for the students, if we would not have this, until now 
we would have nowhere for the them to get lessons.56 
According to Lacroix, the business-orientation of the Priests causes ‘regular conflicts 
between the Church and the population, as the church is more interested in its 
financial affairs than in the maintenance of good relations with its believers’ (2005: 
47). Comunarios never mentioned to me that they had any types of ‘conflicts’ with 
the church. However, there is evidence that the priests share prejudices against 
Chiquitano with members of the concepceño elite and they certainly did not see their 
economic dealings with the comunidades as charitable acts. The few times I visited 
the local German Franciscan priest, he expressed that he thought that Chiquitano 
comunarios were lazy and that they only came to the Church when they wanted to 
borrow money. He stressed how much the Church had done for the comunidades and 
how ungrateful and forgetful Chiquitanos were in respect to these favours.57  
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 ‘Más bien yo agradezco a esta institución que es La Parroquia por que ellos fueron los que 
ayudaron, por ellos tenemos el colegio, el grande, tenemos el hogar parroquial que lo estamos 
utilizando de aulas también aurita para los alumnos, que si no tuviéramos eso, hasta el momento no 
tuviéramos donde pasen clases los alumnos’. Workshop: Candelaria, 10 May 2007. 
57
 For example, field notes: Concepción, 28 February 2007. 
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Apart from being concerned about its own finances, Lacroix maintains that 
the Church intervenes in the local political sphere and decision-making, and is 
therefore ‘caught in constant political struggles’ (2005: 47). Certainly, the local 
catholic priests did not keep their political opinions to themselves. When I first met 
the German Franciscan Priest in October 2006 and he asked me what I was doing in 
Concepción, I told him that I was carrying out research with the Chiquitano 
Organisations. He responded: ‘with these MAS supporters, these communists?’. 
Some weeks later, I witnessed that in his mass he was preaching against Evo Morales 
and the MAS government, saying that MAS wanted to weaken the Catholic Church, 
for example, by undermining their role in education. Various sources confirmed that 
this was not a single incident, but that the priests liked to mix political messages with 
their service.  
State Bureaucratic Institutions 
To the right of the Mission church, on the southern corner of the square, is the 
Alcaldía Municipal (Mayors’ office), at the time of research occupied by MAS 
Mayor Justo Seoane, a veteran of the Chiquitano movement (Seoane’s rise to power 
and the functioning of the municipal system will be addressed in Chapter VII). This 
was the local state bureaucratic instance that that Chiquitano leaders and comunarios 
had most contact with. Frequently, groups of Chiquitano leaders and comunarios 
were standing outside the building and often leaders would say that they were off to 
meet with Justo Seoane or other Chiquitano municipal officials – or with those local 
politicians sympathetic to whatever cause they were pursuing. The interaction 
generally focused on coordinating the different productive and infrastructure projects 
for comunidades which the town hall was supporting. 
For instance, comunarios from Santa Ana mentioned that the municipality 
financed their teacher, supported a housing project and a cattle ranching initiative.58 
Cattle ranching initiatives are quite popular among comunarios, one reason being 
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 Workshop: Santa Ana, group 2, 20 April 2007. Housing projects generally aimed at constructing 
houses that were made of adobe bricks and would then be plastered and painted. The parish and the 
national government through the ‘presidential fund’ were also carrying out ‘housing projects’ in some 
comunidades in the TCO Monte Verde. Generally, the comunarios are in charge of making the adobe 
bricks, while the project provider gives advice on how to build the houses and supplies any additional 
materials needed. These houses are supposed to provide better shelter and fewer habitats for the beetle 
that carries Chargas disease, which is known to live in paja roofs and between the wooden slats of 
Chiquitano houses. Workshop: Makanaté, 15 May 2007. 
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that they provide milk for the children and allow comunarios to produce cheese.59 
Additionally, the comunarios see cattle as a source of cash income to turn to in case 
of harvest failure, which signifies that they do not need to seek employment on a 
local cattle ranch. The sale of cattle also pays for the costs incurred by sending 
children to college in the ex-mission settlements (Balza Alarcón, 2001: 229). 
Nevertheless, from the comunarios perspective, the utility of such development 
schemes will depend on the impact on their ability to subsist (see below).  
Another state bureaucratic instance with seat in the locality was the Sub-
Prefecture, at the time of fieldwork led by PODEMOS-backed sub-Prefect Nataniel 
Castedo Trujillo. Comunarios stated that they had no direct contact with the Sub-
prefecture, as comunario from Makanaté noted: ‘…we hardly have coordination and 
they do not visit us’.60 The lack of interaction is likely due to the very opposing 
political views that the sub-prefect – a member of the Concepceño elite – and 
Chiquitano leaders hold. At the time of fieldwork, these opposing views were being 
publicly played out through the sub-prefects and Chiquitano leaders opposing claims 
to autonomy. The sub-prefect, in line with other members of the concepceño elite 
and departmental leaders, was a supporter of the departmental autonomy claim. He 
made his position abundantly clear when staging a pro-autonomy rally in the sub-
prefecture on 2 July 2007 to support the departmental wide paro cívico (civic strike) 
aimed at pressuring the Bolivian government into acknowledging departmental 
autonomies in the new constitution. Green- and white Cruceño flags adorned the 
building (and the neighbouring Church, perhaps attesting to the political allegiance 
of the priests) and large speakers blasted out pro-autonomy songs. 
A further state bureaucratic instance that some Chiquitano interact with is the 
Prefecture of Santa Cruz. Those comunarios who mentioned that they had contact 
with the Prefecture where from San Javier municipality – comunarios from 
Concepción, in contrast, were adamant that they had no such contact. Comunarios 
from Rosario in San Javier municipality specified that the Prefecture was helping 
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 Workshop: Las Abras, 17 April 2007. Generally, through such projects the comunidad receives two 
or more cows and one bull. After a certain amount of time, usually five or six years, the comunidad 
returns the original number of cattle that they received and then these are passed on to another 
comunidad. Such projects often involve some credit to buy wire to enclose pastures and veterinary 
implements. See Balza Alarcón for similar projects among Chiquitano communities (2001: 229). 
Apart from the municipality, the ‘presidential fund’, parish and central with the help of NGOs, and 
some years previously the Bolivian milk company PIL, also supported such projects. 
60
 ‘…casi no tenemos coordinación y no nos visitan’. Workshop: Makanaté, 15 May 2007. 
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them in the maintenance of the paths and had built a bridge for them. They had also 
asked for electricity and water provision.61 The comunarios saw it as positive change 
that the Prefecture was now considering them:  
Before they did not come and we did not even know them. Now they come here and 
here one asks them for things that one needs, as we asked them for the path… and it 
will be done in two months from this date, it will be evened out.62 
Another comunario noted ‘yesterday we talked about that now we are not alone any 
more, now we have…that the Prefecture comes and keeps an eye on whether things 
go well, if they are carried out’.63 The comunarios further explained that Rubén 
Costas – the departmental Prefect – had even come to the comunidad twice in 
person.64 This sudden interest from the side of the Prefecture in the affairs of 
Chiquitano comunidades in San Javier municipality did not go unnoticed from 
Chiquitano leaders. Such maintenance work was usually carried out by the 
municipality or with NGO funding. Margarita the coordinator of the CGTI-MV 
suspected that this had to do with convincing comunarios to support the departmental 
autonomy campaign in an effort to de-politicise the comunidades.65 Such political 
manoeuvres are a testament to ongoing and persistent clientelist tactics employed by 
different political actors operating in the department.  
Non-Governmental Organisations 
NGOs also formed an important state actor for many comunidades. They provided 
welfare, agricultural advisory services and juridical aid and attempted to promote the 
comunidades economic development.66 The following description limits itself to the 
three NGOs that were most active in the area at the time of fieldwork. The NGO with 
the longest presence in the area is Apoyo Para el Campesino-Indígena del Oriente 
Boliviano (APCOB – Support for the Indigenous Peasant of Eastern Bolivian). The 
NGO was founded in Santa Cruz de la Sierra in 1980 by German Jesuit Jürgen 
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 Workshop: Las Abras, 17 April 2007. 
62
 ‘Antes no venían ni siquiera lo conocíamos. Ahora ya llega hasta aquí y aquí uno le piden las cosas 
que necesita, como decir aquí le pedimos que el camino… y será cumplida de aquí a unos meses más 
va a estar rispiado’. Workshop: Las Abras, 17 April 2007. 
63
 ‘… ayer hablábamos que ya no estamos solos, ya tenemos que…la prefectura viene y vigila si las 
cosas andan bien, si se cumplen’. Workshop: Las Abras, 17 April 2007. 
64
 Workshop: Las Abras, 17 April 2007. 
65
 Field notes: San Javier, 17 April 2007.  
66
 This following description excludes the CEJIS, as the role of this NGO is amply addresses in the 
Methodological Appendix. 
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Riester. It has since engaged in supporting lowland indigenous groups in 
campaigning for the recognition of territorial rights, customary rights, formulating 
ethnodevelopment strategies and through productive projects. APCOB has also 
carried out and provided a platform for research regarding lowland indigenous 
peoples with the aim of raising awareness and respect for lowland groups.67 Even 
before Riester founded APCOB, he has been active in promoting organisational 
activities among lowland groups and he was key figure in the emergence of the 
Bolivian lowland federations (see Chapter V).  
APCOB has its headquarters in Santa Cruz, but has some regional offices, 
one of them in Concepción. The Concepción office is a beautiful large white-washed 
building with wooden beams and carved pillars, and a large carved wooden APCOB 
sign over its entrance. The building houses offices for the local APCOB staff, a 
documentation centre and a radio room. In the latter, a Chiquitano radio engineer 
worked on creating programmes for the Chiquitano radio station which the regional 
Chiquitano Umbrella Organisation Organización Indígena Chiquitana (OICH – 
Chiquitano Indigenous Organisation) was getting up and running.  
APCOB had supported comunidades in Lomerío with forestry management 
projects (albeit with questionable success, see McDaniel (2003)), and had in 1999 
started to help comunidades in the TCO Monte Verde, by establishing communal 
forestry management plans (see APCOB, n/d).68 At the time of fieldwork, such plans 
were functioning in only one or two comunidades within the TCO. Comments from 
comunarios from Santa Ana, a small comunidad in the TCO Monte Verde in San 
Javier municipality, serve to highlight why such plans may be contentious and fail. 
APCOB had proposed a forestry management project to them some weeks before, 
and the comunarios were debating the pros and cons of such a plan. One comunario 
noted:  
We will have to see because we have to analyse between all of us if it will benefit us, 
if it is good … because on the one hand is good to also have [it] and partly it is also 
bad, because the truth [is] that we have to be very careful with the management 
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 APCOB’s main funders and partner include the European Union, different German, Dutch and 
Belgium development organisations and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF). See APCOB 
(www.apcob.org.bo) and Yashar (2005: 201). 
68
 Workshop: Makanaté, 15 May 2007. APCOB was founded by German anthropologist Jürgen 
Riester, had interacted with the CICC since its foundation. It was generally active in the Bolivian 
lowlands, in aiding the organisational efforts of the lowland indigenous movement. 
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because it is not just having it, we have to be very careful. On the other hand it is 
good because it creates a source of work for the sector.69 
Another comunario added: ‘We have to be very careful with the management. Then 
you cannot chaquear [make and work your fields], you cannot burn … we have to 
analyse it’.70 Thus, the possibility to have a ‘source of work’ and ‘resources’ was 
measured against ‘not being able to clear the forest to make fields’. Despite such set-
backs, APCOB was still aiming to provide such projects.  
A further NGO with constant presence in Concepción was the Bolivian 
Centro de Estudios Jurídico Investigación Social (CEJIS – Centre for Legal and 
Social Studies). CEJIS is an NGO that specialises in the promotion of human rights 
and was founded in 1978. Its’ staff is composed mainly of lawyers and social 
scientists and the NGO’s work has focused on raising awareness about collective and 
individual rights and on supporting different population groups in exercising these 
rights and developing political strategies.71 Throughout the 1990s, CEJIS has been 
involved in organising workshops to inform different ‘disadvantaged’ groups about 
the content of the LPP and the decentralisation law, to advise them on how to use the 
newly opened political spaces and on how they could gain access to municipal 
resources. CEJIS has also developed a specialism in providing legal support to 
different indigenous, peasant and landless groups to support their struggles for titles 
to land and territory.  
It publishes books on highland and lowland indigenous political issues and 
has documented indigenous and peasant territorial and land struggles. A comunario 
from the comunidad Rosario in San Javier Municipality summed up APCOB’s and 
CEJIS’ roles:  
… if we look at the top, there are the NGOs that go with the central, ALAS and the 
CEJIS … where we can voice our concerns about how we live in our pueblo, which 
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 ‘Habría que ver porque nosotros tenemos que analizar entre todos si es que nos va a beneficiar, si 
es bueno…por que en parte es bueno también tener y en parte también es malo, porque la verdad hay 
que tener mucho cuidado con el manejo porque no es no más tenerlo, hay que cuidar mucho. Por otra 
parte es bueno porque cría fuentes de trabajo en el mismo sector’. Workshop: Santa Ana, 20 April 
2007. 
70
 ‘…hay que tener mucho cuidado con el manejo. Ya usted no puede chaquear ya no puede 
quemar…hay que analizar’. Workshop: Santa Ana, 20 April 2007. 
71
 The NGO is largely dependent on international funding organisations, such as Oxfam Great Britain 
and America and Danish and German development corporations, as well as EU funding. 
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suffering we feel, how they exploit us, and where we are also going to learn and they 
teach us also what an autonomy is.72 
At the time of fieldwork, the NGO was run by Argentinean human rights lawyer 
Leonardo Tamburini. A team of about six CEJIS employees was working 
permanently on advising indigenous and campesino leaders and Constituent 
Assembly members on policy proposals and the wording and content of proposals for 
the constitutional text. Another team were supporting the Chiquitano centrals in 
Concepción, San Javier and Lomerío in the last phase of their territorial claim, and 
THEY were running a project that focused on developing a proposal for the future 
governmental structures that would be implemented in the claimed territory (see 
Chapter III). This last area – research, or elaborating diagnósticos, for example on 
communal justice procedures, leadership election, or the trajectory of political 
struggles – is another area CEJIS specialises in. While the CEJIS headquarter is in 
Santa Cruz, it has some regional offices – one of these in Concepción. The 
Concepción office is located away from the town centre close to the Chiquitano 
central. It is an inconspicuous small concrete building, surrounded by high concrete 
walls. That this building is marked by a very small and inconspicuous wooden sign is 
testimony to the tense relation that CEJIS staff has with many Concepceños and 
Cruceños. They denounce them as ‘lefties’ who stir up trouble by politicising the 
indigenous population. This issue is addressed in more detail in the following 
chapter. 
The British NGO Plan International was also very visible in the area, 
especially through their white four-by-four vehicles with the blue ‘Plan’ logo on the 
side. The NGO generally provided support in the area of infrastructure, education, 
early child development, health and leadership workshops. Don Víctor, from 
Candelaria one of the larger comunidades in Concepción municipality outside Monte 
Verde, proved very positive about the interaction with the NGO: ‘It works very well, 
coordinates with us and has carried out projects that benefit us’.73 While Plan did not 
run projects in all comunidades, this particular comunidad had especially benefitted 
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 ‘Si vamos por arriba, está la ONG’s que va con la central, ALAS y la CEJIS … donde vamos a dar 
la inquietud de cómo vivimos en nuestro pueblo, que sufrimiento sentimos, cómo nos explotan y en 
donde vamos también a aprender y nos enseñan también que es una autonomía.’ Workshop: Las 
Abras, 17 April 2007. 
73
 ‘…que trabaja muy bien y coordina con nosotros, y a hecho obras que nos benefician a nosotros’. 
Workshop: Candelaria, 10 May 2007. 
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from Plan activities, counting with a Plan-financed ‘library’ and water-piping system 
built 2003 – 2004 with the help of Plan and the municipal government.  
NGOs do not only interact with individual comunidades, but also with the 
Chiquitano centrales. These cooperate very closely with NGOs in delivering 
different projects to comunidades. NGOs either provided finance to the central 
leaders who would then implement the project, or implemented the projects 
themselves, but under central control. In fact, the CICC leaders often insisted that no 
activities should happen in the comunidades without their consent and cooperation.74 
This interaction with NGO and other state instances was crucial task of Chiquitano 
leaders as the following comments by Hugo Hurtado, the CICC Communication and 
Health Secretary, indicates: ‘we are always knocking at the doors of other 
organisations, so that they collaborate with us in logistic matters [and] in training’.75 
Comunarios also stressed that it was the central’s tasks to help ‘acquire’ projects for 
the comunidades. For example, Miguel a comunario from the Candelaria comunidad 
in Concepción municipality noted during a workshop sessions: 
Well, currently the Organisation CICC represents all the comunidades of 
Concepción, through them, they canalise the projects for the comunidades, or let’s 
say for the benefit of the comunidades.76 
The central advised comunidades on projects – or on rare occasions also business 
deals – which they had arranged themselves. A comunario from Rosario, a 
comunidad in San Javier municipality explained:  
[The leaders] are there to advise us, to know what a forestation is, to know how you 
can live in a community, which trees you have to fell or how you can solve a 
problem or which business [to do] or how this comunidad can carry on doing it’s 
business…77 
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 Field notes: Palestina, 1 March 2007. See, Workshop: Las Abras, 17 April 2007. 
75
 ‘Siempre nosotros tocamos puertas a otra instancia, para que nos colaboren en lo logístico, en 
capacitaciones’. Interview: Alta Mira, 23 Januray 2007. 
76
 ‘Bueno actualmente la organización CICC representa a todas las comunidades de Concepción, a 
través de ellos, ellos canalizan proyectos para las comunidades, o sea en beneficio de las 
comunidades’. Workshop: Candelaria, 10 May 2007. 
77
 ‘Están para asesorarnos, para saber que es una forestación, para saber cómo se puede vivir dentro 
de una comunidad, que de desmonte hay que hacer o como se puede arreglar un problema o qué 
negocios o cómo puede continuar esa comunidad haciendo sus negocio…’. Workshop: Las Abras, 17 
April 2007. 
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NGOs like Oxfam Great Britain and America provide finances not only for projects, 
but also to keep the organisation running. Some of their initiatives were aimed at 
improving the central’s role in the management of service and project provision.78  
Further, APCOB and CEJIS staff was frequently present in central meetings. 
For example, Lorenzo Pasabare a CEJIS employee and former central leader, often 
dropped in to see what was going on in the CICC to coordinate activities and 
discover whether items of the agenda needed to be discussed or be organised jointly. 
Further, once a year APCOB and CEJIS held planning meetings with the central, in 
which central leaders, OICH leaders, CGTI-MV and NGO personnel discussed the 
programmes that they carried out in the Chiquitanía. New projects and proposals are 
introduced, criticised or approved. Meetings also occur at the start and end of 
projects, as well as other stages within project cycles to fulfil planning and 
evaluation criteria. These are either held in the centrales, the office of the respective 
NGO in Concepción, or the regional headquarters in Santa Cruz. That APCOB and 
CEJIS cooperated with the central closely was also obvious from the fact that they 
shared personnel. At the time of fieldwork one of the central technicians also worked 
for APCOB, who paid his wage. As CICC leader Mauro Cuasace summed up: ‘we 
have support from the technicians, for example CEJIS, and other institutions, not just 
in the economic [matters] but also to help in organisational [matters]’.79 
Lowland Indigenous Umbrella Organisations 
Other actors to add to the web of agents Chiquitano leaders and comunarios 
interacted with are the lowland indigenous umbrella organisations, i.e. the 
Coordinadora de los Pueblos Étnicos de Santa Cruz (CPESC - Coordinating Body 
for the Ethnic People of Santa Cruz), the Confederación Indígena del Oriente, Chaco 
y Amazonía de Bolivia (CIDOB – Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of the West, 
Chaco and Amazonia), both with offices in Santa Cruz, and the OICH, which is 
based in Concepción. The OICH is the umbrella organisation of the twelve 
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 Interview: Mauro Cuasace (CICC leader) Concepción, 23 January 2007. 
79
 ‘Tenemos apoyo de los técnicos como, por ejemplo CEJIS, y otras instituciones, no solo para ver lo 
económico si no para coadyuvar en lo organizativo’. Interview: Concepción, 23 January 2007. 
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Chiquitano organisations of the Gran Chiquitanía and was founded in 1995. The 
OICH in turn, forms part of the CPESC, which again is affiliated to the CIDOB.80  
OICH leaders and their technicians were at the forefront of the struggle for 
indigenous rights in the lowlands and provided their affiliated centrales with 
assistance in their territorial and political struggles. The leaders of the OICH and the 
central in Concepción were in frequent contact to coordinate political activities and 
projects. At the time of fieldwork, OICH leaders were constantly liaising with 
CPESC and CIDOB leaders to discuss the progress of the Constituent Assembly and 
organise marches and protests to pressure for the inclusion of their demands into the 
constitutional text. As another comunario from Las Abras explained:  
… like the central they get together, they say ‘we are going to gather in the OICH’, 
no? … the leaders get together and from there they leave to report to us, all these 
organisations, the OICH gets together with all those in the surroundings, for 
example, all the centrales of this area…81 
Central leaders at times also liaised directly with the umbrella organisations CPESC 
and CIDOB. Leaders of the umbrella organisations and the centrales regularly meet 
to discuss political ideas, elaborated strategies, define political concepts and plan 
direct political actions, such as marches. For example, in 2007, CPESC and CIDOB 
leaders and leaders from the affiliated organisations repeatedly met and debated and 
defined the concept of ‘indigenous autonomy’. They also developed a strategy to 
lobby for the inclusion of the CIDOB’s proposals into the Constituent Assembly 
debates. Again, after meetings with the umbrella organisations, leaders were 
expected to share relevant information among other leaders and the comunarios.82  
The Chiquitano Central of Concepción 
The last important actor that Chiquitano comunarios had frequent contact with was 
their grassroots Organisation, or ‘central’. It encompasses the forty-five Chiquitano 
comunidades of Concepción municipality and represents these legally established 
comunidades before local, departmental and national state authorities. Comunarios 
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 The CIDOB at international level is affiliated to the Coordinadora de Organizaciones Indígenas de 
la Cuenca Amazónica (COICA – Coordinating Body for Indigenous Organisations of the Amazon 
Basin). 
81
 ‘… también como central se reúnen, dicen ‘vamos a reunirnos en la OICH’ no? … los dirigentes se 
reúnen y de ahí ya salen para que nos comuniquen, todas esas organizaciones, la OICH se junta con 
todos los alrededores, por ejemplo de todas las centrales de esta zona…’. Workshop: Las Abras, 17 
April 2007. 
82
 Workshop: Las Abras, 17 April 2007. 
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often stressed that it is also the legal entity that carries the territorial claim.83 As a 
Comunaria from Tierra Nueva, a small comunidad in San Javier municipality noted: 
‘they have searched for us where we can work and the slavery like before has 
finished. And this is why I thank them because of them we have our land’.84 (The 
aspect of ‘freedom from slavery’ and emergence of the organisation will be 
addressed in Chapter V).  
The central’s headquarter is in the Chiquitano area of town, in a white-
washed brick building with a metal roof, which Comunarios, leader and their allies 
also refer to as ‘the central’. The central in Concepción has four rooms. One of them 
is larger and is where the central holds asambleas and other meetings. There is also a 
yard, which sometimes serves for meetings as well. It also has a documentation 
room, in which birth certificates, land titles, a variety of books and other documents 
were held. There are also copies of studies and documents on the territory, 
indigenous politics and territorial management, as well as children’s books written in 
Chiquitano. It also has a computer room and internet access. 
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 See, Workshop: Turux Napez, 19 April 2007; Workshop: Santa Ana, 20 April 2007; Interview: 
Guillermo Cuasase (OTB Santa Mónica), Santa Mónica, 22 Januray 2007.  
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 ‘…la gente de la central para mi esto es bien no, por que ellos nos han buscado donde nosotros 
tengamos para trabajar y se acabe la esclavitud como antes, por eso yo les agradezco por que, por 
ellos es que tenemos nuestra tierra’. Workshop: Comunaria form Tierra Nueva, Turux Napez, 19 
April 2007. 
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Photo 7: The CICC Headquarter (Central) 
 
The central building (right) in Concepción, Bolivia. 
The organisation is composed of ‘base’ and ‘leaders’. The ‘base’ includes every 
comunario or Chiquitano who does not hold a leadership position within the 
organisation. Chiquitano leaders (dirigentes) occupy different roles or offices within 
the organisation. They are also often referred to as the ‘secretaries’ of certain 
working areas, e.g., ‘Secretary for Gender’ or ‘Secretary for Land and Territory’.85 
They can be men or women; however in all three centrales more men occupy these 
positions. The highest office in the central in Concepción is the ‘president’. The 
president is also the legal representative of the Chiquitano organisation.86 The 
directory (the leaders and the president of the central), are elected every four years in 
a Great Assembly of representatives of the various comunidades affiliated to the 
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 In the following, I translate ‘dirigente’ as ‘leader’, but ‘dirigente/ secretario de salud’ as ‘health 
secretary’. Many comunarios also use the term ‘líder’ to refer to the religious leaders of a comunidad. 
A comunaria from Santa Ana noted that she got confused by the use of the term liderazgo by 
personnel of the NGO Proceso in a leadership workshop for women. She thought that ‘líder’ had a 
religious function until she was told that the NGO used the term liderazgo and ‘líder’ to refer to 
political leaders. Workshop: Santa Ana, 20 April 2007. Comunarios generally refer to political leaders 
as ‘dirigente’ or ‘autoridades’. 
86
 Interview: Lorenzo Pasabare, Concepción, 1 June 2007. 
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CICC.87 The leaders work closely together with the so-called ‘técnicos’ or ‘técnicas’ 
(technicians). They are either hired by the central or provided by NGOs and support 
its activities by providing outside expertise, either permanently or for the duration of 
a certain project. For example, there are several forestry engineers (at least one is an 
APCOB employee) and a technician, who help the central in organisational matters. 
They helped organise meetings, structure them, write important items on the white-
board and took the minutes.88 Another post in the central was that of the coordinator, 
who performs an administrative function and the leaders appoint him or her 
internally. Lastly, there were the secretaries that the central employs. Leaders, 
technicians and administrative staff – who can often be encountered in the central 
building – are also often referred to as the ‘central’.  
Apart from everyday interaction between the people who form the central, 
activities are organised by the central through ‘open’ or ‘closed’ meetings. ‘Open’ 
meetings are those that comunarios, leaders, technicians and NGO members can 
attend. The central held weekly, monthly, quarterly and annually ‘planning’ or 
‘evaluation’ open meetings. They are held to plan the leaders’ and technicians’ 
activities, to announce important events, inform the grassroots about political 
processes at department or national level, or are called to coordinate group action, 
such as assemblies or marches. 
Besides arranging projects for the comunidades the central also fulfilled other 
important roles. It was generally there to ‘solve their problems’ and ‘looked after’ the 
affiliated comunidades.89 In this respect, comunarios and leaders often stressed that 
the central advanced their causes and solves their problems on a more political level, 
not least because it can ‘bring the comunarios together’. As a comunario from 
Candelaria noted:  
When the CICC was founded it was with the idea that it had to support the 
indigenous people, because by ourselves we could not. Now with our organisation 
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 Lorenzo Pasabare explained that the idea is that the first year is to learn and the other three years ‘to 
exercise’ the post. Every comunidad presented their candidates and the one with most votes would 
become President. The first three or four most important posts, such as President and Secretary of 
Land and Territory, were elected in a secret ballot. The others were elected in an open vote, by a 
simple show of hands. Interview: Lorenzo Pasabare, Concepción, 1 June 2007. 
88
 Most lowland indigenous organisations have such technicians, who provide support or for certain 
projects as coordinators or consultants. 
89
 Workshop: Candelaria, 10 May 2007; Interview: Lorenza Rodriguez (CICC technician), Candelaria, 
19 Januray 2007.  
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we can start a fight, because with all the comunidades, they call an assembly to solve 
the problems.90 
Nicolás from the same comunidad stated something similar:  
Well, for me the central is above all, the principal matrix, whose obligation it is to 
strive for all the comunidades, those that are affiliated as well as those who are not, 
also to defend the rights that correspond to everyone as a human being. Also 
amongst all the comunidades we support the CICC, so that it stands up firmly. Up to 
the moment the CICC is working vey well.91 
Further, as already mentioned, the central was supposed to ‘provide information’ to 
the comunidades and keep them informed about any political and economical 
developments in the area (and at national level) that might affect the comunarios.92 
As the CICC Health and Communication Secretary Hugo Hurtado noted: ‘one as 
leader has the obligation to inform the base’.93 As a comunario noted:  
… it is like the compañero says, that we always have to direct ourselves after the 
leaders of our centrales, because we are [here] for that, that they direct us and we 
also understand that they inform us.94  
The central also organises training workshops in the comunidades, for example to 
enhance female comunarios’ leadership skills, as well as providing stipends for 
children to attend schools and university.95 Consequently, many of the leaders and 
technicians mentioned that the central had been an important ‘training ground’ for 
their professional and political careers. For example, the OTB of Santa Rita, Pedro 
Solis Pinto, a former central leader and at the time of fieldwork helping out in a 
CEJIS project (see Chapter III), explained to me how important the formal and 
                                                 
90
 ‘Cuando recién se fundó la CICC, fue con el sistema que tenia que apoyar a la gente indígena, por 
que solo no podíamos. Ahora con nuestra organización tenemos como empezar una lucha, por que 
con todas las comunidades ellos llaman a asamblea para resolver los problemas’. Workshop: 
Candelaria, 10 May 2007. 
91
 ‘Bueno para mí la central es más que toda la matriz principal, la cual su obligación es velar por 
todas las comunidades, tanto por las que están afiliadas como las que no están, también para 
defender los derechos que le corresponden a cada uno como ser humano. También entre todas las 
comunidades le ponemos el hombro a la CICC para que se pare fuerte, hasta el momento la CICC 
esta trabajando muy bien. Esta ayudando en la carnetizacion, en salud … ayudando con becas de 
estudio a los jóvenes para otros países’. Workshop: Candelaria, 10 May 2007. 
92
 Workshop: Comunario from Tierra Nueva, Turux Napez, 19 April 2007; Interview: Hugo Hurtado 
(CICC Health and Communication Secretary), Alta Mira, 23 January 2007. 
93
 ‘Uno como dirigente tiene la obligación de informar a las bases’. Interview: Alta Mira, 23 Januray 
2007. 
94
 ‘…es como dice el compañero que nosotros siempre debemos dirigirnos a los dirigentes de nuestras 
centrales, por que para eso estamos para que ellos nos dirijan, y nosotros también comprendamos lo 
que ellos nos informan’. Workshop: Comunario from Tierra Nueva, Turux Napez, 19 April 2007. 
95
 See, Workshop: Makanaté, 15 May 2007; Workshop: Candelaria, 10 May 2007. 
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informal training he had received through the central had been for his political 
awareness: 
… so, in this moment I was exercising a post in the [central] directory which was 
my first experience, for example, of fighting and seeing so many problems that have 
presented us, no? and there I kept learning many things… and having contact with 
older and professional people, like lawyers, engineers… also the Organisation has 
been a part of school for me, because there I have learned many things that I did not 
learn in college. So I have learned many things, and also training in many different 
areas, for example, how to defend your own organisation. I did not know what my 
rights were but thanks to the assessors we have learned.96 
Also many CGTI-MV and CICC técnicos expressed in interviews that central made 
it possible for them to go to university and that they continued learning when 
working for the central. 
Furthermore, comunarios asked the central for help if problems arose 
between comunarios or comunidades which could not be resolved at the comunidad 
level. Comunarios also approached the central if a comunario was seriously ill and 
needed medication or transport. The central also assists comunarios in legal matters: 
if a comunario has trouble with the law, officials of the municipality call in. Central 
leaders to help resolve the matter.97 Moreover, the central aids comunarios in getting 
legal documents, such as identification cards.98  
As can be concluded from the above, the central fulfils many functions for 
comunarios that state bureaucratic institutions fulfil for other citizens in the locality. 
As such they fulfil ‘state’ functions. That Chiquitano interact with such an array of 
actors that form part of the state power structure in Concepción also determined my 
methodology for exploring Chiquitano-state relations, addressed in the following 
chapter. It was of a necessarily multi-sited character reflecting the fragmented nature 
of the state power structure, as well as the geographical dispersion of Chiquitano 
comunidades in the municipality. 
                                                 
96
 ‘Entonce en ese momento yo estaba ejerciendo el cargo en la dirigencia y fue mi primera 
experiencia ejemplo de lucha y ver tanto problema que se no ha presentado ¿no? y ahí fui 
aprendiendo mucha cosa… y tener contacto con persona mayores y profesionales, como ser 
abogados, ingenieros… también la organización ha sido como una parte de escuela para mi, por que 
de ahí he aprendido mucha cosa que yo en el colegio no la aprendía ¿no? Entonce he aprendido 
mucha cosa y también capacitándose uno en diferente área ejemplo no, como defender a su misma 
organización. …no sabia era mi derecho pero a través de los asesores que gracia a ellos hemos 
aprendido…’. Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007. 
97
 Interview: Lorenzo Pasabare, Concepción, 1 June 2007. 
98
 Workshop: Candelaria, 10 May 2007. 
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Chapter III 
Methodology: Of Multi-Sitedness, Shifting Positionalities and the 
Politics of Research 
Following the clarification of concepts employed in this thesis, this chapter aims to 
ground this study by providing a methodological discussion, regarding the ‘multi-
sited’ ethnographic fieldwork I carried out from September 2006 until August 2007, 
mainly in the eastern Bolivian municipality of Concepción. A fieldworker should lay 
open their activities in the field and methods used, so the reader gains enough clarity 
about the conditions in which the research was carried out and about the origin of the 
featured data. This is, as Firth’s noted in the 1930s, because:  
… even the simplest record of what purports to be the “facts” of a native culture has 
involved a considerable amount of interpretation, and every generalization about 
what the people do has meant a selection from the immeasurably wide field of their 
activity, a comparison of items of individuals behaviour (1936: 3). 
In this spirit, this chapter provides a personal narrative of how I developed my 
research question, as well as explaining methodological choices I made. It reflects 
upon the multi-sited nature of my research, which allowed for the study of the state 
power structure for Chiquitano as enacted by different actors and in different sites.1 
While many of the state actors reside in Concepción, the Chiquitano comunidades 
themselves are distributed throughout the rest of the municipal territory. Further, 
state actors may move around and engage with other state and non-state actors in 
different geographical settings. Two of the sites I conducted research in, were 
distinct research projects: one run by Comité de Gestión del Territorio Indígena de 
Monte Verde (CGTI- MV – Management Committee of the Indigenous Territory of 
Monte Verde) and the other, by the NGO Centro de Estudios Jurídico Investigación 
Social (CEJIS – Centre for Legal and Social Studies). The projects not only formed 
part of state actor activities, but my cooperation with the project researchers also 
provided me with access to data gathered through more structured methods of data 
collection. 
                                                 
1
 Also compare Lucero’s (2008) methodology for investigating state-indigenous relations in Bolivia 
and Ecuador. This also led him to carry out fieldwork in different sites, follow indigenous leaders 
around and spend time working in NGOs collaborating with indigenous movements.  
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Additionally, the chapter reflects on the multiple subject positions I adopted, 
or that were ascribed to me, in the field. I argue that research ethics depend on the 
social and cultural context that a researcher encounters. In other words, ‘ethical 
conduct’, presentation of self, and what constitutes appropriate research methods, are 
all linked to the socio-cultural context of a researchers field sites. For this reason, this 
chapter goes beyond dealing with methodological issues to describe how different 
actors in the locality presented themselves to each other. This is also a further 
introduction to the local socio-political structures. The final section reflects on the 
implication of working on the ‘side’ of ‘the Chiquitano’ and their allies. I argue, that 
taking up the position of an advocate as a methodological choice, must be 
distinguished from a personal moral position, while I acknowledge that these may 
coincide. I hold, that by treating the state as a power structure and focusing on the 
relations between actors, allows me to move beyond my advocate position during 
fieldwork in the writing up process.  
What I Set out to Research, Why and How 
My choice of research question and case study location were informed, apart from 
scholarly literature, by experiences I had before I was a graduate student and a pre-
fieldwork mission to Bolivia. In 2003 and 2005, I worked as an intern and seminar 
assistant for a German NGO.2 It organised workshops for members of different 
Bolivian state agencies during which the delegates compared the Bolivian 
decentralised system to that of the German one. They were supposed to find ways of 
facilitating the coordination between the Bolivian decentralised state instances and 
making the institutions more citizen-friendly. Reflecting on what I learned developed 
into a research interest in how (decentralised) political institutions impact on 
                                                 
2
 The NGO Internationale Weiterbildung und Entwicklung gGmbH (Inwent – Capacity Building 
International) Inwent was founded in 2003 through a merger of the Carl Duisberg Gesellschaft e.V. 
(CDG) und the German Foundation for International Development (DSE). Inwent has it’s headquarter 
in Bonn, Germany, and operates in the field of international development. It is one of the 
decentralised implementing institutions of the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(BMZ). 60 per cent of the work Inwent carries out is commissioned by the Ministry. However, Inwent 
may also get commissioned for projects from other actors, such UN institutions, the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) or the German business sector (see Inwent, 2010). Due to its close relationship 
with the German Government the ‘non-governmental’ nature of the organisation is highly debatable.  
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populations and in turn, how populations interact with and perceive state 
bureaucratic levels.3 
To find a research location to investigate indigenous-state relations, I set out 
in May 2006 for a one-month long pre-fieldwork mission to Bolivia. Initially, I relied 
on Bolivian contacts resident in La Paz, who I had met at the workshops in Germany, 
and some of the staff of German international development institutions.4 I decided to 
concentrate my reconnaissance efforts on the Chiquitanía in the Santa Cruz 
department, along with two other departments. I travelled to the capital of Santa Cruz 
department: Santa Cruz de la Sierra (generally simply referred to as Santa Cruz). 
Here, I received help from Carlos Echegoyen, an employee of the Deutscher 
Entwicklungsdienst (DED – German Development Service), who later helped me 
gain ‘access’ to the Chiquitano organisations.  
Carlos was a sociologist trained in conflict mediation and deployed by the 
DED to work for the Santa Cruz-based NGO CEJIS.5 He had supported CEJIS and 
the Chiquitano Organisations in the protection and execution of indigenous rights 
and conflict mediation since 2005. I learned from Carlos and his colleagues that 
among ‘hot topics’ in the region were land-problems, the conflicts surrounding 
claims to Tierras Comunitarias de Origen (TCOs –Original Communal Lands) and 
                                                 
3
 Initially, I was particularly interested in the validity of claims by scholars that decentralisation would 
promote and enlarge democracy, stimulate social and economic development, make states more 
accountable and accessible to civil society (for example, Litvack et al., 1998; Llambí and Lindemann, 
2001; Lockwood, 1998; Schneider, 2003). Such claims had also led some analysts to consider its 
potential in reducing levels of conflict and ethnic tensions within states (e.g. Licha, 2002; Treisman, 
1999). Bolivia seemed to undermine such optimistic claims, as the introduction of decentralisation 
reforms in 1994 had had some success in such issues as re-directing of public investment in favour of 
‘poorer districts’ (for example, see Faguet, 2003: 1), but not stabilised central government, proven by 
such episodes as the 2003 ousting of President Sánchez de Lozada in 2003. 
4
 Especially helpful and accommodating was Aymara Raúl Maydana, Federación de Asociaciones 
Municipales (FAM – Federation of Municipal Associations) coordinator, resident in La Paz. Most of 
these German organisations have useful libraries, where I could obtain studies and general information 
about the current state of affairs in different Bolivian municipalities, as well as knowledgeable staff 
with some of who I discussed my research ideas. 
5
 The DED was founded in 1963 and has its main seat in Bonn, Germany. Like Inwent it implements 
part of the German Federal Governments’ international development strategies and has the ‘legal form 
of a non-profit-making, limited liability company’ (see DED, n/d). On their website, the DED 
explains that it ‘is owned jointly by the Federal Republic of Germany, represented by the Federal 
Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the working group “Learning and Helping 
Overseas”, a registered association. DED is financed by the federal budget’ (n/d). It operates through 
placing specialist development workers in local civil organizations and municipal structures at the 
request of governmental and nongovernmental organisations. These specialists engage mainly in 
training, advisory capacity and planning tasks, if required supplemented by financial support (see 
DED, n/d). 
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the question of departmental autonomy.6 A conflict of particular longevity and 
gravity was that surrounding the TCO Monte Verde in Velasco Province. Chiquitano 
from the region had claimed the territory since the 1990s and, as later materialised, 
the territorial struggle presented the main subject of Chiquitano-state engagement. 
Not long before my arrival in Bolivia, President Evo Morales had announced that he 
wanted to hand over the legal title for the TCO, to three local indigenous 
organisations who had jointly claimed the land: the Central Indígena de 
Comunidades de Concepción (CICC – Indigenous Organisation of Communities of 
Concepción), the Central Indígena de Paikonecas de San Javier (CIP-SJ – 
Indigenous Organisation of Paikonecas of San Javier) and the Central Indígena de 
los Comunidades Originarios de Lomerío (CICOL – Indigenous Organisation of 
Communities of Lomerío). Opposition came from some forestry concessions, which 
were still fighting to keep land within the TCO, the PODEMOS party, the Cruceño 
Civic Committee and the Departmental Prefecture, who were all on the side of the 
concessions. 
That such issues were of concern to the local indigenous organisations 
became apparent when I travelled to the small Jesuit mission, Concepción and San 
Javier and talked to Chiquitano leaders. In Concepción, I spoke to Manuel Peña, the 
CICC’s President and the first Cacique of the Organización Indígena Chiquitana 
(OICH – Chiquitano Indigenous Organisation) Rodolfo López, and in San Javier I 
spoke to CIP-SJ’s Secretary of Land and Territory Andrés Morobanchi.7 The three 
leaders coincided in explaining that the most pressing issues, which concerned their 
organisations’, were territorial conflicts, obtaining pending territorial titles and the 
Constituent Assembly.8  
In terms of the first issue, territory, Morobanchi explained further that the 
Organisations were involved in a territorial management process (gestión territorial), 
which involved developing guidelines for the use of natural resources, as well as 
thinking about how the territory should be governed in the future. The leaders 
expressed that the Constituent Assembly was important, because it would possibly 
                                                 
6
 For a brief definition of the figure of TCO, see Chapter VI.  
7
 The umbrella organisation OICH encompasses the Chiquitano Organisations of the five Provinces 
Chiquitos, Velasco, Ñuflo de Chávez, Ángel Sandoval and Germán Busch. See Introduction for a 
further specification of the activities of the OICH.  
8
 Fieldnotes: Concepción, 8 June 2006; Interview: Rodolfo López, Concepción, 8 June 2006; 
Interview: Andrés Morobanchi, San Javier, 8 June 2006. 
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re-define TCOs in terms of territorial governance and control over resources. These 
issues remained hazy in the legislation as it stood, i.e. they were not clearly defined 
in the INRA Law (see Chapter VI).  
That the issue of how the TCO was currently tied into the state administrative 
system was not very clear, was evidenced by the fact that none of the leaders could 
clearly explain the relation. For example, when I asked Morobanchi what role the 
municipal governments played in governing the TCO and the communities within, he 
replied:  
A: No, the municipalities are not administrating it now; the [Chiquitano] 
Organisations are administrating it.  
Q: So, the TCO is something that is outside the municipality and the municipality 
has nothing to do with its management? 
A: It is also part. 
Q: So there are two municipalities that… 
A: … Of course, for example, the improvement of paths, all that sort of thing for the 
comunidades, some school projects, sanitary posts, which is what is part of [what] 
the municipality [does].9 
My conversation with Morobanchi also shifted to one further issue of concern for the 
Organisations: the campaign for autonomy by Bolivia’s lowland departments. He 
explained to me that this also had to do with control over resources. Therefore, the 
indigenous organisations were asking for a different type of autonomy:  
Of course, if it is an indigenous autonomy, the Originarios [originary people] 
themselves manage their natural resources, which are within their territorial claim. 
… Well, the autonomy which they are thinking of is to take advantage of the natural 
resources that are within Monte Verde, of the entire [territorial] claim.10 
                                                 
9
 ‘R: No, más que todos los municipios no lo están manejando ahora, si no lo están manejando las 
organizaciones. 
P: ¿Entonces las TCO es algo que es afuera del municipio y el municipio no tiene nada que ver con el 
manejo? 
R: Si, también es parte. 
P: Entonces ya hay 2 municipios que… 
R: …Claro, por ejemplo el mejoramiento de caminos, todo eso para las comunidades, algunos 
proyectos de escuelas, postas sanitarias, eso ya dentro de lo que es el municipio.’ Interview: San 
Javier, 8 June 2006. 
10
 ‘O sea, es muy diferente, ¿no? La autonomía de la ciudad que es Santa Cruz, a lo que nosotros aquí 
hemos pedido que sea una autonomía indígena, eso es muy diferente. … Claro, si es autonomía 
indígena, que los mismos originarios manejan sus recursos naturales, los que hay a dentro de su 
demanda territorial. …Bueno, la autonomía que ellos piensan es aprovecharse de los recursos 
naturales que tiene dentro de Monte Verde de toda la demanda’. Interview: San Javier, 8 June 2006. 
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Chiquitano-state relations, with their focus on gaining territorial rights presented an 
interesting, and little researched topic of inquiry (see Introduction). As my research 
would entail repeated contact to the central and carrying out research in the 
comunidades, permission to do so depended on the leaders’ consent. Conversely, the 
leaders were very adamant that people who wanted to carry out research or other 
activities in comunidades would require their approval.11 Both, Manuel Peña and 
Rodolfo López approved of my planned research, as it could be of some use to the 
comunidades and the central. Andrés Morobanchi simply noted:  
Of course. Every study is important, right?12  
Researching the Chiquitano ‘Governance’ System: A so-called 
Multi-Sited Ethnography 
To collect data on Chiquitano-state relations, I planned to combine long-term 
observation and conducting interviews with members of the local indigenous 
organisation, civil society organisations, municipal governmental institutions and 
Chiquitano comunarios.13 This is an approach followed by many anthropologists, 
who see fieldwork carried out in close contact with people (often in the form of some 
type of ‘community’ or communities) and communicating in the peoples’ own 
language, as the core of anthropological practice (see, for example Davies, 1999: 4-5; 
Evans-Pritchard, 1940; Keesing and Strathern, 1998; Malinowski, 1960; 
Powdermaker, 1966).14 Observation of, participating in and ‘recording’ everyday 
life, or what Malinowski calls ‘the imponderabilia of actual life and typical 
behaviour’, should be supplemented by ‘the native’s views and opinions and 
                                                 
11
 That indigenous umbrella organisations take such a stance is very common, see, for example, 
Jackson (1999: 291). 
12
 ‘Claro. Todo estudio pues es importante ¿no?’. Interview: San Javier, 8 June 2006. 
13
 A holistic perspective maintains that ‘an isolated observation cannot be understood unless you 
understand its relationships to other aspects of the situation in which it occurred’ (Agar, 1980: 75). 
This calls attention to the fact that, in Malinowski’s words ‘all social, cultural and psychological 
aspects of the community… are so interwoven that not one can be understood without taking into 
consideration all the others’ (1960: xvi). Researchers who conducted their research in a more holistic 
manner in the Bolivian context of Bolivian decentralisation policies are Ricardo Calla  and, Lema et al 
(2001).  
14
 Some authors note that fieldwork should be ‘long’ generally meaning at least a year, to allow the 
fieldworker to live and experience social life at every season of the year, and hold that successful 
fieldwork is seldom possible in a period much shorter than a year, especially when a new language 
and culture must be learned (e.g. Keesing and Strathern, 1998: 7-9). However, I would argue that this 
very much depends on the type of study conducted and where it is conducted. Some ‘sites’ might be 
very temporary phenomena which do not allow for a continued length of observation. After all, 
studies may focus on some type of gatherings, meetings or project. 
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utterances’ (1960: 19-22).15 Similarly, I planned to conduct mainly semi-structured 
and informal interviews, which I would record, in order to collect interpretations of 
events and opinions and obtain ‘richer accounts of daily life’ (Agar, 1980: 105). 
Data collection focused especially on such elements as Chiquitano 
perceptions of space and place, collective identities, and politics, authority and 
leadership, freedom and autonomy. After all, negotiating different views of and 
different meanings attached to such concepts generally lie at the heart of indigenous-
state relations.16 Attention to these elements would shed light on the Chiquitano 
political or ‘governance’ system, as well as areas of accommodation or resistance 
against state pressures.17 Further, I aimed to establish Chiquitano organisations’ and 
communities’ interactions with each other and governmental and non-governmental 
actors (in other words, to trace Chiquitano state actors), I had to conduct research in 
different sites: Concepción, a Chiquitano comunidad, the CICC, the CGTI-MV and 
CEJIS. In the case of the latter two, more precisely, research projects which members 
of each were carrying out. Thus, my field research had, what Marcus (1986; 1995) 
would call a ‘multi-sited’ character.  
Reflections on Multi-Sitedness 
George Marcus (1986; 1995) conceived the term ‘multi-sited fieldwork’ to 
differentiate this type of fieldwork from that carried out in different sites for 
comparative purposes. He stressed that in contrast to the latter, it is at the heart of 
this type of ‘mobile’ multi-sited research to quite literally follow ‘connections, 
associations, and putative relationships’ (1995: 97, 103).18 Consequently, he 
highlighted that this type of ethnography is often practiced by those who get their 
theoretical inspiration from postmodernism. While Marcus is certainly the 
approaches’ most eloquent advocate, it has to be acknowledged that many 
                                                 
15
 Some ethnographers have noted the incompatibility of the two notions and have noted that they 
could either ‘observe’ or ‘participate’ in a given activity (see Evans, 2008: 125). 
16
 See, for example, the essays in the edited volumes of, Assies et al (2000), Urban and Sherzer (2001) 
Warren and Jackson (2002) and Surrallés and García Hierro (2005). 
17
 In a personal communication, Steven Rubenstein reminded me that these areas were of special 
importance when addressing state-indigenous relations – or in fact, when analysing the relation of any 
individuals to the state as power structure.  
18
 Multi-sited ethnography has most prominently emerged in such areas as media studies (e.g. 
Ginsburg, 1994), the social and cultural study and science and technology (e.g. Haraway, 1991a; 
Latour, 2007), migration studies (e.g. Ong, 1993) and development studies (e.g Escobar, 1994; 
Ferguson, 1990).  
 116 
ethnographers before him have conducted fieldwork that involved tracing actors and 
covering different sites. This includes, to name a few, such prominent pioneers of 
ethnographic fieldwork such as Malinowski (1960), when he followed the Kula ring 
and Evans-Pritchard (1940) when he studied the Nuer and carried out research in 
different geographical spaces.19 
Recognising that multi-sitedness is, in fact, not a ‘new’ concept. It means we 
can refute worries that some who have engaged in this type of research have 
expressed. Hannerz (2003: 208) points to concerns about the potentially ‘dubious 
quality’ of multi-site studies, stemming from a perceived lack of depth and breadth 
of research, perhaps stemming from the fact that such studies almost always entail 
focusing on some of the sites, actors and aspects of culture and social life of those 
that could potentially be included (Hage, 2005: 466; Hannerz, 2003: 207-209; 
Marcus, 1995: 99-100). We may simply reply that fieldwork always involves 
focusing on some aspects of ‘culture’ or social relations over others. Further, also in 
studies that are not labelled ‘multi-sited’, selection of sites and research focus 
develop gradually, ‘as new insights develop, as opportunities come into sight, and to 
some extent by chance’ (Hannerz, 2003: 207). That fieldworkers have always 
improvised and adapted their methods to their object and subject of study, is perhaps 
most obvious in cases where fieldworkers have encountered conflict situations and 
cannot rely on rigid or fixed methodological frameworks.20 As Kovats-Bernat notes 
in such cases fieldwork must be seen ‘as an elastic, incorporative, integrative, and 
malleable practice’ (2002: 210).  
In fact, the label ‘multi-sitedness’ may disguise that the sites of investigation 
in such studies are closely connected, since such studies are ‘designed around chains, 
paths, threads, conjunctions, or juxtapositions of locations, in which the ethnographer 
establishes some form of literal, physical presence, with an explicit, posited logic of 
association or connection among sites that defines the argument of the ethnography’ 
                                                 
19
 The point about multi-sited nature of Malinowski’s fieldwork has also been made by Markus (1995: 
106) himself, Hannerz (2003: 202) and Hage (2005: 467). This leads Ghassan Hage (2005: 464) to 
label ‘multi-sitetness’ as a ‘buzzword’ because its signification and ramifications are not explored by 
many of its users. 
20
 Room for flexibility and improvisation is arguably the very nature of a less structured ethnographic 
data collection process which seeks to avoid the imposition of the researcher’s assumptions about the 
social world and ‘consequently reduces the chances of discovering evidence of the discrepant with 
those assumptions’ (Hammersly, 1992: 11). Also see similar comments by some of the many authors 
who write on methodological issues (e.g. Agar, 1980; Davies, 1999; Robson, 1993). 
 117 
(Marcus, 1995: 105). This leads Hage (2005) to argue that the idea of multi-sitedness 
is ‘not practically feasible’. His reasoning is, that if the concept of a site is 
‘something one has to spend an inordinate amount of time and labour on in order to 
become familiar with’, then he himself did not study a multi-sited reality (2005: 
466). His study on Lebanese migrants focused on a studying a ‘transnational family 
or village as a global phenomenon’, which meant he had to ‘treat all these locations, 
dispersed as they were, as just one site… a globally spread, geographically non-
contiguous site, but it was nevertheless one site’ (2005: 466).21 My own fieldwork 
required research in different geographical sites, but also different sites in Hage’s 
sense (2005): phenomena that take place in one non-contiguous site, i.e. the CEJIS 
and CGTI-MV projects, the central and arguably even the comunidades. I refer to the 
latter type of sites simply as ‘site’, and the former as ‘geographical site’.  
Tracing Chiquitano-State Relations and the Governance System: The Sites 
Concepción 
Firstly, I carried out fieldwork in the ex-Jesuit mission town of Concepción, which 
formed the ‘base’ throughout my fieldwork period in Bolivia: I returned there after 
different research activities in other locations. As noted, Concepción is the capital of 
Concepción municipality and forms the seat of the local state administrative 
institutions in the form of the Alcaldía Municipal and the Sub-prefecture and other 
state actors (see Interlude).  
My presence in this geographical site was imperative, firstly, as it allowed me 
to frequently pay visits to the CICC, OICH and the CGTI-MV and I carried out 
observation and interviews in these organisations. Being situated in Concepción, also 
allowed me to observe public political, as well as major social events in town. The 
main square was the stage for the local carnival celebrations, as well as political 
rallies and protests by Concepceño elite and Chiquitano activists alike. For instance, 
it was the site where the Gran Encuentro de los pueblos indígenas de Santa Cruz (the 
                                                 
21
 It should be added that not all ethnographies that are ‘multi-sited’ require the researcher to move 
around. Marcus calls these ‘strategically situated ethnography’, and argues that they should be 
‘distinguished from the single-site ethnography that examines its local subjects’ articulations primarily 
as subalterns to a dominating capitalist or colonial system. The strategically situated ethnography 
attempts to understand something broadly about the system in ethnographic terms as much as it does 
its local subjects (1995: 111). One example he mentions is example is Anna Tsing’s (1993) 
ethnography. Whether labelling such ethnographies as multi-sited is open for debate.  
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Big Encounter of Santa Cruz Indigenous Peoples), a pro-indigenous autonomy rally, 
was held in June 2007, and where departmental autonomy supporters staged their 
counter rally – to accompany a pro-autonomy paro cívico – about two days later. 
Such events provided insights into how local power relations are acted out in 
Concepción and mapped onto public spaces, as well as insights into questions of 
Chiquitano governance and Chiquitano political claims. I supported such 
observations with semi and unstructured interviews and informal conversations with 
members of the Municipality, Church, Vigilant Committee and Sub-Prefecture, in 
order to gather individual’s opinions and interpretations of certain events and the 
general local, departmental and national socio-political situation.  
The Comunidad Palestina 
Another site where I carried out research was the Chiquitano Comunidad Palestina. 
Palestina is one of the forty-two legally recognised ‘indigenous communities’ in 
Concepción Municipality. It is located in the TCO Monte Verde, a four-hour drive 
from Concepción and is composed of 135 people, 31 families in total (see 2006 
census, CGTI-MV, 2007: 5-6). This makes it one of the smaller comunidades, as 
most comunidades have a population of between 150 and 300 people (Gobierno 
Municipal de Concepción, 2007b: 51-52). I chose to stay in Palestina after a 
discussion with CICC and CGTI-MV leaders, who pointed out that the comunidad 
was fairly easy to access, despite it being the rainy season. The CGTI-MV consulted 
the comunarios from Palestina, as to whether they agreed to my staying there, and 
had arranged for me to stay with the household of Pedro and Hilda Massaí. I stayed 
in Palestina for one week (1-8 March 2007).22 
As noted in the Introduction, comunidades are the more immediate political, 
economic and social space for the Chiquitano comunarios (also see Chapter V and 
VI). Research in a Chiquitano comunidad was necessary in order to gain a greater 
insight into the functioning of communal political structures; the way comunidades 
interacted with each other, and how comunarios perceived the centrales and other 
                                                 
22
 Although staying in one or two comunidades for about a month or longer would have allowed me to 
collect more detailed ethnographic data, engagement in other research activities meant that I did not 
have the time to do so. I recognise that spending longer in Palestina or another comunidad would be 
very beneficial to complement the data I gathered. It would have allowed me to collect more in depth 
data on little-researched ‘rhizomic structures’ in Chiquitano comunidades, for example, kinship ties 
and community power structures.  
 119 
state actors. It was also necessary to gain a deeper insight into the ‘imponderabilia’ 
of communal life – aspects of which, would also shed light on the way Chiquitano 
act and view themselves in the local socioeconomic and political context (including 
interactions with external actors) the way authority and leadership work in 
comunidades, and how they perceive landscape and space.  
I stayed in a room within the families’ housing complex, where I pitched up a 
little tent, in which I slept to protect myself from stinging insects. Apart from the 
two-room house in which I slept, the complex consisted of a house made of wooden 
slats, covered with a palm-leaf roof, where the family members slept in hammocks or 
on wooden beds, and a small hut (again with wooden slat walls and palm roof), 
which contained the cooking facilities of the family (see photo 8). In front of the 
house and small hut there was a construction of wooden beams with a palm-leaf roof 
(see photo 9). This sheltered a wooden table and some chairs and stools, the wooden 
tacú – a large mortar carved out of a piece of tree-trunk, which served to peel rice, 
for instance. 
I carried out observation and informal interviews, on which I took notes. I 
also recorded some of the interviews with a digital recorder. The main daily activities 
I engaged in, were helping the Chiquitanas with their household chores: for example, 
taking the twenty-minute walk to the chacos (fields) in order to collect firewood, cut 
down plantains, papaya and harvest rice. This meant I spent most of my time around 
the families’ housing complex or in the chacos. As one woman in the comunidad 
pointed out to me: 
…women never really leave the community to go far. They move more around the 
community and in the chacos. Men go further, as they may go hunting and stay for 
some days in the forest or some may go off to work for cash.23  
I also attended communal meetings and a communal work effort (minga), to cut the 
grass around church and school buildings, together with other male and female adult 
family members. Once, I accompanied members of another household to recover the 
meat of a tapir (anta), which they had shot in the thicket of the forest, roughly two 
hours’ walk away from the comunidad. For my help, the hunters gave me a share of 
                                                 
23
 Field notes: Palestina, 1 March 2007. This thesis does not contain an in-depth analysis of gendered 
role in the household, however, the issue of what are seen to be male and female activities does 
feature in some of the comunario’s comments about what they perceive ‘a comunidad’, and ‘being 
Chiquitano’ to be (Chapter V).  
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the meat I carried to the family. In the evenings, the families’ neighbours, brothers or 
father would come past, and we would sit at the table and talk to each other. 
Photo 8: The Massaí Families’ Kitchen 
 
Hilda Massaí is roasting maize for chicha. Above the fireplace meet is drying.  
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Photo 9: Part of the Massaí Families’ Housing Complex, Comunidad Palestina  
 
Photo 10: Path to Chacos of Comunidad Palestina  
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Photo 11: Plantain Grove in the Comunidad Palestina 
 
The Chiquitano Central - CICC 
A further site was the CICC, the Chiquitano grassroots organisation with headquarter 
in Concepción municipality (see Interlude). During my fieldwork period, leaders 
frequently travelled to meetings with the umbrella organisations in Santa Cruz or 
Sucre, to debate policy and law proposals and to pressure for the inclusion of their 
demands in the Constituent Assembly (see photos 12 and 13). 
Gathering data in the CICC and about the activities of central leaders was 
vital, as they can be important state actors. They fulfil certain administrative and 
normative functions for the comunidades but also legally represent comunidades 
before local, departmental and national state authorities. They interact with other 
state administrative actors, NGOs and indigenous umbrella organisations. They are 
important in securing services for comunidades, are active in the local political 
sphere and were the main group of people to advance the territorial claim. Through 
observation, I gathered data about their activities of individuals working in the 
central and gained a picture of their functions, the way they related to comunarios, 
and other Chiquitano associations, as well as the different state agencies on varying 
state levels. I supplemented this data by carrying out informal interviews.  
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Photo 12: VIth March of Indigenous People of the Lowland, Santa Cruz 
 
VIth March of Indigenous People of the Lowland, Santa Cruz, 7 July 2007. CIDOB and 
affiliates demands the inclusion of their proposals in the constitutional text.  
Photo 13: The Constituent Assembly Autonomy Commission, Sucre 
 
OICH first Cacique Rodolfo López demanding the inclusion of indigenous autonomies in the 
new constitutional text in a session of the Autonomy Commission of the Constituent 
Assembly, Sucre, 12 July 2007.  
Two Further Sites: Research with the CGTI-MV and CEJIS Teams 
I carried out research in two further ‘sites’: the CEJIS and CGTI-MV research 
projects. Research with the CEJIS and CGTI-MV research teams took the form of 
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what could be called a ‘collaborative approach’. Not in the sense that Lassiter 
(2005a; 2005b) describes it, where researchers and ‘subjects’ collaborate in the 
production of ethnographic texts, but I cooperated with others in the gathering data.24 
The research projects themselves, however, aimed to be ‘collaborative’ in Lassiters’ 
sense. Collaborative and other participatory techniques often entail an 
epistemological critique (that draws on Foucault’s writings) about the ways of 
research and knowledge production, which drowns out local knowledge, reduces the 
complexity of human experience and may thus reinforce the status-quo of societal 
power relations.25 Ideally, through more participatory techniques, local knowledge is 
not filtered through an outsider researcher’s ‘preconceptions’, but rather ‘emerge’ or 
can be accessed through, in a participatory relationship (see e.g. Gaventa and 
Cornwall, 2001: 74; Reason and Bradbury, 2001: 4). The two projects followed a 
collaborative logic in two main areas. Firstly, the research teams were mainly 
composed of Chiquitano researchers and that they heavily drew on their local 
knowledge in designing the question frameworks and adapting the methodology in a 
way that they deemed suitable for the local context. Secondly, they aimed to 
elaborate the research output (the final documents) in close collaboration with 
Chiquitano leaders and comunarios and incorporate their feedback into the final 
product.  
                                                 
24
 Lassiter points out that ethnography is by definition collaborative in the sense that ‘we cannot 
possibly carry out our unique craft without engaging others in the context of their real, everyday lives’ 
(2005a: 16). Nevertheless, a collaborative approach moves collaboration ‘deliberatively and explicitly’ 
to the centre state and emphasises it ‘as very point in the ethnographic process, without veiling it … 
Collaborative ethnography invites commentary overtly part of the ethnographic text as it develops. In 
turn, this negotiation is reintegrated back into the fieldwork process itself’ (2005a: 16). According to 
Lassiter, collaboration falls in general ‘into six (not mutually exclusive) categories: (1) principal 
consultants as readers and editors, (2) focus groups, (3) editorial boards, (4) collaborative 
ethnographer/ consultant teams, (5) community forums, and (6) coproduced and co written texts’ 
(2005b: 94, for a more in-depth explanation, see pages 94-96). A number of ethnographers have 
consciously adopted a collaborative approach as they argue for a more critical, engaged or 
collaborative ethnography that should serve ‘humankind more directly and more immediately’ 
(Lassiter, 2005: 83, see for example Cook, 2005; Peacock, 1997; Rose, 2005; Scheper-Hughes, 1995; 
Singer, 2000) 
25
 More participatory and collaborative approaches are consequently also a favoured in feminist 
methodology that follows the idea that the relationship between researcher and researched should be a 
reciprocal one, ‘that “hierarchical distinctions” between researcher and researched should be broken 
down’ (Hammersly, 1995: 48). Advocates of Action Research follow a similar reasoning, as they 
criticise conventional research strategies as they perpetuate entrenched structural relationships of 
power and maintain ‘monopolies of knowledge’. They argue that ‘participatory knowledge strategies 
can challenge deep-rooted power inequities’ (Gaventa and Cornwall, 2001: 71). Also see Reason and 
Bradbury (2001), David (2002) and Rahman. (1993: 195-196). 
 125 
A combination of factors contributed to my decision to do join the CGTI-MV 
and CEJIS research projects. Firstly, both projects were part of Chiquitano-state 
interaction. They were aimed at increasing the Chiquitano comunidades legibility 
(Scott, 1998) and thus part of the phenomenon I was researching. Secondly, both 
projects were aimed at gathering socio-economic and demographic data on how 
comunarios plan for the territory (see below). This overlap in research agendas 
meant that project staff and I might ask Chiquitano leaders and comunarios similar, 
if not the same questions. While there might be an argument that collecting the same 
information twice by different researchers might yield different results and therefore 
be great for triangulation purposes, CEJIS staff, CGTI-MV staff and I felt that in our 
case it would be an unethical burden on those ‘researched’. The project leaders (and 
I) saw my working as a project researcher in return for gaining access to the data as 
an ethical trade-off. We collected the data together and then used it for our distinct 
purposes: for meeting the projects’ aims of elaborating documents to be read by 
Chiquitano comunarios, leaders and NGO personnel and I would use it to write my 
thesis for an academic audience. Collaborating on the projects also fulfilled the 
central leaders’ requirement that research carried out with themselves or the central 
should benefit the leaders in some way. 
This also coincides with my own ethical stance, which I share with many 
other researchers (see for example, Postero, 2007: 19). My ethnical stance was 
initially formed during fieldwork for my Bachelor dissertation (Weber, 2003) in the 
Ecuadorean highlands in 2001-2002. The research focused on the role of the radio in 
the development of political consciousness amongst indigenous women. During the 
fieldwork, I was affiliated to the DED as an intern and the indigenous radio station 
Escuelas Radiofonicas Populares del Ecuador (ERPE – Popular Radio Schools of 
Ecuador). The research was of interest to ERPE, who wanted to use part of the 
material for a book that they were writing on their 40-year history. The indigenous 
women that I interviewed frequently asked me what they would get back in return for 
the information that I got from them and I referred to my collaboration with ERPE. 
Most found this acceptable, as they respected the popular radio and its work. Without 
the backing of and collaboration with ERPE, I would have felt uncomfortable in my 
role as a researcher and therefore sought a similar collaborative relationship for my 
PhD research. However, I agree with David (2002: 17) and others that knowledge 
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production should not only be determined by ‘vested social interests’ driven by 
‘liberal market or communitarian identity models’ and that knowledge construction 
by universities university should be defended. 
The CGTI-MV project 
The CGTI-MV project was called the ‘Ordenando Nuestro Territorio’ (‘Putting Our 
Territory in Order’). It involved conducting, what CGTI-MV staff called, a ‘social 
census’, This inquired about the origins of the settlements, mapping of the ‘borders’ 
of communal areas, collecting census data, data on belief systems, agriculture 
systems, social organisation, governance and community justice and so on. Much of 
the collected data would inform each of the communities’ (development) plans 
(planes comunales). The plans would also include maps of the communal areas and 
establish ‘zones of use’. I.e. zones where comunarios can establish houses, practice 
agriculture, obtain wood etc.26  
The research team was composed of six to eight people, including CGTI-MV 
and central leaders and technicians. Numbers varied slightly from trip to trip, as 
some leaders and technicians were engaged in other commitments at times. However, 
CGTI-MV technician Gabriel Montaño, an agricultural engineer in his mid twenties, 
and self-identified mestizo from Concepción, was present on all research trips. He 
was in charge of the research project and subsequent elaboration of documents.  
The team carried out research workshops (talleres) that lasted several days 
and included a variety of methods. A first technique was focus groups. For this, the 
research team split the comunarios randomly into three to five groups, which would 
each fill-in prepared tables or matrixes (matrices) on different themes, including the 
types of plants, forest fruits and wood collected and their uses, the types of animals 
hunted, the lengths and reasons for migration, the types of communal authorities and 
their functions etc.27 Each group would then present the results to the other groups in 
a plenary. This gave comunarios the possibility to elaborate or correct each others 
matrixes; a method which the CGTI-MV team members had agreed would be ‘more 
participatory’ and would generate more complete matrixes.  
                                                 
26
 This will be treated in more retail in Chapter VI.  
27
 In order to divide the comunarios up into different groups, each comunario was given numbers 
from one to three and made to join the matching group.  
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Another method was the use of unstructured interviews to gather information 
about the founding and development of the comunidad. These were conducted with 
two to four comunarios, chosen by the CGTI-MV staff for being deemed 
knowledgeable about these issues. Research team members carried out most of these 
interviews as ‘group interview’ with two or three comunarios. Experience taught the 
team that this meant comunarios felt more at ease to answer the questions, as they 
could help each other out, when they forgot something, or consult others on the 
verity of information. As a final technique, the team carried out a population 
census.28 
I participated in the project during the first months of fieldwork. I frequently 
visited the CGTI-MV office and participated in the leaders’ and technicians’ daily 
meetings and activities and I accompanied the CGTI-MV research team on two of 
their research trips. The first one was a week-long trip (9-14 October 2006) to the 
comunidades Monte Verde, Palestina and Makanaté within the TCO Monte Verde. 
The second research trip to the comunidad Puerto San Pedro (also in the TCO Monte 
Verde) did not happen until February 2007 (13-16.).29 Reasons for the delay included 
the holding of ‘Olympic games’ by the comunidades, quarrels with the support 
personal that the CGTI-MV had hired for the project, and preparations for a march of 
the indigenous lowland movement aimed at – once more – altering the INRA law 
(see Chapter VI). I participated in the team as a research workshop co-facilitator and 
photographer. Apart from carrying out observations and conducting some 
unstructured interviews; I was in charge of gathering data on the issues of 
community justice and political structures of the comunidades, areas that were also 
of concern to my research. 
                                                 
28
 To carry out the census of the population of the comunidad the research team members asked 
comunarios to return to their housing complexes, to avoid collecting data for the same family several 
times (for example, wife and husband and an elder child). Often, several family members sat together 
answering the census questions and helped each other recall birthdates and whether the different 
family members had identification cards (carnets). While the census recorded the names of family 
members that were absent from the comunidad at the time, it excluded those that did not 
‘permanently’ reside in the comunidad. ‘Permanently resident’ were those that only left to other 
places for visits, short periods of work or study. Nevertheless, children who had left to Concepción or 
other places in order to study and only came to the comunidad for short visits were excluded. Further, 
the emphasis was on the amount of ‘households’ in the comunidad, counting family members living in 
their own housing complex with or without spouses or children of their own as distinct ‘household’. 
29
 As will be addressed in the following chapters, Puerto San Pedro is the only non-Chiquitano 
‘immigrant’ community within the TCO, members originating from the Chaco Chuquisaqñeo region. 
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Photo 14: CGTI-MV Research Workshop in Palestina, TCO Monte Verde 
 
CGTI-MV technician Elmar Massaí (right), facilitating a workshop in Palestina. 
Photo 15: CGTI-MV Workshop in Puerto San Pedro, TCO Monte Verde 
Comunarios in plenary, explaining the matrixes to each other. 
 129 
The CEJIS project 
What the CEJIS team, the centrales and the CGTI in short called ‘projecto 
gobernanza’ (governance project), was an Oxfam America financed project that 
would run for one year. CEJIS was to carry out the project jointly with the CGTI-
MV, CICC, CICOL and CIP-SJ. Through a ‘sistematización participativa’ 
(participative systematisation), which sought to ‘include the interpretations of the 
people, the voice in which they speak about their experiences and future visions’, the 
project staff aimed to record Chiquitano experiences of the struggle for territory and 
the territorial management process, establish the status quo of and collect future 
visions regarding Chiquitano governance. The general objective of the project was to 
elaborate a proposal for future governance structures which would allow for the 
consolidation of governance and a normative framework for the TCO Monte Verde 
(see CEJIS and OXFAM, 2006: 4-5).30  
CEJIS and Oxfam also stressed the ‘political intentionality’ of the project: 
strengthening governance and governability would mean that Chiquitano could 
exercise their collective rights over the territory which, according to the project 
partners, would guarantee ‘the full exercise of autonomous development’.31 And as 
Elba Flores, the CEJIS project coordinator from the Santa Cruz office, stressed: it 
was also supposed to be ‘empowering the comunarios of the TCO so that they, with 
us, define territorial politics’.32 Further, CEJIS and Oxfam reasoned that the process 
in Monte Verde would serve as a case study, an example for other indigenous groups 
and their NGO allies in similar situations.33  
The CEJIS research team was composed of three permanent staff and various 
other individuals, who were responsible for certain aspects of the project. Firstly, 
permanently occupied with the project, was Margoth Céspedes, the head of the 
                                                 
30
 This, CEJIS and OXFAM reasoned, would ‘contribute to securing the means of life and well-being 
of the indigenous communities of Monte Verde, through the strengthening of their capacity for 
governance and governability, for their autonomous and sustainable development. …Reconstructing 
the process of the construction of governance for the territorial management of the TCO Monte Verde 
in a critical way [is] directed at contributing to the exercise of collective rights over the territory and 
their auto-determination’ (CEJIS and OXFAM, 2006: 4). 
31
 From the project summary ‘Sistematización Participativa: Proceso en Construcción de Gobernanza 
y Gobernabilidad en la TCO Monte Verde’ (November 2006). 
32
 Field note: Santa Cruz, 24 November 2006. 
33
 From the project summary ‘Sistematización Participativa: Proceso en Construcción de Gobernanza 
y Gobernabilidad en la TCO Monte Verde’ (November 2006). 
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CEJIS Concepción office, a bright and ambitious sociologist in her mid-twenties.34 A 
second member of the ‘governance’ research team was Lorenzo Pasabare, a 
Chiquitano veteran of the CICC and former CIDOB leader in his late thirties. 
Permanently employed by CEJIS, his main area of work was ‘land and territory’ 
(tierra y territorio). He worked closely with the CICC, the CIP-SJ and the CGTI-
MV, gave legal advice, and shared information about the progress of land legislation 
and other intelligence he obtained from the staff of the CEJIS Santa Cruz office. He 
frequently travelled into the territory to help central and comunarios to ‘expel’ third-
party intruders and he informed comunarios about the progress in the territorial claim 
and incipient collective action, such as, for example, the Territorial Encounter. A 
third member was David Rivero, a Chiquitano in his early forties and CIP-SJ veteran, 
who was employed by CEJIS, primarily for the governance project. He was 
experienced in ‘participatory methodologies’ and popular education techniques. The 
team received support from several other individuals during the workshop phase of 
the project. These mainly took up roles as workshop facilitators and transcribers.35  
During the planning stages of the project, which involved holding meetings in 
the CEJIS Santa Cruz office in early and late November 2006, the project drew on 
additional know-how. Firstly, present was Elba Flores, a sociologist in her early 
forties and the ‘governance project’ coordinator. Overseeing the project and liaising 
with Oxfam America were only some of her tasks: she was also busy with other 
projects, such as working on the legal side of the territorial claim. Secondly, there 
were two consultants. CEJIS had hired them to help the rest of the team refine the 
project objectives and clarify the conceptual framework (‘governance and 
governability’) and suggested improvements to the methodological framework the 
research team defined.36 They were also responsible to check research output and 
propose suggestions regularly and for checking the final document. This document 
                                                 
34
 Margot was originally from the rural Chaco region of Bolivia. She had previous experience working 
for CEJIS in the Beni department. Her role was that of the head of office and the coordination of 
various projects. Her wage was paid partly by the German DED, for who she was working mostly in 
issues of conflict resolution 
35
 Additional researchers who supported the three permanent staff in carrying out the research 
workshops were Chiquitanos Pedro Solís Pinto (OTB Santa Rita, former CICC leader), Jesús Macoñó 
(former CIP-SJ leader) and William Roca (former CIP-SJ leader). Present in some of the workshops 
where also Elba Flores, Margarita (CGTI-MV Coordinator), Mercedes Nosta (consultant 
anthropologist) and two further CEJIS workers form Santa Cruz. See Appendix 1 for information on 
which individuals were present in the respective research workshops.  
36
 The consultants were anthropologist Mercedes Nostas Ardaya and sociologist José Vicente 
Chazarreta form Santa Cruz. 
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was to be presented to Chiquitano leaders and communal representatives so that they 
could provide feedback to complement the data, adding another ‘collaborative’ and 
‘reflexive element’ to the document and to ‘validate’ it.37 Then, the document would 
be diffused among the leaders, comunidades and supporting NGOs.38  
Present in the planning stages were also four Chiquitano members of the 
CGTI-MV and the central. This was in line with the project’s premise that this 
project was supposed to be carried out in collaboration with the centrales and CGTI-
MV whose members should help define, ‘validate’ the framework and project 
methodology and feed-back results to their Organisations and feed their reactions 
back to the research team.  
While all team members present at the meeting contributed to question 
design, Chiquitano team members and the input of the four CGTI-MV and central 
members was especially crucial when it came to wording the questions so that 
Chiquitano leaders, technicians and comunarios could easily understand them. A 
difference was, for example, that questions addresses to the former two groups could 
include some political jargon and concepts, as they would generally be familiar with 
such terminology. Further, research team members involved in carrying out the field 
research, held regular reflexive meetings to assess the wording of the questions, the 
research progress and the execution of the methods (i.e. assessing the way they the 
researchers carried them out and if need be, adjusting execution or a researchers’ 
individual behaviour).  
                                                 
37
 From Project Summary ‘Sistematización Participativa: Proceso en Construcción de Gobernanza y 
Gobernabilidad en la TCO Monte Verde’ (November 2006). 
38
 Another plan that emerged at a later stage was to take elements form interviews and workshops and 
turn them into radio clips, as experiences in comunidades showed that such documents were seldom 
read, and the emphasis on written documents marginalised those who could not read. 
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Photo 16: Reflexive Team Meeting, CEJIS Office Concepción 
 
Reflexive team meeting after workshops in Makanaté and Palestina with (from left) Patricia, 
Lorenzo, David, Jesús and the author. 
Photo by Margoth Céspedes 
I started participating in the CEJIS governance research project from mid-October 
2006 until July 2007. I attended two planning meetings in Santa Cruz in November 
2006 and contributed to the discussions regarding methodology and conceptual 
framework. I assisted David and Margoth in obtaining and reviewing resources from 
the CEJIS and APCOB libraries, other NGOS, the centrales and the CGTI-MV.39 
Further, I participated in many of the projects’ research activities. I returned to 
England, however, before the implementation of the last two phases of the project 
(elaboration of the document and dissemination).  
                                                 
39
 Getting hold of secondary material is not always easy, as a proportion of it is distributed over the 
libraries of different NGOs. Documents that feature the results of previous research projects are often 
kept in individual’s offices, and might just be accessed by chance. There might only be a single copy 
of a book or document in one of the libraries. Thus we maximised our efforts by sharing the material 
that any of us could get their hands on. 
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CEJIS Project Methods: Interview, Focus Groups and Socio-Dramas 
Short-Structured Interviews 
One of the research techniques employed in the project was that of short-structured 
interviews. During December 2006 and January 2007 David and Lorenzo conducted 
such interviews with 24 leaders, former leaders and technicians from San Javier and 
Concepción. Only six of the sample group were women, reflecting the fact that 
female leaders and technicians are generally in the minority, although the centrales 
are working to change this trend. The team had delegated the task to David and 
Lorenzo, because they knew the sample groups well from their past experience of 
working with the centrales. This meant that they could quickly seek out this 
judgmental sample group on their motorbikes.40 They had easy access and a high rate 
of willing respondents.  
The question catalogues addressed ‘self-identification’, what the territory 
meant to the interviewee, how s/he explained what a ‘comunidad’ was, the workings 
and performance of the centrales, control and ideal characteristics of central leaders, 
central and comunidad interactions with different state administrative levels, and 
lastly, visions regarding future Chiquitano governance structures.41 Questions were 
open-ended, but intended to collect standardised data. The aim was to achieve a 
degree of generalisability and see trends in the responses. The team built on the 
results to refine the question sheets for the semi-structured interviews and used the 
opportunity to identify key individuals willing to be interviewed in a longer sessions. 
Generally, Lorenzo and David noted down the answers on their questions sheets. 
This thesis draws on the data thus gathered and as answers generally took the form of 
short statements, attesting for some of the short quotes that appear in this thesis. 
Focus Groups 
A second research technique was that of focus groups. The team carried out focus 
groups in early March in two comunidades that would not be able to participate in 
                                                 
40
 Judgemental sampling (also purposive sampling) involves seeking out particular people who are 
‘specialists’ in an area of interest to the study (Agar, 1980: 121; Arber, 2001: 77). This is also often 
referred to as ‘purposive sampling’ defied as: ‘studying the entire population of some limited group, 
or a clearly defined subset of the population. A purposive sample is one in which each element is 
selected for a purpose, usually because of the unique position of the sample element’ (Schutt, 1996: 
164). 
41
 The list of questions varied slightly according to whether those interviewed were leaders or 
technicians (see Annex 1, for a list of these Interviews). 
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the following research workshops, as the logistics would have been too difficult: La 
Embocada and San Miguelito Sur. Lorenzo and David carried out the group in La 
Embocada, and Lorenzo, David and I carried out two further groups in San Miguelito 
Sur the following evening.42 To carry out the focus group, we split the community 
into two groups. Lorenzo and I facilitated one focus group and David the other. 
Lorenzo read out the questions and I had the tape recorder walking around to tape 
answers and asked back up questions. 
We overcame the problem that women were generally less happy to 
participate than men, by encouraging their participation and calling on them to 
answer as a group, rather than picking on individuals. We felt that this caused 
awkwardness to women, who could or did not want to answer. Further, it was 
beneficial to have a male and female facilitator, as this increased the level of female 
participation (Lorenzo and David attested that in comparison to the previous night, 
the level had increased by my presence).43 We subsequently used these strategies in 
subsequent focus groups ran as part of the communal workshops. However, it should 
be pointed out, that in some comunidades there were not enough female researchers 
to team a male and a female researcher. Further, sometimes even extra-
encouragement of female participants remained fruitless. 
The CEJIS project attempted to counteract male bias in the data by running 
women-only workshop, which Lorenzo and David ran with Chiquitano comunarias 
and former female leaders in San Javier.44 In Palmira, in Lomerío municipality, 
enough comunarios participated and we had sufficient research staff to divide 
Palmira comunarios into two groups – one composed of men and one of women (see 
photo 17). In this occasion, the type of information women shared with the (female) 
researcher differed significantly from that women had provided in ‘mixed’ 
workshops. For example, when it came to talk about different conflicts that existed in 
the comunidad, comunarias talked freely about intra-family conflicts that they faced, 
                                                 
42
 I had just returned from my week-long stay in the comunidad Palestina, thus missing the first focus 
group. 
43
 Field notes: Concepción, 9 March 2007. 
44
 Here it should also be added, that while in many workshops children and teenagers were present, 
CEJIS also scheduled a young person’s workshop, which Lorenzo and David ran in San Javier. This 
was to ensure that young Chiquitano voices were not excluded from the data, as young people would 
be less likely to contribute during the workshops. Unless younger people were directly prompted, 
adult Chiquitano commanded the authority to speak in these occasions.  
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and violence that women at times experienced – testament to the importance of 
running women-only workshops to avoid male biases in the collected data. 
Photo 17: Women-Only Focus Group, Comunidad Palmira 
 
The researchers also encountered the problem that leaders of the comunidad were 
more willing and keen to participate, drowning out the voices of other comunarios.45 
While leader’s statements were very informative, we took care to encourage the 
participation of other comunarios. However, this did not solve the problem that 
comunarios might be less willing to talk (critically) about their communal authorities 
if they were also present in the workshop. While there was nothing we could do 
about this, communal authorities were not present in all workshop groups and some 
comunarios voiced critical opinions either way. If there was a strong discontent with 
leaders one of the Chiquitano team members would get usually get wind of this by 
socialising with comunarios throughout the workshop. In general, we also made sure 
                                                 
45
 See, for example, a note I made after participating in a workshop with comunarios in San Miguelito 
Sur: ‘One of the people who answered a lot was a community leader; he was the Corregidor of the 
community. I wondered whether his presence would influence the answers of the group on community 
authorities, their performance, community participation in assemblies, and mechanisms of control of 
the community authorities. Would people be honest if an authority was present? Would they openly 
criticise them? They did not. We do not know whether this is due to the presence of the community 
authority’. Field notes: Concepción, 9 March 2007, edited.  
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that non-Chiquitano researchers teamed up with a Chiquitano colleague. This seemed 
to increased confidence of comunarios and meant they were more willing to answer 
questions and engage in discussions (this issue is explored in more depth below).46 
Research Workshops 
A core strategy the CEJIS team employed as part of their methodology were research 
workshops. The research team carried out ten research workshops with comunarios 
from different comunidades: four in the area of San Javier (one inside the TCO, three 
outside), five in Concepción (two inside the TCO and three outside), and one in 
Lomerío (for a list of the dates, location, participating comunidades and staff, please 
see Appendix 1). While research team composition varied slightly from workshop to 
workshop, it was always composed of a minimum of six researchers. In average four 
researchers’ were Chiquitano and a minimum of two were women (see Appendix 1). 
I participated in eight of these ten workshops.47  
The workshops were deemed important for gathering data that captured 
‘different visions and experiences’ of comunarios and emphasis was on participation 
by comunarios from ‘different age groups, genders, leaders and non-leaders’ (CEJIS 
and OXFAM, 2006: 12). They generally ran for two days and involved a variety of 
research techniques, from focus groups to socio-dramas and interviews. Lorenzo or 
David delivered the invitations for the workshops to the four or five participant 
comunidades about ten days before the workshop would be held. The invitations 
asked the comunidades to chose up to eight participants, of which half should be 
women. Comunidades generally adhered to this, sending fairly equal numbers of 
women and men. Comunidades also generally adhered to the demand that the group 
                                                 
46
 This is not to confirm a simplistic assumption that that ‘case study initiatives should have been 
researched by a research team whose composition mirrored the race and ethnic mix of the participants 
within the initiative (Hoggett et al., 1994: 64). This is implies a rather simplistic view of ‘identity’, 
and does not fully explore the dynamic between researcher and researched, what information 
researched will share (and what not) with the researcher, how and why, of which Berreman’s (1962) 
work is a great example. While Hoggett et al. point out that their case study research they ‘were led to 
question simplistic assumptions which insisted that ‘black on black research or community 
development was politically, logically or socially imperative’ (Hoggett et al., 1994: 63), they stop 
short of actually exploring the researcher-researched dynamics and why, in their case ‘mirroring’ did 
or did not work. 
47
 I missed one, because I had accompanied central leaders to Sucre, where they were debating their 
demands for the Constituent Assembly, and the other, because I was taken ill. Also note that the first 
workshop had a very different composition. There were 11 researchers of which five were Chiquitano 
and eight were women. The high number of researchers was due to the fact that this was a type of 
‘pilot’ workshop. Project coordinator, consultants and additional staff had come along to see how the 
methodology worked out in practice and subsequently carry out adjustments.  
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should not overwhelmingly be composed of leaders. Eight participants was a guiding 
number for larger comunidades – some smaller comunidades could not spare that 
many participants.48  
For the workshop sessions, we divided the comunarios up according to the 
comunidades they had come from – to achieve comunidad-specific, comparable data 
(for the matrix featuring the order of themes and questions, see Appendix 2). Often 
this meant that the focus groups had greatly differing numbers of participants. The 
hosting communities did generally not stick to the eight-participant-rule, with more 
participants attending the workshop. For example, in El Carmen, the comunidad with 
the highest level of participation, eighteen comunarios showed up to participate, in 
contrast to one participant from San Isidro and two from El Encanto. If there were 
very low numbers of participants from one comunidad we combined participants 
from two comunidades into one focus group while collecting the data for each of the 
comunidades separately.  
Workshop sessions lasted from one, to one and a half hours, interspersed with 
refreshment breaks. We aimed to close the workshop at 6 o’clock in the evening, 
when the sun started to set. We started the second day with a breakfast for everybody 
at about seven, an hour after sunrise. At the end of the workshop, usually in the 
afternoon of the second day, we held a plenary with all participants. As in the CGTI-
MV project, the idea was that the different groups would present their results to each 
other and discuss them. In this we concentrated especially on discussing and 
complementing each comunidad’s visions for a future TCO governance structure. 
                                                 
48
 For example, the comunidad Manantial in San Javier with six families and ten people in total. 
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Photo 18: Co-Facilitating a Workshop in Las Abras 
 
Margoth and Lorenzo co-facilitating a focus group session in Las Abras 
Photo 19: Comunarios in Plenary in Makanaté 
 
Photo by Margoth Céspedes 
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Socio-Dramas 
A valuable research tool during workshops was that of the socio-drama. These are a 
type of role play during which, a group of workshop participants were asked to act 
out a certain situation, imaginary or taken from a real-life situation. In most socio-
dramas that we carried out as part of the research workshop, two or three (or 
sometimes more) research team members would also take up roles. This way they 
could help to advance the play, in case it got stuck or derailed.49 After the role play, 
the actors and the rest of the participants were asked to discuss the plot in a plenary. 
The research team taped the play and noted down how it developed. We used this 
technique to gain insight into certain conflicts within the community and into 
problem-solving mechanisms, communal norms and principles, and forms of 
punishment. Information on these topics would have been hard to obtain through 
other means, as comunarios were often reluctant to talk about inner-communal 
conflicts. Topics were chosen after we had spent several hours or a night in the 
comunidad, giving team members time to chat to comunarios and find some area of 
potential conflict and would provide a socio-drama topic.  
That a workshop situation is not the best way to collect data on such sensitive 
topics shows up the flaws in this way of conducting research. Arguably, comunarios 
would share this type of information with researchers who spent more time in the 
comunidad and who comunarios get to ‘know’. An indication of this is that 
comunarios were much happier to talk to Chiquitano colleagues about such issues 
(see below). Still, a benefit of socio-dramas, was that comunarios often acted slightly 
different to the way that they verbally stated when asked about such topics. Getting 
comunarios to ‘act out’ how they solved conflict of punished wrong-doers put an 
element of ‘imponderabilia of everyday life’ into an otherwise quite artificial 
research process. It also helped to circumvent a problem we encountered with the use 
of the term ‘norms’, when we collected information regarding certain rules and 
principles of behaviour in the comunidad (see Annex 2). The term meant nothing to 
many the comunarios, some of who would jokingly point out ‘conosco a una Norma’ 
(‘I know a Norma’), referring the name. Alternatively, they referred to the ‘Normas 
                                                 
49
 Even if the plot at the time of acting seemed to go off on a tangent, upon later analysis of the 
generated data, this often revealed some insights into the community logic. My participation in 
sociodrama generated some interesting information on how comunarios perceived themselves and me 
as community outsiders and foreigner (which features in a later chapter).  
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de uso y aprovechamiento de los recursos naturales en la TCO Monte Verde’ (CGTI-
MV et al., 2006c) (‘The Norms of Use of Natural Resources in the TCO Monte 
Verde’) that the centrales had elaborated with input from the comunidades and 
distributed as leaflet among them.50 
Photo 20: Sociodrama in the Comunidad Las Abras 
 
Five research team members participating in socio-drama. From the right, the author, 
Lorenzo, Elba, William, Margarita, and Pedro taking notes.  
Photo by Margoth Céspedes 
Semi- and Unstructured Interviews 
A last method the CEJIS team employed was semi- and unstructured interviews. The 
interviews were carried out with ‘key people’ from May to July 2007 and were 
supposed to shed more light on topics that we felt we did not, or could not, get 
covered in enough depth in previous research activities.51 A first group of key people 
were comunarios, who could tell us about the history of the comunidad, how it was 
                                                 
50
 A note of caution to those who might seek to replicate this technique: sociodramas, especially 
dealing with such topics of conflict have to be well thought out. A topic might be controversial and 
better be left alone. This was demonstrated clearly by one instance in the comunidad Candelaria, 
where I proposed to Lorenzo to make the topic of witchcraft the centre of the sociodrama. My interest 
in the topic had been triggered by the burning of an alleged witch in a comunidad in Lomerío some 
weeks before. Lorenzo went very quiet and told me to forget about the idea as this was a very delicate 
issue. He told me: ‘Witchcraft is like the mafia. They are afraid of it, there are no problems, but the 
people do know that it exists. Witchcraft is bad, there is no proof. In these cases, justice is carried out 
only by the comunidad’. Field notes: Candelaria, 10 May 2007. The issue was too delicate to address. 
51
 It should also be noted that they generated more critical voices, especially where the interviewees 
were the Chiquitano team members themselves and the interview built on the many informal 
conversations that we had had throughout the fieldwork process. 
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founded, by whom, how it had developed and what challenges it had faced. They 
were identified by the Chiquitano team members and helpful comunarios and 
generally held a one point during the research workshops. The project also scheduled 
interviews with current and former Chiquitano leaders, municipal officials, Oversight 
Committee members and members of NGOs that had been working with the 
Chiquitano Organisations. Again, these were selected in a judgmental sample after 
consultations with the research team. 
Photo 21: Interviewing Key Informants 
 
Elba in the process of interviewing a key informant in the comunidad Las Abras. 
Interview topics with the second set of key people varied according to the expertise 
of the person interviewed, but generally covered how they saw role and performance 
of central leaders, how the central interacted with other public and private instances, 
the comunidades and so on. Interviews with Chiquitano key people also featured a 
section on ‘power structures’ within comunidades, the workings of the communal 
justice system and the way the Law of Popular Participation had shaped the 
organisational structures of comunidades. We also asked most interviewees about 
their visions for a future TCO management structure and their thoughts on the 
‘autonomy’ question. Interviews lasted between fifty minutes to one and a half hours; 
the longest went on for over two hours. Lengths depended on amount of topics 
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covered, response details and how many follow up questions we could think of. All 
interviews were taped and like all other taped material, later transcribed by the team 
members or one of the staff that hired for transcription. 
Of the thirty-five recorded interviews the Concepción CEJIS team conducted, 
Margoth conducted six, Lorenzo and David conducted two together, Jesús conducted 
one and I conducted twenty-three interviews and a further two together with Margoth 
(for a complete list of interviewees carried out, please see Appendix 1). There were 
several reasons why I conducted most of these interviews. Firstly, as part of my 
research agenda I had planned to carry out interviews with many of these individuals 
anyway. Secondly, by May 2007 the research schedule of the CEJIS researchers had 
grown very tight and they would have struggled to find the time. Apart from the 
research, they were occupied with preparations for the looming TCO Monte Verde 
titling ceremony and ongoing juridical and more hands-on conflicts with terceros.52  
Thirdly, the research team reasoned that my persona was less ‘suspect’ than 
CEJIS workers or Chiquitano in carrying out the interviews with Concepceño 
political figures. They thought their conducting interviews might cause tensions, as 
the aim of the research project was to strengthen the Chiquitano territorial claim, 
which many key political figures opposed. Further, the other research team members 
reasoned that I might ask more in-depth questions as I was less familiar with the way 
of life of Chiquitano comunidades, the functions and actions of the centrales and the 
local state administrative structures – in short, I would take less things ‘for granted’. 
Lorenzo and David also reasoned that Chiquitano interviewees might talk more 
freely to me about the about the performance of their leaders as they would be less 
concerned to tell and outsider than a fellow Chiquitano who knew the same people 
(issues of ‘positionality’ will be addressed in more detail below).53  
                                                 
52
 For example, Lorenzo was helping the central to convince the inhabitants of several new highland 
immigrant settlements within the TCO Monte Verde border, to move their settlements out of the 
territory.  
53
 The fact that different researchers with different positionality gathered data in the cause of the 
project means that we not only gathered a great quantity of data, but also data influenced by our 
various subject positions. Arguably, the fact that we obtained data through different mechanism and 
through different researches adds to data variety and some elimination of bias. After all, as Agar 
points out, if more than one researchers ‘examine a similar area, the differences in their biases will 
generate contradictions in their reports’ and these contradictions could be pointing to a more sensitive 
understanding of the phenomenon researched (1980: 49). 
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Reflecting on Research ‘As Part of a Team’ 
Apart from benefitting from some of the data the CGTI-MV project and the large 
amount of data the CEJIS projects generated, I also benefited in less obvious but 
important ways: I gaining physical access to different comunidades, which are hard 
to reach due to the unpaved paths that lead to them. Especially in the rainy season 
when they turn into mudslides and even experienced drivers find them hard to 
navigate. Vehicles get stuck and trees fall over the path, requiring manpower of at 
least three to free the cars or move the tree (see photo 22). On a more personal level, 
especially during my first visits to the territory, other research team members taught 
me some do’s and don’ts of community life. For example, which insects to avoid, 
where to go and bathe (i.e. is there a certain spot on the river/ damn where men or 
women go, or a certain spot to take your bucket with water to) and where to put up 
your hammock. 
Photo 22: CGTI-MV Team Clearing the Path to Monte Verde 
 
Most importantly, being part of the research project meant that I spent much time 
with very knowledgeable Chiquitano informants: my Chiquitano colleagues. 
Informal chats in the back of pick-ups, on the way to workshops, while relaxing in 
our hammocks, during breaks and in the evenings, were the most valuable sources of 
insights, which my thesis draws on heavily. In particular, my CEJIS team colleagues 
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became friends, as well as very patient informants. Also, other CEJIS staff in 
Concepción, Santa Cruz and Sucre provided me with many valuable insights. This 
generally took the form of analysis of, and comments on, the current Bolivian 
political situation, which was at times hard for me to grasp. Further, through the staff 
of the CEJIS Concepción and Santa Cruz offices, I learned about meetings of the 
lowland indigenous umbrella groups, planned protest action, and meetings of 
umbrella group leaders with state officials. Members of the CEJIS Santa Cruz team 
gave me lifts to such events, which allowed me to carry out observation and conduct 
some informal interviews.54 
However, gathering data as part of a research team also threw up certain 
challenges, some of which closely related to those that collaborative researchers also 
may experience. Issues in collaboration and, in my case, cooperation, often emerge 
in areas of power and control, from decisions over methodology and practicalities of 
the research, to questions regarding ‘who has the right to represent whom and for 
what purposes and whose discourse will be privileged in the ethnographic text’? 
(Lassiter, 2005b: 102).  
A first issue in collaboration is, that it may require that anthropologists give 
up a certain amount of power and control over their work. This may present a 
problem for their ego, or may be seen critical by the academic establishment itself 
(Lassiter, 2005b: 102).55 At times, I also felt that it was difficult to ‘give up control’. 
In my case, this was related to the fact that my ideas of what information was 
‘relevant’ to the project or what might be classified as ‘thorough’ data collection 
strategies, sometimes diverged from those of the other researchers. Researchers 
might take a different approach to asking question or take differing care to ask 
follow-up questions. Further, I did not agree with the rigid filling-in-a-matrix 
approach employed in the CGTI-MV project. I reasoned that more space should be 
given to comunarios to record the data in they saw fit and that techniques should aim 
to collect more qualitative data. I also felt that the data generated in the CGTI-MV 
                                                 
54
 I should also note that the CEJIS granted me the use of their library, where many publications and 
projects documents on the struggle for the TCO Monte Verde, as well as other socio-political 
processes in (especially lowland) Bolivia are held. It also facilitated my access to APCOB’s library – 
which is also very comprehensive. 
55
 Lassiter points out that, depending on the attitude of the thesis committee, this may be especially 
problematic for graduate students (2005b: 102).  
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project contained a gender bias as most of the facilitators were male.56 The 
facilitators did not actively encourage women to take part in the discussion, and so 
women often would not. My raising this issue as a problem was largely ignored and 
all I could do was encourage women to participate in the sessions I facilitated.  
I felt such issues more strongly during the CGTI-MV project than in the 
CEJIS project, because in the latter we had regular meetings that allowed us to 
discuss researcher’s observations’ and suggest ways of changing data collection 
strategies that would ensure sufficient depth of information. Again, such issues with 
data collection highlight the shortcomings of such structured approaches to data 
collection, and point to substitute or at least supplement them through ethnographic 
methods. Lastly, working with other researchers involves that you being dependent 
on their input and feedback and, more importantly, their timeframes. For example, 
sending results to head office in Santa Cruz, so that the researchers there could 
comment on the results and suggest changes to the question catalogue and 
methodology, led to great delays. After the first delays were threatening to jeopardize 
the project, project overseers agreed that field research team members could adapt 
questions and methods on their own accord in the reflexive meetings to avoid further 
delays. 
Time delays, due to tight project deadlines, bad planning or external factors, 
such as bad weather, caused significant problems to the data gathering process. 
Arriving at a workshop late, meant that workshop sessions had to be rushed through, 
with fewer breaks which resulted in tiredness among staff as well as comunarios, 
affecting their willingness and ability to concentrate. After all, coca and sweets only 
helped to keep participants awake and concentrating to a certain degree. Further, 
comunarios got fed up waiting for the project team to arrive in their respective 
comunidades. They gave up valuable time they could spend working on their field or 
carrying out other necessary activities. Infringement on their time for no reason 
caused anger among comunarios and in two or three cases, where the team arrived 
late at a comunidad to collect the participants, they had gone off to their field. 
Finding replacements caused further delays to the start of the workshop.  
                                                 
56
 Apart from my presence, there was one other female researcher, Lily, a Chiquitana sociologist in 
her early twenties, hired by the CGTI-MV in the initial stages of the project to help with developing 
the project’s methodological framework.  
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A further issue emerged in the area of power balances. As other researcher 
have noted, while ideally collaborative research should involve ‘side-by-side work of 
all parties in a mutually beneficial research program’ (Lassiter, 2005b: 84), the very 
real issue of persisting power and knowledge (im)balances between researcher and 
collaborators might impede a true equal partnership. No matter how hard researchers 
adapt their personal positions, the micro-politics of their relations may still reflect the 
power relations prevalent in social and political relationships the boarder ‘system’ 
(David, 2002: 13; Lassiter, 2005b: 83). I also perceived such issues among the CEJIS 
researchers. They came to the fore, for example, in May 2007 when Margoth’s own 
commitment to multiple projects meant she had to attend meetings elsewhere. She 
was under much pressure and in haste, forgot twice, to inform the rest of the team of 
her absence. This caused her Chiquitano colleagues to feel that sometimes she was 
not pulling her weight.  
The general complaints about this, fused with those of another nature: the 
Chiquitano team members felt that while they were meant to play a large role in 
developing the methodology, their opinions were not taken into consideration. They 
acted out their frustration by turning up late to set off to the workshop and by not 
pulling their weight during workshops, instead taking time out to socialise with other 
comunarios. While this may have been an important social activity, allowing them to 
share information about the activities of CEJIS, the central, and wider on goings in 
the political sphere of the country, this left the rest of the researchers with more 
responsibility and work than expected.  
In hindsight, my Chiquitano colleagues’ feelings and reactions can partly be 
attributed to the fact that they felt a lack of control over some aspect of the project. 
Although in the initial research team meetings, the CEJIS team had stressed that their 
expertise was crucial to the research process. Instead the final decisions in the project 
were still made by non-Chiquitano mestizo people, who, in turn had to answer to 
mestizo and foreign project funders, namely Oxfam. This links back to problems with 
projects’ supposed collaborative or participatory nature and to questions whether this 
ideal can ever be achieved in a context where the project is ultimately aimed a 
satisfying the guidelines of funders. Nevertheless, the situation improved during the 
final two workshops, team members made an effort to socialise with each other, there 
was more story telling and joke making going on – likely because this contributed to 
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a feeling that this levelled out the differences between the researchers – and this 
improved the team morale. 
Positionality/ Positioning in a Multi-Sited Context 
The way I carried out research had implications for my positionality during 
fieldwork. That positionality (researcher place or origin, marital status, gender, race, 
class and cultural background etc) affected the researchers’ relationships and 
interaction, as well as structuring power relations in the field, has been considered by 
researchers more vigorously since the 1980s (Busher, 2009; Evans, 2008: 124; 
Haraway, 1991a, 1991b; Howard, 1997: 20; Robson, 1997; Walker, 2009).57 
Disclosure of and reflection upon a researchers’ position enables readers to follow 
the conditions in which researchers carried out the research and how the researchers’ 
positionality affected the quality of the gathered data.58 In multi-sited fieldwork the 
issue of positionality becomes further complicated, as the fieldworker’s ‘identity’ 
requires re-negotiation in different sites. The fieldworker is likely to undergo ‘a 
constantly mobile, recalibrating practice of positioning’ (Marcus, 1995: 113). I also 
negotiated various identities depending on the context I was gathering data in: I was 
a PhD Student at the University of Liverpool carrying out anthropological fieldwork, 
a DED intern, a researcher for a CEJIS project and a workshop facilitator/ 
photographer in CGTI-MV research activities.  
Fieldworkers have pointed to ethical dilemmas, emanating from a 
researchers’ positionality and the power relations which shape the fieldwork and the 
post fieldwork stages. Among these, are the previously-mentioned dilemmas faced 
by researchers following collaborative approaches, which centre on the inequalities 
in knowledge production but also the researchers’ ultimate control over the text (e.g. 
                                                 
57
 Especially influential in this have been feminist scholars in anthropology as well as other 
disciplines. See for example, Haraway (1991b) or Harding (1991).  
58
 First of all, I am female, at the time of fieldwork 28. Although not married, I have a long-time 
partner who did not accompany me to the field. My nationality is German and I have lived in England 
since 1999. I speak German and Spanish with a noticeable German accent. To those who are familiar 
with foreign accents this makes it easy to detect my place of origin.  
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Field, 1999: 22; Walker, 2009: 3; Wolf, 1996).59 More recently, some researchers 
have addressed dilemmas linked to adapting, or being ascribed, different identities. 
Such issues include that the way a researcher is perceived may positively or 
negatively affect the identities of people he or she associates with (e.g. Busher, 
2009).60 Researchers have also considered how adapting, or being ascribed, different 
positionalities or identities may interfere with the stance of University ethical 
clearance procedures, as well as ethical codes of the AAA, which ‘coincide in their 
recommendation that the ethnographer maintain complete transparency in field 
relations, avoiding deception and thus suspicion of subversion through complete 
disclosure of the terms of the study’ (Kovats-Bernat, 2002: 215). As a response, 
researchers have stressed that realities in the field, especially if they involve highly 
stratified or polarised social relations or conflict situations, may require a continued 
adaptation of research approaches and positionality, which may include 
‘misrepresenting’ certain aspects of your identity. Generally researchers have done 
so, in order to behave ethically and minimised potential risks to self and, above all, 
others (also an AAA requirement) (see for example, Belousov et al., 2007: 156; 
Kovats-Bernat, 2002: 214; Sluka, 1995). 
I suggest that, rather than considering hiding or misrepresenting part of your 
self as ‘ethical dilemma’, we can draw on the work of Georg Simmel (1906) and 
Gerald Berreman (1962) and recognise that ‘disguising part of yourself’ is inherent 
in all social interaction and that therefore the ethics of what can be revealed and 
concealed depend on the respective field site. Illuminating here is Gerald Berreman’s 
remark:  
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 For example, Les Field points to the asymmetrical power differential between him and the 
consultants (mostly Nicaraguan artisans) he relied on for essays on indigenous culture, class, gender 
that he draws on in his book. He acknowledges that he as American intellectual, had the power to 
present ‘the last word about Nicaraguan cultural history’, which lets him to agree with Spivak that 
academic authors should not pretend that ‘the subaltern can speak’ though their work (1999: 22). 
Further, while the book advances his academic career, while the participants in his research ‘will not 
receive equal regards’ (1999: 22). 
60
 For example, Joel Busher found, that his own positionality also affected that of other people. This 
created an ethical dilemma for him, as local leaders used their association with him to justify their 
own positions in a formalised organisational hierarchy, while he, as he notes, was there to ‘observe’ 
the organisation , not to instigate hierarchical change (2009: 4-5). A second dilemma he faced that he 
was associated with HIV/Aids given ‘the association that people often made between white 
researchers, orphans and vulnerable children (OVC) and, consequently, HIV/AIDS’ (2009: 7). 
Consequently, his respondents might also be associated with the disease. Association may not even 
have to work through physical contact. For example Michael Walker notes that he was associated with 
the local priest because they share some social and physical characteristics, such as, having a beard, 
being white, speaking not only Portuguese but the Bantu language Shona etc. (2009: 1). 
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Every ethnographer, when he reaches the field, is faced immediately with accounting 
for himself before the people he proposes to lean to know. Only when this has been 
accomplished can he proceed to his avowed task of seeking to understand and 
interpret the way of life of those people. … Both tasks, in common with all social 
interaction, involve the control and interpretation of impressions, in this case those 
conveyed by the ethnographer and his subjects to one another (1962: 5). 
This is because all social relationships are based around the condition that 
individuals know something about the other, in the most basic sense of that 
interaction between them may proceed in the way necessary (Simmel, 1906: 441). 
This involves ‘impression management’ from the side of individuals, not just 
revealing, but also concealing aspects of the self from others.61 In this process of 
revealing and hiding part of their ‘selves’ from each other, individuals may even 
lie.62 In fact, Simmel notes that ‘if there were such a thing as complete reciprocal 
transparency, the relationships of human beings to each other would be modified in a 
quite unimaginable fashion’ (1906: 447-448). Naturally then, as Berreman notes, 
‘participant observation, as a form of social interaction, always involves impression 
management. Therefore, as a research technique it inevitably entails some secrecy 
and some dissimulation, unless the latter is defined very narrowly’ (1962: 12).  
Two further aspects of impression management are relevant in the research 
process. Firstly, the recognition that impression management is a reciprocal process. 
Others’ perceptions of you will influence the role or identity that you can actually 
occupy, as they are likely to try to fit you into their social system. In the case of the 
                                                 
61
 Also Gerald Berreman (1962) and Robert Murphy (1964) follow this argument. Berreman, usefully, 
draws in his analysis of ‘impression management’ in a highly stratified Himalayan village on Erving 
Goffman’s ‘dramaturgical approach’ as proposed in Goffmans’  (1959) ‘The Presentation of Self in 
Everyday Life’. He conceives sets of social interaction in terms of ‘audience’, ‘performers’ and 
performance ‘teams’. Performance teams or ‘own teams’ cooperate in conveying a certain impression 
to the audience. In Goffman’s words: ‘We find a team of performers who cooperate to present to an 
audience a given definition of the situation. … We often find a division into back region, where the 
performance of a routine is prepared, and front region, where the performance is presented. Access to 
these regions is controlled in order to prevent the audience form seeing the backstage and to prevent 
outsiders from coming into a performance that is not addressed to them. Among members of the team 
we find that familiarity prevails, solidarity is likely to develop, and that secrets that could give the 
show away are shared and kept (quoted in Berreman, 1962: 11). 
62
 Simmel notes with respect to ‘lying’ that is one of the possible forms of concealing things (another 
form, for example being ‘secrecy’). Through a lie ‘our fellow-man of his own motion gives forth truth 
or error with reference to himself. Every lie, whatever its content, is in its essential nature a promotion 
of error with reference to the mendacious subject; for the lie consists in the fact that the liar conceals 
from the person to whom the idea is conveyed the true conception which he possesses. …. Veracity 
and mendacity are thus of the most far-reaching significance for the relations of persons with each 
other’ (1906: 447). He continues that as such then, ‘we must take care not to be misled, by the 
ethically negative value of lying, into error about the direct positive sociological significance of 
untruthfulness, as it appears in shaping certain concrete situations’ (1906: 448-449). 
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ethnographer this means that an initial response of those he or she encounters ‘is 
probably always an attempt to identify him [or her] in familiar terms; to identify him 
[or her] as the performer of a familiar role’ (Berreman, 1962: 13). Secondly, the 
impression that the ethnographer, or one of his associate, gives ‘will determine the 
kinds of validity of data to which he will be able to gain access and hence the degree 
of success of his work (Berreman, 1962: 11). As in this process both, researcher and 
researched, are intent to ‘convey to the other the impression that will best serve his 
interests as he sees them’, this involves over and under communicating facts or even 
distorting them (Berreman, 1962: 11). As Berreman notes, ‘this is just one phase of 
the general ethnographic problem of evaluating data in the light of informants’ 
vested interests, sources of information, attitudes toward the ethnographer, and many 
other factors’ (1962: 22). This means being ‘constantly alert to the likelihood of such 
deceptions, using cross checks, independent observation and the like for verification’ 
(1962: 16).  
Of course, also in my different field-sites, actors were engaged in managing 
their ‘identities’ or ‘subject positions’. This can be illuminated by considering the 
following examples. CEJIS workers among themselves would outspokenly discuss 
national politics and their involvement in advising and supporting different 
indigenous and peasant social movements and their political activities. In contrast, 
CEJIS workers managed their representations of self towards many Concepceños, 
and also often other Cruceños, typically by refraining from mentioning the name of 
the NGO that they worked for and the work that they did. This was because CEJIS 
workers are at best viewed with suspicion by many individuals in Concepción, as 
well as Santa Cruz department, as the organisation has supported the struggle for 
indigenous rights to rights and, importantly, land and resources over the past fifteen 
years. Negative feelings acutely intensified with the rising socio-political tensions 
which accompanied the Constituent Assembly and the Autonomy debated in Santa 
Cruz department – tensions that could also be felt in Concepción. Another trigger 
was that two former CEJIS employees were appointed Ministers under Evo Morales. 
Concepceños criticised CEJIS staff for politicising the local indigenous population. 
Strong testament to the negative sentiments is that CEJIS workers have experienced 
threats to life and well-being in Santa Cruz and Beni departments. The CEJIS Santa 
Cruz office has repeatedly been bombarded with Molotov cocktails and ransacked by 
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right-wing university students and the Unión Juvenil Cruceñista (UJC – Union of 
Santa Cruz Youth) in September 2008. In short, Concepceño elites saw member of 
the indigenous central in Concepción and any of their allies with misgiving.  
Consequently, when people in Concepción asked Margoth Céspedes, the head 
of the CEJIS Concepción office, who she worked for, she would say such things as ‘I 
work for an organisation over there’ (‘trabajo por una organización por ahí’) and 
would wave her hand vaguely in the direction of the CEJIS office. Even when probed 
about what the organisation did, she said things like ‘it is just one of those 
[organisations]’ (‘es una de esas…’). The likely explanation is that people would 
think that she was working for one of the more positively looked-upon NGOs located 
in the same area of town as the CEJIS office, such as Plan International or APCOB. 
These were seen to have a less political and more charitable and developmental 
agenda.63 If people got Margoth to reveal the name of her employer, they often 
replied with a disparaging or mocking tone: ‘ah, una de esas’ (‘ah, one of these’), or 
‘de la izquierda’ (‘from the left’). Experience had taught Margoth that openness 
about her profession would usually result in negative comments and an end to the 
conversation she was having. Even disclosing other aspects of her ‘self’ first and 
unmasking the nature of her employment after having become more familiar with the 
respective person would not have changed the situation. This revealed that working 
for CEJIS was ‘unethical’ in the eyes of many Concepceños and Cruceños. 
This also highlights the second aspect, namely that impression management is 
not purely down to personal choice, but heavily influenced by the role that 
individuals actually can play in social interactions: impression management is a 
reciprocal process. This is also entails that ‘the way researchers are viewed is also 
affected by the company they keep’ (Howard, 1997: 33). As Berreman found, in 
cases of highly stratified or polarises localities this entailed that ‘acceptance by one 
element of the community does not imply acceptance by the whole community and 
frequently … precludes it’ (1962: 6). In Concepción the situation was similar. 
Acceptance by the Chiquitano organisations caused mistrust from the site of 
Concepceño elites. In fact, actors from both ‘sides’, the one of the central and the 
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 Plan International is primarily involved in service provision and APCOB is best known for their 
forestry projects and other productive projects.  
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one of the Concepceño elite, found that there could be no ‘neutral ground’. This 
becomes evident when considering the following example. 
One day in the CGTI-MV pick-up on the way to a workshop in the TCO 
Monte Verde I asked my fellow front-cabin passenger, a Concepceño mestizo forest 
engineer working for the CGTI-MV, how the situation in Concepción was for him 
and whether he felt that other Concepceño saw him critically for working with the 
central. He responded that at times fellow Concepceños called him ‘traicionador de 
su clase’ (‘traitor against his class’), as they perceived him to be working against the 
interest of his ‘class’ i.e. the fellow Concepceño elite. He added that some members 
of his own family were also ‘against him’. As a matter of explanation, he noted that 
the conflict between Chiquitano and the Concepceño had gone ‘too far and on for too 
long’ for there be any neutrality in the matter. In this context, he included himself in 
the narrative by referring to ‘us Chiquitanos’, which highlighted further that you 
were either ‘with the Chiquitanos’ and therefore associated with them, or ‘on the 
other side’.64  
Another person who experienced that there was no ‘neutral’ way of 
positioning yourself in Concepción, even as a stranger in the locality, was a fellow 
female DED worker in her late twenties, stationed in Concepción from October 2006 
to February 2007. Although she worked together with Carlos Echegoyen and closely 
with CEJIS, she had taken care to portray herself as a ‘neutral’ DED worker and 
taken up residence in a room rented out by a wealthy land and property owning, 
European descended family. Feeling the tensions in the locality she had explained to 
me that this was like ‘living in the lion’s den’ and that being friendly with a powerful 
family would ensure a certain amount of protection and respect from Concepceño 
side. However, tall and blond, she was not easily missed. She walked to the CEJIS 
office most days. All this contributed to the fact that, as a mutual friend reported to 
us in February 2007, neighbours were commenting on her activities, stating things 
like: ‘all gringos work for the other side anyway’.65  
The third aspect of impression management, namely that an individuals’ 
performance will determine what type of ‘performance’ those that encounter him or 
her will put on, and how much ‘backstage’ information she or he will have access to, 
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 Field notes: Puerto San Pedro, 13 February 2007.  
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 Field notes: Concepción, 22 February 2007. 
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is demonstrated by the following example. Chiquitano and non-Chiquitano CGTI-
MV and CEJIS research team members were perceived vastly differently in 
Chiquitano comunidades, which was also linked to the fact that the comunarios knew 
(or could presume to know) more about Chiquitano team members than the others. 
Comunarios often had at least heard of the Chiquitano members of the team because 
most were former or current leaders. Comunarios could place the Chiquitano team 
members into the network of communities; their roles in terms of their former or 
current position in their Organisation (and therefore partly deduct their agendas); 
they might have met them at assemblies of Organisation members, political rallies, or 
encountered each other during past projects in which the researcher had participated. 
As former leaders, Chiquitano team members commanded respect as well as 
confidence, a fact which also played a role in convincing comunarios to give their 
time to attend two-day research workshops. Often, some comunarios would know the 
Chiquitano team member as kin and could place them as close or distant family 
member. This closeness and mutual identification was also reflected in the fact that 
comunarios and Chiquitano researchers had lively conversations with each other, 
shared jokes and anecdotes and referred to each by their names, with the respective 
title of ‘Don’ for men, and ‘Doña’ for women, for example ‘Don Lorenzo’. 
However, Chiquitano team members also fostered their rapport with the 
comunarios, especially in the non-official parts of the research workshop, they would 
make sure to socialise with comunarios, or as noted above, they would actually take 
‘time out’ to do so. They did then not come across as official workshop facilitators or 
member of a research team, but were primarily perceived as fellow comunarios who 
possessed certain knowledges about local and national political events that were of 
importance to comunarios. As comunarios who shared much of their concerns, 
Chiquitano researchers then had access to certain ‘backroom’ information which 
comunarios were less happy to share with other researchers. This included 
information about conflicts in the comunidad, such as clashes due to witchcraft, 
quarrels with neighbouring comunidades or dissatisfaction with certain leaders. 
In contrast, comunarios knew little more about the other researchers than 
their names or what they might deduct from physical appearances and accents. They 
indicated a formal distance, as well as respect, by referring to them as ‘licenciada’, 
or in short ‘lice’ (female) or ‘licenciado’ (male). While this usually refers to people 
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who have passed their licenciatura (university degree), it indicates here that they 
perceived non-Chiquitano researchers to have had a higher degree of formal 
education than themselves. As often transpired, this also included a presumed higher 
knowledge of the political system outside the comunidades. While sometimes lively 
conversations ensued between non-Chiquitano researchers and comunarios, they 
usually took a different and more formal level. Broadly, topics issues of interest to 
the research project, or involved more general conversations about where the 
researchers was from, what their family situation was, and at times, trying to 
establish mutual acquaintances and discussing their whereabouts. While non-
Chiquitano researchers established rapport and got friendly with comunarios, they 
could not alter their images further than appearing as one more mestizo researcher (or 
NGO staff) who had come to the comunidad – friendly, respectful and respected but 
somewhat interchangeable. Most aspects as their persona and political motivations 
generally remained hidden to comunarios. In turn, comunarios were generally keen 
to hide certain ‘backroom’ aspects and portray their comunidad in ways that they saw 
as appropriate, to the ‘outside world’. 
This again highlighted the importance of working with Chiquitano 
colleagues, as the information they gathered, as well as their on knowledge of the 
backroom situation was a great asset for cross-checking statements. Chiquitano 
colleagues also revealed backroom secrets of another group: the central leaders. 
Themselves former leaders, they were no longer directly involved in the running of 
the central, felt less obliged to portray some ideal image of its work and were happy 
to provide their interpretations of leaders’ activities. In turn, Chiquitano leaders were 
inclined to portray the central and its activities in a positive light. This coincides with 
Bergman’s experience that ‘many types of back region secrets were revealed only by 
people who were not members of the groups whose secrets they were’ (1962: 18).  
Important is also to consider how NGO workers and central leaders portrayed 
their selves to each other. As an onlooker, I perceived that NGO workers showed 
much respect to Chiquitano leaders. In the case of the NGO CEJIS, its workers 
assisted Chiquitano of Concepción, San Javier and Lomerío in the technical juridical 
battles that they had to fight with INRA, in courts and in tribunals in order to gain a 
legal title to their territory. They also show much solitarily for the political activities 
of the Chiquitano central and lowland indigenous movements in general. CEJIS 
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workers are present at almost all important events that lowland indigenous groups 
stage. They do these things despite the animosity that this brings them from other 
members of lowland departmental society. They very much purvey to Chiquitano 
leaders that they are ‘on their side’. 
Chiquitano leaders, in turn, generally showed respect to NGO workers. 
Similar to other comunarios, they often referred to NGO workers as ‘licenciada’ 
‘licenciado’ or ‘doctor/a’. Chiquitano leaders cooperated very closely with CEJIS 
and other NGOs and frequently invited NGO employees to attend central meetings. 
Further, Lorenzo Pasabare at the time employed by CEJIS, often dropped in to see 
what was going on in the CICC or the CGTI-MV in order to coordinate activities. 
Once a year the central held planning meetings with CEJIS (and some other NGOs) 
in which they discussed project progress, new projects and proposals. NGO workers 
and central members also met at the start and end of projects, as well as during other 
stages within project cycles. 
However, NGO participation was not desired in all spaces. The central 
leadership also held closed meetings without the participation of technicians and 
NGO staff.66 While the content of these meetings cannot be personally accounted for, 
it demonstrates that central leaders did not want to share a certain amount of 
‘backstage’ information with the NGOs. Further, on certain occasions Chiquitano 
leaders took off the mask of cooperation. This occurred, for instance during the 
course of the CEJIS ‘collaborative research project’. In its planning stages central 
leaders had agreed that at least one leader from a central would accompany the 
researchers to the workshops. They were to introduce the aims and objectives of the 
research project and to give an update of the work of the central, the TCO process 
and the Constituent Assembly, to comunarios. However, leaders were generally 
absent from the workshops, causing the CEJIS team some embarrassment and 
disappointment among comunarios, who had expected their presence. 
CEJIS workers expressed their disappointment with this attitude. As they were 
often very closely cooperating with central leaders, and these had initially expressed 
interest in the project, they expected the leaders to share the same interest in the 
project and its execution. CEJIS workers were not the only researcher who fell into 
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 As I was never allowed to participate in such a closed meeting, I will concentrate on the description 
of the open asambleas and reuniones that I witnessed or heard about. 
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this ‘expected compliance’-trap. Also other researcher carrying out projects which 
leaders had sanctioned have subsequently expected the leaders’ actively support their 
respective research agenda or project – which they often do not, as they fail to attend 
planned meetings or activities (e.g. Amskov, 1999: 2). This feeling is heightened 
because central members can nevertheless at times be very demanding towards NGO 
workers, asking for funds, support, or information.  
This example shows that the agendas of NGOs and central differed 
significantly behind the ‘mask of solidarity’ they portrayed to each other most of the 
time. In reality, central leaders juggle many parallel activities which demand their 
attention, making it hard for them to pay attention to a single project: they were, not 
least, constantly busy with administering and executing a variety of NGO funded 
projects in various stages of the project cycles as well as advancing the territorial 
claim. Further, central and NGOs did also not see eye-to-eye on the control of 
project resources. Central leaders expressed that NGOs were getting money in the 
name of Chiquitanos but then used them to run the NGO instead. Central leaders also 
resented the financial dependence on NGOs. Such resentments would sometimes 
come to the surface in arguments between NGO workers or central members.67 
Several NGO workers had stories to tell, where they had received a public scolding 
by leaders about supposedly hogging project materials bought with money destined 
for the centrales, treating comunarios badly, or for lack of informing the central 
about their activities. 
My Multiple Subject Position 
I managed my own subject positions very differently in front of different audiences. 
Like DED and CEJIS colleagues, I knew that to be seen to engage with indigenous 
movements would attract suspicion and criticism from many Concepceños and 
Cruceños across ethnic and occupational strata. Seeing that a white gringa in Santa 
Cruz as well as Concepción was constantly asked what she was doing in the area, I 
was thinking of an ‘identity management’ strategy which would allow me to carry 
out my research. This was also imperative as the aspect of my safety was of concern 
due to University and funding body regulations. Drawing on the works of others who 
carried out fieldwork in conflictive situation (e.g. Belousov et al., 2007; Kovats-
                                                 
67
 For example, field notes: Concepcón, 27 February 2007.  
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Bernat, 2002; Sluka, 1995) and after consulting my supervisors, I decided to affiliate 
to an international NGO with a positive profile and good track record in the field site: 
kindly, the DED granted me the role of intern. This not only provided me with a type 
of ‘safety net’, or support network, throughout my fieldwork, but also with another 
identity or role to add to my ‘repertoire’. After all, international and domestic 
development workers were generally respected in Santa Cruz, as long as they were 
‘developing’ the ‘underdeveloped hinterland’ of the province and they did not appear 
to incite the ‘indios’ to protest. Consequently, I stressed my DED affiliation when 
talking to members of the local white and mestizo population, who were opposed to 
the Chiquitano land struggle, or when I was not sure were a person’s political 
persuasion lay.  
Being affiliated to the DED and having the well-respected DED worker 
Carlos Echegoyen as my main gate-keeper also had another side effect, namely that 
Chiquitano leaders and technicians initially associated me more closely with the 
DED. Echegoyen took me along to meetings he had scheduled with the CICC, the 
OICH and the CGTI-MV in September 2006. Although I had already visited three 
organisations on my pre-field mission and gained their approval of my research 
project, Carlos reasoned that it would be good to introduce me and my project at 
formal events where most central and CGTI-MV leaders and employees would be 
present. This was to ensure that I would be as transparent as possible about what I 
would be doing and allowed me to ask for the consent to carry out the research from 
a larger group of individuals as the initial three leaders, as described above. My 
association with the DED and Echegoyen initially helped gain the leaders’ support 
for my project.68 Nevertheless, when dealing with central leaders, CGTI and CEJIS 
personnel, I managed my ‘self’ very differently. I informed them about my project 
and PhD student status, and repeatedly reminded them that the DED affiliation was 
only one of the identities I carried.  
However, the subject position I could adopt vis-à-vis central leaders was also 
heavily determined by the role that I could play. As noted, CICC leaders maintained 
that research carried out in comunidades, the CGTI-MV and the central had to be 
sanctioned by the leaders and the comunidad in question, and should benefit the local 
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Chiquitano population in some way. Consequently, the only role that I could occupy 
was that of an ‘advocate’. That it is difficult or impossible to carry out such research 
without an advocate position is evidenced by the fact that much of the research 
regarding Chiquitano communities and the centrales in San Javier, Lomerío and 
Concepción has been carried out by individuals working for NGOs or by researchers 
affiliated to the central.69 Thus, most were what Nancy Scheper-Hughes called 
‘anthropologist-companheiras’ (1995: 411).70 While I am aware of more critical 
voices regarding the issue of ‘side taking’ (see below), a personal stance is that side-
taking is not necessarily problematical, and in the case of my research unavoidable. 
In the comunidades, my positionality was again another. As I was either with 
the CGTI-MV or the CEJIS team, I appeared as one more member of the research 
team. I was also in company of people known to many comunarios, which 
contributed to the fact that they were generally not very suspicious of the gringa that 
had come to their comunidad. This is not to deny that as the only European in the 
team I did not attracted some special attention, not least because my Spanish was at 
times clumsy, a source of amusement to comunarios. Comunarios would ask what I 
was doing there, where I was from, where my family was, how I liked their 
comunidad and so on. Still, comunarios generally put me into a similar category as 
non-Chiquitano researchers, evidenced by the fact they often called me ‘lice’ or 
‘doctora’ apart from ‘gringa’. 
However, I was still very foreign to comunarios. An indication of this is that 
during my stay in Palestina, I was invited to join a group of men to go fishing and 
chew coca in the evening as well as to go hunting, although I did not accept the 
invitation at the time. Both activities are generally more engaged in by male 
comunarios. This indicates that comunarios perceived me as I sufficiently foreign so 
that my participation in ‘male’ comunarios activities would have been accepted, 
resonating with the findings of other female researcher that a ‘sufficiently foreign’ 
status allowed them to participate in ‘male activities’ (for example, Howard, 1997: 
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mixture of ‘assignment’ by people and a personal political stance (see 1995: 411). 
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20-21; Siskind, 1973). However, the invitations may have also linked to the fact that 
I owned a large bag of coca leaves, which the respective comunarios knew I would 
share with them, if I came along.  
This episode links to a last aspect, namely how my gender affected my 
positionality.71 While foreignness might have meant that I could transgress 
comunidad gendered roles and spaces, it somewhat restricted me in terms of rapport 
with other CGTI-MV research team members. While carrying out research with the 
CGTI-MV team, in one trip I was the only and in another, one of two women. During 
both trips, I felt that interacting with the male Chiquitano researchers was reduced to 
sexist comments and bad jokes from their side. While sexist jokey banter is a part of 
many conversations male and female Concepceños and Chiquitano have among each 
other, and is such not unusual, in this case, the banter drowned out all other elements 
of the conversations. As I noted in my field-diary 
… there is hardly ever a normal conversation going on. If I try to talk about more 
serious issues that are of interest to my research, this is quickly stopped and the 
issues are diverted to the fact that I used a machete and am now fit to be married, if I 
would also learn how to cook, and so on.72  
However, such talk did not mean that team members would not ‘look out’ for me. 
After all, they took me along, looked after me with food and drink and the odd ration 
of coca leaves. A likely explanation as to why their verbal engagement took the form 
of jokes is that they did not grow to know me further than my ‘female gringa’ mask 
– a person who did not know much about comunario way of live and somebody they 
did not know very much about. That they reacted like this whenever I tried to strike 
up amore serious conversation and ask them about central or CGTI-MV activities 
also implies that they did not want to share this information with me, presumably 
because they did not really know what to make of me and my asking such questions.  
This assumption is supported by the fact that I did not have the ‘sexist joke 
problem’ with the one male mestizo research team member who could relate to me 
on a different level: we shared the experience of having lived in Costa Rica for some 
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time and shared similar academic interests. Further, I did not encounter similar 
problems with male Chiquitano CEJIS research team colleagues. On explanation 
might be that there were more women researchers, meaning that I was not the only 
target of banter. However, I think that there more likely explanation s that I got to 
know my CEJIS Chiquitano colleagues to a deeper level. This meant that our 
conversations covered all sorts of personal and professional topics. It is highly likely 
that by spending more time with the CGTI-MV team on research trips might have 
changed the situation as the researchers would have got to know other parts of my 
‘self’ and ‘identity repertoire’.  
The way that my gender influenced the shape relations could take with 
Chiquitano comunarios has already been indicated above. I should add that being a 
woman did mean that women revealed a certain amount of information to me as well 
as other female researchers, which they did not reveal to male researchers, or as long 
as male comunarios were present. The clearest example was that Chiquitanas talked 
about incidence of violence against women and Children more freely when men were 
absent. On the other hand, it can be assumed that a certain amount of male 
‘backroom’ information was remained hidden from female researchers, which was, 
in turn possibly revealed to the male researchers.  
The Politics of Fieldwork and Writing about it 
Taking up the role of an ‘advocate’ had practical implications and raised certain 
moral dilemmas, especially during the writing-up process. Certain questions which 
were in my mind during the research process came to be more problematic in the 
writing up process. Such questions included: whose side am I taking? Whose agenda 
supporting, i.e. do I take the side of the central, of the comunarios, or the NGOs 
(which claim to be supporting the cause of the Chiquitano, but at times have a 
conflicting relationship with both)? Do you have to be loyal to ‘the cause’, or can 
you have your own ‘cause’? Does this mean agents cannot be critically analysed in 
term of their roles or performance? 
Anthropologists’ engagement with such issues has focused on different 
problems and debates. One of the main debates has been between advocates of 
engagement in anthropological practice and/or writing and those who argue for 
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greater detachment. As Burr (2002: n/p) summarises, the main fault line in this 
debate runs among ‘cultural relativists’ who may ‘take a firm stance on not becoming 
involved with difficult ethical issues at the local level’ and those influenced by 
Marxist, post-Marxist, post-modern and feminist critiques. Highlighting the power 
inequalities prevalent in their field sites as well as in knowledge production, the latter 
strive for a ‘greater accountability to the societies in which they work’ (2002: n/p).73 
Authors generally discuss ‘engagement’ as a moral issue and/or one of 
‘method’, when debating appropriate standards for the discipline. For instance, 
Nancy Scheper-Hughes, advocate of an engaged approach, argues: ‘cultural 
relativism, read as moral relativism, is no longer appropriate to the world in which 
we live, and anthropology, if it is to be worth anything at all, must be ethically 
grounded’ (1995: 409).74 In her fieldwork she acted as ‘anthropologist’ and ‘activist’, 
and she reflects her ‘advocate’ stance in her writing. For her, advocacy is a question 
of moral and method: she ‘assumed the local cargo of anthropologist-companheira’ 
during her research in Brazil, as the role was ‘assigned’ to her ‘by activist women 
and men of the Alto’ (1995: 411). Swedenburg (1992) is another author ‘broadly 
concerned with studying and writing “history from below”’ (1992: 482).75 This 
convinced him that solidarity might require ‘that we learn from, and be (tactically) 
complicit with, the silences and resistances of the people we live with and study’ 
(1992: 484).  
In contrast, some authors support activism in the field, but not in the writing 
up process and vice versa. For example, Shokeid, criticising Swedenburg’s stance, 
opines that the role of an anthropologist is ‘to describe and analyse – as honestly and 
compassionately as possible – the social manifestations of human experience as well 
as the work of other anthropologists’ (1992: 465). He claims to adhere to an 
intellectual and professional ethos that is neither ‘value free’ nor ideologically 
committed, noting that we have to differentiate between ‘involvement, advocacy, and 
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 However, this is of course not to deny that taking an engaged role may not have political 
implications. As Scheper-Hughes points out: ‘I assumed the local cargo of anthropologist-
companheira, dividing my time (and my loyalties) between anthropology and political work as it was 
assigned to me by activist women and men of the Alto’ (1995: 411). 
75
 Also see, Swedenburgs’ (1999) work on Palestine. 
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commitment’ in anthropology. He explains that while ‘many, if not most, of our 
colleagues are to some extent “involved,” or “engaged,” anthropologists’, this does 
not mean that ‘anthropologist’s ideological and emotional agenda’ should not be 
uncritically tolerated, as this might lead ideologically tailored ‘truths’ (1992: 466, 
473).  
Authors also point to a multitude of other problems that they associate with 
‘taking sides’. Some see it as a political problem. For example, Robins’ (1996) 
critique of Scheper-Hughes’ work, focuses on the fact that anthropologists can also 
intervene on the ‘wrong side’. He points to South Africa where ‘Eiselin and the 
Volkskundiges provided the intellectual framework for a segregationist ideology’ 
(1996: 342). Secondly, he points to a moral issue, namely that depending on the 
context, ‘the intervention of the “great white” anthropologist can smack of 
paternalism and elitism and may aggravate rather than alleviate the suffering of the 
“beneficiaries”’ (1996: 343). Thirdly, authors point to methodological questions, 
namely that the notion of taking side with the ‘oppressed’ is problematic when such 
groups are treated as ‘undifferentiated’ categories, hiding multifaceted ‘identities’ as 
well as other axis of difference (e.g. Gaventa and Cornwall, 2001: 75; Scott, 1985; 
Vermeersch, 2005). A fourth aspect is the question regarding the ‘authenticity’ of 
voices (see Gaventa and Cornwall, 2001: 75; Scott, 1985; Vermeersch, 2005). Some 
authors note that after all, relatively powerless groups may either knowingly or 
unknowingly adopt the voices of the powerful (Gaventa and Cornwall, 2001: 75; 
Scott, 1985). Lastly, we may add that morally committed advocates may face the 
issue that the line between their own agenda and that of the actors they claim to 
support may become blurred in the writing up process. Establishing one (mutual) 
agenda might become increasingly difficult upon in-depth analysis.  
David somewhat side-steps these debates by pointing out that most of these 
problems are rooted in the relationship of ‘knowledge’ and ‘social interest’. Social 
researchers might want to be on the side of the ‘underdog’ and see their role in 
advocacy, but ‘how is the researcher to take a stand as advocate if every position is 
based upon social constructions based upon selections and interpretations based upon 
social interest?’ (2002: 14). After all, as Swedenburg reminds, ‘all academic 
discourse is selective, conducted through arbitrary closures’ (1992: 483 also see 
Hammersly, 1992: 2). It would be tempting to follow David’s conclusion that this 
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means that if we recognise the close relationship between knowledge, the social 
researcher and it’s constructed nature, then researchers can simply establish whose 
side they are on (2002: 14).  
However, in the case of Concepción the act of establishing whose side ‘I’ am 
on is not as simple. As I have shown, those deemed to be on ‘one side’ are not a 
‘homogenous group’ and cross-cut by various differing interests. As becomes clear 
in the case of the Chiquitano central, the CGTI-MV, CEJIS, APCOB and the 
Chiquitano comunarios, all these actors are not necessarily on the ‘same side’ 
although the seem to be from the point of view of the Concepceño elite. I argue 
therefore that taking on the role of an advocate can be just as unethical as not to do 
so in the light of a situation where the ‘sides’ are crosscut by many different 
interests. Further, we must distinguish between taking an advocacy role as moral 
stance or as methodological choice. As in the case of Scheper-Hughes’ work, 
advocacy is often a combination of both. In the case of my research, where ‘sides’ 
become increasingly blurred the closer we look at actors’ interests, I distinguish the 
advocate ‘role’ I occupied in the field from my moral position. Rather than ‘taking 
sides’ this thesis pays attention to the power relations between the various competing 
actors of the same, as well as opposing ‘sides’. Further, I focus on how the agendas 
and actions of different actors influence each other. Through considering the ‘state’ 
as a power structure and analysing citizen engagement with different state actors, I 
hope to shed more light on the different citizen and state practices Chiquitano leaders 
and comunarios engage in, and how different actors constitute the state for the 
Chiquitano. 
Conclusion 
In sum, my research focused on the Chiquitano organisations’ and communities’ 
interactions with each other and with different governmental and non-governmental 
state actors. This meant that my fieldwork necessarily took the form of what may be 
described as a ‘multi-sited’ ethnography (Marcus, 1995). My presence in different 
sites was necessary, not least, because the different actors –Chiquitano comunarios 
one the one hand and state actors on the other – are dispersed among different 
geographical sites. Through observation, informal talks and interviews in Chiquitano 
comunidades, I gained a greater insight into Chiquitano-state interactions and the 
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functioning of communal political structures; the way comunarios interacted with 
each other; how they perceive and interact with the centrales and other state actors; 
as well as getting a deeper insight into communal life. 
With respect to CEJIS and the CGTI-MV, I became a researcher in research 
projects that each was carrying out. Two of the reasons why I saw collaborating with 
these two organisations as beneficial were, firstly, because they were part of the state 
legibility project (Scott, 1998), and secondly, both research projects aimed to gather 
data, which coincided with data I aimed to gather, thus cooperation on gathering data 
avoided unethical research repetition. My thesis therefore not only draws on the 
ethnographic data I collected, but also on data collected through methods as diverse 
as structured interview, focus groups and sociodramas.  
This data is portrayed in this thesis by moving beyond simply taking sides by 
instead shedding light on the different interests and agendas aligned each ‘side’. 
Looking at the interaction of Chiquitano comunidades and leader with state actors 
such as NGOs and state bureaucratic institutions, allows for an analysis of some of 
the enabling aspects of these relations, areas of cooperation and where this 
interaction leads to paradoxes, as well as modes of Chiquitano resistance. The 
following chapter addresses the historical dimensions of Chiquitano – state 
engagement, by considering the Chiquitano ethnogenesis sparked by the arrival off 
Jesuits in the region, the changes in Bolivian citizenship regimes and the emergence 
of contemporary patters of land ownership in the region.  
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Chapter IV 
History of the Chiquitano: Ethnogenesis, Land Loss and Citizenship 
The previous chapter introduced the methodological choices made during fieldwork 
and argued that what constitutes appropriate research ethics and methodology 
depends on the socio-cultural context a researcher encounters in the field. This 
chapter turns to the history of Chiquitano people and the Chiquitanía by focusing on 
changing actors of governance and emerging citizenship regimes, which in Bolivia as 
in other Latin American countries, have been closely tied to landholding regimes and 
economic activity, and as such to racial categories (e.g. Harris, 1995). It also pays 
attention to Chiquitano ethnogenesis, understood as a continuing ‘process of 
becoming’ (Radding, 2005: 121; also see Veber, 1998).1 In historical perspective, 
Chiquitano-state relations centre primarily on the struggle for land and different 
resources. While power structures and forms of ‘governmentality’ and elite 
composition changed over time, a constant has been the imposition of new meanings 
on the region’s natural resources (such as land and forests), which were ultimately 
transformed into commodities in a system of private property to the overall exclusion 
of Chiquitano groups (see Ciccantell, 1999). 
That memories and interpretations of people’s histories are important for 
interpretations of their present social, political and economic circumstances, as well 
as the construction of their modes of identification, has been highlighted by different 
authors (e.g. Melucci, 1989; Rivera Cusicanqui, 1987; Sider, 2003). Similarly, in the 
Chiquitano case, reflecting on their history shapes the contemporary Chiquitano self-
understanding and (political) actions. This is perceivable, for example, in discourses 
and statements surrounding their territorial struggle (see Chapter VI) and in the way 
Chiquitano think about their future organisational structures. The following 
statement by one Chiquitano activist provides an example. In early June 2007, I sat 
on the patio outside the CEJIS office in Concepción with Lorenzo Pasabare, eating 
                                                 
1
 I follow Eric Wolf’s definitions of ‘race’ and ethnicity’. Wolf marks the difference between the 
terms as follows: ‘Racial designations, such as “Indian” or “Negro”, are the outcome of the 
subjugation of populations in the course of European mercantile expansion. The term Indian stands 
for the conquered populations of the New World, in disregard of any cultural or physical differences 
among Native Americans. … Indians are conquered people who could be forced to labour or to pay 
tribute’ (1982: 380). In contrast, ‘ethnic categories express the ways that particular populations come 
to relate themselves to given segments of the labour market. Such categories emerge from two 
sources, one external to the group in question, and the other internal’ (1982: 381). 
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cuñapés, (salty, hard little round maize buns typical for the region), drinking coffee 
and carrying out an informal interview. The CEJIS project team had singled him out 
as a key informant because he had been a local CICC leader as well as a key figure 
of the Santa Cruz based Central Indígena de Pueblos y Comunidades Indigenas del 
Oriente Boliviano (CIDOB – Central of Indigenous Peoples and Communities of 
Western Bolivia). It was his turn to answer the question that project team members 
had asked many current and former Chiquitano leaders, technicians and comunarios 
before him, namely: what he thought a future territorial government for the TCO 
Monte Verde should look like.  
Popular perceptions held that a new government for the TCO Monte Verde 
would either be conformed by leaders of the three local Chiquitano Centrales, their 
representatives, or be directly elected by all Chiquitano living in the area. Generally, 
people had expressed that the organisational structure should be that of a ‘syndicate’ 
presided over by president, vice-president and secretaries for different working areas, 
for example, a secretary for land and territory. Lorenzo’s opinion differed. He 
pointed out that such structures were particularly ‘western’ and different to the 
‘traditional’ structures of the Chiquitano people: they were externally imposed. 
Lorenzo stated:  
In many of the comunidades, they only talk of a western authority, right? President, 
vice-president and so on. The people do not know anything else and I started 
thinking [about] how the very Chiquitano was in years before, how he was. I have 
read, I wanted to get somebody who tells me … I have gone to ask the old people 
how [it was], but there is nothing anymore…: they tell me that there were Caciques 
and all these things … But [even in] Palmarito and in other comunidades in one or 
another way, they were organised by their patrons or through the Church, this is not 
legitimate anymore … It is not the very legitimacy of the Chiquitano indigenous, or, 
well, they have not found what they were like… what type of authorities they had, 
right?  
And there the Chiquitano, they invented it. … Before they elected him because he 
was a good hunter, he fought with the jaguar (tigre), he was elected authority of the 
Chiquitano people because he was good, fought with the jaguar and overcame and 
killed him. … And what is more, they say, he had the right to have three or more 
women. But who, who has told them that, who investigated this exactly? Might this 
not have come from the side of the Guarani people? We know that the Guarani 
people are another culture in the lowlands, right? And they cannot attach something 
from another culture to us. The Chiquitano people might not have been like that or 
they might have been, because there were some parallels. …in reality, it is the case 
that nobody tells it any more … They are telling us only from the time when [we] 
were colonised…and … it is my thinking that unfortunately (desgraciadamente) 
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right up to the state, power takes this form … [and] we are almost also structured 
like syndicates, right? … Should it be that we simply copy what we see, like [this 
form of] organisation, let’s say president, vice-president, secretary…? But it is a 
syndicate, I don’t know but it is not legitimate of the Chiquitano now. …the only 
way that I can think of is that the cabildo remains (prevalecer), because the cabildo 
is what they dream of in the indigenous comunidad of Palestina.2  
Apart from illustrating how thinking about the past influences contemporary 
Chiquitano political strategies and considerations of what will be appropriate for the 
future, this statement shows a sense of uncertainty that comes from a recognition that 
their history has been heavily constructed in interaction with outside forces. An 
uncertainty perhaps stemming from the fact that ‘indigeneity’ – in the sense of 
tracing ancestry and cultural practises to pre-conquest populations – is one pre-
requisite for indigenous citizenship, and the rights that depend on it. The statement 
reflects Lorenzo’s awareness of the lasting legacy of the Jesuit mission system, 
introduced with the arrival of the Jesuit missionaries in the Chiquitanía in 1692, as 
well as the way that living with ‘patrons’ influenced Chiquitano culture and 
organisational structures.  
This chapter is structured according to ‘stages’, i.e. the early Conquest, 
concentration in the Jesuit missions, the republican period, the rubber boom and the 
construction of the Corumbá Railway and the effects of the 1952 Bolivian 
                                                 
2
 ‘En mucho de las comunidades hablan de una autoridad occidental nomás… presidente, 
vicepresidente, ta, ta nada mas saben la gente y yo me puse a pensar, como era pues el propio 
chiquitano en años antes, como era. Yo he leído he querido sacar alguien que diga yo como promotor 
tengo que ir ha preguntar a los viejitos como, nada ya, no hay: me  hablan que habían caciques y 
tanto todas esas cosas hasta en Palmarito digamos  no, pero en Palmarito  y en otras comunidades 
eran algo así de autoridades que de alguna y otra manera eran organizados por su patrones o por la 
iglesia no es legítimo pues ya no, no es una legitimidad propia del indígena chiquitano o sea no se 
han encontrado como eran ellos… que tipo de autoridades tenían ¿no? O por ahí nomás se la invento 
el Chiquitano… antes se elegía porque era buen cazador porque peleo con el tigre, era elegido 
autoridad del pueblo Chiquitano porque era el bueno digamos peleo con el tigre lo venció y lo mató. 
… y además tenia dizque derecho a tener a tres o a más mujeres. ¿Pero quién, quien lo dijo eso, quien 
lo investigo exactamente? ¿Eso no será un, no será que eso viene de repente eso es del lado del 
pueblo guaraní?  sabemos que el pueblo guaraní es otra cultura en tierras baja, no, y no nos pueden 
meter algo del otro pueblo a lo que es. El pueblo chiquitano de repente no ha sido así o de repente 
también fue así, porque casi habían algunas cosas homogéneas. …pero en realidad de los casos es 
que ya nadie lo cuanta pues no están contando nomás de lo que fueron desde  que lo colonizo  nomás 
ya, hacia arriba ya  y yo veo y en mi pensar mío desgraciadamente hasta el poder del Estado pues 
esta así no con esa forma de estructura y casi estamos estructurado como sindicato también no … 
será que copiamos nomás de lo que vemos porque por decir este la organizaciones esta digamos este  
presidente, vicepresidente, secretario…? Pero es tipo sindicato, no sé pero no es lo legítimo del 
Chiquitano ahora. La única manera que me queda pensar seria prevalecer, por que el cabildo algo 
que como se suena digamos en la comunidad indígena de Palestina’. Interview: Lorenzo Pasabare, 
Concepción, 1 June 2007. 
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Revolution.3 It concludes with a brief overview of the situation of Chiquitano 
comunidades in the 1970s, which witnessed the emergence of the Chiquitano 
movements in Ñuflo de Chávez province (addressed in the following chapter).  
Pre-Jesuit Contact: The Early Conquest 
At the eve of contact, in the Andean sphere, the Inca Empire engaged in efforts to 
create a state apparatus, seeking to control the population and exploit local resources 
of the different ethnic groups whose social and economic organisation took the form 
of the ayllu.4 In contrast, societies in the Paraguayan-Chaco-Chiquitano lowlands 
were organised in a more egalitarian manner (Freyer, 1997: 43-44; Radding, 2005: 
50). Authors coincide in noting that Chiquitano social life was nomadic or centred on 
small semi-permanent settlements (Freyer, 1997: 24; see Krekeler, 1993: 145-146; 
Schwarz, 1994: 26).5 As Radding notes: 
the physical spaces created by these settlements linked them integrally with the 
forest … their skills for building, fashioning tools, procuring food, healing, and 
conserving the biota of their world grew out of their intimate knowledge of the 
bosque and the pampas. Just as forcefully, the spiritual guardians (jichis) who 
inhabited their cosmos derived their form and meaning from the natural environment 
of the forests and streams in the Bolivian lowlands (2005: 43). 
                                                 
3
 The description of the situation of the pre-mission, mission, and post-mission era in this chapter 
draws largely on the works of four authors: anthropologist Jürgen Riester (1968; 1976), historian 
Brigit Krekeler (1993), anthropologist Burkhard Schwarz (1994) and historical ethnographer Bärbel 
Freyer (1997) (Freyer’s Magister Arbeit was later published as ‘Los Chiquitanos: Descripción de un 
pueblo de las tierras bajas de Bolivia según fuentes jesuíticas del siglo XVIII’ (2000)). I acknowledge 
the weakness in this approach. It is due to a lack of access to mission and other historical 
documentation, and the fact that an in-depth analysis of these accounts is outside the scope of this 
thesis. The authors’ writings draw on the mission history of the region, as well as descriptions of the 
area before and shortly after the mission period, and are based on a revision of texts produced by 
Jesuit missionaries. The most commonly cited accounts are by the Jesuit priests Julian Knogler, Juan 
Patricio Fernández, Francisco Burgos, Martin Schmidt, and Pierre François Charlevoix. Authors also 
rely on the descriptions of Santa Cruz and the Chiquitanía compiled by Alcides d’Obigny as a result 
of his tour through the area in 1830-1831. The newer publications sum up historical descriptions 
covering several centuries, which often makes it hard to distinguish to which timeframe a particular 
statement belongs. Illuminating, however, is the well-researched work by historian Cynthia Radding 
(2001; 2005) which addresses many of the themes this chapter covers.  
4
 In the ayllu structure, agricultural land was owned by kin-based communities, although held by 
individual households. Labour intensive tasks, such as agriculture, house building and maintenance of 
irrigation systems were carried out jointly, with the main beneficiary providing food and drink for the 
other workers (see Patterson, 2000: 1-2; Stern, 2000). Also see Klein (2003a: 13-20) for Aymara 
Kingdoms and Quechua speaking nations and their relation to the Inca Empire. See Clastres for 
egalitarian societies (1989). 
5
 Radding calls these ‘rancherías’. I refrain from using this term, to avoid confusion with the term 
‘rancho’ which Chiquitano informants used to denote the small Chiquitano settlements tied to cattle 
farms and agrarian enterprises. 
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The longevity of the settlements depended on patterns of mobility linked to swidden 
cultivation, the shifting location of the chacos, cycles of hunting, fishing and 
gathering, and changing political alliances and warfare (Radding, 2005: 41).6 To 
establish a clear linguistic and ethnic affiliation of the groups that later became 
known as Chiquitano is difficult. Authors refer to as many as fifty different ‘tribes’ 
or bands (Krekeler, 1993: 26).7 In terms of linguistic affiliation most authors cite 
arawak, chiquitano and chapakura (Lacroix, 2005: 14).8  
The aim of Spanish conquest was to provide the financial means for the 
growing costs of the foreign policies of Spain as part of the colonial mercantilist 
system, with differing results and strategies for the Andean highlands and lowlands. 
For nearly half a century after conquest in the Andes, the Spaniards depended 
heavily on already established labour systems and the kurakas (native lords) which 
they labelled caciques, for the operation of the encomienda system and colonial 
economy (see Stern, 2000).9 Through the reforms of Viceroy Francisco de Toledo 
(1569-1581), the Crown set up the república de los españoles for Spaniards and the 
república de indios for Indians. In the highlands, this saw the establishment of a 
‘tributary citizenship’ in which Indians paid taxes and supplied labour. It also 
entailed royal protection of their lands and a degree of local autonomy (Hylton and 
                                                 
6
 For a more detailed description of productive and hunting and fishing practices and changes 
according to location of the communities, see Freyer (1997), Schwarz (1994: 26-27), and Radding 
(2005: 38-41).  
7
 Métreux mentions the Tobacikosis, Terrapekosis, Tamakocis, Cibarakoas, Penokis, Paranis, 
Subarekas, Palkonos, Gorgotokis, Zambikis, Kozos, Pakaras, Pinokos, while other authors refer to as 
many as fifty different ‘tribes’ (in Krekeler, 1993: 27). In contrast, Freyer notes that author’s mention 
up to fifty groups that according to her do not belong to the Chiquitano groups (see 1997: 98). 
Radding reminds that most such anthropological classificatory lists draw on those that assume 
linguistic-ethnic linkages as ‘established, in part, by imperial practices that defined ethnicity in terms 
of dialects that missionaries and secular officials set out to codify in written grammars and 
vocabularies in an effort to make sense of the tribal affiliations they sought to control’ (2005: 119). 
This link has been taken up by newer publications (also Métreux, 1949). In contrast, Radding holds 
that neither geography and locality determine ethnicity, nor do ‘ethnic identities conform neatly or 
wholly to specific languages’ (2005: 119). Instead, Radding emphasises ethnic identity as a ‘process 
of becoming’ (2005: 120-121). 
8
 Problems in drawing boundaries among the different groups, stem from the fact that chroniclers 
faced different dialects and altered their spelling of names they associated with a group (Freyer, 1997: 
98). It is likely that chroniclers labelled social and political allegiances rooted local communities and 
chiefdoms as ‘ethnic identities’. However, these alliances were often only temporary (Radding, 2005: 
43). 
9
 The encomienda system in the highlands involved the distribution of Indian communities into 
districts (the encomiendas), which were handed to Spanish grantees (the encomenderos). 
Encomenderos were charged with ‘serving the crown’s military and political needs in the colony, and 
attending to the material and spiritual well-being of the Indians “entrusted” to his care. In exchange, 
he was free to command tribute and labour from them’ (Stern, 2000: 26). The system was finally 
abolished by Phillip V in 1720 (see Konetzke, 1998: 194-195). Also see Klein (1992: 37) and for a 
detailed analysis of the encomienda system, see Konetzke (1998: 173-195).  
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Thomson, 2007: 36; Platt, 1993: 161; Postero, 2007: 27-28).10 The exploitative 
relations were primarily introduced to ensure a steady supply of workers for the 
Potosí silver mines, and in lesser degree, for the quicksilver mines of Huancavelica 
and to carry out public works in Lima and other cities. Bad working conditions 
meant that many lost their lives in the process (see Konetzke, 1998: 199-203).11  
The two-tier colonial system was based on Indian labour extraction, 
‘naturalised’ through the maintenance of social distance between superior ‘white’ 
and subordinate ‘so-called Indians, Spaniards, Blacks, and mixed-race groups 
collectively named castas’ (Radding, 2005: 121;  also see Wade, 1997).12 The system 
was combined with ‘an intrinsic ingredient of humiliation in social treatment of the 
subaltern classes’, based upon a widely held belief in a ‘genetic inequality between 
the parts’ (Postero, 2007: 29).13 
Conquest of the more sparsely populated lowlands had a different trajectory. 
The two main goals for the entrada (‘entrance’ or ‘excursion’) originating from Río 
de la Plata into Chiquitano territory, were the search for gold, silver and precious 
stones, and later, territorial consolidation based on ‘taking advantage of the 
indigenous workforce’ and securing the border against the Portuguese (Krekeler, 
1993: 57-58, 72). There were four entradas into the region, starting with that of 
Pedro de Mendoza in the early 1530s, whose orders were to colonise the region and 
secure it by building strongholds for future inland expeditions. The second was 
headed by Alvar Nuñez Cabeza de Vaca (1534-1544); the third ‘gran entrada’ 
(‘great entrance’) was led by Domingo Martínez de Irala (1547-1549), the fourth by 
Ñuflo de Chávez (1557-1561) (Krekeler, 1993: 33-34).14  
The ‘entrance’ of Ñuflo de Chávez ended with the first founding of a 
permanent city, Santa Cruz de la Sierra in 1559, located a few kilometres away from 
                                                 
10
 Also see Eric Wolf (1982) on this system. 
11
 Although different colonial officials and priests began voicing concerns against mita, it was not 
until the Bourbon Dynasty that a review of the reforms was carried out. The Cortes de Cádiz finally 
ruled the abolishing of the mita in 1812 (Konetzke, 1998: 200). 
12
 This led observers to conclude, that in fact, what was put in place was one and not ‘two republics’ 
as pointing to the existing interdependence of the systems. See Saignes (1995). Also Radding notes 
that the separation became blurred in practice through migration, labour demands and growing 
ethnically mixed populations (2005: 164).  
13
 Also see Gilly, who refers to this as ‘racial subalternity’ (2003: 29-21). 
14
 For more detailed description of the entradas, see Radding (2005: 45-52). The gran entrada carries 
this name because it was the one deemed to have had the greatest success. It resulted in the opening of 
a path and communication channels between the two administrative zones of Río de la Plata and Peru 
(Krekeler, 1993: 41). 
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the present-day San José de Chiquitos (capital of Chiquitos Province) (Riester, 1976: 
122) .15 Soon after its creation, the citizens of Santa Cruz divided indigenous groups 
from the surrounding area amongst their encomiendas and between 1561 and 1620, a 
class of feudal lords developed that oversaw varying numbers of servants (Krekeler, 
1993: 43,70).16 Additionally, Chiquitano were used in expeditions to find ‘the land or 
gold of Mojos’, in wars against the Chiriguano, as well as being sold off to highland 
mines (Freyer, 1997: 10; Krekeler, 1993: 70). Chiquitano groups frequently defied 
servitude through armed resistance (Krekeler, 1993: 46; Radding, 2005: 52). In fact, 
uprisings were one of the main reasons why in October 1582 Capitan Holguín 
received orders to re-locate the capital, later named ‘the New’ Santa Cruz de la 
Sierra, to a different, more easily defended position and better suited to fight and 
conquer the Chiriguanos (Krekeler, 1993: 46).17 Encomiendas continued to supply 
the settlers with labour for the ranching and agriculture (see Radding, 2005: 67-68).18 
As Radding points out, ‘early colonial contacts in the Chiquitanía grew out of 
the conflictive demands of encomienda service, intermittent raiding and warfare, and 
the trade for iron tools’ (2005: 53). This latter element had a lasting impact and 
Radding asserts that access to ‘axe heads, hooks, steel knives, and scissors’ certainly 
initiated ‘a veritable technological revolution by altering methods for clearing the 
forest, hunting, fishing, and construction’ (2005: 53). She adds that as the continued 
supply of these tools proved central to the diverse groups, which ‘most likely 
intensified intertribal warfare’ (2005: 53). It was also an important factor 
contributing to the continued contact between the groups and the Spanish (Freyer, 
1997: 10; Radding, 2005: 53; Riester, 1976: 123). In this period, Chiquitano groups 
also faced Spanish and human traffickers, who bought children, adolescents and 
                                                 
15
 Krekeler gives another date, stating that Santa Cruz de la Sierra was founded on 26 February 1561 
(1993: 42-43). 
16
 Lorenzo Suárez de Figueroa, who was named governor in 1580, described that in 1586, 160 Spanish 
lived in Santa Cruz. Of these, 65 were encomenderos, who together owned around 8,000 indigenous 
encomendados, while another 3,000 served as personal servants in houses in the city and the 
countryside (Krekeler, 1993: 45). 
17
 Krekeler notes that not all Spaniards had retreated from the city of Ñuflo de Chávez and the eastern 
region until 1592 (see 1993: 47-48, 50).  
18
 The form of encomienda that existed in Paraguay and eastern Bolivia was the encomienda 
originaria or encomienda yanacona. The ‘Indians’ worked and lived permanently in the houses of the 
Spanish. Entire families could be incorporated in the household as servants or workforce for the 
campo (Krekeler, 1993: 101-103; also see Villamarín and Villamarín, 1975). In contrast, the 
encomienda mitaya, practiced in the highlands, meant ‘Indios’ stayed in their home villages and 
owned their own land, to which they could return after having worked for the encomenderos 
(Krekeler, 1993: 102-103). 
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women and in exchange for axes and knives to be sold on as labourers or soldiers. 
Also Portuguese slave hunters (bandeirantes paulistas or mamelucos) took advantage 
of the uncontrolled frontier region to take prisoners (Freyer, 1997: 11; Krekeler, 
1993: 50-51, 71-79; Radding, 2005: 130-131).19 Native peoples resisted ‘through 
flight, armed combat, and legal protest’ (Radding, 2005: 133). 
Authors conclude that apart from a growing reliance on iron tools, lasting 
effects of the period included that Chiquitano groups suffered a severe population 
decline, not least due to imported illnesses, a shrinking of the territory they could 
occupy due to Spanish and Portuguese incursions, and a fragmentation of the native 
communities (Freyer, 1997: 11; Krekeler, 1993: 51, 27-23; Radding, 2005: 130; 
Schwarz, 1994: 28). Schwarz also adds that this phase saw the rupture of exchange 
relationships with other groups and the highlands (1994: 28). For her part, Radding 
concludes that among the lasting results of early Conquest was that it showed the 
‘vulnerability of frontier outposts’ demonstrating the ‘need for missionary order to 
“reduce” native communities to supervised towns in fixed locations, a process that 
marked the transition from conquest as private enterprise to state imperialism’ (2005: 
54).  
The Jesuit Period (1692-1767) 
Consequently, the Jesuit missions in the Chiquitanía did not only have a religious 
function, but served to secure the Empire against attacks from the Portuguese, the 
‘uncivilised tribes’ of the surroundings and to pacify the Chiquitano groups so that 
they could more easily be exploited in the colonial political economy (see de la Peña, 
2005: 720; Freyer, 1997: 13; Krekeler, 1993: 81-85). In 1692, José de Arce founded 
the first Jesuit mission in San Javier de los Piñocos, in what is today Ñuflo de 
Chávez province.20 Over the following years, Jesuits from Switzerland and Germany 
founded nine further reducciones (‘reductions’) (Freyer, 1997: 13; Riester, 1976: 
                                                 
19
 Krekeler (1993: 73) notes that until 1660 the incursions of the mamelucos were not registered with 
certainty. However, she points to sufficient indicators that Chiquitanos suffered these attacks. 
20
 Krekeler notes that the reducción was among the Pinokas, Kimeras, Ponajikas, Guapakas and 
Poojijokas who spoke chiquito, and the Kibicikas, Paikonecas, Burecas and Itatines who spoke other 
languages. She notes that the dates on groups and subgroups vary amongst the authors (1993: 52). 
Freyer (1997: 13), however mentions the Piñocas and Xamaro who were later joined by the Penoqui. 
 173 
123).21 The reduction of La Concepción was established by Padre Lucas Caballero, 
among groups that spoke chiquita, and Paikonekas, Piokos and some Guarayus who 
spoke other languages (Krekeler, 1993: 53, 131). 
An initial and ongoing task for the Jesuits was to search for converts. One 
form took ‘holy hunts’ that lasted for up to four months at a time and relied on 
‘missionised’ groups to seek out and surround encampments in the forest. According 
to Radding, these hunts ‘resembled indigenous practices for hunting, warfare, and 
taking captives’ (2005: 59). Jesuits employed various mechanisms, including 
persuasion, false promises, brutal force and handing out presents. Especially 
effective proved the distribution of material goods, particularly iron tools (Freyer, 
1997: 83-85; Krekeler, 1993: 124-134). Some groups sought out the mission 
settlements in order to escape Spanish slave hunters and bandeirantes (Krekeler, 
1993: 124-129). Again other groups resisted the ‘holy hunts’ altogether and retreated 
to the hinterland (Schwarz, 1994: 29). 
The Workings of the Mission System 
Each mission comprised around a thousand inhabitants, headed by two Jesuit priests 
holding ecclesial and political authority as Crown administrators. In 1709, the Jesuits 
managed to get the reductions exempted from the tributo de los indígenas 
(indigenous tribute), they also achieved a ban on the distribution of ‘Indians’ among 
encomenderos for twenty years and Chiquitano groups were not to be recruited to the 
Potosí mines (Krekeler, 1993: 52).22 The Jesuits imposed one single language, by 
elevating that spoken by the majority – ‘chiquito’ – to the main language and 
pressured for it to be taught to all groups.23 Their reasoning was that it would be 
more effective to teach and govern the different groups in one of their own 
                                                 
21
 The other reductions were San Rafael (1696), San José (1698), San Juan (1699), Concepción 
(1709), San Miguel (1721), San Ignacio (1748), Santiago (1754), Santa Ana (1755) and Santo 
Corazón (1760). The settlements were built for a maximum of 6,000 inhabitants. This meant that they 
needed to be located close to sufficient water and wood to cater for the high number of people away 
from temporarily inundated areas and those with mosquitoes. They were normally located on the top 
of hills (Schwarz, 1994: 29).  
22
 Also see Finot (1978: 340). 
23
 For a long time authors described chiquito as an isolated language, while in 1984 Müller linked it to 
the Ge-language family and within this to bororo, which forms its own language family. However, in 
1987 Greenberg maintained that it does not belong to the Ge family, but that together with it, it should 
be linked to the Macro-Ge family (in Freyer, 1997: 21). Radding notes that religious rituals and 
languages and were gendered (reflecting the gendered nature of the chiquito language). For instance, 
young boys and men knelt closer to the altar, followed by rows of standing men, followed by kneeling 
young girls and standing women. Men appropriated the task of oral preaching (2005: 230-231). 
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languages. Even so, the various communities were allowed to speak their own 
languages amongst one another (Freyer, 1997: 21; Krekeler, 1993: 136; Radding, 
2005: 227; Riester, 1976: 123; Schwarz, 1994: 32-33).  
In terms of the architectural organisation of the missions, the Jesuits erected 
houses at three sides of a rectangular plaza, with further houses erected along streets 
that led from the square at a right angle. The fourth side of the plaza was reserved for 
the mission church, the missionaries’ living quarters, workshops and schools (Freyer, 
1997: 43; Krekeler, 1993: 137; Radding, 2005: 65; Riester, 1976: 124). As the 
missions were generally consolidated by the 1750s, Jesuits, lay brethren and native 
builders created the eye-catching churches which still exist in the ex-reductions today 
(albeit restored or fully or partly rebuild, see photo 23).24 The various groups or 
ethnic bands that became know as Chiquitano, occupied distinct areas of the missions 
according to linguistic and cultural characteristics. The different sections were called 
parcialidades (Freyer, 1997: 40).25 Concepción housed as many as eleven ethnic 
bands in different parcialidades at a time (Radding, 2005: 138). 
                                                 
24
 The churches followed a nearly uniform architecture. As Radding describes: ‘the basic building 
materials comprised enormous carved wooden pillars of hardwood that supported their massive roofs, 
their walls enclosed with adobe; palm-and-thatch roofs were gradually replaced with fired clay tiles’ 
(2005: 223). She adds that the similarity in design is likely due to the lack of stone and lime, the 
architects and builders therefore resorting to the use of earth and timber. The churches were 
distinguished, however, by the varied use of decoration in the form of floral designs and images of 
saints, which were painted on the walls by native artists using vegetable and mineral dyes. Also 
unusual was the technique of carving wooden pillars, pulpit, saint figures and other wooden elements 
in the church, and placement of features such as a bell tower or solar clock (Radding, 2005: 223). 
25
 According to Radding, the term ‘parcialidades’: ‘appears in different areas of the Spanish 
American Empire to refer to subunits with distinct residential and ethnic identities that either formed 
part of larger communities or were brought together by colonial policy in consolidated reducciones. 
She adds that: ‘it is important to distinguish between the category as used by Spanish officials to 
designate a tribute-paying unit or a residential area and the changing indigenous meanings of 
parcialidad to establish reciprocal relations of support and political alliances’ (2005: 137). 
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Photo 23: The Mission Church of San Ignacio de Velasco 
 
The internal political organisation of the missions followed the Leyes de Indias 
(Laws of the Indies), according to which the reductions should be administered in the 
style of Spanish cities. Jesuit priests based the internal governance system on the 
caciques of the different parcialidades by devolving significant authority to them. As 
the missions reached a stable population, priests instituted a system where caciques 
took on administrative and military offices. Among the most important featured the 
cabildo (indigenous council) officers with the titles of corregidor (highest officer 
with administrative and judicial authority), the teniente (lieutenant, assisted the 
corregidor), alférez real (royal standard-bearer), alcaldes, fiscales (enforcement 
officers, two per mission), the comandante (commander), the justicia mayor 
(justice), and the sargento mayor (sergeant). A general cacique, helped by the 
cabildo, headed the settlement (Freyer, 1997: 45, 92-93; Krekeler, 1993: 136-137; 
Radding, 2005: 168-173; Schwarz, 1994: 33).26 In sum, the tasks of these authorities 
included organising of and watching over the missions, supervising work and social 
                                                 
26
 These were all titles that appeared in the Indian pueblos of New Spain in general. For more 
information the cabildo system, see Schwarz (1994: 33), Krekeler (1993: 136-137), or Radding (2005: 
168-173). 
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life, recording demographic developments, fulfilling catechism and liturgical 
ceremonies and enforcing attendance at religious services, ceremonies and 
communal work through moral suasion, but also threat of physical punishments 
(Freyer, 1997: 45, 92-93; Krekeler, 1993: 136-137; Radding, 2005: 168-173; 
Schwarz, 1994: 33).27 Jesuits also integrated the ‘most powerful and knowledgeable 
shamans’ into a ranked order that paralleled that of the civil authorities (Radding, 
2005: 202, also 204).  
Jesuit missionaries strengthened the leaders’ authority not only by delegating 
special functions to them, but also through providing privileges, such as assigning 
them the house closest to the plaza, providing extra rations and gifts, permitting the 
wearing of special clothing during fiestas, seating in an elevated position in church 
and distinguishing them through a silver-tipped staff (Freyer, 1997: 45, 86-87; 
Radding, 2005: 172-173).28 Nevertheless, as Radding reminds, the ‘missionaries, 
shamans, and caciques were engaged in a power struggle in parallel planes of 
symbolic intercession and political authority’ (2005: 204). As will be addressed in 
the following sections, cabildos not only functioned as ‘vehicles of social control’, 
but also ‘forums of protest’ and at times instigators of uprisings against ecclesiastical 
and imperial authorities, especially in the period after the expulsion of Jesuit priests 
from the missions (2005: 177).  
Importantly, the work of the missionaries involved converting the ‘reduced’ 
groups to Christianity and authors point to different techniques that Jesuit priests 
employed for this end. For example, they interpreted catastrophes such as illnesses, 
droughts and contamination of water or foodstuffs as ‘punishments by the Christian 
god’, while Christianity offered the salvation (Freyer, 1997: 74; Krekeler, 1993: 
                                                 
27
 Punishments played a large role in religious education. Knogler notes that small offences, such as 
leaving out several paragraphs in the Catechism, or inappropriate behaviour of children in church, 
were punished with beatings. Breaking the Ten Commandments was punished by locking the 
perpetrators in a dungeon, beating them with sticks, or expelling them to another reduction. Other 
chastisements involved having to confess your sins in front of the whole community before being 
whipped (in Freyer, 1997: 86-87). Radding mentions that punishments took the form of whipping or 
‘confinement to the stocks’. She notes that ‘fear and resentment of physical punishments punctuated 
Indians’ written protests, providing a recurring theme in their acts of resistance and open rebellion’ 
(2005: 172). 
28
 Sinclair Thomson observed that colonial officials handed a staff as well as other symbols of power 
to ‘ethnic rulers throughout their American dominion’, as a sign of colonial state sovereignty as well 
as ethnic authority (2002: 41).  
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134).29 Additionally, they used the language of prayers, music and dance as more 
‘theatrical’ elements of religious practice, as well as the ‘liturgical imagery that 
adorned the mission churches’ (Radding, 2005: 196). They introduced processions, 
which involved singing hymns and carrying crosses, evoking ‘both solemnity and 
festivity by announcing feast days thus marking the cyclical recurrence of special 
events in the Catholic liturgical calendar’ (Radding, 2005: 226, also see Krekeler, 
1993: 134).30 Feast days proved significant, as they brought together different 
kinship networks and as such affirmed communal identity ‘under the auspices of 
Catholic rituals’ (Radding, 2005: 226). In addition, choral and instrumental baroque 
music (with European orchestral stringed and wind instruments) figured prominently 
in the missions. As Radding notes: ‘formal choirs intoned polyphonic liturgical 
songs, often accompanied by instruments, which served to teach Catholic doctrine 
and dramatize the solemnity of religious holidays’ (2005: 235).31  
Administratively, the Chiquitos mission province was tied to the Jesuit 
provinces of Paraguay and Tucumán, although it was geographically close to the 
Moxos Missions of the tropical savannas of northern Bolivia (Radding, 2005: 62). 
The Jesuit Colleges of Córdoba provided manpower and some material support for 
the Chiquitos missions. Nevertheless, they also received a subsidy from the Spanish 
Crown under the terms of royal patronage that conceded broad powers over the 
ecclesiastical hierarchy and religious orders in the Americas, in return for monetary 
support for the evangelisation effort (Radding, 2001: 111). 
Despite these external links, the mission settlements in the Chiquitanía were 
economically autonomous to a significant degree. Due to the large amount of people 
concentrated in one place, agriculture had to be intensified and the missionaries 
introduced storage methods and a system for controlling output. The missionaries 
                                                 
29
 Radding noted that the Jesuits attributed death due to imported illnesses to ‘divine intervention 
against shamans who had tried to harm them’ (Radding, 2005: 204). Knogler recorded that the priests 
themselves drew their authority form their ‘capacity’ to assimilate their role with that of the cacique 
and bazübo (Freyer, 1997: 88). Also, Métraux notes that the Jesuits managed to gain authority through 
assuming the role of an ‘overall leader’ who excelled in ‘his generosity, magical knowledge, valour, 
and eloquence’ (in Krekeler, 1993: 134). 
30
 Krekeler records that through the introduction of such rituals, the Jesuits made themselves enemies 
of the ‘shamans and medicine men’ (Krekeler, 1993: 134).  
31
 According to Radding, ‘musicians who served in the missionary orders adapted European baroque 
operatic forms to compose operas, oratorios, and musical dramas based on themes drawn from biblical 
stories and classical mythologies’ (2005: 236). These were rendered entirely or partially in native 
languages and the scenarios were adapted to the local natural environment (Radding, 2005: 236). 
Participation in the choir and access to choir lofts in churches was reserved for men (Radding, 2005: 
235). 
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initiated cattle breeding, improved field cultivation, and introduced iron tools and 
looms. The groups worked the communal land for two or three days a week for up to 
eight hours. Produce was partly destined for the maintenance of the priests, the 
church, orphans, widows, the elderly or ill. Surpluses were distributed to individual 
families. The land of those occupied in artisanal activities or the militia was 
cultivated by others (Freyer, 1997: 90-91; Krekeler, 1993: 138-140; Riester, 1976: 
124; Schwarz, 1994: 35).32 In contrast to the core areas of Mesoamerica and the 
Andes, but comparable to other peripheral regions of Hispanic America, such as the 
deserts of north-eastern Mexico or the grasslands and forests of Chile and Argentina, 
such labour commitments substituted tribute payments in money, goods, or labour 
(Radding, 2005: 166). 
By the eighteenth century, population levels had stabilised sufficiently to 
develop an economic system of commodity production, ‘achieved through 
imposition of colonial policies and negotiated terms of exchange in the pueblos’ 
(Radding, 2005: 69-70). Via trade links, the missions were connected to the mining 
economies of northern New Spain and the southern Andes. However, the shape trade 
took was conditioned by the ecological and cultural parameters of the mission 
frontiers, indigenous agrarian systems and technologies (Radding, 2005: 69-70). The 
main export items were cotton cloth and wax. Under Jesuit tutelage, women not only 
spun traditional cotton cloth for clothing and bedding, but produced varying sizes 
and qualities of lienzos (linen and canvas cloth) in workshops.33 The wax Chiquitano 
had traditionally collected from different wild bee types also became a commodity, 
as it was used for lighting homes, churches and mines.  
In the mission workshops Chiquitano practiced tanning, smelting, carpentry, 
lathe work and cabinet making, producing goods to be used in the missions 
                                                 
32In schools, children of the caciques learned to read and write maths and Spanish, while the others 
were educated in various occupations, for example, weaving or carpentry. Father Martin Schmid was 
one of the leading personalities in the introduction of European artisanal activities, as well as making 
musical instruments and playing orchestral music (Krekeler, 1993: 138).  
33
 Women’s cotton cloth in the form of clothes and hammocks was also used internally in the 
missions. According to Knogler, when entering the missions, Chiquitano were given a simple dress 
similar to the tipoy out of two pieces of cloth without sleeves or collar and openings for head and 
arms. For women, it reached to the floor, the men’s ones over the knees. The women’s robe 
maintained the name tipoy and the men’s was called camiseta (Freyer, 1997: 64). 
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themselves, as well as export (see Radding, 2005: 77).34 Items imported to the 
missions included cloth and textiles produced in the highlands, tools, wine, diverse 
utensils, ornaments and clothing for religious ceremonies, as well as diverse metal 
items (such as scissors, hooks, needles, etc.) (Freyer, 1997: 92; Krekeler, 1993: 138-
139; Radding, 2005: 77).35 Radding adds that the missionaries invested considerable 
sums to replenish the missions’ cattle herds (2005: 77).  
The groups’ labour was ‘compensated with semi-annual “gifts”, or payment-
in-kind that included metal tools, religious medallions, woollen and cotton cloth 
produced in the highlands, and rations of meat from the missions’ herds’ (Radding, 
2001: 112). While indigenous families turned to the missions for meat and certain 
tools and commodities, basic needs were still met through their swidden plots, 
hunting, fishing, and gathering. Seasonal migration remained an important aspect of 
the socio-economic system of the mission and social reproduction of the groups 
(Freyer, 1997: 32, 91; Schwarz, 1994: 30, 35).36 Radding notes that while this 
territorial mobility clashed with the colonial policy of retaining ‘neophytes’ in fixed 
settlements, the missionaries eventually reached a compromise and mission 
discipline adapted to the alternating seasons of hunting and cultivation with labour 
demands coming to include such fruits of gathering as wax (2005: 57).  
Another reason for this tolerance was that the mission economic system, 
based on the introduction of small artificial lagoons for water supply and fishing, 
livestock rearing and agricultural practices, could simply not sustain the large 
population (see Schwarz, 1994: 31).37 Freyer argues on similar lines. As the missions 
were surrounded by forests, there was not enough grazing space for large cattle herds 
                                                 
34
 Other items export items included ‘inlaid boxes, strings of carved rosaries, canvas carrying bags, 
tablecloths, napkins and woven muslin produced by Chiquitano carpenters and weavers’ (Radding, 
2001: 112). 
35
 Jesuit agents (procuradores) stationed in the mission district itself, as well as La Plata and Potosi, 
controlled the flow of goods and kept careful records of the volume and monetary value of mission 
sales and purchases (Radding, 2001: 112). For a more detailed description of exported and imported 
goods, and the workings of the system, see Radding (2005: 76-78). 
36
 See Freyer (1997: 26-31) for agricultural and migration patterns and mechanisms and the 
agricultural calendar before and during the mission period.  
37
 Schwarz argues that the new economic pattern was flawed as it concentrated a large population in 
one space. This meant that the amount of cattle raised led to over grazing. Additionally, the burning of 
fields that were now closer together and in higher concentration, meant that much smoke was 
produced in the dry season, which affected the health of the population. Over-fishing was probably 
also a problem. Schwarz notes that in Chiquitano eyes, the system must not have seemed viable over 
the long-term (1994: 32-33).  
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and foreign crops were not apt for the climate, leading to the continued cultivation of 
maize on the chacos (1997: 29, 32, 91).  
In terms of the numbers of individuals ‘reduced’ in the missions, a census 
elaborated by Francisco de Palacios, auditor of the Audiencia de Charcas, in 1754 
mentions ‘51 different reduced tribes with a total of 14,701 inhabitants’ in all the 
missions (in Krekeler, 1993: 54). Freyer notes that between 1755 and 1766 the 
number of inhabitants in the reductions grew from 11,943 to 23,788 (1997: 15; also 
see Riester, 1970: 290).38 Nevertheless, despite these numbers, in 1767 the Spanish 
Crown expelled the Jesuits from Latin America. Authors mention several reasons for 
this. Firstly, Madrid remained suspicious of the massive amount of land that the 
Jesuits had brought under their control. Secondly, colonial administrators feared the 
construction of a ‘state within the state’ by the Jesuits. A third concern was that the 
Jesuits protected the ‘Indians’ from encomenderos, who were thus deprived of a 
cheap labour force. Lastly, the Jesuits denied Spanish traders and visitors access to 
the reductions; merchants could only come to the missions for one day, denying them 
the possibility of uncontrolled trade (Freyer, 1997: 89; Krekeler, 1993: 86, 114-115). 
Lasting Influences of the Mission System 
Although the mission period lasted for only thirty years, authors agree that it had a 
fundamental impact on the Chiquitano groups, although opinions vary as to its nature 
and significance. They generally agree that the mission system sparked an 
ethnogenesis, leading the emergence of a shared ‘identity’, society or ‘culture’ and 
that ‘Chiquitano’ emerged as the generic term for the different groups (Freyer, 1997: 
17; Krekeler, 1993: 27; Schwarz, 1994: 33-34, 36). However, as noted in Chapter II, 
other group names, such as Manazica, Manapeca, Paiconeca, Paunaca, Mococa, 
Morotoca, Zamuco, Covareca, Piñoca, and Guarañoca continued to exist for self-and 
group identification and it must be assumed that groups attached different meanings 
                                                 
38
 Freyer states that in the following year, the population sank to 19,981 due to an epidemic (1997: 
15). Knogler, however, writes about 37,000 people, of which 22,000 were baptised, which was only 
60 per cent of the entire population of the missions (in Freyer, 1997: 15). Radding points out that it is 
difficult to construct exact graphs of the fluctuation of population in the missions. Steep drops in 
population can generally be linked to epidemics, but also warfare (carried out as raiding and targeted 
homicide) and flight back to the forest by different bands (see 2005: 68-69). Freyer notes that the 
padres reacted to recurring disease with attempts to move the missions, as well as constantly looking 
for recruits to ‘replenish’ the missions in the face of high mortality rates (1997: 74). 
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the denominators that circulated (Radding, 2005: 124).39 It also led to the emergence 
of ‘chiquito’ as a shared language, which strengthened cohesion and solidarity at the 
interethnic level, although this did not entirely lead to the disappearance of the other 
languages, some of which are still spoken today (Schwarz, 1994: 34).40 
Secondly, authors point out that the close physical relationship between 
different groups in the missions, led to a ‘shared ritual model’ which forms an 
important marker of Chiquitano ethnic identity today. After the Jesuits left, many 
groups maintained elements of the missions’ religious and organisational system, 
including the cabildo, which still exerts the main religious and political functions in 
many Chiquitano comunidades. The authors coincide in noting that the observance of 
religious festivals and recitation of sermons ‘sustain enduring traditions of cultural 
identity to the present day’ (Radding, 2005: 232-233; also see Riester, 1976: 170-
171; Schwarz, 1994: 34-36). Furthermore, the religious musical texts of operas, 
oratorios, and musical dramas, ‘became treasured cultural artefacts of Chiquitano 
faith and identity’, repeatedly copied and preserved (some until the present) together 
with sacred images for Mass and festival processions (see Radding, 2005: 236).41 
While this might point to male dominance in cultural reproduction as 
‘oratorical skills of sermonising’ and cabildo posts were reserved for men, Radding 
posits that ‘women contributed in fundamental ways to cultural production and 
public life in the missions’, as producers of chicha, which not only serves ‘to enliven 
a good party’ but also function as ‘necessary ingredient for social conviviality; 
moreover, the rituals observed for their production and consumption offered conduits 
                                                 
39
 Schwarz argues that ‘shared identities’ emerged within each mission settlement, rather than being 
‘constituted at a global level of the whole of the Chiquitanos’ (1994: 34-36). While a reasonable 
statement, this ignores that there was also a movement of groups between missions (see Radding, 
2005: 68-69). 
40
 There is some confusion in the literature on this matter. Riester noted that in 1983 in the zone of 
Concepción, some elderly people spoke paunaca, quitemoca, and yurucariquia. However, according to 
the CICOL and APCOB in 1984, in this sector there was only a small group of people in the 
comunidad La Embocada who spoke paunaca (in Schwarz, 1994: 34).  
41
 She notes that: ‘the chanted verses repeated in the sermons seem stilted and removed from the 
cadences of everyday spoken Chiquitos, converted into the privileged knowledge of male religious 
leaders. Nevertheless, their performance serves to reaffirm the bonds of community and to 
demonstrate the integrity of their culture to the wider Bolivian society in which the Chiquitanos are 
immersed’ (2005: 233). 
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of spiritual power’ (Radding, 2005: 234).42 While missionaries sought to undermine 
drunkenness in the missions, chicha remains central to Chiquitano cultural practices 
and an important marker of Chiquitano modes of identification. 
Additionally, for many groups the ex-missions came to form the local 
spiritual centre (and we may also add, state administrative centre) (Schwarz, 1994: 
34-36). An indicator is that to present times the missions are the setting for certain 
religious rituals and performances. For example, acts undertaken by masked 
individuals, such as the clowns (bufones), or grandfathers (abuelos), are carried out 
in San Rafael, San Juan, Santiago, and San José; the yarituses (ostrich) perform in 
San Javier in the Saint Peter and Saint Paul festival (Radding, 2005: 226), or may 
perform at other festive occasions to express pride in Chiquitano-ness (see photos 24 
and 25, below). The legacy of the mission system is also perceivable in the fact that 
groups who moved away to establish themselves in communities, choose ‘their own 
patron saints and reproduced the spatial logic of the reductions at a micro level: with 
plaza, chapel and elongated houses’ (Schwarz, 1994: 37). 
What emerged and exists today as the ‘Chiquitano belief system’ is 
consequently a syncretism between Catholicism and different indigenous belief 
systems and shamanic ritual practices (Freyer, 1997: 94; Radding, 2005: 204; 
Riester, 1976: 170-171; Schwarz, 1994: 32). Radding points out that when analysing 
visual and textual elements like, for example, the Chiquitano jichis, it becomes clear 
that the languages of moral suasion and religious belief, as well as native traditions, 
were ‘reworked in new combinations’:  
 … moral space, symbolic references, and spiritual concepts developed through both 
religious and secular experiences of the colonial past and recent historical periods. 
Demonology, sorcery and the spiritual forces of the natural world … to be feared, 
respected, and appeased – evolved together with Christian imagery and were adapted 
to Catholic doctrine (2005: 238).  
                                                 
42
 Radding expands, that chicha was (and still is) important in the context of visits from neighbouring 
villages, for example, in the context of patron Saint fiestas: ‘caciques were expected to provide 
hospitality to visitors from neighbouring villages, symbolized by the pozokas, who would later 
reciprocate in kind. A good cacique served abundant food and drink, and thus needed a wife who 
knew how to make good chicha. … These social occasions at the same time proved deeply religious, 
linked to the Catholic liturgical calendar and to the Indians’ moral universe’ (2005: 234). 
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Photo 24: Evo Morales Being Dressed as Yaritú 
 
A Chiquitana yaritú from San Javier dresses Evo Morales as yaritú. TCO Monte Verde 
titling ceremony, 3 July 2007, San Javier. 
Photo 25: Evo Morales as Yaritú 
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With respect to a third area, the Chiquitano economic system, authors differ in 
opinion as to the scope of change. While Schwarz (1994: 31) concedes that 
transformations for nomad groups were more extensive, he coincides with Freyer 
(1997: 91-92) in arguing that the impact of the economic system was less drastic. 
Both hold that while economic self-sufficiency was ‘reduced’, many elements of the 
groups’ previous systems remained intact. In turn, Radding records that the 
systematic trade of labour for goods introduced in the missions supplanted the barter 
system characterising early colonial relations (i.e. Indians seeking metal tools and 
encomenderos seeking bonded labour). She also notes that the Chiquitano relied on 
priests for access to colonial markets, as well as items that they had come to value, 
such as clothing, religious tools (2005: 84-85). Although economic relations were 
heavily determined by the traditional Chiquitano productive system, the Chiquitano 
came to identify with changes introduced during mission times (Radding, 2005: 84-
85). 
In terms of a gendered division of labour, Freyer posits that while labour 
sharing remained in place, the specialising in certain tasks (such as weaving, 
ironwork, woodwork, and dying leather), led to an increased labour division (1997: 
32, 91). The gendered labour division was also reinforced by commodity production 
for Andean markets. Women’s weaving and men’s collecting wax additionally led to 
gendered differences in terms of freedom of movement: women’s spinning and 
weaving was supervised in mission workshops, while men were free to visit the 
forests (Radding, 2005: 86). 
Authors generally point out that although groups incorporated certain cultural 
practices from the Jesuit mission structure, there was a significant degree of 
continuity (Freyer, 1997: 88-89; Schwarz, 1994: 30). As mentioned, the mission 
system was based around compromises between colonial policies, Jesuit religious 
custom and the socio-economic practices of Chiquitano groups. The very spatial 
organisation of the reduction and the system of parcialidades, allowed continuity of 
the groups’ parentesco (kinship) systems, organisational forms and practices. As 
Radding point out, ‘nineteenth-century documents and ethnographic testimonies 
show persuasively that the importance of the parcialidades for the internal 
organisation of Chiquitos villages outlived the colonial order’ (2005: 173). 
Moreover, even though by the mid-twentieth century political power and urban 
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property had passed over to non-Indian Bolivians and Chiquitanos had dispersed to 
live in ranchos and comunidades, ‘contemporary Chiquitanos recall evidence … that 
associates residential blocks, or “sections”, of their pueblos with family lineages and 
ethnic identity’ (Radding, 2005: 174). 
Another factor that contributed to the continuity of social practices was a lack 
of control over the population from the Jesuit side. One the one hand, groups left the 
missions to continue established hunting, fishing and gathering cycles (Schwarz, 
1994: 31-33). On the other hand, the missions were isolated, with one priest being 
frequently absent, leaving the other to administer up to 4,000 people (Freyer, 1997: 
95). Authors point out that away from the control of the Jesuits, the shamans 
(cheserúrr or bazübos) continued their practices (Freyer, 1997: 28; Schwarz, 1994: 
31-33), which again strengthened cultural reproduction. Shamans, as ‘media for 
spiritual powers that can bring healing, prophetic knowledge, endurance and triumph 
in the face of hardship, or, conversely, illness defeat, and death’, served as ‘guardians 
of cultural traditions and protectors against foreign invasions or alien spirits’ 
(Radding, 2005: 198).43 Authors also record that presence in the forest and absence 
of priests, led to a perpetuation of group leadership systems based on prestige though 
hunting success (Freyer, 1997: 28; Schwarz, 1994: 31-33). 
Nevertheless, with regard to this latter point, there is some discrepancy 
among authors as to the effect of the mission system on Chiquitano leadership 
structures. Krekeler points out that the installation of caciques as cabildo leaders 
contributed to the formation of a more hierarchical leadership structure than was 
prevalent before life in the missions. Prestige and power was less ‘gained’ from 
peers, than ‘granted’ to caciques through the Jesuits (1993: 167). Radding concurs 
that this hierarchical structure was reinforced because cabildo members benefited to 
a higher degree than others from the mission economy. They were favoured not only 
through privileged living space but also in the distribution of goods (2005: 78). 
Several authors maintain, however, that this formalisation and the ban on polygamy, 
led to an overall weakening of cacique authority in the eyes of their peers (Freyer, 
1997: 86-87, 92-93; Krekeler, 1993: 137; Riester, 1976: 124). In turn, Radding states 
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 As Radding points out, shamans had: ‘the capacity to transport themselves spiritually into the 
natural domain of forests and deserts and the return to their communities, to the realm of human 
culture. … Shamanic knowledge established cultural norms for regulating hunting, fishing, gathering, 
sowing, and harvesting’ (2005: 198-199).  
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that the ‘authority vested in the cabildo overlapped with native criteria of association 
and leadership based on kinship networks, ethnic alliances’ (2005: 173). Offices of 
internal governance ‘merged Iberian precepts of public order with indigenous 
practices of leadership, reciprocity, and redress’, as missionaries, and later colonial 
officials, had to negotiate ‘the boundaries of imperial dominion’, far from the centres 
of vice-regal power (Radding, 2005: 164). Through this system, caciques reasserted 
their own authority over the separate bands and they were installed as intermediaries 
between their kinfolk and church and civil authorities inside the missions (Radding, 
2005: 171, 173).  
Even so, the system introduced had a long-lasting legacy. As noted, cabildo 
structures exist to the present day and have responsibility for maintaining religious 
life in the comunidades, resolving disputes, organising mingas (communal work 
efforts) and defending ‘what remains of their land, water and forest resources’ 
(Radding, 2005: 174, see Chapter VII). It should be added, the leadership system 
thus instituted was gendered masculine (Radding, 2005: 195), a situation that also 
largely persists today, although the Chiquitano federations are working to change 
this. 
To conclude this section, authors point to the extent to which Chiquitano 
groups appropriated and shaped the system to their own ends. Schwarz notes that the 
period is perceived positively in the long term collective memory, ‘a sentiment that is 
reproduced through the music, the logic of the fiestas, the persistence of spatial 
structures and other cultural elements’ (1994: 36). Radding concludes that ‘the 
colonial regime endured with remarkable stability, notwithstanding repeated episodes 
of local rebellion, because indigenous peoples became stakeholders in its judicial and 
cultural institutions and, no less significant, forced compromises in the political and 
territorial ambitions of the imperial project’ (2005: 166). 
The Post-Jesuit Period 
After the Jesuits were expelled, a formal civil government was instituted in the 
Chiquitanía and the mission towns were entrusted to secular priests and lay 
administrators. The province was converted into a civil governorship, separate from 
the administrative centre of Santa Cruz and the missions were placed under the 
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diocesan authority of the Bishop of Santa Cruz (Radding, 2001: 111-113, 2005: 58). 
Still, as Cynthia Radding comments: ‘the Chiquitano missions continued to function 
under the corporate structures that the Jesuits had established’ while ‘the political 
and economic life of these reducciones was increasingly dominated by the 
conflicting policies that emanated from the ecclesiastical and civil authorities of the 
province’ (2001: 111). 
Contradictory demands emanated from the Bourbon administration and 
accompanying policies as implemented after 1768. Through the reforms, the Crown 
intended to implement economic and political changes aimed at modernising and 
stimulating manufacturing and technology in Spain as well as the colonies. The 
Audiencia of Charcas applied Bourbon policies to the Missions by charging the 
Governor of Chiquitos, as well as secular mission priests and administrators, with 
maintaining commercial circuits linking the province to the highlands, in order to 
guarantee ‘the subsistence of the reducciones and to enhance their production while 
minimising the maintenance expenditures administered through the Junta de 
Temporalidades’ (Radding, 2005: 78).  
Export products continued to be wax, cloth and carved wooden rosaries. 
Efforts were made to make some aspects of production more commercially 
competitive.44 Already in the latter mission years, the value of wax had increased and 
the value of the exported goods grown in comparison to those imported. Despite this, 
expenditures of the missions were generally higher than incomes. Mission ledgers 
show that from 1768, mission costs did not only include commodities imported into 
the mission, but also ‘clerical stipends and local salaries, and administrative costs 
that extended beyond the region, including the governor’s salary and merchant 
commissions’ (Radding, 2005: 79). Radding shows that these salaries led to the 
expansion of mission costs, as ‘the additional burden of administrative salaries 
                                                 
44
 Colonial officials took steps to enhance the variety and quality (and output) of lowland weaving 
especially during the late colonial period, as muslin declined in market value, most likely due to 
textile production in highland non-guild workshops and a clandestine import of British textiles (see 
Radding, 2005: 242-245). However, the introduction of mechanised workshops, together with demand 
for an increase of production and quality, met opposition as the spinners’ and weavers’ immediate 
rewards did not increase accordingly. Radding notes that ‘in the absence of powerful incentives, on 
the one hand, or, on the other, means of coercion, Chiquitano women and men would have resisted 
mechanised production as alien to the bases of their gathering and weaving skills that, in turn, were 
closely linked to their gardens and the forest’ (2005: 244-245). 
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during the post-Jesuit years surpassed the missions’ capacity to generate surpluses by 
over 100%’ (2001: 113).45  
However, successive governors denounced priests to the Audiencia, claiming 
that they were plundering the missions’ warehouses to clandestinely sell their goods. 
They also criticised that the distribution of goods in the missions had taken on the 
character of commerce. In turn, priests responded that they resorted to such means to 
contribute to their incomes, as their stipends were irregularly paid and often 
inadequate.46 Whatever the reasoning, Radding notes that priests and administrators 
‘came from the same small circle of landowners and merchants based in Santa Cruz; 
through the collection of stipends and the exchange of mission products for trade 
goods, these families generated commercial wealth from the productive resources of 
the pueblos’ (2005: 80). In short, while secular priests and administrators maintained 
the corporate mission economy, they took control over productive assets, 
appropriated goods and de facto exploited the Chiquitano workforce. Together with 
the emerging Cruceño elite, they engaged in trade and contraband, while siphoning 
off surplus production and wealth (see Radding, 2001: 81, 111-113; Radding, 2005: 
85-86; Schwarz, 1994: 37). Lacroix highlights how the new governors ‘turned into 
tyrants and appropriated individually the collective lands of the church’, producing ‘a 
general disorder’ (2005: 20).47 Not surprisingly, Lacroix (2005) and Tonelli 
Jusiticiano (2004) refer to this period as the ‘decadencia’ (‘decay’ or ‘deterioration’).  
The mission economies started to wither under the new regime, something 
the Chiquitano were aware of from its early phases. While they perceived the Jesuit 
period as ‘good years of plenty’, Chiquitano cabildos denounced mistreatment 
(including excessive corporal punishment and labour demands), privateering with 
mission property, neglect of religious care, aspects that they saw as infringing on 
their ‘fundamental rights’ (Radding, 2005: 82-83). Complaints, petitions, brief 
turmoil and rebellions also focused on the scarcity of tradable commodities, the 
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 She points to other costs, as from the 1790s, ‘the missions were expected to support salaries 
assigned to the small detachment of soldiers stationed in the eastern frontier with Mato Grosso’ (2005: 
79). 
46
 Priests claimed that they were not regularly receiving their stipends and in some cases payments 
were in array for years. Priests had to personally collect stipends in Santa Cruz or send authorised 
representatives, who for their service would charge part of the stipend (Radding, 2005: 80). 
47
 According to Lacroix, the ‘disorder’ was so great that the first governor of Chiquitos asked to be 
released of his functions after only three months. In 1768, the bishop of Santa Cruz admitted his 
failure to establish order in the zone. Reinaldo Brumberger, a Catholic priest, observed that this 
‘constituted the beginning of slavery in the region’ (2005: 20). 
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spoilage of other goods, priests’ and administrators’ illicit sexual unions with 
indigenous women and ‘general misconduct and stinginess’ (Radding, 2001: 114-
118, 2005: 75).48 Radding concludes that the mission-as-enterprise system as 
promoted through the Bourbon administration, ‘contradicted the ecological and 
cultural foundations of the native communities. … the pecuniary demands for the 
market exchange overtook the bases of indigenous economies’ (2005: 84). 
Notably, to launch their complaints against civil governors and priests, 
Chiquitano authorities and officials turned to the defence of the missions’ religious 
institutions and socio-economic system and took up the role of ‘spokespersons and 
guardians of the communal property that they had understood to be the product of the 
labour of their people’ (Radding, 2005: 86). Radding described that to legitimise 
their complaints and resistance, subalterns employed the ‘language of religious 
convocation’, which they endowed with their own meanings. They used it sometimes 
together with ‘allusions to divine and earthly majesties that ruled the Spanish 
empire’, to address colonial authorities in oral and written form (Radding, 2005: 232, 
also 156).49 For example, in 1779, Manapecas of Concepción revolted against their 
priest as he violently flogged one of their kinsmen and allegedly kept a mistress in 
his quarters, ‘violating the sanctity of the colegio’. The revolting Manapecas carried 
musical instruments and employed religious images and language in their 
‘inflammatory speeches’, accusing the priest of ‘immoral behaviour’ (Radding, 2005: 
236-237).50 Reasons for complaint consequently mirror those recorded as triggers for 
rebellions and major uprisings throughout the Colonial period in the highlands (such 
as, the Great Rebellion of 1780). Still, protests and revolts were generally local, 
                                                 
48
 For accounts of specific cases of complaints leading to petitions or open defiance, see Radding 
(2005: 74, 79-83, 188-192). Lacroix points out that in a few cases protests against the ‘new owners’, 
provoked uprisings in the last decade of the eighteenth century. He reports that in San Ignacio, all the 
administrators were massacred (the priest was saved as the Chiquitano had ‘respect for the Church’) 
(2005: 21). 
49
 For further examples, see Radding (2005: 232-233).  
50
 The work of various authors has shown that not only religious language, but also the colonial policy 
of legal political separation, created a legal-discursive medium through which Indians could negotiate 
or protest colonial policy or local transgression. For example, by challenging land takeovers or 
inappropriate labour demands from Creole landowners (Langer, 2000; Larson, 2004; Postero, 2007: 
29; Stern, 1987).  
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short-lived and aimed at temporary relieving tax or removing corrupt officials, never 
threatening government as such (see Klein, 1992: 75-79).51 
In terms of landholding patterns, in the eighteenth century the Chiquitanía 
was characterised by the corporately held land of the Chiquitano pueblos, as well as 
private estancias, ‘which overlapped in unevenly defined territorial spaces until after 
the mid-nineteenth century’ (Radding, 2005: 114). With the arrival of the new 
mission administrators, other criollo (American-born people of European ancestry) 
and mestizo (mixed blood) Cruceños began to move into the missions. Authors also 
refer to them as ‘vecinos’ (neighbours). In some cases they appropriated mission land 
and cattle, as well as central housing, displacing Chiquitano families or forcing them 
to abandon the pueblo altogether to escape vecino ‘abuses’ (see Lacroix, 2005: 21; 
Riester, 1976: 125, 141; Schwarz, 1994: 21, 37).  
However, in contrast to the highlands, where ‘Bourbon policies aimed to 
convert Indian commoners into individual labourers and petty commodity 
producers’, the lowlands were more sparsely populated, including by Hispanic 
settlers, which reduced land pressures (Radding, 2005: 115). Consequently, as 
addressed below, the Chiquitanía was not directly under dispute until the 1850s. In 
turn, Cruceños ‘sought enrichment and the accumulation of assets through livestock 
and the commercialisation of Indians’ labour’, which meant that they focused on 
appropriating the missions’ commercial circuits before seizing resources, chiefly 
land, water and livestock (Radding, 2005: 115). When French naturalist Alcides 
d’Orbigny toured the Chiquitanía in 1830-1831, he found the missions largely 
‘intact’, in that they counted among their assets cattle ranches (estancias), workshops 
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 Klein explains that rebellions most often took place among free communities due to abusive 
taxation by a local corregidor, conflicts over land with non-Indians, or local interference in the 
appointment of local kurakas by Spaniards (Klein, 1992: 74-75). He adds that the famous Túpac 
Amaru Rebellion of 1780-82, was a fundamental departure from this pattern. Firstly, it was large – 
encompassing over 100,000 rebel troops and covering an area from southern Peru in the Cuzco area 
through Upper Peru into the highlands of northern Argentina. Secondly, it was a well-coordinated 
multi-class and multi-caste mobilisation. Thirdly, it aimed to establish an ‘autonomous region under 
the control of local classes to the exclusion of all Spaniards’ (Klein, 1992: 75). The rebellion ended at 
the end of 1781, when it had been crushed in most areas and cities (see Klein, 1992: 75-77). See also 
Sinclair Thomson (2002) for a detailed analysis of this episode.  
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and a viable population, which had maintained its former level (see Radding, 2005: 
106).52  
Independence and the Rise of the Republic 
Even though thousands of ‘Indians’, among them Chiquitanos, died in the 
independence war, rules for the new political system were dictated by Spanish and 
mestizo elites.53 While authors note that Bolivian Independence in 1825 brought 
changes in economical patters, definitions of personhood and citizenship, legal and 
customary relations, they also argue that these have to be understood in relation to 
colonial foundations (Klein, 1992: 101; Radding, 2005: 240; Rivera Cusicanqui, 
1990). 
The philosophical and juridical principals that underlay the constitutions of 
1826 and 1834, as well as the civil and penal codes promulgated by Andrés de Santa 
Cruz in 1830-1832, stemmed from enlightenment principles. These professed ‘the 
equality of persons and the secularisation of culture’ and suggested an apparent 
departure from the dual structure of república de indios and república de españoles 
(Radding, 2005: 268).54 Radding summarises the faculties ascribed to ‘citizens’ and 
‘Bolivians’:  
The category of Bolivians comprehended all those born within the territory of 
Bolivia and was extended to the children of Bolivian parents born outside the 
                                                 
52
 It should be added, however, that while most missions maintained their population and even grown 
slightly, a census featuring the population of the ten missions cited by Tonelli Jusiticiano (2004: 119), 
demonstrates, that some had already suffered a substantial population drop between 1805 and 1852. 
For example, San Rafael (2,729 to 900), Santa Ana (1,684 to 927), San Juan Bautista (1,584 to 707) 
and Santo Corazón (1,263 to 789). He explains this as being due to economic crisis and illnesses 
(2004: 118). Freyer observes that at the end of the eighteenth century, the population density of 
Chiquitano groups in general had declined following the activities of Brazilian slave hunters and 
illnesses that they carried. She estimates that generally groups were a fifth of their former size (1997: 
39-40). 
53
 Chiquitanos were caught between the fronts of the independence war and were divided between 
royalists and patriots. While republicans defended the ‘liberation of the indigenous’, they were also 
guilty of acts of massive repression. One example is the massacre of Santa Barbara in 1815. Ignacio 
Warnes, a republican from Santa Cruz, pointed to the manipulation of the Chiquitanos by the royalists 
after he had ‘liberated’ the mission settlement San Rafael. As a consequence, ‘he ordered the burning 
of thousands of Chiquitanos because of their support for the royalists’ in Santa Barbara (Lacroix, 
2005: 22). Chiquitanos remember the story in different ways, and it has been retold by different 
authors. For a longer version of this event, as well as Chiquitano involvement in border conflicts in 
the 1820s, see Radding (2005: 282-284). For details on independence movements and struggles in 
Upper Peru, see Klein (1992: 89-98).  
54
 These values ‘were conveyed to the colonies through the Spanish Cortes of 1812 and the 
Constitution of Cádiz, a document created in the midst of the Iberian dynastic crisis that followed the 
Napoleonic invasions of Spain and Portugal’ (Radding, 2005: 241). 
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country, but who stated legally their desire to live in Bolivia; foreigners who 
obtained a letter of naturalisation or who established three years of residency 
(vecindad) in Bolivia; veterans of insurgent troops in the battles of Junín and 
Ayacucho; and, finally, slaves who, by the constitution of 1826, were declared free. 
Citizens designated those Bolivians who were married heads of household or 
persons over twenty-one years of age (legal adults), knew how to read and write, and 
had employment or independent means of livelihood without being in the service or 
pay off another. … Only citizens in full exercise of their rights (ciudadanos en 
ejercicio) could vote or be elected to public office (2005: 280). 
As in other independent states that came into being in Latin America, liberal thinkers 
reasoned that such a citizenship regime was the road to ‘progress’. The extension of 
civil liberties to indigenous people might lead to the abolition of ‘archaic’ indigenous 
communal institutions and allow for the conversion of indigenous individuals ‘into a 
prosperous class of small landholders and artisans through schooling and access to 
the market’ (de la Peña, 2005: 720). They saw the creation of the ‘new Bolivian 
citizen’ as linked to: 
the formation of the register of land-holdings (Catastro), and the administration of 
justice by white local Judges (Jueces de Letras and de Paz). As a corollary, the 
traditional tribute paid by the indians should be abolished and replaced with a new 
property-tax based on the annual income which could be expected from each holding 
(predial rústico) (Platt, 1984: 5-6). 
Platt notes that this massive reform programme must be considered ‘as a crucial 
instrument of 19th century nation-building (or, as it would be phrased today, of 
“National Integration”)’ (1984: 6). ‘Freeing’ the individual from the ‘arbitrariness’ of 
local authorities, for instance in the area of taxation, the ‘nation’ itself was to become 
to reference point for the property-owners registered in the catastro (Platt, 1984: 6).  
As early as 1825, Bolívar decreed the privatisation of community land, along 
with the elimination of traditional communal authorities and obligations. In Bolivia, 
legislation in the Decreto del Melgarejo of 1866 and the Ley de Desvinculación 
(Disentailment Law) of 1874 confirmed these measures.55 Nevertheless, the narrow 
definition of citizenship implied that it, together with formal political participation, 
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 General Mariano Malgarejo decreed the law of 20 March 1866, ‘which declared proprietors of full 
rights all the indigenous that owned land of the state in the exchange for the payment of a low sum 
between 25 and 100 pesos. The indigenous had from then on 60 days to pay the first sum under the 
threat of confiscation. In 1868, Malgarejo decreed a complementary law according to which the lands 
of the communities owned by the indigenous “race” were property of the state and in consequence 
ordered them to be publicly sold to cover the internal debt and resolve the necessities of the national 
service’ (Lacroix, 2005: 23). Of course, indigenous peoples generally lacked the money to purchase 
land, losing it to large landholders, forcing Indians to become colonos (Postero, 2007: 33). Also see 
Klein (1992: 135-141).  
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excluded the majority of (indigenous) Bolivians, i.e. women, non-property owners, 
those not literate in Spanish or with an independent status as artisans, professionals 
or merchants (de la Peña, 2005: 720, 723; Langer, 2000: 246, 263; Radding, 2005: 
280-282). To compound matters, under the colonial system, Indians ‘held a special, 
if subordinated status’, which was subsequently removed along with obligations 
(such as the forced labour system mita and tribute payments) and specific 
protections, such as ‘Indians legal standing in the corporate ownership of land and … 
access to colonial courts (at reduced costs) through the protector of Indians’ 
(Radding, 2005: 281). Radding notes that this ‘undermined the ancestral customs and 
cultural integrity of indigenous communities and threatened to dissolve their 
corporate patrimony’ (2005: 281).56 
In the long run, all over Bolivia the legislation resulted in an expansion of 
haciendas or estancias at the expense of indigenous communities (see Albó, 1987: 
380-382; de la Peña, 2005: 720-723; Klein, 1992: 152-253; Lacroix, 2005: 23; 
Langer, 2000: 245; Radding, 2005: 281; Schwarz, 1994: 38). While the import of this 
legislation was most felt in the highlands, in the Chiquitanía fundamental 
transformations were underway. The regime change led to an expansion of role of 
the state bureaucracy in the province and its economy, and triggered processes which 
would lead to the dispossession of communal lands and livestock, which passed into 
the hands of Cruceño estancieros (Lacroix, 2005: 22-23; Radding, 2005: 106, 281; 
Schwarz, 1994: 39).  
Nevertheless, the republican administration largely maintained the colonial 
mission economic structures for over fifty years after independence. The legacy of 
the mission economy supported in large measured the economy of Chiquitos 
province and the entire Santa Cruz Prefecture (Radding, 2005: 245, 279). The 
economy continued to be based primarily on ‘bartering and trading goods for goods’, 
with the commodities produced in the missions circulating as currency (Radding, 
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 Yet, in Bolivia, as in other Latin American countries, governments did not effectively abolish the 
Indian tribute system for several decades after independence, renaming the tax ‘indigenous 
contribution’, giving ongoing legitimacy to community governments and their land titles (Kicza, 
2000b: xxiv; Klein, 1992: 106). This was because the independence wars triggered a crisis in the 
highland mining sector, stagnant international trade and temporarily weakened the hacendado class. 
Revenues from tributes presented an important income for the state, at the time accounting for around 
60 per cent of government income. Land tenure legislation did not change until the 1860s and 1870s, 
when the contribution declined in importance and criollo ‘capitalist demands for land, labour and raw 
materials pushed liberal reforms back onto the … agenda’ (Postero, 2007: 32, also Klein, 1992: 105-
107, Platt, 1984: 8).  
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2005: 247).57 Furthermore, in this period, salt became an important commodity, 
especially in the eastern and southern pueblos of San Juan, Santiago and San José 
(see Radding, 2005: 245). While lowland indigenous peoples did not pay their semi-
annual tribute payments like the Bolivian highland peoples, and therefore lacked 
special protection of their communal possessions, they supported the local economy 
through obligatory public service. This involved three days per week carrying out 
tasks such as maintaining churches, cutting roads through the forest and driving mule 
trains that delivered post or goods between the missions and Santa Cruz (Radding, 
2005: 110-111, 248-249).  
In the Chiquitanía, the national government’s plan was to introduce a 
citizenship regime linked to the notion of private ownership of livestock. In 1833, it 
began distributing three head of cattle to each household, with the promise of more to 
be distributed if the initiative prospered. This, however, failed in the sense that the 
Chiquitanos ‘never took that livestock as their property’; cattle came ‘under non-
Indian management, and the herds grew or diminished according to the individuals in 
charge of the livestock sections assigned to each parcialidad’ (Radding, 2005: 112).  
The population of the Chiquitos province suffered further when the region 
was affected by severe droughts in the 1820s and mid-1840s. These ecological crisis 
had ‘repercussions for the artisanal and agricultural output of the pueblos and their 
subsistence’ (Radding, 2005: 106, see also 251). Drought led to hunger and illness, 
loss in mission population and livestock, as well as weakening the structures of 
communal authority (see Freyer, 1997: 39-40; Radding, 2005: 107).58 The records 
for the period show skewed demographic profiles for the missions, pointing to high 
morbidity and mortality, population movements from one mission to the other, and 
flight to the forest to search for subsistence (Radding, 2005: 252). 
In the 1840s, the national government started paying increased attention to 
the eastern lowlands. President José Baliván (1841-47) attempted to bring Santa Cruz 
department (then including the provinces of Moxos, Chiquitos, Valle Grande and 
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 For more details on the mission economies at this time, see Radding (2005: 247-253). 
58In term of illnesses, Radding mentions that in the 1820s, the mission populations of San Javier 
suffered losses due to chicken pox and the fires. In the 1830s Concepción suffered an epidemic (2005: 
251). During the following decade, hunger and illness were so widespread through the missions, that 
Governor Marcelino de la Peña shifted resources to the most affected villages, imported livestock 
from Moxos province and traded mission cattle for maize to the Brazilian settlement of Casalbanco, 
which he could distribute among the affected population (Radding, 2005: 106-107).  
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Cordillera) ‘under national sovereignty’. For this purpose, he encouraged projects for 
colonisation and road building, establishing military outposts and religious missions 
to ‘control nomadic tribes of salvajes’ (savages), and promote the regions 
commercial development through cacao plantations and gathering of quinine bark 
(Radding, 2005: 300).59 Settlers were also accorded the right to extract labour power 
from the indigenous peoples living within the boundaries of the granted area, directly 
challenging the corporate structure of the Chiquitos mission settlements (Radding, 
2005: 309). When Cruceños moved close to missions and boundary disputes ensued, 
mission land regularly passed to Cruceños, especially as Chiquitanos and priests 
often lacked legal titles and exact boundaries (Radding, 2005: 108-109).60  
In 1852, voices grew loud in among the governors of Santa Cruz to convert 
the ‘open lands’, customarily held by the mission pueblos, into ‘rental properties’. 
Arguments included that this would increase productivity of these underused lands, 
which were abused by priests who planted them for their own benefits, or lent them 
to vecinos. Rental would provide an income which could be partly dedicated to the 
upkeep of the cathedral of Santa Cruz and other parish churches (Radding, 2005: 
108-109). Defence came from local priests (some of who defended their own 
positions as administrators in the missions), claiming that the Indians should be 
considered the ‘rightful owners’ of mission land as they had used it for subsistence 
cultivation and livestock ‘since time immemorial’ (see Radding, 2005: 108). Critics 
warned that if lands were put up for rent, Indians might move away from the 
missions. Agriculture in the Chiquitanía, contrary to the highlands, did neither 
benefit from irrigation nor the plough, and the worry was that without Chiquitano 
communal labour, the agricultural system would fall apart, among with the system of 
obligatory public works and services (Radding, 2005: 110-111). 
Despite warnings, by autumn 1852, the prefect put his plan to lease the cattle 
into effect. Nearly 8,000 head of cattle from San Javier, Concepción, San Miguel, 
San Ignacio and San José were auctioned off to six bidders for a period of six years. 
In return for letting livestock graze on their estancias and their labour input, Indians 
were to receive cattle on feast days and tools, notably, to be bought with the proceeds 
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 It was also part of this drive, that in 1842, Baliván established the department of Beni by 
presidential decree, separating the Moxos province from Santa Cruz department. In an attempt to 
enhance colonisation and settlement in the new department, he ‘extended full political rights of 
citizenship’ to the Moxos Indian communities (Radding, 2005: 299-300). 
60
 For examples of Cruceño land claims, see Radding (2005: 108-109). 
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of the livestock rental. Disregarding this, the proceeds of the rental were diverted to 
coffers in Santa Cruz, leading to verbal warnings and threatened uprisings from the 
Chiquitano side (Radding, 2005: 112). The state-sponsored auctioning of mission 
livestock effectively transferred the collective assets into private hands. This led to 
depleted mission herds and disrupted ‘long-standing methods of remuneration and 
the reciprocal exchange of meat for measured labour output that had supported the 
moral economy of mission life’ (Radding, 2005: 113).  
Another change in this period concerned the sparse, but increasing presence 
of Spanish vecinos in the settlements and the spread of private property around the 
missions. These developments opened up important ‘pathways of economic 
interdependency and cultural exchange’ and more regularly travelled routes 
(Radding, 2005: 288). The social networks they fostered, for example, through the 
appointment of members of the Cruceño Creole families as mission lay 
administrators, had a visible and lasting impact on the region’s socio-economic 
system.61 Much like in the rest of Bolivia and Latin America, merchants and 
landholding families sought to maintain the formally abolished colonial system based 
in discourse around race and the distinction between ‘vecino’ and ‘naturales’. 
Instead, the distinction that emerged was that between ‘ciudadanos’ (citizens) and 
‘barabaros’ or ‘salvajes ‘(barbarians) (Postero, 2007: 35; Radding, 2005: 279; 
Rivera Cusicanqui, 1987: 2). This served to legitimate and secure Cruceño control 
over public offices (and Indian labour force) (Radding, 2005: 268).62  
According to the new constitution, the public administration was supposed to 
function in the following way: ‘the prefecture of Santa Cruz became a department, 
Chiquitos remained a province, and the ten pueblos were designated cantons’ 
(Radding, 2005: 285). The primary site of local governance became municipal 
corporations (ayuntamientos) and electoral assemblies. While Radding reports that 
records from the first decade of republican rule indicate that Indians and Creoles 
alike participated in an indirect mode of suffrage, where indigenous cabildos and 
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 Radding points out that ‘the bonds (fianzas) that curates and administrators were required to present 
to the prefect of Santa Cruz in order to secure their appointments provide clear evidence of the kinship 
networks that hovered around the Chiquitos pueblos’ (2005: 289).  
62
 Regarding debates around Creole visions of republican citizenship, see, for example, Pablo 
Regalsky (2003). Indicative of the strong socio-political cleavages on race-lines is also that while 
mestizaje was recorded in the mid-nineteenth century, as Indians moved between pueblos and 
provincial capital to fulfil labour demands and as Cruceños in the pueblos, local officials recorded this 
‘in terms of social and racial distance, rather than mestizaje’ (Radding, 2005: 292, also: 290-292).  
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representatives from each canton chose the electors for the province of Chiquitos, 
from 1839, ‘Indigenous voices from the cantons are no longer heard … overtaken by 
the preferential civic role of the Creole citizen’ (2005: 287).63 Whereas the new 
republican order aspired to create of a body of equal citizens, hierarchies along 
ethnic and family lines remained entrenched, as did ‘personal relations of clientelism 
and servitude … as indelible markers of prestige and governance’ (Radding, 2005: 
181-282).  
While Creole elites were often divided among themselves and locked in 
‘disputes over power, the popular classes of indigenous comuneros (commoners) and 
mixed-race workers and peasants fought to exercise the rights of citizenship on local 
issues and joined shifting political alliances with different caudillos and political 
parties’ (Radding, 2005: 282). Such practices show up the relations of mutual 
dependency, as well as the contested meanings of political practices, through which 
Chiquitano negotiated their relationship with state actors. As pointed out in the 
previous and following chapters, entrenched racial hierarchies, clientelism and 
localised citizenship practices could be discerned prominently in the Chiquitanía into 
the 1970s, while they still influence the socio-political system today. 
Another thread of continuity that spans from the mission polity to today’s 
Chiquitano community governance structures, is that Chiquitano traditions of local 
governance and political practices remained deeply anchored in the cabildo 
(Radding, 2005: 288). As elsewhere in Bolivia, the formal abolition of the 
communities’ legal status did not lead to a disappearance of communal institutions 
and authorities (de la Peña, 2005: 722-733; Langer, 2000: 245).64 Moreover, like in 
the Colonial period, Chiquitano groups developed a language to address 
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 Radding notes that records from the years 1826 and 1837 show that: ‘electors chosen from the 
cantons included Chiquitano men [probably cabildo officers], but the electors chosen for the province 
invariably were Creoles, most often the priests who served in the pueblos. Each assembly required all 
participants to present their credentials and the appointment of a president, secretary, and examiners 
(escrutadores) to certify the electoral process’ see (Radding, 2005: 286, see page 286-287 for more 
details). 
64
 The extent of this, of course differed from region to region. While Chuquisaca communities were 
weakened to a greater extent and fell under white landlord control, in northern Potosí hacienda 
expansion and townspeople land acquisition was slighter, causing less disruption to communities. In 
the southern Bolivian highlands, communal authorities were more successful in resisting land 
measurement and acquisition by outsiders, as the decline in the southern region’s main economic 
pillar – silver mining – weakened southern landlords, impeding their usurpation of communal lands 
(see Langer, 2000: 245). 
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ecclesiastical and secular authorities around their system of ‘catholic ritual, labour 
discipline, and internal governance centred in the cabildo’ (Radding, 2005: 279-280). 
While some Chiquitano reacted to the influx of Cruceño vecinos and 
increasing labour demands by moving away from the missions (Schwarz, 1994: 37), 
returning to the forest was no longer a long term option Radding notes that 
‘stockbreeding, agriculture, mining, and road building’ had not only ‘changed the 
physical environments’, but also altered the ‘range of cultural alternatives for the 
indigenous communities’ (2005: 293).65 On the one hand, commodity exchange and 
livestock played roles in ‘their internal economy and in their traffic with the 
Cruceños’ (2005: 293). Chiquitano economic activities continued to support Santa 
Cruz commercials circuits and public finances (2005: 288). On the other, settlers 
continued to move into the provinces and penetrated ever more remote regions, with 
the aim of amplifying their economic activities and secure access to indigenous 
labour (Lacroix, 2005: 21; Riester, 1976: 125; Schwarz, 1994: 38). As noted, 
although Cruceños gained increasing control over the former missions, they 
continued to form the social and religious regional centres for the Chiquitano groups, 
visibly, as they continued to occupy the space of the ex-reductions symbolically or 
physically during Catholic fiestas (Schwarz, 1994: 38-39). 
The above-mentioned developments explain the outbreak of uprisings, as 
well as other acts of protest, to defend communal lands and circumvent the 
destruction of indigenous livelihoods in the Bolivian highlands and some lowland 
areas, as well as several other Latin American countries (many ending in massacres 
carried out by armies at the service of the landowning oligarchy) (Albó, 1987: 80-82; 
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 In term of physical changes, Radding point out that these developments also ‘set in motion 
ecological processes counter to the seasonal rhythms of chaco cultivation, fallow, and forest recovery’ 
(2005: 302). The large clearings, intense cultivation and road building let to ‘physical changes in soils, 
vegetation, and the morphology of lagoons and streams’ (2005: 302). 
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Langer, 2000).66 Authors note that these were moments that led to the emergence of 
a new collective identity or an ‘oppositional indigenous identity’, which would 
become important in the developing social movements formed on ethnic lines in the 
subsequent century (see Albó, 1987: 380-382; de la Peña, 2005: 721-722; Larson, 
2004: 228; Platt, 1984: 15; Rivera Cusicanqui, 1987; Stern, 1987). However, while 
uprisings are registered in the Chiquitanía region in the late 1700s, along with some 
minor instances of protests in the republican period, in contrast to the Bolivian 
highlands and Chaco region, no major uprising are registered to have happened in the 
Chiquitanía. Radding suggests that land tenure disputes did not often erupt in 
Chiquitos, because the attention of provincial governors, vecinos, pueblo 
administrators and cabildo officers was absorbed in defining the terms of debate 
around corporate mission economy, as this assumed ‘fiscal and social importance for 
Indians and Creoles [alike] until the last third the nineteenth century’ (2005: 293).  
The Rubber Boom, Chaco War and the Santa Cruz – Corumbá 
Railway 
The Rubber Boom and Forced Labour 
Chiquitano peoples were severely affected by three further events: the rubber boom 
from the late 1870s, the Chaco War (1933-36) and the construction of the Santa 
Cruz-Corumbá railway (1945-1955). Towards the end of the nineteenth century, 
which in the highlands saw ‘the ages of silver and tin’ (1880-1932), in the lowlands 
growing demand from European markets and the United States led to a ‘rubber 
boom’ which resulted in a more intense occupation of the Amazon.67 Between 1879 
and 1885, the first foreign (mainly English and German) and Cruceño companies 
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 Platt states, that after all, what was at stake were the ‘entire social and cultural orders’ of regional 
societies (see 1984: 12). Platt shows that Indian communities in Northern Potosí, demanded the 
continuation of the ‘tributary pact’, seeking ‘tributary citizenship’: ‘as “citizens” they could demand 
enlightenment, education and individual legal protection from the state and its judiciary, while as 
“tributaries” they could demand state recognition of their colonial titles to the ethnic territories 
(repartimientos)’ (1993: 161). However, communities also turned to more offensive action. As Kicza 
notes, ‘encountering politically divided elites, failing national economies, and ineffective 
governments, many Indian communities undertook to take lands away from nearby haciendas’ 
(2000b: xxxiv). One Bolivian example of indigenous communities’ desperate defence of their lands 
was the last Guaraní uprising of January 1892. The insurgents were defeated by the military, leaving 
an estimate of six to nine hundred dead and eight hundred wounded, most of who died later (Postero, 
2007: 24, also see Pifarré, 1989: 385).  
67
 This is to borrow the heading of Kleins’ (1992: 149-187) chapter, which addresses this period for 
the case of the Bolivian highlands.  
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entered primarily the Beni, but also the north of Santa Cruz department and the 
Chapare region to exploit rubber (Lacroix, 2005: 23; Lema, 2006a: 63).  
This also led to the enganchamiento (‘hooking’) of indigenous workers, who 
were recruited as rubber tappers from outside the region (Pacheco Balanza and Ávila, 
2001: 56). Between 1880 and 1945, thousands of Chiquitanos were forcefully taken 
to the rubber areas from San Ignacio de Velasco in Velasco province and Concepción 
in Ñuflo de Chávez province (Riester, 1976: 126; Schwarz, 1994: 40). Chiquitanos 
were forced to work in the rubber zones by patrons, whether by direct enlistment or 
to pay off debts, but nearly always under intimidation (Riester, 1976: 126).68 Authors 
describe that the rubber patrons controlled a network of barrancas (barracks). They 
also enforced a system of habilito, which forbade the practice of joint agriculture, 
while the patron supplied and rationed all foodstuffs and basic consumer goods, for 
which they arbitrarily fixed prices. This left the labourers permanently indebted. 
Patrons also ruled over labourers families in terms of the duration of their stay and 
general freedom of movement (Pacheco Balanza and Ávila, 2001: 56; Riester, 1976: 
134).  
Conditions in the rubber areas were similar to those described for other zones 
of rubber exploitation in the Amazon region, with the patrons maintaining a system 
of ‘terror’ (torture and physical punishments, killings and rape) to establish their 
hegemony – as has been described by Taussig (1987) for the Peruvian case. Authors 
point to poor working conditions, and low life expectancy in the rubber zones. This 
was no higher than two years, according to Riester, or three to five years according to 
Schwarz (Riester, 1976: 125-126; Schwarz, 1994: 40). Stories from survivors point 
to thousands of deaths due to lack of food, over exploitation and disease (especially 
malaria and beriberi). Flight was difficult, as rubber tappers stayed in the forest for 
an average of seven months while their families remained in the main barracks and 
worked for the patron (Riester, 1976: 126). Riester adds that those who did managed 
to flee were fiercely persecuted and often entire families would be ‘eliminated 
through bullets’ (Riester, 1976: 135-136).  
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 Few studies exist regarding the influence of the rubber boom on the Santa Cruz socio-economic 
structure or on indigenous communities. Accounts address social conditions only briefly, focusing on 
the labour system in the rubber areas, or details of rubber barons and their links to the international 
rubber trade. For examples, see Ximena Soruco’s analysis of the international rubber trade (2008: 14-
38). Exceptions are the more detailed studies by Fifer (1972) and, more recently, Roca (2001), who 
study the Bolivian rubber boom in more depth. 
 201 
In cases where flight was successful, survivors retreated to zones that were 
hard to reach and far away from the former reductions, leading to the emergence of 
new communities along the River of Zapocó Norte in the sector of San Antonio de 
Lomerío (Riester, 1976: 135-136; Schwarz, 1994: 40).69 Chiquitano today still 
recount the horrors of the rubber boom (see Chapter VI), leading Riester to conclude 
that ‘the rubber areas represented and still represent today, a trauma for the 
Chiquitanos’ (1976: 126). 
Around 1910, growing competition from rubber plantations in South-East 
Asia led to a drastic decline in international rubber prices, while the appearance of 
synthetic rubber in 1926 eroded external markets for this product. As a result, the 
foreign capital that financed the extractive activities abandoned the Bolivian north, 
while simultaneously patrons made efforts to diversify the productive base through, 
for example, encouraging the small-scale exportation of castaña (chestnut) and 
lifting restrictions on agriculture in the barracks. By the 1930s rubber production had 
declined markedly in comparison to the previous boom period, although the Second 
World War allowed a small recovery of production, when it reached similar levels to 
those registered during the first years of the century. However, in the post-war years, 
prices fell sharply, producing a second rubber crisis (Pacheco Balanza and Ávila, 
2001: 57). By the 1970s, rubber extraction had shrunk and by that time the number of 
Chiquitanos in the rubber forests had diminished significantly (Riester, 1976: 134).70  
In the Chiquitanía, capital accumulated in the rubber boom was largely 
invested in cattle ranching, the production of sugar cane and commerce in Santa 
Cruz. New landowners settled in the Chiquitanía (mainly in Concepción, San Javier 
and San José) and recruited Chiquitano workers for the new estancias, establishing a 
system of debt servitude (Riester, 1976: 136; Schwarz, 1994: 40). If freed, 
Chiquitanos generally also moved south, although some decided to stay in the rubber 
area as the soil was better (Riester, 1976: 136). Riester’s informants stressed that 
while the Chiquitano settlements that emerged through this migration faced problems 
in terms of high transportation costs to regional markets (e.g. San Ignacio was 400 
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 The founders of comunidades in that sector came from Concepción, San Rafael, San Ignacio and 
San Miguel (Schwarz, 1994: 40). 
70
 In 1965, there were still 2000 Chiquitanos in Velasco, the number fell to 250 in 1970; in Ñuflo de 
Chávez the number halved to 100 (Riester, 1976: 134). 
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km away), personal freedom was more important than the benefits they could 
achieve by selling their produce (1976: 136). 
Some Chiquitano, who returned from the rubber areas in the southern zone of 
Ñuflo de Chavez province, established themselves around San Javier and 
Concepción. However, the push to establish cattle ranches on land surrounding the 
ex-missions and the large size of existing estancias, meant that land to establish 
settlements was growing scarce. In some cases, local administrators put land at the 
disposition of Chiquitano groups, but this was generally of poor quality. Riester adds 
that the alternatives were to work for (and become dependent on) the patrons, or seek 
refuge in remote places, such as the area around Lomerío (1976: 141). 
The Chaco War and the Construction of the Santa Cruz – Corumbá Railway 
Another significant event for the Chiquitano was the Chaco War (1933-36) between 
Bolivia and Paraguay. Chiquitanos were recruited to fight (often by force) (Riester, 
1976: 127). Consequently, Chiquitanos abandoned many settlements that had their 
origin in the ex-reduction of Santo Corazón, as well as many settlements in the 
sectors of Roboré, Puerto Suárez and Rincón del Tigre. A similar process took place 
around the ex-reductions of Santiago, San Juán and San José. However, immediately 
after the War, new settlements started to emerge in remote areas, above all in the 
sector of San Antonio de Lomerío (Schwarz, 1994: 41). In terms of other 
consequences of the War, Schwarz notes that although little data exists, ‘it can be 
assumed that the large landowners took advantage … of the absence of [Chiquitano] 
men to achieve an even greater expansion of the estancias’ (1994: 40-41).  
A further important event that impacted on the Chiquitano communities was 
the construction of the Santa Cruz de la Sierra – Corumbá railway between 1945 and 
1955. The railway was supposed to strengthen commercial exchange between the 
highlands and plains, as well as promote economic integration of east Bolivia into 
the national economy. It was also part of an effort to reduce dependency on imported 
agricultural products (Riester, 1976: 139). Creole and mestizo enganchadores 
attracted a large part of the Chiquitano from the area of the ex-reductions of Santo 
Corazón, Santiago, San Juan, and San José, to construct the tracks as low-paid 
workers (Riester, 1976: 41). This provoked the permanent migration of large 
numbers of Chiquitano comunarios from the north of the Chiquitanía to the south to 
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work on railway construction and thus escape their patrons (Schwarz, 1994: 41). 
Riester, nevertheless, observes that the Cruceño mestizos and Creoles took advantage 
to refine the economic exploitation of Chiquitano groups even more than in previous 
times. They signed contracts which obliged them to provide a certain number of 
Chiquitanos to work for the railway company in return for 30 - 50 per cent of their 
wages (1976: 126). 
With respect to the consequences of railway construction for the Chiquitano 
population, authors paint a mixed picture. Schwarz observes that new settlements 
emerged along the railway line, which were not based on ‘the traditional model’ of 
Chiquitano communities, as they lacked a kinship system and put less emphasis on 
‘autochthonous rituals’ or the use of the Chiquitano language (1994: 41-42). Riester 
stresses that, as a positive effect, the wages the Chiquitano earned as railway workers 
allowed them to buy weapons for hunting, clothing, and celebrate fiestas. However, 
he also describes how railway construction impacted negatively on Chiquitano 
peoples in terms of access to land: Creoles and mestizos occupied the ‘best positions’ 
north and south of the railway lines, so as to be close to transportation, as well as to 
be able to extract and sell wood (1976: 140). 
The 1952 Revolution and Agrarian Reform 
Two further events that had a huge influence on Bolivian citizenship regimes, 
Chiquitano spatial occupation and socio-political organisation, were the 1952 
Revolution and agrarian reform of 1953. The Chaco War led to a shift in political 
objectives, protagonists, and allies in Bolivia (Albó, 1987; Grootaert and Narayan, 
2001: 380-382). Anger against the rosca (the economic and political elite based 
around the tin-mining sector) had risen and governmental credibility severely been 
damaged during the war, which historians point out, was primarily provoked by the 
Bolivian government to cover up the economic crisis and growing social unrest 
driven by falling tin prices after 1930 (Kohl and Farthing, 2006: 44).71 As the war 
revealed the weakness, incompetence and corruption of the state bureaucracy, ex-
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 During the 36 months long campaign 250,000 men aged between 17 and 50 had been sent to the 
front, a significant percentage in a country with a population of around two million. Some 52,400 men 
died in combat or through natural causes, 21,000 were captured, 10,000 deserted and Bolivia lost 
thousands of square kilometres of territory (Dunkerley, 2003: 144). 
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combatants developed a common vision of an effective state and a unitary nation (see 
Dunkerley, 2003; Grindle, 2003a: 4; Klein, 1992: 44; Kohl and Farthing, 2006: 45). 
Contributing to the revolutionary tide figured the considerable political 
mobilisation and class conflict in the mining regions which predated the war, as well 
as unrest in areas of the countryside, particularly around Cochabamba and the 
northern highland plain. The revolution was preceded by more than a decade of 
uprisings, military coups and instability (Canessa, 2009; Dunkerley, 2003; 
Gotkowitz, 2003; Kohl and Farthing, 2006: 46).72 The party to lead the revolution in 
April 1952 was the moderate left-wing Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario 
(MNR – National Revolutionary Movement), founded in 1941 by a core of middle 
class professionals, students, and intellectuals (Grindle, 2003a: 4). The MNR 
operated in alliance with the mobilised miners, workers in general and peasants and 
indigenous groups. They seized power through a three day confrontation in La Paz, 
Cochabamba and Oruro and installed Victor Paz Estenssoro as president (Albó, 
1987: 380-382; Grindle, 2003a: 2-5; Kohl and Farthing, 2006: 46). 
While the MNR itself was decidedly anti-communist and saw its goals 
primarily in securing the interest of the middle class, workers and peasants pushed 
for more radical legislation. Such pressures came above all from the newly (and with 
MNR backing) founded Central Obrera Boliviana (COB – Bolivian Workers’ 
Confederation), which brought together the (armed) workers organisations under 
Juan Lechín (Grindle, 2003a: 2-5; Kohl and Farthing, 2006: 46). Pressures were 
heightened through the activities of armed peasant syndicates and villagers, who had 
begun taking over hacienda lands on their own accord.73 This forced the MNR to 
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 As Kohl and Farthing note, the four key mobilising sectors were firstly, university students who 
abandoned the politics of their elite parents (‘the Chaco generation’) and later constituted the core of 
the MNR. Second, junior military officers ‘split between military socialists and nationalist fascists’, 
who would lead the military dictatorships between 1964 and 1982. Third, the labour union based 
around mines, railroads and urban print shops, which emerged ‘with strong influences from left-wing 
political parties’ (2006: 45). Lastly, in the highlands indigenous groups began to organise. In the 
1930s free indigenous communities had organised around Cochabamba to buy and lease land from 
agriculturalists suffering under the1930s economic crisis. The first congress of over 1000 valley and 
highland community leaders took place in La Paz in 1954. The president of the military government 
of the time, Gualberto Villarroel, promised schools and the end of pongueaje (bonded labour), which 
although not implemented until after the Revolution, legitimised and fuelled the demands of rural 
communities (Gotkowitz, 2003; Kohl and Farthing, 2006: 46). 
73
 As Andrew Canessa points out, rural violence, ‘was not evenly distributed through the county and 
was most concentrated in the Cochabamba valley and the rich agricultural lands of the altiplano 
around Lake Titicaca, where intense dispossession of Indian lands had taken place at the end of the 
nineteenth century and in the early decades of the twentieth, in particular around Achacachi’ (2009: 
177). 
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proclaim the 1953 Land Reform and the elimination of servile relations in 
agricultural production. The reform aimed to distribute large landholdings among 
former peons, rural workers and landless peasants (Canessa, 2009: 177; de la Peña, 
2005: 730; Gotkowitz, 2003; Grindle, 2003a: 2-5; Kohl and Farthing, 2006: 46).  
Additionally, in line with the populist and Import Substitution 
Industrialisation (ISI) policies pursued by Latin American countries (and beyond) 
from the 1950s to the start of the 1980s, the MNRs capitalist and partly statist 
modernisation programme included the promotion and expansion of the domestic 
market, through backing producers with credits, agricultural inputs, tariff barriers and 
the nationalisation of key industries (the mines formerly owned by the rosca were 
converted into the large state enterprise COMIBOL). Additionally, the MNR 
promoted the extension and diversification of the agricultural-geographical frontier 
through the opening of new roads to the east, where new productive possibilities 
arose in oil and agribusiness. Important was also the attempt to broaden civil, social 
and political citizenship rights through expansion of suffrage and the education 
system (see Albó, 1987: 382; Healy and Paulson, 2000; Kohl and Farthing, 2006: 49; 
Rivera Cusicanqui, 1987: 3). 
A crucial aspect of the MNR project and one with far-reaching consequences, 
was the integration of Indians into the corporatist state system via sindicatos (state-
sponsored peasant unions), which were incorporated into the Confederación 
Nacional de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CNTCB –National Trade Union 
Organisation of Bolivian Peasants) (Albó, 1987: 383; Grootaert and Narayan, 2001: 
5; Postero, 2007: 38). Once hacienda lands were recovered, these campesino unions 
were to function in practice as a modernised version of traditional communal 
organisations (Albó, 1987: 382-383, 2002: 75). The idea was to integrate Indians into 
the corporatist state structure as ‘producers’, which involved the relabeling of 
‘Indians’ as ‘campesinos’ (peasants) (Albó, 1987: 381-382, 2002: 75; Ströbele-
Gregor et al., 1994: 108). Significantly, this re-labelling exercise indicated a shift in 
the way that the country’s elites thought about the ‘Indian question’. It reflects the 
rising influence of indigenismo, an intellectual current propagated initially by white 
and mestizo Mexican writers and politicians and which gained momentum in many 
Latin American. It would influence white and mestizo attitudes towards indigenous 
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peoples and state policies in countries such as Bolivia, Guatemala and Peru 
throughout the twentieth century.74  
Driving white and mestizo indigenista intellectuals and politicians was a 
nationalistic sentiment that Latin American states needed strong unified national 
identities, which they reasoned would be constituted through the inevitable 
emergence and ascent of mestizos as the true citizens of the new nations (de la Peña, 
2005: 719-722).75 This departed from the previous liberal stance, which dismissed 
past Indian cultures as barbaric and contemporary Indians as a hindrance to 
modernisation. Instead, indigenistas like the Mexican Manuel Gamio, valued some 
aspects of past ‘Indian cultures’, above all their artistic achievements (Brading, 1988; 
de la Peña, 2005: 727). Furthermore, contemporary Indians were seen as 
‘redeemable’, with the capacity to exercise full citizenship if targeted with education 
programmes and special economic and social development initiatives (de la Peña, 
2005: 727). 
Indigenista intellectuals like Gamio, José Vasconcelos (the founder of the 
Mexica Ministry of Education) and Moisés Sáenz (who served as Mexican vice-
minister of education) were influenced by the writings of Franz Boas and Dewey. 
They moved away from expressing distinctions between ‘mestizos’ and ‘Indians’ in 
racial or linguistic terms, to stressing their cultural and social content (Brading, 1988: 
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 One important Mexican figure, who helped to spread of ‘indigenista ideas’ was Moisés Sáenz (who 
also served as Mexican vice-minister of education). He argued that indigenismo should rely not on 
‘incorporation’, but rather on ‘integration’ policies based on active participation from the grassroots. 
He became convinced that indigenismo ‘should become a well-structured continental movement’, and 
was one of the main organisers of the 1940 First Interamerican Indigenist Congress, held in Pátzcuaro 
where over 200 delegates from 19 countries attended (de la Peña, 2005: 726-727). The Congress also 
led to the founding of the Interamerican Indigenist Institute, through which the think-tank of the 
Mexican Instituto Nacional Indigenista (INI – National Indigenist Institute, founded in 1948), spread 
several ideas which shaped the policies of many countries and the UN at the time and are still 
important in the ‘indigeneity debate’ today (see de la Peña, 2005: 729-730). According to de la Peña, 
the debates and resolutions of Congress ‘completed the conversion of indigenismo into state ideology 
and anthropological doctrine’ (2005: 719). For more details on the congress, see de la Peña (2005: 
727). In Bolivia, an official Instituto Indigenista Boliviano was created in 1941, but it was superseded 
by the 1945 National Indigenous Congress convoked by the populist President Villarroel, and then by 
the 1952 Revolution (de la Peña, 2005: 730).  
75
 For authors addressing indigenista mind set and policies and their effect on indigenous populations, 
see, for example, Friedlander’s (2006) case study on Hueyapan and Alan Knight (1990) for the 
Mexican case. See French (2004), Souza Lima (1991) and Ramos (1998) for the Brazilian case and 
Marisol de la Cadena (2001) for indigenismo and it’s legacy in Peru, but also other Latin American 
countries. Indigenismo and especially, the writings of Peruvian José Carlos Mariátegui, also 
influenced various political movements, such as, for example the Apristas in Peru (Alianza Popular 
Revolucionaria Americana (APRA – American Popular Revolutionary Alliance)), see Davies (1971) 
and Heilman (2006). One of the countries in which the ideology, aspiration and failure of social 
science of indigenismo was manifested in ‘exemplary form’ was Guatemala (see Wasserstrom, 1975). 
Also see Handy (1988). 
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78; de la Peña, 2005: 719). If ‘contemporary Indians appeared sunk in rural idiocy, 
then their backwardness should be attributed to their poor diet, their lack of 
education, their material poverty, and their isolation from the stimulus of national 
life’ (Brading, 1988: 79). ‘To be Indian’ meant to be subordinate in the colonial caste 
system, leading to a population with ‘fragmented cultures’ which persisted in regions 
where the modernising state had not yet percolated and who due to their isolation, 
lack of Spanish language skills, poverty and illiteracy did not participate in ‘national 
life’ (Brading, 1988: 82; de la Peña, 2005: 729-130).  
To achieve a culturally homogenous strong nation-state, Indigenista policies 
should therefore ‘be directed toward breaking up the asymmetrical intercultural 
system’ (de la Peña, 2005: 730), with the aim of ‘cultural fusion, linguistic 
unification, and economic equilibrium’ (Gamio in Brading, 1988: 82). States would 
have to provide for land distribution, agricultural extension, marketing facilities, 
literacy programmes, health campaigns and clinics, and schooling and encourage 
indigenous organisation and participation in municipal politics (de la Peña, 2005: 
729). In short, Indians could be turned into peasants and be made functional to the 
economic development of the respective countries. Paradoxically, while indigenistas 
valued some of the pre-colonial aspects of indigenous cultures, this was simply the 
reincarnation of the early colonial idea that the Indian ‘needed to be civilised’. As 
Brading summarises for the case of Mexico, the paradoxical objective of official 
indigenismo was ‘finally to destroy the native culture which had emerged during the 
colonial period’ (1988: 88). This would ‘remove the obstacles to mestizaje, that 
centuries-long process which would eventually create a homogeneous Mexican 
nation’ (1988: 84).76 
The reforms significantly transformed the Bolivian citizenship regime. In the 
Bolivian highlands, destruction of the hacienda system and passing of land to those 
who had worked it as serfs and peons, effectively ‘freed’ this part of the population. 
                                                 
76
 The Bolivian indigenista brand must be distinguished from those of Mexico or Peru. As Ann 
Zulaswki (2000) points out, there was no political party like APRA in Peru or single political leader 
like Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, who used indigenismo as their political bandwagon. She also 
argues that the ideology of mestizaje was less pronounced, as intellectuals like Bolivian novelist 
Alcides Arguedas saw mestizos as ‘having all the defects of both Spaniards and Indians’ (Arguedas in 
Zulawski, 2000: 111). Still, in their effort to culturally homogenise the nation, the MNR promoted the 
class-based term peasant over the culturally-laden and pejorative ‘Indian’. Just as the term ‘Indian’, as 
defined by the Crown, and ‘citizen’, as defined by the republican state, had previously done, this 
codified a ‘new social and political category’ (Postero, 2007: 38). 
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They no longer needed to work under pongueaje (personal service system) in the 
patrons’ house, ending the general humiliation and (threat of) corporal punishments 
associated with this (see Canessa, 2009; Klein, 2003b: 233). Through the elimination 
of literacy requirements, the voting population increased from 200,000 to nearly one 
million people (Klein, 2003b: 237). While voting might not have amounted to free 
and equal political representation, in the sense that votes were often traded for 
favours, this nevertheless presented groups and individuals in the highlands and 
lowlands with a degree of bargaining power. Through their participation in peasant 
unions and communal organisations former ‘Indians’ were able to organise projects 
for their communities and ‘make demands for better health and educational delivery, 
even if they were sometimes required to pay for themselves’ (Klein, 2003b: 238). 
Rivera Cusicanqui is more pessimistic about the effects of the reforms. She 
argues that it undermined the ayllu economy’s social and economic reproduction by 
encouraging individual landholdings and an emphasis on the petty-commodity 
regime (1990: 116). In the long run, changes in landholding patterns, and the 
increased land use encouraged through governmental programmes, led to depleted 
soils and minifundismo (Healy and Paulson, 2000: 9). State corporatist structures 
undermined the autonomy of Andean ayllus and other indigenous organisational 
structures and tied communities into clientelist networks of ‘state’ actors, including 
political parties and, more recently, NGOs (Rivera Cusicanqui, 1990: 116). Indeed, 
demands for independent organisational forms did not emerge until the late 1960s, 
when critical peasant leaders began exerting their autonomy from official Andean-
based unions (see Chapter V). 
In the Bolivian lowlands, MNR reforms had an entirely different trajectory. 
Most failed to reach the lowlands until the 1960s and 1970s (Riester, 1976: 177).77 
Landowners managed to largely block education and unionisation initiatives among 
lowland peoples. In Ñuflo de Chávez province, landowners forbade state authorities 
to enter their properties to inform themselves about the situation of the workers or to 
educate them about their rights. Jürgen Riester describes how Chiquitano families 
that laboured in a small establecimiento ten kilometres north of Concepción in the 
                                                 
77
 For example, the MNR’s plan to construct schools largely failed and, especially in the lowlands, 
funds supplied to pay teachers often did not reach their destinations. This occurred in the patron-
controlled rubber regions, but also in those areas that already had better lines of communication 
(Riester, 1976: 135). 
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1970s earned a shirt and a pair of trousers per year and the women a dress. For this, 
they had to toil for the patron throughout the year and additionally supply him with 
chicken and eggs as gifts for fiestas (1976: 138).78 The minimum wage legislation of 
1952 had more impact in the Velasco and Chiquitos provinces as the government 
insisted, raised awareness among and mobilised, the rural population. At times the 
military was employed to enforce the law (Riester, 1976: 137).79 
The agrarian reform itself largely impacted adversely on access to land and 
resources for many lowland groups. This was because government policies aimed at 
promoting development and the expansion of the agricultural frontier. From the 
1960s onwards, the government fostered large-scale development programmes and 
encouraged the expansion of cattle ranching, logging operations, mining and oil 
exploration (Yashar, 2005: 70).80 The Santa Cruz elites also permitted access to other 
social and ethnic groups, such as highland immigrants, Mennonites and large-scale 
agro-industry entrepreneurs. The spreading of human settlements, plantations and 
cattle farms along with accelerated deforestation, impacted negatively on the 
Chiquitano groups’ productive systems, as agricultural land grew scarce and access 
to rivers and lagoons for fishing, and forests for hunting diminished. Demographic 
pressures in the comunidades augmented causing an increase in Chiquitano 
temporary and permanent migration to the urban centres, particularly Santa Cruz de 
la Sierra, but also Brazil (Schwarz, 1994: 42-44). To compound matters, Schwarz 
argues that Chiquitano access to the ex-missions, ‘their cultural centres’, was 
undermined, weakening the Chiquitano political and social organisation. Further, it 
accelerated a disarticulation of the kinship system (‘the base of the ethnic social 
organisation’) in many comunidades (1994: 44). 
Later than in the highlands, governmental initiatives led to the promotion of 
education and development projects among Chiquitano comunidades. A prominent 
actor in this was the prefectural development organisation CORDECRUZ. However, 
Schwarz argues on similar lines to Rivera Cusicanqui, positing that such projects 
                                                 
78
 Again, some Chiquitano families tried to flee to other provinces or to Lomerío, in the south of the 
Ñuflo de Chávez province, a region that was not easily accessible (Riester, 1976: 138). 
79
 The MNR fixed the wage at five bolivianos per day for agricultural labourers with three meals a 
day, or alternatively, three bolivianos on top of the wage. 
80
 The laws that accompanied development efforts and that legislated a bias against indigenous 
included the Ley Forestal (Forestry Law), Ley de Fauna y Vida Silvestre (Fauna and Wildlife Law) 
and the Ley Mineral (Mineral Law), all of which granted concessions to exploit natural resources 
(Yashar, 2005: 198). 
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aimed at assimilating comunidades into a non-Chiquitano productive system, 
functional to the national market (1994: 45). He holds that projects like PLAVERDE, 
TURBO and MINGA, provided parallel political organisations aimed ‘at 
manipulating indigenous organisations directly from the base’ and ‘designed to keep 
Chiquitanos away from representation in the official political system’ (1994: 45-47). 
Around the same time, diverse religious sets from Brazil and the Catholic Franciscan 
order stepped up efforts to establish links with the comunidades. Schwarz argues that 
the Franciscans tried to ‘instrumentalise the cabildos as interparroquial 
organisations’ and intended ‘to increase their power through the training of the 
young [Chiquitano people] in the Seminar of Cochabamba’ (Schwarz, 1994: 45).  
However, there is also evidence that the new legislation and government-
sponsored syndicates had some positive impact, resulting in the foundation of new 
comunidades by Chiquitanos that were ‘freed’ from empadronamiento. One of the 
comunidades that emerged in the area of Concepción was El Carmen. As a 
comunario remembered:  
With the revolution of 1952, here they just complied with the decrees that the 
President passed. In the year 1956 syndicates started to be formed. … after that they 
created the comunidad El Carmen in 1957. They made the territorial demand in 
1967. Ten years after the formation of the syndicates. They just started processing 
documents [and] in 1967 they did the transaction and they obtained the documents in 
1973.81 
A second comunario added that the first comunarios came from different locations 
and as far afield as San Miguel de Velasco and Salinas. He described that syndicate 
organisers managed to bring together 47 workers from different properties to form 
the comunidad.82 
In rare cases the emergence of comunidades was also aided by benevolent 
patrons, or the Church. For example, Candelaria comunidad, one of the largest 
comunidades in Concepción municipality, was created about 45 years ago by 
Chiquitanos who had moved from Candelaria Vieja, a cattle ranch. Comunario 
Udalrico Vargas Faldín described to me during an informal interview that the owner 
                                                 
81
 ‘…con la revolución del 1952, acá recién se hizo caso a los decretos que hacía el presidente. En 
aquel entonces en año 1956 empezaron a formarse los sindicatos. … después llegaron a formar la 
comunidad El Carmen el año 1957. Su demanda territorial la hicieron el año 1967. Hace diez años de 
la formación del sindicato, recién empezaron a tramitar sus documentos [y] el 1967 hicieron la 
tramitación y obtuvieron los documentos en el año 1973’. Workshop: El Carmen, 9 May 2007. 
82
 Workshop: El Carmen, 9 May 2007. 
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of the cattle ranch gave them a plot of land before his death, as he feared that 
otherwise the land would be sold and the comunarios expelled.83 Luciano Nogales 
Toro, the 64 year old founder of the comunidad San Isidro, adjacent to Concepción, 
recalled that the comunidad was founded by Chiquitano who previously lived on the 
same hacienda. In 1973, a priest offered to put up the initial payment for measuring 
the comunidad so that they could get their legal titles to the land.84 In a parallel 
development, when patrons occupied more favourable areas, spaces opened up for 
the formation of new comunidades in the most remote sectors of the ex-reductions. 
As a result, comunidades that already existed were demographically strengthened 
and new ones established (Schwarz, 1994: 43). On this phenomenon, Groten notes 
that a large part of the comunidades that exist today were founded between 1960 and 
1987 as a result of land reform (in Schwarz, 1994: 43). 
Conclusion 
Over the history of the Chiquitanía different agents have exerted governance over 
Chiquitano groups, starting with the first Spaniards who began a regime of making 
the ‘Indian workforce’ functional to the colonial economic enterprise through the 
encomienda system and the Jesuit priests. After the departure of the Jesuits (1767), 
important state agents became cattle ranchers and other large-scale agriculturalists, as 
well as members of the colonial administration. While cattle ranchers and large-scale 
hacendados maintained their position, republican local administrators took over from 
colonial bureaucrats after Independence. In some areas of the Chiquitanía, new levels 
of governmentality were introduced following the 1952 Revolution (mainly through 
the establishing of agrarian syndicates). In the 1960s and 1970s, further actors and 
new structures emerged that shaped the lives of Chiquitano groups. Firstly, some 
groups came to incorporate syndicate structures as promoted by state organisers, and 
secondly, non-governmental organisations and development organisations linked to 
the state bureaucracy (such as CORDECRUZ), began to provide projects for ranchos 
and comunidades. Riester criticises such projects for imposing the ‘material goods of 
Western civilisation’ on the Chiquitano, along with ‘new working procedures 
                                                 
83
 Interview: Candelaria, 10 May 2007. 
84
 Workshop: El Carmen, 9 May 2007. 
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without considering whether the projects are good or bad for the indigenous 
comunidad’ (1976: 175).85  
Since the arrival of the Spanish, the Chiquitano have experienced various 
processes, which provoked displacement from their land. The 1953 Agrarian Reform 
sparked the latest processes leading to land loss and depletion of natural resources. 
However, another MNR policy which aimed at spreading state-organised agrarian 
syndicates, combined with action from the side of benevolent patrons and the 
Church, also stimulated the formation of new comunidades. These developments 
meant that on the eve of the emergence of Chiquitano organisations in the early 
1980s, Chiquitano people faced a variety of different situations: differences existed 
between Chiquitanos living in comunidades and in former mission settlements in the 
same province, as well as between comunidades (Riester, 1976: 129). Economic 
exploitation, migration flows and land shortages provoked the disarticulation of 
kinship ties, put strains on the religious system, and led to a disarticulation of the 
productive relationships among some comunidades.86 However, elsewhere they 
continued with considerable vigour. Cabildos were abandoned in some areas and 
exchanged for other forms of organisation (such as rural unions), while they 
continued to manage religious affairs and communal work in other localities. In yet 
other areas, they had been ‘instrumentalised by the patrons’ (Schwarz, 1994: 45). 
Authors also point to language loss, noting that inter-generational rupturing and 
discrimination against the Chiquitano languages are the causes (Schwarz, 1994: 45).  
In Concepción municipality, communities close to agrarian properties (which 
required more workers), were under tighter control by the patron, while the ones 
adjacent to cattle ranches (with a smaller workforce) had generally more contact with 
outsiders. The patrons to the latter proved more forthcoming in demanding some of 
the rights promised by the 1952 Revolution, such as minimum pay, schooling for 
their children and freedom of movement. Chiquitanos who lived in the ex-mission 
settlements (or villages) faced another situation; they were at the bottom of the social 
                                                 
85
 As an example, he recounts the failure of the agricultural schools (escuelas agropecuarias) and 
comments that: ‘to teach them to work with modern machinery is absurd, when it is possible to work 
the land in the settlements with rudimentary tools; to organise cooperatives does not make sense if the 
dominant commercialisation system is not changed’ (1976: 177). 
86
 For a more detailed description of the levels of ‘destructuration’ and ‘restructuration’ of Chiquitano 
space, such as the effects of migration on the various communities in the different regions of the 
Chiquitanía, see (Schwarz, 1994: 177-243). 
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hierarchy, often tied into a ‘criado system’ and unequal trade relations (Riester, 
1976: 137).87 
While the twenty years after the agrarian reform were characterised by 
intense land loss, they also saw the spread of an awareness of basic rights among 
Chiquitano, mainly through the activities of NGOs and syndicate organisers. In the 
early 1980s, some Chiquitano decided to form a movement that would defend their 
interests. They would campaign against excessive labour tribute (prestación vial), 
demand an end landowner abuse, and land rights. They joined a wider organisational 
drive which was emerging at the same time in the Bolivian lowlands in the late 1970s 
and 1980s. As indicated by Lorenzo’s statement at the start of this chapter, it is the 
long engagement with state actors – between accommodation and resistance – that 
Chiquitano confront when they position themselves as indigenous citizens to demand 
rights and land. It is to a consideration of these political strategies that this thesis now 
turns.  
                                                 
87
 According to Riester, criados were a type of domestic labourer, or rather servant, who lived in the 
house of the patron: ‘[they worked] from sun to sun and as payment they can sleep in some dirty 
corner in the kitchen, pigsty or chicken run. When he/she gets to a marriageable age, the patrons 
prefer them to have children out of wedlock ... The family rears these children as they provide a cheap 
workforce ... It is also possible to lend or rent these people out (my translation, 1976: 143).  
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Chapter V 
Ethnic Politics and the Multiple Meanings of ‘Indigenous’ in Bolivia 
The previous chapter focused on the history of the Chiquitano people until the 1970s. 
This chapter analyses the emergence of the Chiquitano movement of Concepción. 
Chiquitano political organising has entailed the spread of new identity markers 
among Chiquitano comunarios. Through adopting the indigenous label, the 
movement has joined the ranks of ethnic movements that consciously position 
themselves in the wider global struggle for indigenous rights. It also enabled 
Chiquitano to gain access to the neo-liberal multicultural rights framework 
introduced in Bolivia during the 1990s. While some of the meanings that are attached 
to the label by national and international state actors are reflected in the way 
Chiquitano comunarios talk about what it means to be ‘Chiquitano’ and ‘comunario’, 
more rhizomic aspects (Rosengren, 2003) remain relevant. Further, this chapter 
shows that Chiquitano attach their own notions that what it means to ‘be indigenous’. 
The first part of this chapter situates the emergence of the Chiquitano 
movement in the wider context of the development of ethnic organisations in Bolivia. 
The Bolivian movements can roughly be categorised into three currents: firstly, 
‘indianism’ which arose during the 1960s and enshrined identity over class as the 
prime mode of organisational identity. Secondly, the movements that explicitly stress 
ethnic identity as key collective identifier but still see class as relevant (i.e. 
Katarism). Thirdly, indigenous movements that frame their political project more 
consciously in line with the domestic and international indigenous rights platform 
(Lucero, 2008: 81). Such movements emerged throughout Latin America during the 
1980s and 1990s. This chapter focuses on the second (katarism) and third currents 
(indigenous movements). Firstly, I address the rise of the Katarist movement in the 
highlands in the late 1960s, as its legacy shaped Bolivian politics and partly set the 
scene for the emergence of subsequent movements. This is followed by an 
assessment of the genesis of the Bolivian cocalero movement and the lowland 
indigenous movement which arose in the late 1980s and strategically positioned 
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themselves as ‘indigenous movements’.1 The last section addresses the birth of the 
Chiquitano central of Concepción municipality. 
Authors have pointed to several factors to explain why such movements 
appeared in the second half of the twentieth century throughout Latin America, and 
why ethnicity became a powerful collective identifier.2 These include the demise of 
the Left in Europe and Latin America, the importance of allies (often in the form of 
NGOs or the Catholic Church), threats to a peoples’ resource base – including land 
loss, human rights abuses, a new generation of educated leaders, demise of the 
hacienda system and a linked reactivation of kinship ties. Different combinations of 
these factors meant that indigenous groups became more aware of their common 
situation, which enabled them to look at themselves as a different ‘category’ within 
the broader society (Assies et al., 2000; Korovkin, 1997, 2000; Maybury-Lewis, 
2002; Postero and Zamosc, 2004b; Van Cott, 1994a; Warren and Jackson, 2002; 
Wearne, 1996; Yashar, 2005). Authors have also stressed the importance of forging 
alliances across national borders (Albó, 1996: 2; Brysk, 1994, 1996, 2000; e.g. 
Jackson, 1995; Jackson, 2001).3 
Here I draw on the terminology and conceptual tools of political scientist 
Deborah Yashar (2005), who employs three variables to account for the emergence 
of contemporary ethnic movements: motive, social networks and political 
associational space.4 She argues that the motive is generally linked to changes in 
citizenship regimes, which provide for, or threaten the autonomy of indigenous 
                                                 
1
 A movement which takes up a specifically indigenous agenda and modes of self-identification in the 
Bolivian highlands is the Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyo (CONAMAQ –
National Council of the Ayllus and Marcas of Qullasuyo). See Lucero’s (2006; 2008) contributions 
regarding the rise of the CONAMAQ. While the case bears much resemblance to the emergence of the 
indigenous movement in the lowlands, it is beyond of the scope of this thesis to discuss it in more 
depth.  
2
 In this respect, some authors point to out that ethnicity has ‘superseded’ class as a prime collective 
identifier (Ibarra, 1992: 17-36; Kearney, 1996a: 7, 1996b; Rivera Cusicanqui, 1987; Selverston-Scher, 
1993; Trujillo, 1994: 50), while others commentators suggest that ‘class’ still influences actors’ 
perceptions of their situation (e.g. Hertzler, 2005: 47; Selverston-Scher, 1994). I coincide with this 
latter view. After all, as authors such as Jean and John Comaroff and Eric Wolf have stressed, class 
and ethnicity are linked, in that both stem from a certain groups subordinate position in a countries’ 
political economy (and political and social hierarchies) (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1992: 54; Wolf, 
1982: 380-381), or in the words of the Comaroffs: ‘the asymmetrical incorporation of structurally 
dissimilar groupings into a single political economy’ (1992: 54). Also see Pape (2009) for an 
historical analysis of organisational strategies based on ethnicity and class in highland Bolivia. 
3
 For a more detailed analysis on the emergence of a ‘new’ ethnic discourse also in other Latin 
American countries, see Stavenhagen (2001). 
4
 To develop her comparative ramework, Yashar draws on resource mobilisation and social movement 
theory (and contentious politics) (e.g. Cohen, 1985b; McAdam et al., 2001; McCarthy and Zald, 1977; 
Tarrow, 1998; Taylor, 1989; Tilly, 1985). 
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communities (2005: 54-57). Earlier corporatist citizenship regimes unintentionally 
enabled indigenous communities to carve out spaces of local autonomy, with limited 
interference from the state in matters of local governance. Subsequent neo-liberal 
citizenship regimes, however, threatened the autonomy that had been secured and, 
consequently, politicised ethnic cleavages (2005: 54-57). This notion can be 
extended to include threats to community cohesion and resource base. Furthermore, 
‘political associational space’ refers to the existence of freedom of association and 
expression, which creates the opportunity to organise (2005: 29).5 But ‘only where 
trans-community networks were in place could and did indigenous communities 
possess the organisational capacity to forge broad indigenous movements’ (2005: 
72). Such networks can take any organisational forms, but can also relate to 
intercommunications networks. They must already be in place, or created by allies or 
dedicated leaders. 
The second part of this chapter addresses the way that the term ‘indigenous’ 
has found a broader use among Chiquitano leaders, who have employed ‘indigeneity’ 
as a political tool. As Kenrick and Lewis point out, ‘indigenous rights’ ‘describes a 
strategy for resisting dispossession that employs a language understood by those 
wielding power’ in the light of a situation where ‘they have no other way to obtain 
recognition for their collective rights to their land and economy within structures of 
authority that systematically discriminate against them’ (2004: 263).6 Nevertheless, 
while comunarios and leaders at times use the term in a way that resonates the 
national neo-liberal multicultural logic and essentialising notions (Conklin and 
Graham, 1995; Povinelli, 1998; Ramos, 1998), some Chiquitano do not readily 
accept the term for purposes of self-identification. This challenges the power of the 
state to increase its populations ‘legibility’ (Scott, 1998) (see Chapter II).  
The last section of this chapter addresses the fact that rather than calling 
themselves indigenous, Chiquitano continue to use other markers for self-
identification, most notably, comunario and Chiquitano. While in some respects the 
meanings of ‘being Chiquitano’ and ‘being comunario’ resonate with the way 
national and international law defines ‘indigenous people’, Chiquitano put more 
                                                 
5
 Yashar notes that this is not reducible to regime type; it is not equal to democracy: ‘The common 
denominator … is that the state does not trample on the capacity to associate and to speak out’ (2005: 
76). 
6
 Also Povinelli makes this point (1998: 580, 590). 
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emphasis on the behavioural principles that compose their community (they stress 
the ‘rhizomic’ over the ‘taproot’ notion (Rosengren, 2003)). Lastly, under the 
circumstances where white and mestizo locals are also claiming a Chiquitano 
heritage, some Chiquitano use the term ‘indigenous’ to stress their difference to 
whites and mestizos. This point highlights that in the contested local political arena 
of Concepción, incorporating or creating distance to others are powerful weapons.  
The Challenge of Contemporary Bolivian Ethnic Movements 
Organising in the Bolivian Highlands: The Katarist Movement 
The first Bolivian ethnic movement to emerge during the 1960s comprised the 
highland-based Katarists. It formed part of a broader trend in Latin America, where 
movements organised on ethnic lines to demand the recognition of ‘cultural 
difference’ and cultural practices, such as customary law, land rights and freedom 
from human rights abuses (Brysk, 1994: 33; Postero and Zamosc, 2004a: 15). Its 
organisational vigour revealed the failure of the state-centred 1952 MNR 
revolutionary project and the integrationist strategy of assimilating Indians into a 
homogenous national culture: ‘instead, social and cultural difference took on a 
variety of new meanings and expressions’ (Healy and Paulson, 2000: 7).7 
Additionally, its successes fostered the emergence of ethnic movements: Katarismo 
developed among young Aymara with secondary and university education from the 
provinces of La Paz (Albó, 1987: 391; Yashar, 2005: 168).8 
Their early ideology was inspired by the writings of Quechua-Aymara 
intellectual Fausto Reinaga. In line with a broader intellectual trend in the highlands 
and his personal disillusionment with Marxist politics, Reinaga moved to an 
‘indianist’ stance. Inspired by the writings of Franz Fanon, he criticised the 
assimilating tendencies of the indigenista corporate structures and reasoned that 
                                                 
7
 Authors have also stressed the importance of land reforms, or accompanying policies in the rise of 
ethnic movements in other countries. For example, for the emergence of ethnic movements in 
Ecuadorean highlands see Korovkin (1997; 2000; 2001) and Zamosc (1994).  
8
 Authors have also stressed the importance of the rise of a new generation of indigenous leaders and 
intellectuals - younger people with secondary or higher education and a good understanding of 
provincial and national politics – for the emergence of ‘ethnic’ movements elsewhere. See Korovkin 
(1997: 29; 2000: 18) and Yashar (2005: 5). For example, according to Selverston-Scher, such leaders 
proved important in the emergence of ethnic movements in the Ecuadorean highlands. She notes that 
they started spreading a form of ‘ethnic ideology’, most effectively through bilingual literacy 
campaigns and education (2001: 75-76). 
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‘revolutionary indianismo’ could overcome the ‘yoke of long-standing colonial 
oppression’: one day ‘the Indian Nation’ could win its state (Lucero, 2008: 81).9 
Primarily focused on the memory of the Tupaj Katari uprising in 1781, the group 
began to make clear reference to the ethnic basis of discrimination suffered by native 
peoples and stressed that their organisational strength lay in cultural and ethnic 
foundation, rather than primarily class terms (Behrendt, 2000: 6; McKee, 1999: 1; 
Rivera Cusicanqui, 1987; Ströbele-Gregor, 1996: 75-76; Van Cott, 1994b: 9).10 Even 
so, unlike the radical indianist currents, Katarist strands maintained an element of 
class analysis, conscious not to alienate communities organised as unions (Albó, 
1987: 409; Lucero, 2008: 82). 
Katarism spread especially through the Aymara Altiplano because MNR-
promoted unions penetrated to a lesser degree than in other areas. Pre-existing 
communal authority structures governed by ayllus persisted, and in many cases they 
simply changed their names to resemble the union organisations (Albó, 1987: 412; 
Ströbele-Gregor, 1996: 77-79; Yashar, 2005: 161).11 As these groups had maintained 
a more autonomous political and cultural identity, they were ‘more predisposed to 
organise around “Indian” demands – particularly once military reforms threatened to 
undermine the levels of local autonomy secured with the corporatist citizenship 
regime’ (Yashar, 2005: 167). In contrast to Indianist activists, Katarists managed to 
build on and ‘captured’ union networks in the countryside (Yashar, 2005: 167-169). 
They employed radio stations and various types of groupings and cultural centres to 
create networks. In this they were aided by NGO allies, most notably, the Centro de 
                                                 
9
 As Lucero explains, Reinaga tried to put his beliefs into practice through the establishment of the 
Partido Indio de Bolivinao (PIB – Bolivian Indian Party), which, however ‘never became a sort of 
vanguard party of the coming indigenous revolution’ (2008: 81) Still, indianist thought has influenced 
most of the subsequent Bolivian ethnic movements, including the contemporary rhetoric of Bolivian 
President Evo Morales and Felipe Quishpe, the radical leader of the of the Movimiento Indígena 
Pachakuti (MIP – Pachakuti Indigenous Movement. 
10
 In this respect, Silvia Rivera Cusicancqui (1987), has argued for the importance of historical 
memory to explain the emergence of ethnic movements in Bolivia. Also Alberto Melucci also argues 
that ethno-national movements must be seen in a historical context: ‘It contains ethnic identity, which 
is a weapon of revenge against centuries of discrimination and new forms of exploitation…’ (1989: 
90). This opens up the debate about how societies remember and what collective memories might 
entail and how they have come to be constructed (e.g. Hill, 1988b; Whitehead, 2003). 
11
 Authors remind that in areas like Cochabamba and Altiplano of La Paz, haciendas were historically 
most prevalent. Communal authority structures had been subsumed or replaced by the patron. Upon 
the demise of the hacienda system, these communities were most likely to adopt union structures and 
were therefore tied closer to the government apparatus. Where unionisation did not advance, ayllus 
consolidated their control over the land as distributed through the 1953 Land Reform, and they were 
often able to maintain and expand self-governance (Albó, 1987: 412; Ströbele-Gregor, 1996: 77-79; 
Yashar, 2005: 161-162). 
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Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado (CIPCA – Peasant Investigation and 
Promotion Centre) (Lucero, 2008: 83; Yashar, 2005).12 While the military restricted 
political associational space, these activities were tolerated as they operated in a 
‘seemingly non-political sphere of popular culture’ (Lucero, 2008: 83).  
The prime objective of the Katarists focused on exerting organisational 
independence from official Andean-based state-organised peasant organisations 
(Ströbele-Gregor, 1996: 75-76). This move came in reaction to the Military-Peasant 
Pact, which sought to maintain corporate relations with the peasantry after General 
Barrientos staged the coup of 1964 and ended the MNRs eighteen-year rule (Albó, 
1987: 394). Katarists increasingly questioned the Pact, especially after the 
government moved to introduce tax on land owned by peasant communities and 
individuals (see Albó, 1987: 394; Yashar, 2005: 163-167).13 Additional Katarist 
demands included greater self-determination, the recognition of communal lands, 
cultural pluralism, communal organisations, authority structures and autonomy for 
customary law. Materially, demands focused on access to services and resources for 
rural communities (Yashar, 2005: 179-180).  
Throughout most of the 1970s and under the repressive regime of Hugo 
Banzer Suares (1971-1978), Katarism operated clandestinely, while gathering 
organisational strength.14 Opposition against the government heightened in 1974 in 
response to the ‘Del Valle Massacre’ in Cochabamba ‘where governmental forces 
killed hundreds of Quechua peasants who protested recent economic reforms that put 
added financial demands on rural populations’ (Lucero, 2008: 84). By 1977, the 
government faced considerable opposition, and in line with other Latin American 
military regimes, felt increasing international pressures to democratise – a 
                                                 
12
 According to Yashar, CIPCA is a ‘church-affiliated research-advocacy group’ which ‘conducted 
research and promoted development among the Aymara’ (2005: 174).  
13
 Governmental policies were under USA advisory and shifting towards down-sizing the public 
sectors and lowering wages, while this affected the miners and caused growing unrest, peasant sectors 
remained initially faithful – until the government intended to introduce the mentioned land tax (Albó, 
1987: 394). 
14
 Testament to their vigour was that Katarists managed to capture the presidential post of the state-
organised Confederacion Nacional Campesina (CNTCB – National Peasant Confederation), and the 
publication of the Tiwanaku Manifest of 1973, in which Kataristas formulated their views. When the 
government called a National Peasant Congress 1971, Kataristas seized their chance to unite with 
individuals influenced by indianismo and Maoist sectors to push for the occupation of the presidential 
post of the CNTCB by a Katarist – which they achieved. First, Raimundo Tambo and later Jenaro 
Flores, were named president of the CNTCB. While this increased Katarist influence, corporatist 
structure had not been ruptured (Albó, 1987: 394). For more information on the Tiwanaku Manifest, 
see Yashar (2005: 175-176). 
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conjuncture the Katarists used to go public under the banner of ending the military-
peasant pact.  
They achieved this objective and after protracted negotiations with the main 
workers’ organisation, the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB – Bolivian Workers’ 
Confederation), merged to establish the Confederación Sindical Única de 
Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB - the Single Union Confederation of 
Bolivian Peasant Workers). The CSUTCB has subsequently coordinated indigenous 
interactions with the Bolivian state over the last several decades, primarily 
mobilising protests against government policies, seeking to improve the lives of 
indigenous highland peasants, as well as backing (or creating) different political 
parties – none of which managed to gain large support (Albó, 1987: 401-402, 2002: 
76; Behrendt, 2000: 6; McKee, 1999: 1; Ströbele-Gregor, 1996: 76; Yashar, 2005: 
24-25).15  
The organisational base of Katarism began to dwindle when the Paz 
Estenssoro government implemented the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1985 (see 
Chapter II). The closing of the COMIBOL mines, mass redundancies and growth of 
the urban informal sector ‘undermined the strength of leftist sectors in civil society, 
including the CSUTCB’ (Lucero, 2008: 87).16 According to Lucero:  
the political syncretism of Katarismo, in which leftist politics met anticolonial, 
Indian struggles, was doing poorly in the new period of market reforms and electoral 
politics. … In the CSUTCB, the Katarista leaders also found themselves out of 
favour with the other sectors of the confederation. Beginning in 1985, the rural union 
network ceased to mediate relations between ethnic elite and Indian masses. In 1989, 
new non-Katarista leaders took control of the CSUTCB (2008: 88).17 
                                                 
15
 For different protests and the economic conditions of the 1980s, see Albó (1987: 405-406) on the 
protest in 1983, and Nash (1992) regarding the peasant /miners protests of 1986. Katarista-backed 
political parties included the Frente Unido de Liberación Katarista (FULKA – United Katarista 
Liberation Front), the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaj Katari (MRTK), which gave a greater 
emphasis to class analysis and the Movimiento Indio Tupaj Katari (MITKA) stresses the ethnic 
(‘indio’) dimension (Albó, 1987: 401-402; McKee, 1999: 1; Ströbele-Gregor, 1996: 76). Lucero 
points out that this lack of is not surprising, ‘given the extremely patrimonial and weakly 
institutionalised nature of the party system. Parties have historically and primarily been clientelistic 
agents for the Bolivian political class’ (Lucero, 2008: 83). 
16
 As Yashar points out, the closure of the tin mines and COMIBOL ended in the dismissal of some 
22.000 – 23.000 out of 28.000-30.000 workers (2005: 182). 
17
 The Katarista crisis resembled the crisis of social movements in Latin America in the 1980s as a 
whole, see Hellman (1997). Further, many divisions existed within the Katarist movement, leading to 
regular splits, which caused its credibility among peasants to drop substantially (see Albó, 2002: 78; 
McKee, 1999: 2; Ströbele-Gregor, 1996: 73). 
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Katarism as an organisational force did not sustain political momentum, but political 
actors from all across the ideological spectrum demonstrated an increasing interest in 
indigenous matters. This became evident in 1993, when the MNR presidential 
candidate, Sánchez de Lozada, chose the Aymara Víctor Hugo Cárdenas as his vice-
presidential candidate (Albó, 1996: 4; McKee, 1999: 3; Yashar, 2005: 24-25).18  
Rising Organisational Tides in the Bolivian Valleys: the Coca Growers Movement 
Among these newer actors (and perhaps the most successful) is the cocalero (coca 
growers’) movement, which emerged in the 1980s. Migration to the subtropical 
valleys, most prominently the Chapare district of Cochabamba department, had 
grown following the closure of COMIBOL, as former miners searched for alternative 
means to secure their livelihoods (McKee, 1999: 3; see Yashar, 2005: 185).19 
However, the zone came under pressure from US-backed coca eradication policies 
from the mid-1980s onwards, a policy that trapped locals and highland migrants 
between a struggle for economic survival and being identified as the enemy in the 
war against drugs (see Albro, 2005: 437-438). Within this context, peasant coca-
producers mobilised from 1985. They built on existing local unions and their 
umbrella Federations (there are currently six) which had formed during the 1960s 
and 1970s (Albro, 2005: 438). Militancy was fuelled by the arrival of former miners, 
many of whom carried their radical union tradition and tactics into the movement 
(Albro, 2005: 438; Yashar, 2005: 185). 
In order to achieve their goal of legalising production and consumption of the 
coca leaf, cocaleros activists ‘self-consciously started to talk about ethnicity as a key 
component of their political struggle’ (Yashar, 2005: 187). They adopted some of the 
earlier Katarist rhetoric and articulated their case for the continuation of coca 
cultivation as an ‘indigenous’ issue, stressing that the leaf is sacred, important for 
cultural reproduction, ritual and daily consumption (Albó, 2002: 78; Albro, 2005: 
438; McKee, 1999: 3; Yashar, 2005: 185). This reflects a move to frame policy 
objectives that resonate with the Bolivian states’ multicultural language of 
                                                 
18
 According to Albó this was significant as it was under MNR tutelage that Indians had been turned 
into Campesinos and meant that ‘Bolivia’s oldest and most powerful party … finally appeared to 
realise the important role that the ethnic issue played at the national level and among potential voters’ 
(1996: 4). 
19
 Coca is produced for the domestic market, but since the 1970s illegal coca exports have been 
earning increasing amounts of foreign exchange as international demand continued to rise (McKee, 
1999: 3; see Yashar, 2005: 185). 
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indigenous rights, as well as attesting to the cocaleros linkages to the pan-American 
and global indigenous movement and its allies. Consequently, they have ‘articulated 
their goals with those of the hemisphere’s indigenous organisation, namely self-
determination, autonomy, recognition of cultural distinctiveness, political 
restructuring of the state, territorial rights, access to natural resources and greater 
control over their own local economic development’ (Albro, 2005: 439). Cocalero 
tactics proved successful and they have become one of the most radical and best 
organised sectors in Bolivia, gaining a prominent position in the CSUTCB (Albó, 
2002: 78; Albro, 2005: 438; McKee, 1999: 3; Yashar, 2005: 187). 
Although the cocalero discourse has stressed a deep distrust with regards to 
political parties, the organisation had developed its own ‘political tool’, through 
which it could partake in electoral politics and take advantage of openings provided 
by the 1994 Law of Popular Participation (see Chapter II). Evo Morales who has led 
the Chapare Federations since 1988 (re-affirmed for the fifth time in his post in 
2003), capitalised on this turn to electoral politics to establish the MAS party in 1999 
(Albro, 2005: 438). 
Drawing on these coca growers’ roots, Morales has stressed the indigenous 
basis of the MAS. Apparently having learned from the problems of Katarism with 
establishing a lasting political base, he articulates an inclusive political project, 
careful not to rely on either ethnic or class lines. He has adopted an ‘indigenous 
positioning’ (Canessa, 2007b: 207) – by framing ‘Bolivia’s national crisis of political 
legitimacy’ in general in terms of indigenous rights (Albro, 2005: 433). Canessa 
summarises:  
because they have been excluded from the processes of colonization and 
globalization, [indigenous peoples] are in the best position to develop critiques of 
neo-colonialism and globalization; and indigenous people, because they have been 
historically excluded from the nation state, are in the best place to understand other 
peoples’ exclusion, be they workers, women or other political minorities (2007b: 
207).  
Such an inclusive project allows for broad national and international coalition-
building. Morales has learned from the successes of the coca growers movement, 
which has long drawn strength from its participation in civil society networks, 
including links to church and human rights groups, domestic and foreign NGOs, 
labour unions, as well as sympathetic social scientists (Albro, 2005: 439).  
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While the indigeneity rhetoric resonates with the domestic multicultural neo-
liberal rights framework, it also positions the MAS project in the broader 
international indigenous rights arena; the inclusive version allows for the articulation 
of rural with urban concerns and the creation of a board domestic support base. The 
MAS discourse combines an inclusive indigeneity with an anti-globalisation and –
capitalism discourse, which attracts rural and urban mestizos and ‘Indians’ who 
believe that the neo-liberal state project impacted negatively on their livelihoods 
(Albro, 2005: 442-446; Canessa, 2006: 248, 250-252). The inclusive indigenous 
project also resonates with many in Bolivia who claim indigenous ancestry, as well 
of those who can not, but identify with the political project. This is also reflected in 
the increasing use of the term ‘indigenous’ for self-identification, not only among 
rural but also urban populations, including those who would have previously 
identified as mestizos and even embracing those of European descent (see Canessa, 
2007b: 208).20 
Indigenous Mobilising in the Bolivian Lowlands 
Another powerful actor emerged in the Eastern Bolivian Lowlands. Paralleling 
developments in other countries whose national territories cover part of the Amazon, 
the Bolivian government undertook efforts to ‘develop’ the ‘underdeveloped’ 
lowlands through stepping up colonisation efforts in the 1960s (see Chapter IV). It 
fostered large scale development programmes and encouraged expansion of cattle 
ranching, logging operations, mining and oil exploration (Yashar, 2005: 70).21 
Consequently, settlement and economic concessions often surrounded indigenous 
communities and curtailed their access to resources, such as water, animals and 
forest products (Yashar, 2005: 198). 
                                                 
20
 Mark Goodale (2006) refers to urban expression of indigenous identity, which are inspired partly by 
different domestic, as well as expressions of indigeneity form other areas of the globe, as ‘indigenous 
cosmopolitanism’. 
21
 For purpose of comparison, the Ecuadorean government initiated similar measure in the 1960s. 
Andean small farmers and rural workers, as well as large landowners (especially cattle ranchers) 
started clearing land and laid claim to it. This politicised the indigenous communities as it affected the 
ways they lived and lands they lived off. It led the emergence of the first indigenous organisation 
1964 in the form of the Shuar Federation, followed by that of the Quichua in Napo who organised 
1968 (Yashar, 2005: 113). Further challenges arose after the 1967 discovery of large oil reserves, 
which domestic and foreign agents stepped n to exploit it – complete with the detrimental effects to 
the environments that this entailed (Sawyer, 2004; Yashar, 2005: 114-116). Similar types of 
encroachment on Amazonia peoples living spaces have been the main motive for mobilisations also in 
Peru, Colombia and Brazil, if groups could draw on or create the necessary associational networks 
(Postero and Zamosc, 2004a: 16; Van Cott, 1994b: 16). 
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Against this backdrop, the Izoceño-Guaraníes were the first lowland organisation 
to organise in 1979. Bonifacio Barrientos Lyambae, the Capitán Grande of the 
Capitanía Izoceña, played a prominent role in this (ALAS et al., 2001: 3). Between 
1978 and 1982, Barrientos contacted different indigenous groups in the Chaco and 
Santa Cruz, including Guaraníes, Ayoreos, Guarayos and Chiquitano peoples; in 
their first official assembly (1982) they founded the lowland umbrella organisation, the 
Central Indígena de Pueblos y Comunidades del Oriente Boliviano (CIDOB - 
Central of Indigenous Peoples and Comunidades of Western Bolivia) (ALAS et al., 
2001: 3; Yashar, 2005: 199). CIDOB’s emergence predated (and influenced) the 
emergence of the Chiquitano organisations, along with other local indigenous 
entities, which arose in its image. 
Yashar insists that this late emergence of Bolivian lowland federations, in 
comparison to their counterparts in the Ecuadorean lowlands (the Shuar organised 
fifteen years earlier) and the Bolivian highlands, can be explained because the 
challenge to ‘autonomy’ came later than in the Andean highlands and took a different 
form: ‘while the state expanded in the three decades after World War II in the Andes, 
the Amazon remained relatively marginalised from contemporary politics, the 
market, and the state’s role in each’ (2005: 69). While the view of the state this 
implies is questionable (see Chapter II), we can agree with Yashar that the region 
was not favourable terrain for organising. Distances between communities can be 
large and there was often a lack of communication between them (2005: 195). 
Although in some regions trans-community networks existed (as in the Guaraní 
case), in other areas they emerged with the foundation of agrarian syndicates, or 
through the activities of allies. Like in other areas of Latin America, some networks 
were also (unwittingly) left in place through the (evangelising) activities of churches 
of various denominations (2005: 195).22 Yashar concludes that ‘what was missing 
                                                 
22
 As an example she states that the Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL) played such a role in the 
Bolivian lowlands ‘it assumed a parastatal role – particularly in the areas of literacy, bicultural 
education, leadership training, and radio communication. They helped to create new communities. … 
In some cases they even aided Indians in the efforts to gain titles to land … those who attended SIL 
schools and programme had better skills and resources – including literary, professional training, and 
knowledge of their rights, etc.’ (2005: 196). She adds that this pattern parallels the one found for the 
Ecuadorian Amazon (2005: 196). Churches also played a role in some Andean settings. During the 
1960s and 1970s, Post-Vatican II, the Catholic Church was often a catalyst in the process of 
indigenous peasant mobilisation in Bolivia and Ecuador and it replaced such as actors as leftists 
groups. For the case of Ecuador see Korovkin (1997). 
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until the 1970s and 1980s was the motive to organise as Indians and the 
organisational capacity to do so’ (2005: 179).  
This changed in the 1970s and 1980s, when ‘the option of fleeing the advance 
of outsiders became increasingly untenable as state reforms facilitated greater and 
faster penetration by these outside forces’ (Yashar, 2005: 195). In Santa Cruz and the 
Beni, large tracts of land were distributed to large estates, causing indigenous 
movements to emerge (Yashar, 2005: 195).  
Allies played a crucial role in facilitating the movement’s emergence and 
supporting its organisational trajectory.23 The founding story of CIDOB cannot be 
disentangled from the activities of the NGO Apoyo para el Campesino-Indígena del 
Oriente Boliviano (APCOB – Support for the Indigenous Peasant of the Bolivian 
East).24 APCOB worked directly with the Capitanía del Izozog and helped gain 
financial support, facilitating invitations to international indigenous meetings and 
invited foreign indigenous speakers (Yashar, 2005: 200-201).25 From the outset, 
CIDOB leaders and APCOB worked to gain support and stimulation from actors in 
the global indigenous rights arena. This was noticeable in the development of the 
CIDOB’s strategy for demanding territorial instead of land titles, which took 
inspiration from their cooperation with the Coordinadora de Organizaciones 
Indígenas de la Cuenca Amazónica (COICA – Coordinating Body for Indigenous 
Organisations of the Amazon Basin) (see Lucero, 2008: 92).26 Leaders adopted the 
‘indigenous label’ with the clear intention of ‘constructing a new identity, to support 
                                                 
23
 As noted in Chapter II, Salesian priests facilitated the emergence of the Ecuadorean Shuar 
Federation. In the Chimborazo region of the Ecuadorean highlands liberation theology-inspired 
Catholic Priest Monsieur Proaño and his literacy campaign via radio schools linked highland 
communities and led to the emergence of the Chimborazo indigenous movement (Weber, 2003; 
Yashar, 2005: 102-106). 
24
 According to Yashar ‘APCOB saw itself engaging in a kind of research activism dedicated 
specifically to cultural issues such as the right to customary law and indigenous rights to territory – 
particularly as a space in which indigenous people could reproduce their sociocultural practices. Over 
the years, APCOB has focused on projects that addresses territorial demands, socio-political 
organisation, gender, and culture’ (2005: 201). Also see Lucero (2008: 91-93) for more information 
on APCOB’s relation to the CIDOB.  
25
 For example, APCOB founded ‘a Programme of Interethnic Relations in 1982 that organised a 
bulletin, meetings, and trips to facilitate the process of interethnic contact’ (Yashar, 2005: 201). 
Indigenous leaders Urañabi, however, points out that while support from NGOs such as APCOB was 
important, equally crucial were the abilities of those indigenous leaders who administered the 
organisation, ‘a skill without which the organisation would have floundered’ (quoted in Yashar, 2005: 
202). Also on other Latin American countries, NGOs saw ethnicity and building on the already 
existing ‘traditional organisationl frameworks’ as a useful tool in promoting a grassroots based self- 
management (Korovkin, 1997: 29-30, 2001: 57; Zamosc, 1994: 48, 53). 
26
 As Lucero points out, this was indeed a strategy that ‘owed much to the experience of the Iroquis 
Nation in Northern America’ (2008: 92). Also see Healy (2001).  
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modern political and developmental activism and to rally dispersed ethnic minorities 
toward a common cause’ (Healy in Lucero, 2008: 92). 
The period of community organising coincided with military rule in Bolivia. To 
gain recognition and access to resources Barrientos was forced to negotiate with military 
leaders. These permitted the foundation of the CIDOB, while officially restricting its 
meetings. In practice, however, they did not enforce this rule. With the democratic 
opening, political associational space extended further and indigenous leaders began 
organising across the Amazon, often with CIDO assistance (Yashar, 2005: 200).27  
Over the years, CIDOB developed into a national umbrella organisation that 
now represents more than thirty indigenous peoples in the departments of Tarija, 
Cochabamba, Pando, Beni and Santa Cruz. Due to this growth, during its Eighth 
Congress in 1989, the CIDOB chose to call itself a ‘confederation’, the 
Confederación Indígena del Oriente, Chaco y Amazonía de Bolivia (CIDOB – 
Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of the Bolivian West, Chaco and Amazonia) 
(ALAS et al., 2001: 3; Yashar, 2005: 203).28 CIDOB’s role is that of a spokesperson 
for these organisations. Since the first Sánchez de Lozada administration (1993-
1997), CIDOB negotiated with the government and demanded respect for 
internationally recognised (but domestically unfulfilled) indigenous rights, including 
the recognition of indigenous territories, the right to self-government, recognition of 
customary law, legal pluralism and the right to cultural survival and development 
(Yashar, 2005: 203).29  
Among the CIDOB’s successes figure the historic 1990 ‘March for Territory 
and Dignity’ from the Amazon lowlands to the highland capital (650 kilometres), 
                                                 
27
 Particularly noteworthy was the Central de Pueblos Indígenas del Beni (CEPIB - Central of 
Indigenous Peoples of the Beni), who played a crucial role in the 1990 March for Territory and 
Dignity (2005: 202).The Izoceño-Guaraníes later formed the Asamblea del Pueblos Guaraní (APG – 
Assembly of Guarani People) and the Capitanía del Alto y Bajo Izozog (CABI – Captaincy of the Alto 
and Bajo Izozog), the Ayreos the Central Ayorea Nativa del Oriente Boliviano (CANOB – Central of 
Native Ayoreos of Eastern Bolvia), the Guarayus Central de Organizaciones de los Pueblos Nativos 
Guarayos (COPNAC – Coordinating Body for Guraryos Native People)), and Chiquitano who later 
formed the CICC and CICOL. These would all become active members of CIDOB (Yashar, 2005: 
200). 
28
 As the CIDOB moved to assume the role of the representative body for the lowland indigenous 
movement at national level, it left an empty space in terms of representing people from Santa Cruz. 
To fill the void, in 1992 a committee of organisations from Santa Cruz elaborated a proposal to 
create a departmental organisation. During a meeting in 1994, grassroots entities created the 
Coordinadora de los Pueblos Étnicos de Santa Cruz (CPESC – Coordinating Body for the Ethnic 
People of Santa Cruz), which they ratified a year later in a Gran Asamblea. The CPESC is member of 
the CIDOB (ALAS et al., 2001: 12). 
29
 For a debate on the Indigenous Law, see Chapter 8. 
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when the participating groups protested against the increased destruction of their 
living space and demanded territories. Attaining significant public support, they 
achieved the first official recognition of indigenous territories; shortly afterwards 
Bolivia became one the of the first Latin American countries to ratify ILO 
Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (Albó, 2002: 77; Ströbele-Gregor 
et al., 1994: 106). CIDOB political pressure and mobilisation later resulted in the 
inclusion of some of their demands (for example, the collective ownership of land), 
into the 1996 National Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA) Law. They have also 
proposed candidates for national and local elections (Balza Alarcón, 2001: 43; 
Yashar, 2005: 24-25). 
Cooperation between Highland and Lowland Movements 
While the agendas of the newer highland and lowland movement seemingly overlap, 
cooperation has not always been easy – with special tensions regularly ensuing 
between the CSUTCB and the CIDOB. In this regard, former president of the 
CIDOB, Nicolás Montero noted: ‘We have never had a sincere relationship with the 
CSUTCB … it has a particular situation that is different to ours, their systems of 
government are very different from our own and for that reason they have reached 
the point of becoming a political party’ (quoted in Lucero, 2008: 94). Lowland 
leaders stress that their movements organically grow out of the comunidades – less 
top-down (or ‘taproot’) than the union model they think highlanders use.30  
Additionally, there is a mutual distrust and political differences between the 
various groups (see Albó, 1996: 3; Lucero, 2008: 94-96; McKee, 1999: 3-5). 
CIDOB and CSUTCB leaders have held opposing attitudes toward the government. 
While the CIDOB demonstrated a willingness to collaborate with the Bolivian 
government and were more pragmatic, the CSUTCB has generally opposed the 
executive (see Albó, 1996: 5). They have also exhibited different ideas about 
political priorities – throughout the 1990s ‘territory’ was less of a concern to 
highland groups, who were more focused on political and economic autonomy 
(Canessa, 2007b: 209).  
                                                 
30
 Still, as the comments by Lorenzo Pasabare’s in the previous chapter indicate, in reality many 
lowland movements have also adopted a union organisational model. As Lorenzo’s statements 
indicate, this creates a dilemma for lowland groups who in line with their ‘indigenous’ agenda are 
balancing between stressing their ‘traditional’ organizational forms based more on a rhizomic model 
and their social movements based on a union organisational (or taproot) model (see Chapter II). 
 228 
There are also differences in the collective identifiers groups use and 
promote. Interestingly, during the 1990 March for Territory and Dignity, where 
marchers from high and lowlands participated, most highland group leaders 
‘passionately opposed being identified as indigenous on the grounds that this term 
was a colonial imposition, preferring to be known as “originarios”, originary people’ 
(Canessa, 2007b: 209).31 Olivia Harris notes in this respect:  
While in the early stages the Aymara movement appropriated the colonial term 
Indian for itself, rather as the black power movement had done in the USA, 
increasingly they have rejected not only this term but also the label indigenous, 
because of their racist connotations, Instead they have chosen the term pueblos 
originarios – first people – which places the emphasis on the legitimacy of their 
political claims rather that some racist essence (2000: 21). 
However, no sweeping statement can be made that highlanders self-identify as 
originario and lowlanders as ‘indigenous’. As Canessa points out, ‘since Evo 
Morales’ election, the use of “indígena” among highland populations has been 
spreading’ (2007b: 209). Conversely, lowlanders may self-identify as indígena, but 
also at times as originario – attesting to the constant circulation of ideas and 
denominators among the movements.32 While establishing a common coordinating 
body has failed in the past, at the time of fieldwork, highland and lowland indigenous 
organisations, union movements and the MST were all cooperating in the latest 
coordinating body, the Pacto de Unidad (Unity Pact).33 Although they managed to 
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 On the rise of the term see also, Xavier Albó (1996: 2). This also becomes clear when considering 
statements of Evo Morales featured in recent publications, where he also often employs the term 
rather than ‘indigenous’ (for example, see Albro, 2005, 2006). 
32
 Another area where this circulation of ideas is obvious, is in the meanings that highland and 
lowland attach to land and territory. Andean indigenous organisations have generally come to 
recognise that ‘territory’ signifies one’s own space in which to live, not simply a parcel of land to 
cultivate (see Albó, 1996: 2).  
33
 As part of the campaigns which marked the’500 Years of Resistance’, in 1992 the CSUTCB and 
CIDOB began to demand the establishment of an Asamblea de Nacionalidades - a form of governing 
institution for the indigenous communities. In March 1995 the CSUTCB, CIDOB and other 
indigenous representatives organised a conference in Santa Cruz entitled Instrumento Político - Tierra 
Territorio. The Instrumento Político - Asamblea por la Soberanía de los Pueblos (IP-ASP) was 
formed as the indigenous people’s latest representative body. It did not sustain political momentum 
(see McKee, 1999). 
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organise joint marches and assemblies, there was constant friction among the 
different members, which at times brought the alliance close to breaking point.34 
The Chiquitano Organisation of Concepción  
The situation prevailing in Ñuflo de Chavez department on the eve of the emergence 
of the movement in Concepción, largely fits Yashar’s description of Bolivian 
Amazon lowland areas. Nevertheless, her claim that associational space has 
generally existed, while organisational capacity and motive were lacking until the 
1970s and 1980s, can not unilaterally be assumed. The 1952 Revolution did not 
dismantle, but increased, cattle rancher and logger dominance over land, and while 
some comunidades obtained land titles, others stayed dependent for household 
reproduction on cattle ranches or other large-scale agricultural properties (see 
Riester, 1976: 129). Consequently, in the 1970s comunidades and ranchos found 
themselves in divergent circumstances: while some were relatively independent, 
others were tightly controlled by patrons. In the towns, some Chiquitano found 
themselves at the bottom of the socio-economic hierarchy. While Chiquitano ranchos 
and comunidades were to a certain degree tied to the local administrative structure 
via labour drafts and other impositions, a number comunidades enjoyed a level of 
autonomy in running their own affairs.  
Yashar’s notion of an absence of trans-community networks rings true in the 
Chiquitano case. As the CICC noted, in Concepción: ‘as every comunidad had their 
“ancestral” form of organisation, there was no communication between them and 
their daily problems were not known’ (n/d: 1). Interaction was further impeded by 
the ban on public meetings imposed by successive oppressive regimes and 
restrictions imposed by the patrons, stifling associational space. What existed was 
discontent and a ‘motive’ for organising. This is indicated by the ‘everyday’ 
resistance expressed since the Jesuit times in the form of foot-dragging, stealing, 
feigning or rejecting submission, undertaking prohibited traditional practices, 
                                                 
34
 Pacto de Unidad (Unity Pact) is another name for the Asamblea Nacional de Organizaciones 
Indígenas, Originarias, Campesinas y de Colonizadores de Bolivia (The National Assembly of 
Indigenous, Originario, Peasant, and Coloniser Organisations of Bolivia), an alliance of indigenous, 
originario, peasant and coloniser organisations. It emerged in 2002, after peasant, originario and 
indigenous organisations had demanded a Constituent Assembly by marching from Santa Cruz to La 
Paz. On 3-5 August 2006 the organisations declared their common goals for the Constituent Assembly 
in the ‘Manifiesto de la Asamblea Nacional de Organizaciones Indígenas, Originarias, Campesinas y 
de Colonizadores de Bolivia’, during a Magna Asamblea Nacional realised in Sucre.  
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contempt, suicide or flight; also certain dances during fiestas expressed discontent 
(Lacroix, 2006: 28-29; Riester, 1976: 36).35 Chiquitano also retreated to isolated 
localities, refused to supply local markets or work for the whites (Riester, 1976: 
36).36  
The initial idea to organise was conceived by comunarios who had attended 
union workshops in the highlands with the help of the Catholic Church. As Nicolás 
Aguilar Faldín (a CICC founding member) records: 
Recently they began to want to organise the cooperatives. They came here to these 
parts, father Julio Tumiri [a priest from La Paz], who said to me: “… there are some 
congresses. We are taking people there and there are scholarships for those who are 
interested in going”. So, in Concepción, they chose Umberto Baciar to study 
agronomy. And I went … to study to be president of a cooperative, an agricultural 
cooperative, yes.37 
He recalled travelling to Cochabamba when he was seventeen and staying 
there from 1971 until 1974. Apart from studying agronomy, Aguilar learned to speak 
quechua and about ‘politics’; which enabled him ‘to fight for the simple people like 
me’. Upon returning to his comunidad with fellow activists, he: 
formed a consumer cooperative … here we sold plantain, maize, yuca, good business 
… [Additionally,] in 1952 … I got to know the part[ies] that [were] fighting, the 
MNR and FALANGE … I became more politically aware. I was still young, no? [I 
learned] what are good politics and the bad ones … and I said: “It cannot go on, we 
have to get to something, leaders, we have to do something” … So I went to Conce 
                                                 
35
 Lacroix mentions the ‘dance of the abuelos’ (grandparents), which portrayed the non-converted 
ancestors and ‘constituted a reference to pre-Jesuit culture. They openly ridiculed the masked 
individuals that represented the Spanish’ (2006: 29). 
36
 That resistance is expressed in more subtle ways, including rituals, has been noted by authors such 
as Scott (1985), Dirks (1994) and, for the Ecuadorean case, Korovkin (2000). Comaroff posits that: 
‘when expressions of dissent are prevented from attaining the level of open discourse, a subtle but 
systematic breach of authoritative cultural codes might make a statement of protest which, by virtue of 
being rooted in a shared structural predicament and experience of dispossession … provides an 
appropriate medium through which the values and structures of a contradictory world may be 
addressed and manipulated’ (quoted in Dirks, 1994: 487). Rituals can thus provide an expression of, 
and a safety valve for, conflicts within a community without questioning the basic order of society 
itself (Dirks, 1994: 485). 
37
 ‘Recién se estaba comenzando a querer organizar las cooperativas, se vino por acá por estos 
rincones el padre Julio Tumiri y me dicen ellos, “ejte hay unos congresos, estamos llevando y hay 
becas pa’ el que tenga interés de ir”, Conce pone a Humberto Baciar pa’ ingeniero agrónomo, parte 
de Concepción. Y yo me fui… a estudiar ya para presidente de la cooperativa, cooperativa 
agropecuaria, ya’. Interview: Candelaria, 10 May 2007. 
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with… my cousin. [When] we got there [we said] “why do we not organise 
ourselves through football?38 
Opportunity to forge an intercommunity network arose in 1977, when the 
comunarios of Alta Mira (a comunidad close to Concepción) initiated work on a 
football field and, shortly after, arranged the first inter-communal football 
tournament in 1980. These seemingly inconsequential events provided the necessary 
political associational space and network in a political atmosphere characterised by 
deep-seated hacendado hostility and the ban on public meetings imposed by 
successive dictatorial governments (ALAS et al., 2001: 16; Lacroix, 2005: 49).39 
ALAS et al. also mention the enabling role of the Corporación de Desarrollo de 
Santa Cruz (CORDECRUZ – Santa Cruz Development Corporation), who in 1984 
arranged inter-communal work groups to implement agricultural work projects 
(2001: 16).40 
CICC founding member Udalrico Vargas Jaldín points to some of the main 
impulses for organising: 
Because in these times, they enslaved us through the labour tribute [imposed by the 
sub-prefecture]... They sent us to the Sub-prefect in those times, they gave us tasks, 
digging and sorting out the roads, with picks. … If you did not do [the tasks] in a 
week, you had to do them in a month until you finished the job, right? That’s how it 
was… when we organised ourselves, this was the first battle that occurred to put an 
end to it.41 
Such labour tribute also served to supply lands to private landowners. This grievance 
was compounded by the expectancy that they needed to ‘respect’ the patrons and it 
was a ‘crime and forbidden to disobey their orders’ (CICC, n/d: 1). As a comunario, 
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 ‘Exacto. De ahí ya fue. Formamos una cooperativa de consumo… acá se vendía plátano, maíz, 
yuca, buen negocio… Habían poderes políticos, estaba en el 52 y ahí conocí qué partido era el que 
luchaba, era MNR y FALANGE… Y fui conociendo a fondo la política… ya joven ya ¿no? Cual es la 
política buena y cual es la mala … y yo decía: “no pueda seguir, tenemos que llegar a algo, a algo 
tenemos que hacer, dirigentes”… Entonces nos fuimos a Conce con mi primo. Llegamos allá 
“¿porqué no nos organizamos en forma de fútbol?’. Interview: Candelaria, 10 May 2007. 
39
 As McAdam et al. note ‘under repressive regimes, authorised public ceremonies and holiday 
celebrations frequently provide occasions for making of claims, however fleeting, whose statement 
elsewhere would put the claimants at high risk to detection and punishment’ (2001: 10). 
40
 The Santa Cruz Development Corporation represents a technical arm of the Prefecture. This 
changed with the LAD-adm 1995 (see below), when tasks that CORDECRUZ had been responsible 
for passed to be directly undertaken by the Prefecture (Rivero et al., 2007). 
41
 ‘Porque en ese tiempo nos esclavizaban a nosotros en cuestión de prestación vial, limpiar los 
caminos. Nos mandaba el subprefecto en ese tiempo, nos daban tarea, cavar el camino arreglar, 
meterle palo, y era tarea pues si usted no lo hacía en una semana, tenia que hacerlo en un mes, hasta 
terminar la tarea, pues ¿no?, así era entonces cuando ya nos organizamos esa fue la primer lucha 
que hubo, a que se acabe eso, y algunos subprefectos así daban digamos el papel de la prestación vial 
para llevarnos a rozar potreros o tumbar chaco, así era antes’. Interview: Candelaria, 10 May 2007. 
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recorded by ALAS et al., noted, the Chiquitano organised ‘to defend ourselves 
against all the wrongs we suffer; to start to discover a better future for our families 
and comunidades, because the abuses … are many’ (2001: 16).  
The argument of Yashar (2005: 54-57) and other authors who emphasise a 
link between the emergence of ethnic movements and the 1980 economic recession 
in the sense that it led to a ‘drawing back of the state’, cannot directly be applied as a 
promoter of mobilisation in the Chiquitanía.42 Services supplied by the government 
did not reach the environs of Concepción and many rural inhabitants suffered 
continued exclusion from many basic rights (such as health, education and political 
representation) which, in turn, white and mestizo ranchers and town dwellers 
enjoyed. Among the complaints featured often illegal conscription, that lasted for 
two years (ALAS et al., 2001: 17; CICC, n/d: 1). Linked to this high degree of social 
oppression, figured the complaint of arbitrary and ‘illegal arrest of compañeros’ 
(ALAS et al., 2001: 17). Comunarios protested against the ‘occupation of the lands 
of comunidades by latifundios [large estates]’ (CICC, n/d: 1). Lastly, and reinforcing 
the findings of other authors regarding the increased vigour of social movements 
during ‘transitions to democracy’, the CICC mentions in its foundation document: 
‘knowing that our national state now was enjoying a democratic life, in [which] the 
opinions and rights of the citizens were respected, to get these rights respected it was 
necessary to unite [our] efforts … of all the comunidades through a representative 
organisation’ (n/d: 2).43  
The Central Campesina de Comunidades de Concepción (CICC – Federation 
of Peasant Communities of Concepción) was founded on 4 June 1985, during a well-
attended assembly of eight comunidades located close to Concepción.44 Like many 
other lowland organisations that emerged around the time, the organisational model 
                                                 
42
 Korovkin (1997), Guerrero (2001: 221-222) and Zamosc (1994) highlight the role the 1980 
economic recession and withdrawal of the state as one important factor in the rise of ethnic movement 
sin the Ecuadorean highlands. 
43
 As mentioned, transition to democracy in Latin America generally provided increased 
organisational freedom or, in Yashar’s words, political associational space. In Bolivia the 
consolidation of democracy in the 1980s opened up new opportunities for a greater spectrum of actors 
and perspectives (Albó, 1996: 2). Thus, the emergence of indigenous movements and the Chiquitano 
movement can be seen in the light of an ‘explosion’ of civil society and social mobilisation against 
military regimes in the 1970s, followed by demands for citizenship rights in the 1980s (see 
Foweraker, 1995; Foweraker and Landman, 1997; Waisman, 1999). 
44
 The CICC (n/d: 2) calls it ‘the first structural congress of our comunidades in the Ñuflo de Chavez 
province’. 
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chosen resembled that of a agrarian union (ALAS et al., 2001: 17).45 The Chiquitano 
organisation came to formulate similar demands to those emanating from other 
lowland ethnic movements around questions of education, health, financial autonomy 
and rights to organise, although land came to constitute their principal priority 
(Lacroix, 2005: 49). In this respect, the CICC notes: ‘Where comunidades existed, 
mestizos, criollos and caray [white people] invaded. They then proceeded to take 
legal steps through the agrarian reform and appeared as owners of our lands’ (n/d: 1). 
The problem became exacerbated by the fact that land was growing ever more scarce 
within Chiquitano comunidades due to natural population growth.  
Between 1985 and 1989, the CICC set out to assist comunidades to solve 
their land problems through obtaining legal titles (CICC, n/d: 2). CORDECRUZ and 
sympathetic development NGOs stepped in to provide credit for agricultural input, 
productive projects, training and technical expertise. As a comunario noted in a 
document elaborated by the CICC: ‘They gave incentives for training young 
technicians from the comunidades, in order to promote development and strengthen 
organisations among our Chiquitano indigenous comunidades in the Concepción 
zone’ (my translation, CICC, n/d: 2). From 1989 to 1993, the CICC built a more 
consolidated ‘platform’, working with six secretaries designated specific functions, 
such as land, gender, education and health. From 1994, the struggle to establish the 
TCO Monte Verde started to dominate the agenda, while in 1995 the CICC decided 
to participate in local politics, through contesting municipal elections in coordination 
with CICOL (CICC, n/d: 2). 
                                                 
45
 The directory elected on 4 June 1985 was composed of the following members: President: Patricio 
Hurtado Tamo Coiné (Alta Mira), Vice-president: Udalrrico Vargas (Candelaria), Recording 
Secretary: Miguel Supepi Gaveta (Santa Rita), Treasurer: Agustín Supepi Pinto (Guayaba), (Public) 
Relations Secretary: Carlos Bailaba Mangari (A1ta Mira), Agrarian Reform Secretary: Basilio 
Mamata (San Lucas), Health and Education Secretary: Crisanto Chávez Núñez (Guadalupe), Sports 
Secretary: Pedro Supepi Pinto (Santa Rita), Organisation Secretary: Nicolás Aguilar (Candelaria) 
(ALAS et al., 2001: 17). 
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Chiquitano Modes of Group and Self-Identification 
From Central Campesina to Central Indígena and from ‘Peasant’ to 
‘Indigenous’  
Indicatively, in that year the TCO became the CICC’s hot topic and the organisation 
changed its name from ‘peasant’ to ‘indigenous’: the Central Indígena de 
Comunidades de Concepción (CICC – Indigenous Organisation of Communities of 
Concepción). The CICC et al. (2007: n/p) explain that this was a reaction to the 
promulgation of multicultural laws in Bolivia, which also entailed the recognition of 
‘indigenous people’ as subjects with rights. Through identifying as ‘indigenous’ and 
getting their communal organisations legally registered (becoming ‘legible’ (Scott, 
1998) to the state), they could participate in the local political sphere (Chapter VII) 
and claim their own territory (Chapter VI). As CGTI-MV leader Carlos Leigue 
explained to me:  
Yes, it was parallel [to the territorial claim] that the workshops started … when they 
held the workshops in the comunidades they asked the people how they felt … if I 
call them ‘indigenous’. Well, how does this person feel to be indigenous, if by 
calling them indigenous it could be that they get offended, or it could be that he does 
not like it. And so… we have been raising awareness amongst the people and the 
people have accepted it, and in reality, the people did not have [a reason] for saying 
‘well I do not want to be’, because they originate from peoples who have always 
been at the forefront, right?46 
He described that CICC, CIP-SJ, and OICH leaders travelled to the claimant 
comunidades and held workshops to inform the comunarios of Concepción and San 
Javier of their plans to claim the territory and raise ‘indigenous’ awareness among 
them. In the case of the Chiquitano comunidades around Concepción, this was 
relatively problem free, because, as Leigue pointed out, many had failed to achieve a 
legal registration and land titles as peasant communities, generally due to lacking 
awareness of the appropriate administrative procedures:: 
… why have the comunidades not got their legal personality before? Because there 
was not legal accompaniment, there was no orientation that tells them ‘well, we are 
                                                 
46
 ‘Si fue paralelo, ya vinieron las capacitaciones… cuando se ha hecho así los talleres en las 
comunidades se le preguntaba a la gente cómo la gente se siente … que yo la diga indígena, digamos. 
Entonces, como se siente esta persona de ser Indígena, si es, si con decirle yo Indígena, este, puede 
ser que se ofenda, o puede ser que no le guste digamos, ¿no? Entonces en toda esa parte, digamos, se 
ha venido consientizando a la gente y la gente ha aceptado eso, y la verdad no tenía porque la gente 
decir ‘bueno yo no quiero ser’, porque han venido de un origen de un pueblo que siempre ha estado 
al frente’ Interview: Concepción, 26 October 2006. 
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going to get the legal personality for the comunidad as ‘campesina’ … but when the 
demand of the pueblo indígena of Monte Verde is made, then the people start 
thinking and start creating other perspectives, right?. And their vision is not like it 
was [and] they say ‘well, we do not want to be campesino, we want to be indígena, 
right? And this has stayed until now and the comunidades … perceive it; if one is 
called indígena there is no reason why one should get upset. That is ones origin after 
all.47 
Carlos Leigue was clear about the fact that the Chiquitano centrales in Ñuflo de 
Chávez province were aware that this process had to be homogenous, to avoid 
contradictions:  
I think it is important to define a position as pueblo Chiquitano and so we have to be 
strong in the decision because we do not want to contradict ourselves with the 
comunidades, well, ‘I am Peasant’, well, or ‘I am indigenous’. … But we in the 
Ñuflo de Chávez province, we have very much insisted [even if] some comunidades 
do not accept to be indigenous. [But we] have achieved it, because the people that 
have formed the comunidades have not come from another place….48 
Creating homogenous Chiquitano indigenous people was, of course, important in the 
light of Chiquitano claim for territory and rights. After all, Article 171 of the 
Bolivian Constitution clearly implies that only ‘indigenous peoples’ can be legal 
claimants of ‘original communal lands’ (see Chapter VII).49 Carlos Leigues’ 
statement also indicates, that some Chiquitanos do indeed not identify as 
‘indigenous’, a point discussed below.  
Nevertheless, it is above all Chiquitano leaders who use the term in a way 
that resonates with the national multicultural rights framework, i.e. to express that 
Chiquitano have special entitlements by law, have collective interests, or when they 
stress certain collective achievements. In this context, they also often refer to the 
general economic and political circumstances embracing ‘el pueblo Chiquitano’ (‘the 
                                                 
47
 ‘… ¿Porque, digamos, las comunidades han sacado su personería jurídica más antes?: porque no 
había un asesoramiento, no había una orientación que le diga ‘bueno nosotros sacamos la personería 
jurídica de la comunidad como campesina’, no entonces, pero si cuando ya se hace la demanda del 
pueblo indígena de Monte Verde, entonces ahí la gente ya va pensando y va este, va creando otras 
expectativas, ¿no?, y la visión de ellos ya no es como antes, entonces ellos ya han renunciado a decir 
‘bueno nosotros no queremos ser campesinos, queremos ser indígenas’, no?, y eso se ha quedado 
hasta ahora y que las comunidades hasta ahora las comunidades lo perciben eso y no hay porque 
molestarse cuando le dicen a uno indígena, no?, es su origen pues’.  Interview: Concepción, 26 
October 2006. 
48
 ‘… yo creo que es importante definir una posición como pueblo Chiquitano y entonces tenemos que 
ser, este, ser firmes en la decisión porqué no queremos, este, contradecirnos con las comunidades, 
bueno, “yo soy campesina”, este, o “yo soy indígena”, entonces no hay digamos una posición clara, 
pero nosotros como provincia de Ñuflo de Chávez, nosotros tanto hemos insistido, digamos, de que 
algunas comunidades no aceptaban ser indígenas, pero se ha logrado, por lo que la gente que han 
formado las comunidades no han venido de otro lado’ . Interview: Concepción, 26 October 2006. 
49
 Interview: Carlos Leigue (CGTI leader), Concepción, 26 October 2006. 
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Chiquitano people’). One indicative example of this is Carlos Leigue’s use of terms 
in the following statement: 
The other governments that have passed never have wanted to recognise the rights of 
the indigenous peoples. Despite that the Chiquitano pueblo has reacted strongly and 
has made [them] respect the rights. Thus we … have obtained our territory ... We 
have achieved various things more, which belong to us as indigenous, as Bolivians, 
right? Because they have always taken advantage and the indigenous peoples have 
stayed in marginality, in poverty, while others live happily.50 
Carlos Leigue links ‘being indigenous’ and ‘Bolivian’ to deserving entitlement to 
certain rights. His sense of Chiquitano groupness is partly informed by the feeling 
that they are ‘marginalised’; as ‘Bolivian’ and ‘indigenous’, something is ‘being 
owed’ to Chiquitanos, which they now are claiming. Like the other Chiquitano 
leaders, he is aware that ‘indigeneity’ provides ‘political arsenal’ to claim rights as 
indigenous citizens and gain the instant solidarity of other indigenous movements 
(see Hale, 2009: 323).51 The statement also implies that he perceives a sense of 
solidarity between all those (indigenous) peopleswho fought for land and struggled 
for rights: ‘indigeneity’ provides a banner behind which Chiquitano activists and 
other ethnic movements in Bolivia may unite to claim rights that they feel that they 
have been denied in their different localities.52  
The Difficulty of ‘Creating’ Indigenous People 
Nevertheless, the Chiquitano case also shows that getting people to adopt a particular 
identifier is not easy and that it is even harder to get people to associate terms with 
similar meanings.53 The term ‘indigenous’ (as well as ‘peasant’) is associated with 
diverse meanings in different areas of Bolivia. As Canessa’s case study of Pocobaya, 
                                                 
50
 ‘… los otros gobiernos que han pasado nunca han querido reconocer el derecho de los pueblos 
indígenas. A pesar de eso, el pueblo Chiquitano se ha movido fuerte y ha hecho respetar los derechos. 
Entonces hemos … conseguido nuestro territorio. … Hemos conseguido varias cosas más que nos 
pertenecen como indígenas, como bolivianos, ¿no? Porque siempre se han aprovechado y los pueblos 
indígenas han quedado marginados en la pobreza, mientras otros viven felices’. Interview: 
Concepción, 26 October 2006. 
51
 Jürgen Riester makes this point for the different Bolivian lowland groups who adopted the label 
(1976: 36). 
52
 This resonates with Cohen’s point that although a ‘movement’s programme may appear quite 
specific; … its component items are, like symbols themselves, amenable to idiosyncratic 
interpretation by the members in the light of their own circumstances and experiences … It fills a 
vacuum; without it, these feelings would only be expressed in a highly fractionalised and ineffective 
way, they should probably not be heard at all’ (1985a: 108). 
53
 The point that much work has to go into the creation and maintenance of collective identities has 
amply been made by analysts of social movement (see, for example, McAdam et al., 1996; McAdam 
et al., 2001: 6; Offe, 1985; Tarrow, 1988: 422; Tilly, 2004). 
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an Aymara-speaking highland community demonstrates, while Pocobayeños 
identified as ‘indigenous’ in the 2001 census, the term is not employed for self-
identification. Instead, Pocobayeños generally refer to themselves as ‘jaqui’ (people), 
a ‘complex and ritually enforced identity which develops over time and can be lost 
with migration to the city’ (2006: 258). Indeed, Pocobayeños reserve the Spanish 
term ‘indígena’ for lowland Indians, who they deem less ‘civilised’ than themselves 
(2006: 257-258). 
To complicate matters, in the Bolivian lowlands, not all of those who might 
be expected to identify as indígenas do so, including some Chiquitano. In my long 
interview with Carlos Leigue, throughout which we sat on the backsteps of the 
CGTI-MV office in Concepción and looked at the chickens patrolling the backyard, I 
addressed this topic. I had travelled to a meeting of the German Development 
Agencies’ Chiquitanía group in San Ignacio de Velasco – a town in the Chiquitanía, 
which lies to the east of Concepción and can be reached via a dirt track road (around 
seven hours by pick-up). As part of the daily programme, we visited the small 
Chiquitano community of Guapamó located about half an hour from the town. When 
I talked to some of the comunarios, it became clear that comunarios in Guapamó did 
not identify as indígena but identified as campesino instead. One comunario told me 
that he did not really know why, adding that ‘indigenous’ carried a negative stigma.54 
Carlos Leigue offered the following explanation: 
… well, you have visited other comunidades, and to tell you the zone of Velasco, [it] 
is the same Chiquitano people, no? But what happens is that in San Ignacio there are 
now many people from other places, lets say … they come from the altiplano, well, 
or they come from the border with Brazil, therefore it is nearly not that strict 
anymore that the same Chiquitano people, or the person feels originaria. There are 
various factors that have to be analysed [as to why] sometimes people do not want to 
be indigenous any more and want to be Campesino.55 
Leigue associates increasing in-migration with some loss of whatever attributes he 
associated with ‘being indigenous’ or ‘originario’. Alternative explanations might be 
that, firstly, these communities had received legal titles as peasant communities 
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 Field notes: Concepción, 26 October 2006. 
55
 ‘… usted ha visitado otras comunidades, y por decirle la zona de Velasco, es el mismo pueblo 
Chiquitano, ¿no? Pero lo que pasa que en San Ignacio ya hay mucha gente de otros lados, digamos, o 
si bien vienen del Altiplano, este, si bien vienen de la frontera del Brasil, entonces ya ellos, ya casi 
que no es tan bien regid que el pueblo mismo Chiquitano o la persona sentirse originaria de ahí ya 
no, entonces, hay varios factores que hay que analizarlos porque a veces la gente ya no quiere ser 
indígena, y porque quiere ser campesino’. Interview: Concepción, 26 October 2006. 
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through the 1953 Agrarian Reform and they therefore did not need to adopt an 
‘indigenous’ identity. Secondly, it may be that no consciousness-raising workshops 
took place in the comunidades of Velasco province. While in Ñuflo de Chávez 
‘educated’ comunarios could thereafter be ‘proud to be indigenous’, in Velasco 
comunidades may have lacked the necessary leaders, pre-existing networks, 
interested NGO or Church allies, and resources, necessary to spread any collective 
identifier or, indeed, any kind of movement (cf. Yashar, 2005).56 As social 
movement scholars and those working on communities in general have recognised, 
without such a mechanism, no new mode of collective identification can spread (cf. 
Anderson, 1991; Latour, 2007; Melucci, 1985; Tilly, 1984).57 
‘We are not indigenous…’: Thinking About Antagonisms 
There was also another group of people who questioned the ‘indigenous’ label for 
self-identification. One evening in early June 2007 in the Palimira comunidad 
(Lomerío), some Chiquitano colleagues that worked for CEJIS, Don Adriano (a 
comunario from Palmira) and I took some time out to relax in Don Adriano’s patio 
after we had conducted some workshop sessions and interviews. After a while, we 
started talking about the way that we all self-identified.58 First of all, the group 
agreed that they would tell somebody from another country that they were Bolivian, 
because these people would ‘not know about Chiquitanos’. Don Adriano, Lorenzo, 
David, Jesús and Pedro further agreed that they would call themselves ‘Chiquitano’ 
in reference to other ‘naciones’ (‘nations’), such as the ‘nación Aymara’ (Aymara 
Nation), or ‘nación Guarani’ (Guaraní Nation). This demonstrates the relational and 
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 A similar case is made by Shannan Mattiace (2009) for the case of the Maya of the Yucatán, 
Mexico. Drwing on Yashar’s framework she argues that what impeded the rise of an identity-based 
movement in this case was firstly, that Maya peasants had little relative autonomy under the 
corporatist regime (1940s–1980s), and secondly, that networks which might have been relied on the 
union networks and Catholic Progressive sectors (and ‘ally’) did not serve ‘as vehicles for leadership 
training and organization’ (2009: 137). 
57
 This latter point is demonstrated by the fact that according to Carlos Leigue also another group of 
people that did not self-identify as indígena or in his words ‘that do not believe themselves people that 
want to carry the indígena origin’ (porque la persona se cree ya no una persona que no quiere llevar 
digamos el origen indígen’). This group of people are Young people that had gone to the city to work, 
spent a long time there and upon return to the comunidades or the ex-mission towns did not call 
themselves ‘indígena’ anymore. Carlos Leigue did not offer any explanations as to why this change in 
self-identification happens and whether dropping of indígena as self-identification also implies that 
they do not identify as Chiquitano either. Interview: Concepción, 26 October 2006. 
58
 Field notes: Palmira, 6 June 2007. 
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contrastive way in which modes of self-identification are employed in general (see, 
for example, Cohen, 1985a: 115). 
When it came to the term ‘indígena’, the men agreed that ‘indígena’ was 
something that people called the centrales, but that people were not indígena, people 
were Chiquitano, Camba, or Bolivian. They pointed out that the term ‘indígena’ 
features in the names of the centrales, i.e. the Central Indígena Chiquitana de 
Concepción (Indigenous Organisation of Comunidades Concepción), or the Central 
Indígena de Paikonekas de San Javier (Indigenous Organisation of Paikonecas of 
San Javier). On this point, Don Adriano explained:  
They call us indigenous and things like that, but this is also a historical 
misunderstanding. Columbus found this continent on his way to India and this is 
why they call us “indios”, and, well, now “indigenous”. But we do not call ourselves 
“indigenous”. Our organisation is called like that, but I am Cruceño, or also camba.59 
With ‘they’, Don Adriano referred to certain NGOs that the central and the 
comunidades had cooperated with (for example, they mentioned APCOB) and 
anthropologists working for them. Don Lorenzo added that anthropologists were 
generally concerned with trying to categorise Chiquitanos and thought about whether 
to call them names like ‘tribu’ (tribe), ‘aborígenes’ (‘aboriginals’), ‘indios’ or 
‘originarios’. They laughed about this and stated that they found these names 
ridiculous and that they were derogatory. Don Adriano explained that in the past they 
were given names such as ‘Paikos de mierda’ (‘Paikos full of shit’, ‘Paiko’ is short 
for ‘Paikoneka’) and ‘mozos’ (‘slaves’), apart from ‘tribes’ and ‘indio’. He added 
that all these names had been devised to subordinate them to the ‘whites’, to make 
them inferior and ‘classify them, like animals’. Lastly, Don Adriano pointed out that 
this did not exclude international law, which talked about ‘the habitat of indigenous 
people’. He said ‘habitat’ was a word used for ‘animales del monte’ (‘wild animals’) 
and the whites saw them like this. 
These statements demonstrate several things. Firstly, it resonates with the 
point made in Chapter II that while the state has the potential to impose modes of 
identification, the labels states produce may be contested. Populations may attach 
multiple meanings to such terms, and engage it for different purposes at different 
                                                 
59
 ‘Nos llaman indígenas y cosas así, pero eso también es una equivocación de la historia. Colombus 
encontró este continente en camino a la India y por eso no llamaba Indios, y bueno, ahora indígenas. 
Pero nosotros no nos llamamos indígenas. Nuestra organización, si se llama así, pero yo soy pues 
Cruceño, o Camba también’. Field notes: Palmira, 6 June 2007. 
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times (see Brubaker and Cooper, 2000: 16; Hale, 2009: 323). Accordingly, 
Chiquitano leaders tend to use the term ‘indígena’ when making political claims, to 
establish an additional barrier to others, while it is deemed unacceptable for the 
purpose of self-identification by some Chiquitano. Additionally, this indicates that 
Chiquitano comunarios and CEJIS team members are well aware of the paradox and 
antagonism that the adoption of the label entails. While it can be employed to gain 
certain rights, this also means adopting a state-sanctioned reductionist and – in the 
eyes of some Chiquitano – racist, label. Adopting the label makes Chiquitano subject 
to rights, but also ‘white’ ideas and concepts. They interpret it as an attempt to 
categorise and subordinate them, to exert the power to impose a label, a function that 
other labels (such as ‘indio’) have had in the past. Consequently, while the use of the 
term ‘indigenous’ does not preclude pragmatism and agency from the side of those 
who employ the term, it might still be ‘unacceptable’ to some. 
Photo 26: Don Adriano’s Family, Palmira 
 
CEJIS team members with Don Adriano (centre) and his family, Palmira comunidad, 
Lomerío 
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Being a Comunario 
Chiquitano are far more likely to self-identify as comunario or as Chiquitano than 
indígena. The meanings Chiquitano attach to these terms show evidence, of both, 
Dan Rosengren’s ‘taproot model’, with emphasis on an organic link ‘between people, 
place, and language’ (2003: 222), as well as the ‘rhizomic model’, ‘a nonbounded 
and expansive relational identification process …. that stresses similarities and links’ 
(2003: 223). Different comunarios stress different meanings over others, which leads 
to a somewhat confusing picture – reflecting the negotiated and complex nature of 
the self-identification. These contradictions are rarely felt, unless politicians or 
researchers attempt to pinpoint the ‘essence’ of the fluid construction, because 
political projects and rights depend on them, while researchers try to make them 
‘legible’. I address the terms ‘Chiquitano’ and ‘comunario’ separately, as Chiquitano 
attach differing meanings to them. To complicate matters, Chiquitano can either be 
‘de comunidad’ (from a comunidad) or ‘del pueblo’ (from the village). Nearly all 
comunarios living in Concepción municipality are Chiquitano and Chiquitano make 
up 30.4 per cent of the population of the town of Concepción (Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística, 2001).  
Most comunarios, however, live in Chiquitano comunidades. To present a 
general picture of comunidades (as a physical place) in Concepción, San Javier and 
the TCO Monte Verde at the time of field-work, the following presents an ‘ideal 
type’ description. In terms of their location, as already indicated, they are located at 
varying distances former mission settlements; comunidades inside the TCO are 
situated in clearings in the tropical rainforest. Comunidades are generally located 
close to rivers, lagoons or atajados (artificial lakes), or both, to secure the 
comunidad’s water supply, but also to allow comunarios to go fishing. Nevertheless, 
fishing has lost some importance, especially as comunidades are often ‘encircled’ by 
private cattle farms or logging concession and access to lagoons or rivers may 
require permission from the private owner (also compare Jürgen Riester’s (1976:133) 
description of comunidades in the 1970s).  
The comunidades in and outside the TCO Monte Verde and generally 
encompass rectangular houses with thatched paja (palm leave) roofs, with wooden 
slatts as walls build (e.g. see photo 27 below, and photos 8 and 9, Chapter III). Some 
dwellings are plastered with clay and a few are painted white. The bigger 
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comunidades have some more built-up houses, with stone or white-washed adobe 
walls. The frontage of the houses faces a rectangular cleared cancha (multipurpose 
field) in the middle of the comunidad, which also serves as a football pitch (see map 
3). Characteristically, comunidades have one or several school buildings and a chapel 
made out of adobe bricks and painted white, the roof being tiled or made of metal 
and with tiled or concrete flooring (see photo 28). In comunidades in Lomerío 
chapels are often larger and build out of grey stone, with a tiled roof. Chapel, school 
building and and a cancha are elements that comunarios often stress as key elements 
of the physical appearance of their comunidad (see photo 29). 
Map 3: Drawn Map of Palestina, TCO Monte Verde 
 
Author: Samuel Massay, Palestina. 
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Photo 27: Houses in Candelaria 
 
Candelaria is one of the larger comunidades in Concepción Municipality. 
Photo 28: School Building in Candelaria 
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Photo 29: Church in Palmira, Lomerío 
 
Stone-built Church in Palmira, a comunidad in San Antonio de Lomerío Municipality.  
In terms of infrastructure, the larger and more established comunidades have water 
pumps, while smaller, newer ones have waterholes. There is generally no electricity, 
but some comunidades possess a battery or a generator for the school building or 
meeting hall, and some households own a battery-powered radio. Each comunidad 
has a radio system (which does not always work). Another essential part of the 
comunidades are the chacos (fields), where comunarios plant their crops, chiefly 
rice, maize, yucca, plantains and papaya. Lastly, most comunidades possess ‘tierra 
de la comunidad’ or ‘tierra comunal’, i.e. a certain amount of collectively owned 
land. Comunidades located outside the TCOs are normally surrounded by lesser 
amounts of tierra communal than those inside the TCOs. Older comunidades within 
the TCOs usually have more ‘tierra communal’ than the newer ones.  
Returning to the term ‘comunario’, firstly, comunarios themselves hold 
differing notions about the relevance of place of birth and residence in defining a 
‘comunario’. While some stressed the ‘taproot’ idea of having been born in a 
comunidad, those that were either born in the ex-mission settlements of Concepción 
or San Javier where the hospitals were, or on private estates or ranchos, proved more 
likely to stress residency in a comunidad as crucial. Others, like Chiquitano leaders 
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and municipal officials, lived most of the time in Concepción. This meant that they 
stressed different reasons for identifying as comunario. A common theme was 
‘relational connectedness’. For example, Don Basilio, a comunario from Las 
Mercedes de Guayaba, noted: 
For me a comunidad means where various families are living, and based of this 
family, the comunidad constructs itself. It is founded with various people, above all 
with various families. Some two or three families I think [this] is not comunidad. It 
has to be with some ten families and if there are more, even better … it is where we 
are together, or united.60  
While Don Basilio provides a guideline for the size of comunidades, the actual 
number of households or families in a comunidad can vary greatly. There are 
comunidades of five families or less.61  
Not all comunarios saw relational connectedness as imperative, but instead 
stressed the importance of being ‘recognised’ as comunario. The comunarios from 
Turux Napez accepted a man in their comunidad who had immigrated to the area 
from the highlands.62 A comunario from Las Abras stated: ‘when other people come 
to the comunidad, then one notifies the authority, then [he or she] calls us to a 
meeting, so that we decide whether [he or she] stays or whether we throw them 
out’.63 Other comunarios added that it involved the promise to live by the rules of the 
comunidad, which are closely linked to the way that Chiquitanos sanction certain 
uses of communal land and resources. This ‘rhizomic notion’ model’ can indeed 
overrule the above-mentioned ‘taproot’ indicators. 
                                                 
60
 ‘Para mi una significa donde varias familias entonces vivimos ahí y a base de esa familia entonces 
la comunidad se construye. Se levanta con varias personas, más que todo con varias familias, Unas 
dos o tres familias yo creo que no es comunidad, tiene que ser con unas 10 y si hay más mucho mejor 
… es donde estamos juntos o sea unido’. Workshop: Guayaba, 12 May 2007. 
61
 Chiquitano normally refer to ‘family’ as comprising one ‘household’ within the comunidad. A 
family in this sense will usually be composed of a husband and wife (although not necessarily 
formally married) and their children. When asked to list their family or household members, 
comunidades of Palestina, Makanaté and Monte Verde in the TCO Monte Verde listed all their 
children, including the ones that lived in a different household or elsewhere duets work or study. Field 
notes: Palestina, 16 February 2007. It is normal for a family to have ten or twelve children, ‘twelve 
children for the twelve apostles’ as some comunarios told me, although the younger families will have 
less. In some comunidades there are households with single individuals, who are generally related to 
other people in the comunidad. One family occupies one house within the comunidad. The 
comunarios usually build a new house for those family members who have found a partner and plant 
their own chaco (field). Some of the single older comunarios might have a house to themselves. 
62
 It is unknown whether he self-identified as a comunario. 
63
 ‘Cuando viene otra gente a la comunidad, entonces uno les avisa a la autoridad, entonces el nos 
llama a una reunión, para que decidamos si se queda o lo sacamos’. Workshop: Las Abras, 17 April 
2007. 
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Comunarios stressed that the comunidad itself was a place where one lived 
and carried out everyday activities to maintain the household. As Don Esteban from 
Santa Ana noted, the comunidad is ‘where one has things to do, where ones chaco 
[field] is’.64 This idea was especially expressed by women. For example, Doña 
Dominga from the comunidad Santa Ana recorded:  
[In a comunidad] one works with all the people … and, well, one goes home to make 
the lunch for one’s husband and makes food for them, rests and goes back to work 
and goes to help him for a little while and if one has another thing to do, one does it 
… with the children who are in college, one has to get up early to make them 
breakfast, so that they eat it and then send them to college.65 
Importance was also given to ‘working together’. As William Roca, a Chiquitano 
CIP-SJ technician opined, a comunidad is ‘where [they] form a group of people that 
want to work together and in an organised manner’.66 This reflects the fact that 
comunarios carried out tasks together, such as mowing the field in the middle of the 
comunidad, looking after schools and chapels, repairing rain-damaged paths, bridges 
or dams. Comunarios aided each other in some of their agricltural chores, such as 
harvesting. This type of communal work is also referred to as minga. Don Juan, from 
Makanaté, held that comunarios participated ‘out of solidarity’ and ‘out of custom’.67  
This type of reciprocal labour (the Andean Aymara version of which is called 
ayni) is stressed by national leaders like Evo Morales and Felipe Quishpe as 
something especially ‘indigenous’ – and something that stands in contrast to western 
capitalist values (Canessa, 2006: 258).68 As Quishpe remarked: ‘there is no money 
involved in ayni: we do not count (value) money; you cannot buy the physical 
strength of another person. Anyone who goes to perform ayni does it with all his 
heart’ (quoted in Canessa, 2006: 258). Canessa makes the point that while 
Pocobayeños will sometimes ‘mention ayni as something that distinguishes them 
from mestizos but it is given far less prominence than the rhetoric from indigenous 
                                                 
64
 ‘Donde uno tiene su ver que hacer, su chaco’. Workshop: Santa Ana, 20 April 2007. 
65
 ‘… uno trabaja con toda la gente también, todo eso, y ósea uno se va a su casa a hacer el almuerzo 
pa’ su marido y le da de comer, descansa y se va vuelta a su trabajo y ya uno va un ratito a ayudarle 
y si uno tiene otra cosa que hacer, uno lo hace, … con los niños que están en el colegio, uno tiene que 
levantarse temprano a hacerles el desayuno pa´ que tomen y de ahí a mandarlos a su colegio’. 
Workshop: Santa Ana, 20 April 2007. See also, Workshop: Doña Maria Makanaté, 10 May 2007. 
66
 ‘Donde forman un grupo de personas que quieren trabajar en forma conjunta y de manera 
organizadas’. Interview: San Javier, 12 December 2006. 
67
 Workshop: Makanaté, 15 May 2007. 
68
  Of course, this is a stark simplification. However, a deeper engagement with the notion of ayni is 
beyond the scope of this discussion. See Gose (1994).  
 247 
leaders might suggest’ (Canessa, 2006: 259). In contrast, in Concepción 
municipality, where comunarios often confront the effects of commercial 
exploitation of land, the notion of reciprocal work versus labour for cash has a 
stronger meaning. 
Linked to this is also the commonly held notion that what differentiates 
comunarios from others was communal landownership.69 As Patricio Hurtado 
(former leader of the CICC) stressed, this land ‘cannot be sold’.70 As will be 
discussed below, Chiquitano comunarios also have other rules regarding land use.  
Comunarios are not only united through communal landownership and 
communal work practices, but also through a general concern for the comunidad. For 
example, Fermín from San Pablo Sur noted:  
To be a comunario is to be united through all the problems that exist in the 
comunidad, so that we can advance in our comunidad, so that it gets bigger and [to] 
have some legacies that remain for our children … we are already on our way 
down.71  
According to former CICC leader Daniel Leigue, living in a comunidad meant that 
comunarios had ‘the right to everything and to be free’.72 This reflects the fact that 
many comunidades emerged when the Chiquitanos moved away from cattle ranches 
and large agricultural properties to settle in comunidades after the empadronameinto 
(debt peonage) system was largely dismantled in the 1960s and 1970s (see Chapter 
IV). Older comunarios especially perceive comunidades as spaces where they can be 
free from abuse and influence of the patrones (bosses). The statement of Doña 
Catalina from San Lucas reflects this outlook:  
Not to be in an alien place or, let’s say, like that of a boss. In one’s comunidad one 
works calmly, doing what one wants, keeping animals and one is calm [tranquilo]. 
                                                 
69
 For example, workshop: El Carmen, 10 May 2007.  
70
 Interview: Alta Mira, 25 January 2007. These comments show that Chiquitano comunidades have 
communal landownership and restrictions on the sale of land as described by Wolf for the corporate 
community (see 1955: 458). 
71
 ‘Ser una comunidad es ser unido a través de todos los problemas que haya dentro de la comunidad, 
para así llevar adelante a nuestra comunidad, para que se haga más grande y tener algunos 
recuerdos que haya para nuestros hijos así. Ya nosotros estamos yendo pa’ abajo’. Workshop: 
Candelaria, 11 May 2007. 
72
 ‘Es donde vivimos, donde tenemos derecho a todo, y es estar libre’. Interview: Santa Mónica, 26 
January 2007. 
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In contrast, with the boss it is practically impossible that one is like that because at 
any moment, he kicks you and throws you out with all your belongings.73 
In the hacienda, the rules of behaviour are determined by the owner.Breach might 
lead to dismissal, or as many other comunarios report from their past experiences, 
physical or psychological violence.74 Canessa describes similar notions for 
Pocobayeños in the Bolivian highlands, who also perceive the end of haciendas in 
the early nineteen-fifties as the crucial ‘anti-colonial moment’ (Canessa, 2009: 182). 
For this reason, comunarios differentiate between ‘being a comunario’ and ‘being 
empadronado’. Comunarios do not only use the term ‘empadronado’ to refer to the 
debt-peonage system, but to depict a situation in which a comunario becomes a 
contractual worker who resides on the land owned by white or mestizo Cruceños or 
Concepceños, only visiting the comunidad occasionally. Many comunarios view 
‘being empadronado’ in a negative light and associate it with ‘voluntarily’ entering 
into ‘slavery’.75 
Like Ignacio Macoñó (former CIP-SJ leader), many comunarios noted that 
they shared a certain ‘culture’: ‘It is where [they] have their customs, their own 
languages, their dress and their way of working, music’.76 These are also elements 
that comunarios stress as relevant for ‘being Chiquitano’ (and are addressed below). 
Lastly, a few comunarios mentioned that notions of ‘comunidad’ involved ‘faith’.77 
Most Chiquitano comunarios are Catholics, although there a small number of 
                                                 
73
 ‘No estar como en un lugar ajeno, o digamos, así de un patrón. En su comunidad trabaja uno 
tranquilo, haciendo lo que uno quiere, criar animalitos y uno esta tranquilo. En cambio uno con el 
patrón ya casi no es dable que uno este así, porque cualquier ratingo a uno le tira una patada y lo 
botan con todas sus tenencias ahí’. Workshop: Las Mercedes de Guayaba, 12 May 2007.  
74
 See for example: Interview: Udalrrico Vargas Jaldín (comunario from El Carmen, CICC founding 
member), El Carmen, 7 May 2007; Interview: Isidro Pasabare Castedo and Nicolás Yurrupi 
(comunarios from Santa Mónica), Concepción, 19 June 2007; Nicolás Aguilar Faldín (comunario 
from El Carmen, CICC founding member), El Carmen, 7 May 2007. 
75
 Don Diego, Don Dago and Doña Hilda from Palestina told me that there are many Chiquitanos who 
are empadronados (i.e. living under a patron). They noted that they worked from dawn to dusk, 
mostly as cowboys, without earning much. I asked why these people wanted to be empadronados 
rather than having a chaco. Don Diego answered that they just ‘needed’ a patron, somebody to order 
them around. Hilda was more of the opinion that having a chaco was harder than earning cash. Diego 
argued, however, that they needed somebody to tell them what to do and order them around. Both did 
not like the idea of being empadronando and saw this related to loosing ones freedom (perder la 
libertad). Don Dago concluded that they (the Chiquitanos) had been mozos (slaves) long enough. 
Field notes: Palestina, 6 March 2007. 
76
 ‘Es donde tienen sus usos costumbre, sus propias lenguas, su vestimenta, su forma de trabajar, su 
música’. Interview: Del Rancho, 7 December 06. 
77
 For instance, workshop: Makanaté, 10 May 2007. It is not clear whether those people that referred 
to comunidad as having to do with ‘faith’, referred to a ‘community of faith’, i.e. a Christian 
community, or whether it was just one more commonality of what many other Chiquitanos saw as 
‘comunidad.’ 
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evangelicals exist. Observers point out that the religious beliefs and practices of 
Chiquitano comunarios are a syncretism of Catholicism and other practices, which 
can be traced to the time of the ‘reduction’ within the Jesuit missions (see Chapter 
IV).78 Whatever the precise elements of importance for each comunario, all in all, we 
can say that the comunidad and being a full member of it – constitutes the prime 
sphere of citizenship for comunarios. 
Being a Chiquitano 
While the notion of ‘being comunario’ features many elements that point to a more 
rhizomic definition of who can or cannot be a comunario – with the key aspect of 
having to live up to other comunarios’ rules of sociability and engaging in communal 
work practices – ‘being Chiquitano’ had more specific taproot connotations, such as 
language.79 Following the rules of sociability is seen as essential, but the borders 
defining who is ‘Chiquitano’ or ‘other’ are less permeable than in the case of 
comunario.  
Chiquitano often stressed the importance of birth for defining who was or 
was not Chiquitano. However, the emphasis was not on decent, but rather the 
birthplace being somewhere in the Gran Chiquitanía. For example, comunario Pedro 
Soliz, CEJIS researcher and comunario from Santa Rita stated: ‘I am a native 
Chiquitano from here, from Concepción, because I was born here. That is why I am 
Chiquitano’.80 Indeed, this draws the circle widely, to include everybody born in the 
                                                 
78
 Comunarios attend mass in their chapels, celebrate events of the Catholic religious calendar and 
have their patron-saint fiestas of each comunidad. Most comunidades possess their own patron saint in 
the form of a statute or icon. In many comunidades the statue is attributed with bringing luck, for 
example, for hunting (also see Balza Alarcón, 2001: 288-289). Syncretism is especially noticeable in 
Chiquitano myths and cuentos (stories), in which the Jichi or Jichü features as a prominent 
protagonist. The Jichi lives mostly in water holes and possesses the power to control the force of 
nature and is therefore often referred to as the ‘owner of the forest’, or the ‘owner of the animals’. He 
appears to Chiquitano comunarios most frequently in the form of a snake, but also as a frog or a 
human persona (Balza Alarcón, 2001: 256-282). For more information and Chiquitano belief systems, 
see Riester (1976: 142) and Freyer (1997: 96). 
79
 Chiquitano from San Javier and Lomerío at times further differentiate that they are Chiquitano 
Paikoneka (in San Javier) and Chiquitano Monkox (in Lomerío) – names that, as stated in Chapter II, 
have circulated at least since the arrival of the Jesuits. Lacroix notes that ‘the Chiquitano of Lomerío 
have constructed their history and their identity considering themselves Monkox, “Man of the land, 
the place, form here” [“Hombre de la tierra, del lugar, de aquí”], “Inhabitants always in this place” 
[“Habitantes de siempre de este lugar”]…’ The term apparently comes from ‘the Moncoma, that lived 
in the zone at the time of the entry of the Spanish into the region, called Moncocas by the 
missionaries’ (2005: 33). 
80
 ‘Yo soy nativo Chiquitano de aquí de Concepción porque he nacido aquí por eso soy Chiquitano’. 
Focus group: La Embocada, 8 March 2007. 
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geographical territory. As addressed below, also some white and mestizo locals take 
this view. However, Chiquitano also add other markers to narrow the catchment area.  
Frequently stressed was the notion of sharing a language (i.e. chiquitano, 
which is also sometimes referred to as bésiro). For example, during a workshop in 
San Miguelito Sur, a small comunidad a twenty minute pick-up drive from 
Concepción, Justina noted ‘I am born here in Concepción and am proud to be 
Chiquitana because I still speak the language’.81 Another comunario agreed and 
noted something similar:  
Because our, my grandparents taught us to speak the besiro language, now what we 
speak is not correct, this Spanish, it is our native besiro language that identifies us as 
true Chiquitanos and this is what they want to recover.82 
Despite the fact that many Chiquitano see language as such a strong indicator for 
‘being Chiquitano’, only around a third of Chiquitano speak it. Of course, diverse 
actors, from anthropologists, to those involved in the sphere of international 
‘indigenous rights’, or local and national NGOs, emphasise language as an important 
‘cultural marker’ and indicator of ‘cultural distinctiveness’, and as such, of truly 
‘authentic’ indigenous peoples (cf. Graham, 2002).83 Perhaps not surprisingly, many 
Chiquitano share such notions. As one Don Udalrrico a comunario from Candelaria 
noted during a workshop session:  
Because it depends on the language that [he/she] speaks, because if one from 
Cochabamba or La Paz speaks, well, it is another language. However, here the 
Chiquitanos we know that every one, well, each pueblo has its’ language. It is how 
they say, if an Ayoreo enters, we know that he his one, because he has another 
language.84 
Comunarios and leaders regularly stated that they wanted to ‘recover’ the language, 
while the central and municipal government placed emphasis on teaching it in 
                                                 
81
 ‘Soy nacida aquí en Concepción soy orgullosa de ser Chiquitana porque hablo todavía el idioma’. 
Focus group 1: San Miguelito Sur, 9 March 2007.  
82
 ‘Porque nuestros, mis abuelos nos enseñaron hablar el idioma besiro, ahora lo que hablamos no es 
correcto ese español, es nuestros idioma besiro nativo es el que nos identifica como verdaderos 
Chiquitanos y eso es lo que se quiere recuperar’. Focus group 1: San Miguelito Sur, 9 March 2007. 
83
 Anthropologist Laura Graham’s (2002) study regarding the strategic language use of different 
indigenous spokespeople in Brazil shows that language, along with other markers of ‘indianness’ may 
be used to live up to Western audiences’ visions of authenticity, to legitimate or disqualify 
‘Indianness’. Nevertheless, she asserts that strategic language use remains an important symbolic 
medium through which to assert identity. 
84
 ‘Porque depende del idioma que hable, porque si habla uno de Cochabamba o de La Paz, entonces 
ya es otro idioma pue’. Sin embargo acá los Chiquitanos sabemos que cada uno tiene, su pueblo tiene 
su idioma. Es como se dice va a entrar un Ayoreo, ya se sabe que es el, tiene otro idioma’. Workshop: 
Candelaria, 11 May 2007. 
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comunidad schools. It is certainly a policy in line with the central’s stress on 
recovering and preserving Chiquitano ‘indigeneity’. As former CICC technician 
Dina Ramos stated: ‘now they are recovering the culture because it was already 
completely getting lost. What is most recoverable is the Chiquitano talk. It is also 
taught in the colleges as one more subject’.85  
‘Being Chiquitano’ also meant sharing and appreciating a ‘culture’ and 
‘identity’, which was also a source of ‘pride’.86 Don Manuel, a comunario from La 
Embocada, mentioned the most common elements in this regard: 
I am Chiquitano because this entire zone is the Chiquitanía, and I identify myself as 
Chiquitano since the moment that they taught us that one belongs to this race from 
here. Those who taught us were our parents, because they were always from here 
and we feel proud to be from here, living with our traditional customs, dances, 
typical music with drums. 87 
Chiquitano ‘typical music’ refers to the music played by Chiquitano bands, usually 
for communal fiestas, but also when white and mestizo Concepceños hire them to 
perform at their own functions (see photo 30, below). These bands are typically 
composed of three to five people, which always include a flautist, a drummer and 
optionally, various shaker players, smaller and larger drums and cymbals. Chiquitano 
bands and music are held to be vehicles that express Chiquitano ‘continuity’ and 
‘tradition’, but can also been appropriated by Concepceños.88 
                                                 
85
 ‘Ahora ya se están rescatando la cultura porque ya se estaba perdiendo por complete. lo mas 
rescatable es el hablar Chiquitano. También se esta practicando en los colegios como una materia 
más’. Interview: Candelaria, 24 January 2007. 
86
 For example, Interview: Francisco Pesoa (former CICC leader) Limoncito, 24 January 2007. 
87
 ‘Soy chiquitano porque toda esta zona es chiquitana yo me identifico como Chiquitano desde el 
momento de nos enseñaron que uno pertenece a esta raza de acá. Los que nos enseñaron fueron 
nuestros padres, porque ellos siempre fueron de aquí y nos sentimos orgulloso de ser de aquí, 
viviendo con nuestras costumbres tradicionales, bailes, música típica con tambora, pero en mi 
comunidad ya los jóvenes tiene vergüenza de nuestra costumbre’. Focus group: La Embocada, 8 
March 2007. 
88
 When employing these terms, I draw on Siders’ notions of ‘continuity’ and ‘tradition’ – which can 
be oppositional or overlap, depending on the context. Sider provides an example to demonstrate the 
notion of continuity: an Indian sharecropper sitting down at the end of the day on the ‘porch of a 
battered and worn farm house at the edge of a hot, dusty field, - the same, or a very similar house that 
his or her parents, grandparents, or even great-grandparents lived in’ (2003: 10). In contrast, traditions 
are the often more flamboyant celebrations ‘particularly the autonomy of the ceremonies and 
celebrations’ (Sider, 2003: 11). The example he provides are powwow ‘costumed dance display, 
perhaps with some travelling or visiting troupes, along with travelling craft-sale displays by Indian 
people working the powwow circuit’ (2003: 11).  
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Photo 30: Chiquitano Band 
 
Chiquitano Band Playing at the Patron Saint Festival of Limoncito,  
Women overwhelmingly linked artisan activities to ‘being Chiquitano’. For example, 
a comunaria from San Miguelito Sur pointed out: ‘The women have their artisan 
work. They make clay pots, amphorae; they use them to store chicha. They make 
embroidery; we spin the cotton and … cultivate our chaco [field]’.89 Large clay pots 
are important for brewing, storing and fermenting chicha in the large quantities 
needed for fiestas (celebrations) or mingas.90 Cotton hammocks, embroidery and 
other woven cotton products, such as bags, belts and hats, were seen to be 
particularly ‘Chiquitano’ products – but less because they are used in the 
comunidades, but because they were sold as specifically ‘Chiquitano’ items in shops 
in the ex-missions. As noted, such efforts in commercialising Chiquitano products 
are often aided by the Catholic Church or NGOs. Nevertheless, woven products, such 
                                                 
89
 ‘Las mujeres tienen sus trabajos artesanales. Lo que hacen es ollas de barro, cántaro, esto se 
utiliza para guardar la chicha. Se hace bordado, hilamos el algodón y es cultivado en nuestro chaco’. 
Focus group 2: San Miguelito Sur, 9 March 2007. 
90
 Some comunarios commented, with regret, on the fact that in some comunidades people were 
forgetting how to make the pots and that in some other comunidades people simply could not make 
the pots, because they could not find the suitable clay anywhere. 
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as hammocks and clothing, were already produced in the Jesuit missions and formed 
one of the main commodities that the Chiquitano produced for colonial markets (see 
Radding, 2005: 67-77). Chiquitano, Concepceños and tourists alike, associate them 
with Chiquitano ‘tradition’ and the mission history. 
Photo 31: Brewing Chicha 
 
Chicha being brewed in San Antonio de Lomerío in anticipation of the TCO Monte Verde 
titling ceremony.  
‘Being Chiquitano’ was also often associated with wearing a particular style of 
clothing.91 This refers to Chiquitano-style cotton shirts for men and the tipoy, a type 
of cotton dress, for women. Chiquitano comunarios wore neither shirt nor tipoy as 
everyday clothing in their comunidades. I only saw one elderly woman wear a tipoy 
in a comunidad in Lomerío, saw girls wearing it when posing as candidates in a 
‘beauty queen’ competition in a comunidad close to Concepción, and several women 
wearing them during a political rally for indigenous autonomy staged in Concepción. 
I was told that those who own a tipoy would wear it on special occasions and fiestas. 
                                                 
91
 For example, interview: Ana Pesoa Cuasase (former CIP-SJ leader), Monte Christo, 30 January 
2007; interview: Lorenzo Pasabare, Concepción, 1 June 2007. 
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This is a slightly different story from the Chiquitano shirt, which is worn by many 
(above all Chiquitano) members of the municipal government as a daily work 
uniform, as do CICC and OICH representatives. Chiquitano leaders noted that this 
was to express their pride in being Chiquitano. I assume that the women wear the 
tipoy for similar reasons. Cotton shirts and the tipoy are also items associated with 
the mission history, as they were produced and worn by Chiquitanos in the missions 
(see Radding, 2005: 67-77). 
Photo 32: Wearing a Tipoy 
 
Chiquitana wearing a tipoy, in Palmira, Lomerío. While tipoys today exist in different 
colours, they used to be white or beige.  
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Commonly, Chiquitano linked ‘being Chiquitano’ to working in a particular fashion, 
such as ‘working to survive’, ‘working with other people’, and ‘working the land’.92 
Many Chiquitano perceive that their way of working the land actually differs from 
non-Chiquitano, particularly from ‘terceros’ (white or mestizo third party intruders to 
community land or the TCO Monte Verde) or ‘the immigrants’ (i.e. highland 
migrants). As Chiquitano leader Carlos Leigue noted with respect to highland 
migrants: 
[They] are not similar to one, the Chiquitano, right? The Chiquitano works to 
maintain his family, but he is not a trader. The Chiquitano does not work an amount 
to be able to sell. He is not a trader, right? In contrast the one who has come from the 
interior … they work their fields in great quantity but it is for business, it is 
different’.93  
Comunarios mainly work fields for their subsistence (while at times selling some of 
the produce for extra income, if comunarios needed it); ‘outsiders’ are considered to 
exploit the land for commercial gain.94  
Chiquitano land and resource use is restricted by certain ‘usos y costumbres’ 
(customary practices in the sense of ‘norms’ or ‘rules’).95 For example, limiting the 
amount of hectares comunarios could privately plant.96 The importance of adhering 
to such rules was demonstrated clearly during a sociodrama the CEJIS research team 
organised in Las Abras, one of the smaller comunidades in San Javier municipality: 
the plot was that a comunario and his gringo wife (unsurprisingly played by myself) 
had begun extracting wood from the communal land and were selling substantial 
quantities to Bolivian and international enterprises. The wife was also clearing large 
amounts of forest to produce commercial crops. As the comunarios discussed how 
they should deal with the rule-breakers, one comunario stated:  
… well, the comunarios have already said that one cannot clear more than five 
hectares, we just have to make [them] comply to the rulebook, and if he does not 
want to, well that he goes to another place, and we will not permit that he breaks the 
laws of the comunidad, well, and if he wants to help, that he puts the money for the 
                                                 
92
 For example, focus group: La Embocada, 8 March 2007; focus group: San Miguelito Sur, 9 March 
2007. 
93
 ‘No es igual que uno, el Chiquitano ¿no? El Chiquitano trabaja es para mantener a su familia pero 
no es comerciante. El Chiquitano no trabaja en gran cantidad para poder vender. No es comerciante, 
¿no? En cambio el que ha venido del interior … ellos chaquean en gran cantidad pero es para 
negocio, es diferente’. Interview: Concepción, 26 October 2006. 
94
 For example, interview: Maria Chacón (CICC Vice-President), Limoncito, 23 January 2007. 
95
 For example, interview: Facundo Rivero (former CICC leader), Santa Mónica, 26 January 2007. 
96
 Sociodrama: Las Abras, 17 April 2007. 
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sanitary post, and that he works like we all work … because the one who is 
Chiquitano has to think like a Chiquitano and act like a Chiquitano.97 
Another comunario opined that his neighbour was ‘appearing in the comunidad as if 
he were a tercero’.98  
Comunarios stress that such rules are necessary, for clearing large amounts of 
forest disturbs wildlife and negatively affects hunting and fishing. Furthermore, 
Andrés Morobanchi (CIP-SJ Land and Territory Secretary) explained to me that 
treating land and forest ‘like the terceros’ caused resource depletion; where they 
operated: ‘there is nowhere [left], all is plantations, thus, the land is not looked 
after.’99 Where large estates farm for commercial purposes or graze cattle, they clear 
the land of most trees, except a few for shade. The land consequently tends to be dry. 
This creates a visually stark contrast with the Chiquitano comunidades, which are 
often surrounded by trees (or in the case of those in the TCO Monte Verde, forest) 
(see photos 33 and 34, below). Morobanchi added that ‘splitting up the land’ would 
‘cause conflict’. After all, comunidades outside the TCO Monte Verde are generally 
enclosed by large cattle ranches and agricultural estates; each comunidad has a 
limited amount of land at its disposal, while the population is steadily growing.100  
                                                 
97
 ‘… entonces ya los comunarios dijeron que no se puede chaquear mas de cinco hectáreas, solo hay 
que hacer cumplir el reglamento, y ya si el no quiere pues entonces que se vaya a otro lugar, y 
tampoco vamos a permitir que el rompa a las leyes que hay en la comunidad, bueno y si el quiere 
ayudar, que ponga nomás la plata para la posta sanitaria, y que trabaje como trabajamos 
todos.…por que el que es Chiquitano tiene que pensar como Chiquitano y comportarse como 
Chiquitano’. Sociodrama, Las Abras, 17 April 2007. 
98
 ‘…. el ya esta pareciendo dentro de la comunidad como si fuera un tercero’. Sociodrama: Las 
Abras, 17 April 2007. 
99
 ‘…Ya no hay donde, todo es sembradío, entonces la tierra no está cuidada’. Interview: San Javier, 
8 June 2006. 
100
 Because comunarios are aware that subsistence is not guaranteed in the long run, the centrales 
have instigated the demand for the Monte Verde territory (see Chapter 8). 
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Photo 33: Cattle Ranch, San Javier 
 
Photo 34: Comunidad Palestina, TCO Monte Verde 
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In conclusion, the meanings attached to ‘being Chiquitano’ emphasise ‘taproot’ as 
well as ‘rhizomic’ criteria. Taproot indicators may rule a large number of individuals 
out from qualifying as Chiquitano, in contrast to ‘comunario’, which is more clearly 
linked to behavioural principles. Additionally, it is tied to valuing certain ‘traditions’ 
that may or may not form part of the continuity of Chiquitano comunarios’ everyday 
life, sharing a production system and observing principles which ensure the 
continuity of the system. It can be assumed that some of these meanings spread 
among comunarios through the activities of the Chiquitano central, which has 
brought more comunarios in contact with each other and engaged in consciousness 
raising workshops regarding the value of Chiquitano ‘culture’. Furthermore, as will 
be addressed below, Chiquitano stress that as they occupy a certain (marginalised) 
position within the local socio-economic hierarchy, they are different to the ‘more 
priviledged’ people. 
‘We Are All Chiquitano’: Eroding the Community Boundary 
Etablishing difference to certain local others became especially salient in a context 
where those that Chiquitano call ‘ganaderos’ (‘cattle ranchers’), ‘gente del pueblo’ 
(‘people from the town’ i.e. the ex-mission settlements) or ‘the whites’ and that 
generally self-identify as ‘whites’, ‘mestizos’, ‘camba’ or ‘Concepceños’, launched 
their own version of identity politics by appropriating the label ‘Chiquitano’.  
Concepceños perceive the Chiquitanos in several ways. One is by describing 
and talking about Chiquitanos as ‘uncivilised tribes’.101 Another is to portray them as 
people who need protection, that need to be ‘developed’, that do not know how to 
‘work the land properly’, or viewing them as some ancient people who were their 
                                                 
101
 The following is an example of such a view. One day in June 2007, a retired teacher form San 
Javier ask Margoth and me whether there were any descendents of tribes (‘descendientes de tribus’) 
living in Concepción and in San Javier. I noticed that this caused outrage in Margoth. On the way 
back to the office, she explained to me that the term ‘tribe’ the seen as very ‘despectivo’ 
(disrespectful) in Santa Cruz. The day after Margoth told Lorenzo about the incident. He noted that 
the woman must really be one of ‘the old brigades’ and he laughed about the fact that Chiquitanos had 
been called tribes. He too thought that the term was very inappropriate and that it had negative 
connotations. He noted that is was almost like calling them ‘salvajes, no civilizados’ (savages, 
uncivilised). Field notes: Concepción, 20 June 2007. 
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remote ancestor.102 This ancestral claim to Chiquitano-ness becomes visible on 
occasions such as the yearly carnival celebration and concepceño ‘Day of Tradition’, 
when many Concepceño girls and women wear the tipoy, and some Concepceño men 
don Chiquitano shirts and camba hats.103 Concepceños wear these items to stress 
their pride in what they imagine their ‘Chiquitano heritage’ to be and celebrate 
Chiquitano traditions. While Concepceños might claim a common ancestry, what 
they are usually thinking of is a romanticised version of ‘indigenous maidens’ and 
‘warriors’. These are the images that they embody dressing up during festivities (see 
Gustafson, 2006: 356-357). This is in line with what Bret Gustafson describes for the 
discourses and symbolic embodiment that express Cruceño regionalism, or 
‘cruceñidad’ in general. Such displays of regionalism have been growing more 
poplar with the increasing political vigour of the Cruceño autonomy claim.  
According to Gustafson: ‘the idealised Cruceño Camba blends the defence of 
agrarian patrimony – territorial and cultural “property” including traditions, land, 
peasants, and Indians – with the tastes and acquisitive power of the cosmopolitan 
urban consumer’ (2006: 356-357). The male camba is ‘performed’ by ‘wearing straw 
hats, sandals, white peasant pants and shirt, and carrying a slingshot, machete, and a 
water gourd. Displays of cambas as warriors resisting Andean incursions 
complement this “peasant” character’ (2006: 356-357). The female camba: 
… wears a tipoi, a dress said to be typical of indigenous women. She is sometimes 
called kuñata-i, (Guarani, “young woman”), to appropriate the authenticity and the 
sexual allure of the indigenous maiden. Yet, even when dressed as Indians or 
peasants, Cruceños tend to emphasize their urban, cosmopolitan whiteness as an 
expression of their aspiration to participate in an idealized “global” middle-upper 
class consumer society (2006: 357). 
Indicatively, during such events as carnival or the ‘Day of Tradition’, Chiquitanos 
are conspicuously absent from the centre of Concepción, with the exception of 
                                                 
102
 The ‘development refusal’ attitude is reflected in the views of a judge that I encountered in 
Concepción. He mentioned that he judged a case involving a Chiquitano comunidad and a kolla 
(highland immigrant) who was living in the comunidad. The comunarios wanted the kolla to leave as 
he had taken land from the middle of the comunidad and was intensively cultivating it. The 
comunarios maintained that the land was not for that purpose. The kolla, on the other hand, was of the 
opinion that the land was there to be worked and additionally he claimed that the comunarios had 
eaten his cattle. The Judge noted that he had not punished the kola, but had rather ‘congratulated him’ 
and told the comunarios to follow his example. He ordered the comunidad to pay back the man’s 
cows and to leave him in peace. Field notes: Concepción, 24 February 2007. 
103
 Camba hats are straw hats that Chiquitanos and White and mestizo Cruceños associate with rural 
labourers. Chiquitano wear them, for example, on indigenous marches in which they participate to 
protect themselves against the sun, but also to identify themselves ‘Chiquitanos’. Cruceños wear them 
to stress their ‘rural’ or ‘camba’ roots. For ‘camba’ see next footnote.  
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Chiquitano bands members who are invited to play on such occasions. Comuanrios 
do not participate in the ‘Day of Tradition’ and celebrate carnival in their 
comunidades. Chiquitano who live in Concepción party in their houses, or travel to a 
comunidad where they have kin or friends. Another reason for non-participation is 
that for Concepceños such celebrations entail showing a ‘nationalistic’ pride in being 
camba and Cruceño (being from Santa Cruz department), which is hostile to and 
excludes Chiquitanos.104 As Gustafson summarises: 
Cruceño regionalism opposes spatial, social, or subjective expressions of indigeneity 
or class that are not incorporated into folkloric niches of the dominant order. The 
regionalist cosmology thus seeks to absorb gendered hierarchies of class (landlord-
peasant) and race (colonizer-indigene) to reposition lines of contention from within 
the region to its outer edges (2006: 357). 
It is part of this effort to incorporate difference, which has led Cruceños to 
‘increasingly speak of themselves as mestizos who share the heritage of lowland 
native peoples of Santa Cruz. … Non-indigenous Cruceños view these peoples as 
“our ethnics” (nuestras étnias)’ (2006: 357).  
Gustafson adds that this can also be linked to a ‘resurgence of indigeneity as 
a privileged marker of territorial rights’ through the Bolivian multicultural rights 
framework (2006: 357). This becomes clear when considering Gustafson’s 
description how in a civic parade on 25 September 2005 marchers from the Camba 
Nation (a think tank promoting camba nationalism) held aloft a banner quoting a 
passage of the Charter of Human Rights of the United Nations: ‘All Peoples Have 
the Right to Self- Determination’. The slogan on another banner closely resembled 
that of the lowland indigenous movement: Territory, Identity, and Power: Bases of 
Camba Nationalism’ (2006: 367). Similarly, in Concepción those that oppose 
Chiquitano claims to rights, and above all land, have taken to incorporating 
Chiquitano traditions as their own, claiming a common ancestry and, therefore, using 
such makers of tradition to erode the boundary between themselves and Chiquitanos.  
Additionally, Concepceños discursively erode the boundary between 
themselves and Chiquitanos by denying that the Chiquitanos existed and stressing 
                                                 
104
 Chiquitanos as well as some NGO workers have told me that in the past, ‘camba’ used to 
denominate ‘peasants’, or ‘rural workers’. One Chiquitano told me, that it used to be a term with a 
negative connotation, and could mean as much as ‘slave’. In the past, he noted, Chiquitanos were 
often referred to as ‘cambas’ in a negative sense. More recently, the term has come to be used in Santa 
Cruz as a general term for ‘lowland Bolivians’, especially those from the Santa Cruz department. Its 
use often implies a patriotic sentiment. 
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that they all were mestizos, or claiming that a common ancestry and residence in the 
Chiquitanía made them all Chiquitano. An example of the first situation is a 
conversation I had with two self-identified mestizo men from Concepción one 
evening in 2006. The men told me that the Chiquitano people were just ‘like them’ 
and explained that over time, they all had become mestizos. They added that those 
who claimed to be Chiquitano had no more right than them to go and claim land in 
the TCO Monte Verde.105 This resembles the indigenista ‘myth of mestizaje’- logic 
as promoted in the earlier half of the twentieth century. As noted in Chapter IV, this 
notion has proved pervasive and powerful, despite signs that ‘indigenous’ has 
replaced the twentieth century’s ‘mestizo’ as the ‘iconic citizen’ (Canessa, 2006: 
255). The ‘myth of mestizaje’ still permeates the socio-political views of many 
(especially lowland) whites and mestizos.106 
To some Chiquitano, denial of anything specifically ‘Chiquitano’ and 
appropriation of the term by white and mestizo ‘others’, proved disturbing. I 
discussed this issue several times with Chiquitano CEJIS colleague Lorenzo 
Pasabare. He noted that ‘it was important to realise’ that the ‘whites’ also called 
themselves Chiquitanos, even though ‘they were not like them’, what he called 
‘Chiquitano indígena nativo del lugar’ (‘native indigenous from this place’).107 He 
reminded me that comunarios had also picked up on this phenomenon: 
I think that in the comunidades they have realised [it]. [They say] “put Chiquitano 
indigenous, not Chiquitano because even Don Natañel Castedo, the sub-prefect, says 
that he is also Chiquitano, but he does not feel what a legitimate Chiquitano feels” 
…we have learned this in the workshops that we have been doing…not even I 
myself could unravel myself from what I felt, and I felt it here. But these types also 
always say that they are Chiquitano, they also dress like Chiquitanos … the non-
Chiquitano women and say that they are Chiquitanos. They also dress in tipoy and in 
their clothes, but there has to be a difference and exactly the very comunarios were 
the ones who put us in the direction, and recently “Chiquitano indigenous” because 
they also say that they [the whites] are Chiquitanos. Of course, they have been borne 
                                                 
105
 Field notes: Concepción, 6 November 2006. 
106
 Political scientist Shannan Mattiace (2009) describes a similar phenomenon in the Mexican 
peninsular of Yucatán, where local and regional elites influenced by the Mexican indigenismo current 
appropriate Maya cultural markers such as language, folk dances and dress to express Yucatecan pride 
and distinctiveness. She argues that this poses obstacles to ‘would-be ethnic entrepreneurs and 
leaders’ (2009: 158). Firstly, non-Maya claim that they embrace Maya identity and that racial 
discrimination against them does not exist, and ‘organizing around racial discrimination in a society 
that largely insists that there is none, requires tremendous personal and group resources, both 
monetary and emotional’ (2009: 159). Secondly, it ‘makes it more difficult for Maya to draw 
boundaries between “us” and “them” which, as Barth pointed out years ago … is essential to 
movement-organizing’ (2009: 158). 
107
 Field notes: Concepción, 20 June 2007. 
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here… but they were borne with another privilege to the one that we have been 
borne with, no?.108 
By blurring the boundary, white and mestizo Concepceños are denying Chiquitanos 
their history, as well as a better future by invalidating their claim to ‘special rights’, 
above all land. Firstly, through stressing a common ancestry, while evoking exotic 
and romanticised images and an idealised version of the mission history, they are 
filtering out the history of land loss, empadronamiento and enslavement in the rubber 
zones that Chiquitano groups have suffered. Secondly, current claims to rights by 
Chiquitano are generally constructed around the indigeneity rhetoric, so that they can 
have access to the Bolivian framework of neo-liberal multicultural rights. Any denial 
of the Chiquitano claim to ‘difference’ and ‘indigeneity’ represents an attempt to 
deny Chiquitano these rights.  
As the following chapter addresses, in Concepción the issue of land rights is 
especially contentious because of the long struggle for the TCO Monte Verde, which 
white and mestizo Concepceños oppose. In response, many Chiquitano rebel against 
these attempts to ‘blur the boundary’, by employing additional terms, such as 
‘indigenous’, ‘native’, or ‘originario’, to re-establish the boundary vis-à-vis those 
who are differently situated within the local economic, political and social hierarchy. 
These are all labels that have resonance in the context of the Bolivian law, as well as 
terms that carry negative meanings for white and mestizo Concepceños, as discussed 
in Chapter VII. 
Conclusion 
This chapter pointed to some of the multiple meanings that actors attach to the term 
‘indigena’ in the Bolivian political arena, as well as in the Concepción municipality. 
The term may be acceptable for political claims-making, but unacceptable for self-
identification. It is seen as a racist and ‘white idea’, but may be drawn upon to 
                                                 
108
 ‘Creo que en las comunidades se han dado cuenta no, ponga indígena chiquitano, no chiquitano 
porque hasta don Nataniel Castedo que es el sub-prefecto dice que es chiquitano también pero el no 
siente lo que siente el chiquitano legitimo …lo hemos aprendido en el taller que hemos estado 
haciendo ya ahora no, ni yo mismo también me sabia desenvolver  yo lo sentía aquí. Pero estos tipos 
también dicen que son chiquitanos se visten también las mujeres  no chiquitanas y dicen que son 
chiquitanas se visten también de tipoy y de su prenda pero como es que tiene que haber una 
diferencia y exactamente y los propios comunarios fueron los que nos dieron el lineamiento y recién 
nomás indígena chiquitano porque también ellos dicen que son chiquitanos. Claro han nacido aquí 
tanto pero han nacido con otro privilegio a lo que hemos nacido nosotros’. Interview: Concepción, 1 
June 2007. 
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establish a difference to local white and mestizo ‘others’ who, are attempting to erode 
the boundary between them and Chiquitanos in an attempt to undermine their claim 
to rights and territory. This puts a new spin on identity politics. It contrasts with the 
behaviour of white and mestizos in the highlands, who may adopt the ‘indigenous 
label’ to show solidarity with the MAS indigenous project (see Canessa, 2007b: 
208).  
The Chiquitano case also demonstrates that the creation of a collective 
identifier requires much work. It is even harder to attach any meaning to it. Many 
Chiquitanos who adopted the label in Ñuflo de Chávez province associate ‘being 
indigenous’ with the land claim and employ it to underline their difference to whites 
and mestizos. They might also connect it to attributes they think they share with other 
Chiquitano, and indeed, ‘indigenous people’ elsewhere in Bolivia. In contrast, for the 
Chiquitano in Velasco province, and some young people in Ñuflo de Chávez 
province, the term did simply not mean anything relevant to their lives.  
In conclusion, groups may employ ‘indigeneity’ as an identity marker (and/or 
might discursively stress elements that are seen to be ‘indigenous’) in order to 
communicate with the state in ways that it recognises, because this might be the only 
vehicle available to claim certain rights. Simultaneously however, it plays into state 
rhetoric and expectations (2003: 399-400) and furthers the state’s attempt of 
increasing legibility among its population. Adopting the term has been a crucial 
strategy for Chiquitano movements to gain access to the domestic multicultural rights 
framework, as the Chiquitano have engaged in a long struggle to gain territorial title 
to the TCO Monte Verde. Nevertheless, as the following chapter shows, state actors 
have ultimately defined the terms of this engagement.  
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Chapter VI 
Monte Verde: The Long Struggle and Meanings of Territory 
The previous chapter addressed the emergence of the Chiquitano movement and the 
spread of indigeneity as an identity-marker among Chiquitano leaders and 
comunarios. This chapter addresses another aspect of Chiquitano-state relations: the 
struggle for the TCO Monte Verde. The three Chiquitano Organisations of 
Concepción, San Javier and Lomerío, have struggled for the fulfilment of their 
claims to indigenous territories since their participation in the 1990 ‘March for 
Territory and Dignity’. After the march, the Bolivian State incorporated the term 
‘indigenous territories’ (coined by the ILO convention 169) into the Bolivian 
legislation and took steps to legally recognise eight ‘indigenous territories’.1 In 1995, 
the three centrales united their territorial claims for greater political leverage and 
jointly claimed the territory of Monte Verde. In June 2007, after years of legal 
battles, the centrales finally received its title.  
Most Chiquitano and state documents on the Monte Verde territory state that 
the territory is an area that is located within Santa Cruz department, in Ñuflo de 
Chávez Province, in the northern part of the first Municipal Section of Concepción 
and the second Municipal Section San Javier. It encompasses roughly an area of one 
million hectares (e.g. CGTI-MV et al., 2006a: 7; Martínez Montaño, 1998: 12) (see 
map below). However, apart from this geographical area with a certain size and a 
fixed location, actors within the different layers of the state, NGO workers, local 
cattle ranchers, logging companies, Chiquitano leaders, comunarios and umbrella 
organisations, attach different meanings to the space, which are shaped through 
ongoing processes and in interaction with other actors (cf. Gupta and Ferguson, 
1992; Lefebvre, 1991; Massey, 2004). The meanings that Chiquitano attach to the 
space have been shaped through the discursive (and at times physical) conflicts, 
negotiations and collaborations with state actors (both departmental and various local 
actors, including NGOs), as well as through Chiquitano memories of land loss, being 
‘enslaved’ to cattle ranches and agrarian properties. I argue that in the arena of 
competing meanings and definitions, those of the state actors are determining access 
                                                 
1
 The ILO Convention outlines the uses, meanings and rights attached to the term ‘territory’ in 
Articles 14–17.  
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to land and its usage. While the Bolivian legal framework seems to be responding to 
indigenous movements’ claims to land and territory, groups can only gain territorial 
ownership if they administer the space as the state requires. These developments 
seemingly contradict the constitutional text, which defines TCOs as spaces where 
indigenous people ‘maintain and develop their own forms of economic, social and 
cultural organisation’. 
This chapter first addresses developments in Bolivian law in response to 
pressure from Bolivian indigenous movements and their allies. This is followed by 
an account of the history of the territorial claim and analysis of the struggle for the 
TCO Monte Verde. The third part analyses the way that the Chiquitano centrals and 
their NGO allies have been working to make the territory ‘more legible’ (cf. Scott, 
1998) by introducing territorial management procedures, which also includes putting 
more emphasis on the territory’s economic values. In order to have their rights 
recognised, the centrales (and some comunarios) have increasingly adopted a 
language and discourse that the state recognises, for example, by emphasising the 
‘sustainability’ of their way of life in the territory. The final part considers some of 
the differing meanings Chiquitano comunarios and leaders attach to the territory, 
demonstrating that these are nevertheless heavily influenced by the above-mentioned 
memories and experiences, as well as the hope that it may serve as a space where 
Chiquitano can safeguard the continuity of Chiquitano life and sociability.  
Constructing ‘Indigenous Territories’: Laws and Legal Discourses 
The Indigenous Law Project 
The precursor to the territorial demands of many indigenous groups affiliated to the 
Confederación Indígena del Oriente, Chaco y Amazonía de Bolivia (CIDOB – 
Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of the West, Chaco and Amazonia), was the 
land pressure that these groups experienced (Chapter V). From around 1986, the year 
of CIDOB’s fifth congress, the organisation worked at developing legal proposals to 
incorporate the rights of ‘indigenous peoples’ (including territorial rights) into the 
constitution. In the following years, a CIDOB commission presented its proposals to 
the governments of Paz Estenssoro and Paz Zamora. However, it was not until the 
1990 ‘March for Territory and Dignity’ that serious discussions between the Bolivian 
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government and the indigenous movement regarding such laws were held. After the 
march, the government accepted the use of the term ‘indigenous territory’ in official 
documents, and in 1991 it ratified the ILO Convention 169 (Balza Alarcón, 2001: 
35). However, the exact shape these ‘territories’ and other rights would take in the 
Bolivian legal context remained to be established.  
Consequently, the MNR government formed a commission to formulate an 
‘indigenous law’ (Ley Indígena), the product of indigenous-NGO-governmental 
negotiations.2 The proposal drew on certain aspects of the ILO Convention and the 
indigenous claims platform, to give it more leverage and international recognition. 
Nevertheless, in 1992 the Chamber of Deputies rejected the proposal presented to 
them. According to Balza Alarcón, the entrepreneurial sector from Santa Cruz 
department played a crucial role here, arguing that it was ‘in breach of the Bolivian 
Constitution’ (2001: 41). The proposal was simply too threatening, as it lay claim to 
landownership and resources in a department where the economic elite relied on 
large-scale agrarian production (mainly cotton, soya and, to a lesser extent, cattle 
ranching and sugarcane cultivations) and natural resource extraction (especially 
natural gas, and some oil and logging) (see Urioste and Kay, 2005: 43-46). 
The INRA Law and its Procedures 
While indigenous and NGO analysts later criticised the law draft for ignoring many 
of the CIDOB’s initial proposals, it nevertheless heavily influenced the subsequent 
multicultural laws, which reflected some of the proposal’s initial flaws.3 The 
Agrarian Reform Law 1751, also known as the National Institute of Agrarian Reform 
                                                 
2
 Such NGOs were Apoyo para el Campesino–Indígena del Oriente Boliviano (APCOB – Support for 
the Indigenous Peasant of the Bolivian East), Centro de Investigación y Documentación para el 
Desarrollo del Beni (CIDDEBENI – Investigation and Documentation Centre for the Development of 
the Beni) and the Centro de Estudios Jurídico Investigación Social (CEJIS – Centre for Legal and 
Social Studies). 
3
 For example, the notions that the territory should provide for the ‘maintenance and support’ and 
‘growth and development’ of ‘a human population’ was contradictory. Further, the CIDOB’s notion of 
‘territory’ excluded the possibility of recognising ‘discontinuous territories’, problematic for many 
indigenous peoples which occupy space in a discontinuous manner, such as the Guaraní people (see 
Balza Alarcón, 2001: 37-38). Thirdly, the proposal contained contradictory statements about the 
ownership of the ‘natural resources’ within a territory. Article 22.2 granted indigenous peoples 
‘autonomy over their natural resources’, while Article 24.1 limited these to the exploitation of 
renewable resources. Strategic mineral substances and hydrocarbons would remain with the state 
(Balza Alarcón, 2001: 38). Fourthly, Article 46 outlined the recognition of indigenous territories as 
‘autonomous’, while there was no clause to define what this would actually mean (Balza Alarcón, 
2001: 39). Lastly, the proposal failed to specify how a territory’s size or location would be identified 
(Balza Alarcón, 2001: 41). A possible reason for the weakness of the law lies in the fact that it may 
have been formulated to reduce resistance from opposing groups. 
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(INRA) Law, passed in 1996, legislated for what had already been acknowledged by 
the 1994 Constitutional change in Article 171: the possibility of organised 
indigenous groups gaining access to Tierras Comunitarias de Origen (TCOs – 
Original Communal Lands) (Balza Alarcón, 2001: 43, 75). The precursor to the 
promulgation of the law was the 1996 ‘March for Territory, the Right to Political 
Participation and Development’, which departed from Santa Cruz and headed for La 
Paz. One of the main factors that led the CIDOB to stage the march was the fact that 
the claims filed during the 1990 march still remained unresolved (Balza Alarcón, 
2001: 45, 47-50; Flores, 2006: 3).  
The CIDOB’s strategy was to present as many additional territorial claims as 
possible, to create maximum political pressure. With the help of the NGOs APCOB, 
CEJIS, CIDDEBENI and CIMAR, CIDOB prepared sixteen territorial claims based 
on the same juridical bases: the fact that indigenous territories had been established 
via the Supreme Decree after the 1990 march, the 169 ILO Convention (ratified 
through Bolivian Law 1257) and Articles 1 and 171 of the 1994 Bolivian 
Constitution. The claims featured a historical and anthropological argument, which 
proved the ‘indigeneity’ of the claimants and highlighted the gradual reduction of the 
space they had historically occupied (Balza Alarcón, 2001: 45, 47-50). 
The government responded by ordering that titles for the lands recognised 
after the 1990 march should be handed over within sixty days, that the initial sixteen 
territorial demands be legally titled within ten months, and by promulgating the 
INRA Law (Balza Alarcón, 2001: 51). The INRA law defined TCOs as: 
… geographical spaces that constitute the habitat of the indigenous and originary 
peoples and communities to which they have had access traditionally and where they 
maintain and develop their own forms of economic, social and cultural organisation 
in a way that secures their survival and development. They are inalienable, 
indivisible, collective, composed by communities or mancomunidades [groupings of 
communities]…4 
INRA also established the right to the sustainable use of renewable natural resources 
within the TCOs.  
As noted, the definition of TCOs in the INRA Law was problematic, 
reflecting unresolved conceptual problems with the notion of ‘indigenous territories’ 
as defined by the Indigenous Law proposal and the problematic nature of notions of 
                                                 
4
 Art 41.I.5 of the Agrarian Reform Law 1751. 
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‘indigenous rights’ within the international sphere. For example, as noted in Chapter 
II, by adopting the notion of ‘traditional’ lands there arises the problem of how to 
establish with precision the geographical areas to which peoples or communities 
‘traditionally’ had access. Among some of the issues are a) a lack of clarity of the 
meaning of ‘traditional’ in this context, b) that claimed areas of different groups 
might overlap and c) that this notion presents special difficulties for displaced 
peoples or those living nomadic lifestyles (see Balza Alarcón, 2001: 76; also Kuper, 
2003).  
The law also established procedures to determine the size of such territories: 
the Estudio de Necesidades Espaciales (Study of Spatial Necessities) and the process 
of Saneamiento Especial de Tierras Comunitarias de Origen (SAN-TCO – Special 
Indemnification of Original Communal Lands). The Study of Spatial Necessities 
served to calculate the de facto surface area to be defined in favour of the claimants. 
The Vice Ministerio de Asuntos Indígenas y Pueblos Originarios (VAIPO – Vice 
Ministry for the Affairs of Indigenous and Originary Peoples) was made responsible 
for these procedures. In 1999, it formulated a guide for establishing these necessities.  
Problematically, the guidelines were based on the premise that ‘the 
indigenous’ are ‘poor’, poverty being defined as having outgoings to cover basic 
necessities higher or equal to income.5 It put monetary values on activities such as 
forestry, agriculture, animal husbandry, hunting and fishing as well as ‘alternative 
economies and associated traditional knowledge’ (Balza Alarcón, 2001: 311).6 The 
analysis was complemented by an estimation of the increase of the claimant 
population in a fixed amount of years, and the economic potential of the natural 
resources present in the territory (Balza Alarcón, 2001: 311-312).  
Of course, applying notions of ‘poverty’, ‘wealth’, ‘basic services’ and 
‘social security’ as key factors in defining the size of territories is highly 
problematic. How could these notions account for the complexities of the lives of 
different groups? How would groups and their members themselves interpret such 
notions? (see Balza Alarcón, 2001: 313). Balza Alarcón points to the contradiction in 
                                                 
5
 The document lists the following categories as basic necessities: alimentation, health, education, 
housing, basic services, information, and leisure, clothing, transport and social security. However, in 
the guide later, ‘basic services’ and ‘social security’ were left out (Balza Alarcón, 2001: 311). 
6
 Balza Alarcón points out that in reality the studies only considered forestry, animal husbandry and 
agriculture (2001: 312). It can be speculated that it was too difficult to attach any monetary values to 
other activities. 
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‘applying some kind of monetary value to everything in an economy in which money 
does not take a privileged place’ (2001: 315). Moreover, economic activities such as 
‘hunting’ and ‘fishing’ were excluded from the final documents, as these activities 
relied on vast amounts of space. They were deemed ‘unsustainable’ in the designated 
area due to the expected population growth. The study instead suggested other 
activities (for example, forestry management), whose monetary value was higher 
than that of the activity it replaced. Lastly, the studies fixed the number of hectares to 
be designated, but not the territories’ future location (see Balza Alarcón, 2001: 316-
318). In sum, these notions contradicted INRA’s assurance of respect for ‘own forms 
of economic, social and cultural organisation’.  
The second step in the procedure was the SAN-TCO. It involved the 
‘immobilisation’ of the claimed territories, which meant that activities such as 
handing out land titles, invasions and illegal logging were to be stopped. The 
different parties occupying the territory (other than the indigenous claimants) had to 
prove legal land titles, and could stay if they fulfilled the ‘economic and social 
function’.7 The rest were (supposedly) expelled. Hectares ‘missing’ from the 
designated territory after the process would be compensated in unoccupied areas 
adjacent to the TCO (see Balza Alarcón, 2001: 51-53; Flores, 2006: 3). 
Problematically some of the resulting territories were discontinuous and fragmented, 
and spaces that groups relied on for hunting often remained outside the titled area. 
Designated compensation areas were often hard to access or not suitable. Lastly, the 
procedures were lengthy and costly, and groups had little prospect of being 
successful in the ensuing years of legal battles without some form of (NGO) 
assistance (Balza Alarcón, 2001: 53-54).  
The territorial claims were in themselves problematic. Claims often focused 
on the size of the ‘ancestral’ land rather than its strategic use to the group. For 
example, to secure their livelihoods and trade, groups might need access to villages 
(Balza Alarcón, 2001: 23, 54, 60). Claims overlapped or failed to consider 
demographic developments. Such flaws attest to the fact that many claims were put 
together in a very short space of time: at least eleven of the initial claims were drawn 
                                                 
7
 The Bolivian Constitution (Art. 169) and the INRA Law (Art. 2) establish the ‘economic and social 
function’ as a pre-requisite to acquiring and preserving an agrarian property. With respect to terceros, 
this entails demonstrating that the land is put to ‘agrarian use’. Those settlements resident in the 
territory longer than two years were also given the chance to gain a legal title; the remaining area 
would be titled in favour of the claimants (Tamburini, 2006: 251). 
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up within a month before the departure of the 1996 march (Balza Alarcón, 2001: 20-
21, 320). In sum, all this meant that while indigenous groups identified territories 
they favoured (at least according to their hastily-developed proposals), the state 
administration remained the main shaper of the location and size of the territory (see 
Balza Alarcón, 2001: 63). Furthermore, successive governments showed a lack of 
commitment to drive forward the process of entitlement. By 2006, lowland 
indigenous groups had filed claims for fifty-six TCOs and only a total of 31.9 per 
cent of the claimed area had been titled (Romero Bonifaz, 2006: 212, 220).  
The Chiquitano Land Struggle 1973–2007 
First Settlements in Monte Verde: a Chiquitano Subsistence Strategy 
The first Chiquitano comunarios moved to the area of Monte Verde in 1973 from 
Lomerío, where they had suffered land shortages due to population increase and 
because the remaining land was of poor quality. Additionally, logging companies 
aggravated the situation by felling much of the forest, which resulted in chronic 
droughts. This undermined the possibilities for hunting and fishing that Chiquitano 
comunarios relied on.8 During a long interview carried out by CEJIS colleague 
Margoth Cespedes and myself with José Massaí, a comunario from San Lorenzo in 
Lomerío municipality, José recalled some aspects of how he, his father and other 
comunarios first came to settle in Monte Verde. The interview took place at a table 
under the wooden porch of his stone built house. Like other comunidades in Lomerío 
municipality, most of the houses around the main square are built out of stone, while 
houses on the outskirts tend to be made of adobe. José Massaí recalled the immediate 
reason for the move:  
In those times there were many droughts around here. In those times we worked in a 
group, in a union. With the unions we formed groups like this, cooperatives, 
cooperatives, to make fields [chaco]. Together we sowed peanuts, rice. And in the 
lower part we sowed rice. In this area everything dried out. Well, it was a time of 
droughts. We lost [it], right? Our time…, not as much our time, [but] our 
investments. So we were somewhat demoralised because our products had dried out 
and we had not harvested anything. And in those times there was this NGO in 
Concepción, the Bavarian Foundation. And there was this gringo who lived in 
Concepción who was called Don Bole. And he said: ‘to the north of Concepción, at 
                                                 
8
 Interview: José Massaí, San Lorenzo, 7 June 2007. 
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the side of the Rio Negro, there you can [plant], nothing gets lost that one plants in 
the chaco’, he said.9 
José Massaí recalls that Don Bole’s proposition sparked some initial suspicion: ‘And 
those who are against everything said, “he is taking them as his slaves, to pick rubber 
in the Rio Negro”, well, no? [Still] we went …’10 While initially the comunarios 
declined because the area was unknown to them, Don Bole finally managed to recruit 
thirty-three volunteers, including José Massaí and his father: 
Until my father, my father lives still, says to me “listen, I will go” and so I told him 
“how are you going to go, and us?” I told him. “No, but I will go and try” he said, 
“they have talked to me a lot, very good” he said, “everything grows”, he said, “the 
production is there”, he said, “there is fish and here there is nowhere to fish”, he 
said, “there is a lot to hunt”.11  
After weeks of making their way through the forest, they arrived at the place that 
Don Bole had indicated.12 When I interviewed Esteban Massaí, a comunario in his 
late sixties, also among the first settlers and the founder of Palestina comunidad 
(TCO Monte Verde), he explained that they called the new settlement ‘Monte Verde’ 
because of the ‘beautiful green hills’ in the area and because the trees there were 
evergreen (in contrast to Lomerío, where the trees drop their leaves in the dry 
season).13 Don José describes how the settlers set about clearing two and a half 
hectares each for planting:14  
So we made a large chaco… and after that we went back, we left the chaco finished. 
And when we went back again, not all came. Some stayed [at home]. After we 
                                                 
9
 ‘En ese tiempo había mucha sequía por acá. EN ese tiempo, este, trabajábamos así en grupo en 
sindicato’. En sindicato formábamos grupos así, cooperativas, cooperativas. Entonces, para hacer 
chaco. Así conjunto y sembrábamos maní, arroz. Y la parte más baja sembramos arroz. Y en esa parte 
todito se secó. Era tiempo sequía púe’, sequía. Hemos perdido ¿no? El tiempo, no tanto nuestro 
tiempo, nuestros inversiones perdimos. Entonces de ahí ya hemos algo desmoralizado ¿no? por 
nuestro producto pues secó así que no hemos cosechado nada… y como en ese tiempo había una, una, 
por decir ONG en Concepción, la fundación Baviera. Entones había este gringo’ que vivía ahí en 
Concepción, se llamaba Don Bole. Entones dijo “y por que no van a buscar un lugar especial para la 
producción, yo conozco” dijo “al norte de Concepción por el lado de río negro, y allá se puede, no se 
pierde nada lo que trabaja uno en el chaco” dice’. Interview: San Lorenzo, 7 June 2007. 
10
 ‘Entonces, estos contra–todos decían “lo está llevando pa’ sus mozos, a picar goma en río negro” 
entonces ¿no? nos íbamos nosotros, y fuimos ¿no?’. Interview: San Lorenzo, 7 June 2007. 
11
 ‘Hasta que mi padre, mi padre vive todavía, me dice: “oye, voy a ir” entonces yo le dije “¿como 
vas a ir, pues, y nosotros?” le dije. “No, pero voy a ir a aprobar “dijo “me han hablado mucho, muy 
bueno” dijo “se da todo dijo la producción es allá” dijo “hay pescado y aquí no hay a donde mas 
pescar” dijo, “allá hay mucho que cazar”’. Interview: San Lorenzo, 7 June 2007. 
12
 Interview: José Massaí, San Lorenzo, 7 June 2007. 
13
 Interview: Palestina, 2 March 2007. 
14
 Interview: San Lorenzo, 7 June 2007. 
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arrived back there [in Monte Verde], we cleared the chaco and sowed, and sowed 
…. This large, large chaco. Then we harvested whatever large quantity of rice…15 
That not all comunarios returned was likely because the area was remote and they 
did not want to leave their families and their comunidades. Those that returned did 
not produce purely for consumption. They wanted to generate cash to buy products 
that they did not produce, and also to take back money to their families in Lomerío. 
However, selling the produce was difficult as the settlement in Monte Verde was too 
far away from the closest market in Concepción. Don José recalled:  
…there was no buyer. It was difficult for the trucks to enter. Sometimes the way 
took ten, fifteen days … Well, it was … soft earth and they have to make bridges to 
cross, and … we got demoralised. Then we said “but now we want soap and we 
want sugar, it costs, it costs”. And so, I was there for two years. Like that, the rice 
going off, nobody buys … and after we mowed and we sowed what they call 
carioca. We also had a large harvest, which was totally lost, it went off, nobody 
bought it.16 
As it was impossible for trucks to travel over the muddy paths and makeshift bridges, 
many of the founders of Monte Verde later returned to Lomerío.17 As already pointed 
out, while comunarios rely on land for subsistence, they also rely on access to the 
markets in the ex-mission settlements (in this case San Javier and Concepción) to sell 
their surplus for cash if they need it and to buy products that they do not produce 
themselves. Nevertheless, others stayed and started exploring the forest and 
consolidating the comunidad. Esteban Massaí recalled:  
… and this institution [the Bavarian Foundation] worked with us for about two 
years, and after that, the rich people denounced him here in Concepción. The karai 
[whites] said that it was communism, so that they get involved [the military 
administration under Banzer (1971–1978)], and they [the foundation] withdrew him. 
So we stayed on our own account and stayed for five years, suffering, abandoned. 
We thought about returning to Lomerío, but we thought and said, ‘but this wood is 
                                                 
15
 ‘Entonces hemos hecho un chaco grande…. Después volvimos ya, dejamos el chaco terminado. Y 
volvimos otra ves a irnos, ya no volvieron todos. Se quedaron ya, algunos se quedaron. Entonces 
después llegamos allá a limpiar el chaco y sembrar, a sembrar, a sembrar, a sembrar ese chaco 
grande, grande. Hay donde hemos cosechado cualquier cantidad de arroz, cualquier cantidad de 
arroz’. Interview: San Lorenzo, 7 June 2007. 
16
 ‘… no hay comprador, era difícil entrar los camiones. a veces tardaban de 10,15 días en el camino 
¿no? es pué’ tierra, no es como aquí tierra duro, en cambio allá es tierra blandita. Y los puentes 
tienen que hacer para cruzarlos y así pues nos desmoralizamos. Entonces dijimos “nada que hacer, 
bien” dijo, “pero ya toca que queremos jabón y queremos azúcar, cuesta, cuesta”. Entonces yo estuve 
allá dos año’. Así el arroz fregándose, nadie compra … y después carpimos y sembramos, ese que 
dice, carioca. Hemos tenido también cantidad de cosecha, ese si totalmente se perdió, se pudrió, 
nadie lo compro’. Interview: San Lorenzo, 7 June 2007. 
17
 Interview: José Massaí, San Lorenzo, 7 June 2007. 
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very good, better if we bear it for some years and the people will come, and great, 
now there are people.18 
After the NGO workers had been withdrawn due to allegations of spreading 
‘communism’ among the comunarios, the comunidad remained without any form of 
infrastructure. Later the comunidad received help from the Church and the 
Municipality to build infrastructure such as a pump and a school.19 
Photo 35: Esteban Massai 
 
Esteban Massai in his chaco, comunidad Palestina. 
Following the emergence of the CICOL in Lomerío and CICC in Concepción in the 
1980s, they promoted additional settlements in the area with the vision that this could 
solve the land problems of comunidades in Ñuflo de Chávez Province, caused by 
                                                 
18
‘… y trabajo esa institución unos dos años y después lo denunciaron los ricos de aquí de 
Concepción los karai, decían que era comunismo para que se meten, y lo retiraron. entonces nos 
quedamos por nuestra cuenta y estuvimos durante unos cinco años sufriendo abandonados. ya 
queríamos volver a Lomerío, pero pensamos y dijimos, pero este monte es buenísimo, mejor 
aguantémonos unos año y va a llegar gente, cavalito, ya ahora hay gente’. Interview: Palestina, 2 
March 2007. 
19
 Interview: Palestina, 2 March 2007. 
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population increase and the encroachment of cattle farmers (Flores, 2006: 2). In 
subsequent years, settlements emerged along the old rubber path which now lies in 
the southern part of the TCO Monte Verde, such as Makanaté, Santo Corazón, El 
Regreso and Puerto San Pedro (see map, below). Despite the land shortages, the 
settlement process was slow due to the remoteness of the area, lack of schools and 
access to the markets. Still, as some comunarios from Monte Verde decided to move 
closer to Concepción, some comunidades gained additional inhabitants and others 
(such as Palestina) were newly founded (Flores, 2006: 2).20 While the CICC 
continued to encourage new settlements in the area, its main strategy became to 
increase the population of already existing comunidades such as Santa Mónica, San 
Pablo Norte, Palmarito, Palestina, Makanaté, Monte Verde, Limoncito, Puerto 
Alegre, and to gain communal titles for them (Flores, 2007b: n/p).  
Following the foundation of the Chiquitano organisation in San Javier (CIP-
SJ) in 1994, it supported the efforts of comunarios to gain communal land titles in 
the area of Turux Napex. With the help of the Catholic Church the comunarios 
managed to secure fifty hectares per family and some uncultivated land for new 
communal areas, out of the reach of the cattle ranches. The CIP-SJ’s strategy was to 
‘occupy and defend’ these lands against an increasing encroachment of cattle 
ranchers and loggers, through the promotion of temporary settlement by comunarios 
from already existing comunidades and San Javier (CGTI-MV et al., 2006a: 5; Flores, 
2007b: n/p).  
                                                 
20
 For example, Don Esteban described how some comunarios founded Palestina in 1985 because in 
Monte Verde they felt too cut off from the markets. Interview: Palestina, 2 March 2007. 
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Map 4: The TCO Monte Verde and Chiquitano Comunidades  
Source: CGTI-MV et al. (2006a: 12).21 
                                                 
21
 Used by permission of the CGTI-MV, Concepción. 
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The Territorial Claim: Monte Verde as ‘Territory’ 
In 1990, twenty-four CICC delegates participated in the ‘March for Territory and 
Dignity’. According to José Bailaba, after the march they realised that Chiquitano 
people ‘could defend their territory as historic cultural right’ (in Flores, 2007b: n/p). 
This meant that the delegates, together with CICC leaders such as José Bailaba and 
Vicente Pesoa, decided to claim ‘indigenous territories’ as a response to the growing 
land shortages rather than communal land titles as they had done previously.22 
Through the emphasis on claiming the geographical space as ‘territory’, the centrales 
drew on the concept as outlined by CIDOB and the ILO. The centrales framed the 
land claim in terms of a ‘struggle to defend the territory as a zone of ancestral use’ 
which was the ‘last space … to recover the indigenous historical memory and have a 
space for the development of the claimant comunidades’ (my translation, CGTI-MV 
et al., 2006a: 5). As outlined in the previous chapter, this also involved ensuring that 
the claimant population identified themselves and their communities as 
‘indigenous’.23 As CGTI-MV leader Carlos Leigue noted:  
… between the CICC, the CIDOB and the CPESC then, they thought … about 
“claiming a territory, why? Because they have seen the need of the comunidades … 
Because there are some comunidades that are around Concepción and they have no 
land any more… And the families multiply, multiply themselves… they thought this 
for the good of the comunidades but also…they had to get out … to the comunidades 
and tell [them], well, we want a claim, you know that here the families are 
multiplying, afterwards we will not have land anywhere. The business men will take 
over the lands, hence we will stay…with this very small space 24 
Carlos Leigue pointed to another concern:  
… we are going to depend [on them] again, even though we have a comunidad, but 
we are going to depend again on a businessman, … we are going to be slaves of this 
businessman again. The leaders thought about that, well, we want to have our own 
                                                 
22
 Interview: Carlos Leigue (CGTI–MV leader), Concepción, 26 October 2006. 
23
 Interview: Concepción, 26 October 2006. 
24
 ‘… entre la CICC, la CIDOB, la CPESC, entonces, se ha pensado… en demandar un territorio 
¿porque?... Porque se ha visto la necesidad de las comunidades, ¿no? Porque hay algunas 
comunidades que están aquí alrededor de Concepción y ya no tienen tierras, ¿no? y las familias se 
van multiplicando, se van multiplicando, ¿no? … lo pensaron por el bien de las comunidades pero 
también, este, había que salir, digamos, a las comunidades y decir, bueno queremos una demanda, 
ustedes saben que de aquí las familias se van multiplicando, después no vamos a tener tierras donde. 
Los empresarios se van a apropiar de las tierras, entonces nosotros vamos a quedar, este, con un 
espacio muy chico’. Interview: Concepción, 26 October 2006. 
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territory to develop our own culture and develop in all that is the life of the pueblo 
Chiquitano.25 
If comunarios lacked land to produce for self-subsistence they would have to go and 
find work on the bosses’ cattle ranches, logging concessions, or in the towns. This 
would inevitably undermine their way of living as ‘Chiquitano’ and ‘comunario’, i.e. 
their sociality (see Chapter V).  
The CICC’s initial vision was that the claim should cover the comunidades 
along the old rubber path (which runs south from Monte Verde and via Makanaté 
and Palestina and towards Concepción) including Monte Verde (CGTI-MV et al., 
2006a: 5). However, in 1994 the CICC proposed to the CIP-SJ, which had also 
marked out a territory with the help of CORDECRUZ (Turux Napex, with 122,573 
hectares), to jointly claim an indigenous territory: Monte Verde. The organisations 
hoped that this would increase their political leverage. The CICOL also joined the 
claim, although it maintained a separate claim to the territory that would cover what 
became the Lomerío municipality (CGTI-MV et al., 2006a: 5; Flores, 2007b: n/p).26  
The centrales created the Chiquitano Indigenous Commission for the 
Territorial Claim of Monte Verde, composed of leaders José Bailaba, Rubén Suárez, 
Ignacio Macoño and Luis Poquiviquí. The commission’s task was to develop and 
present the claim, to approve projects and organise a strategy for conflict resolution. 
They also received help from the NGOs Asesoría Legal y Asistencia Social (ALAS – 
Legal Consultancy and Social Assistance), CEJIS and APCOB, who formed a 
support commission to help in formulating the claim and to provide legal support 
(Flores, 2007b: n/p).27 Others involved were the Chiquitano Executive Committee 
(which became the OICH), the NGO Centro de Investigación y Manejo de Recursos 
Naturales Renovables (CIMAR – Investigation Centre for the Management of 
Renewable Natural Resources) who supported the ‘technical work’, and Netherlands 
Development Organisation (SNV) (Flores, 2007b: n/p). 
                                                 
25
 ‘…vamos a depender otra vez de si bien tenemos una comunidad, pero vamos a depender de un 
empresario, este, vamos a ser mozos otra vez de ese empresario. En eso pensaron los dirigentes, 
bueno queremos tener un propio territorio para poder desarrollar nuestra propia cultura, y 
desarrollar en todo lo que es la vida del pueblo Chiquitano’. Interview: Concepción, 26 October 
2006. 
26
 The leaders associated with setting the claim in motion were, amongst others, José Bailaba, Carlos 
Cuasace, Ignacio Macoño (Flores, 2007b: n/p). 
27
 Flores notes that it was especially the task of Dr Hugo Salvatierra to formulate the territorial claim 
document (2007b: n/p). 
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In September 1994, a group of leaders from the three centrales conducted an 
inspection of the territory to verify how much land was in the hands of terceros 
(third-party intruders). They also planted boundary stones (mojones) to delimit the 
territory and installed control posts to detain illegal loggers (CGTI-MV et al., 2006a: 
5; Flores, 2007b: n/p).28 On 25 January 1995, a commission composed of Chiquitano 
comunarios and CIDOB leaders presented the claim to Bolivian President Gonzalo 
Sánchez de Lozada, requesting an area of 1,082.334 hectares (see Flores, 2006: 3; 
Martínez Montaño, 1998: 12; Tamburini, 2006: 243).29 However, by 1996 the 
centrales had not received a reply. After further pressure from the centrales, their 
NGOs allies and the CIDOB, the centrales managed to resubmit the claim on 8 
March 1996 (CGTI-MV et al., 2006a: 6; Flores, 2007b: n/p).30  
The territorial claim provoked a strong reaction from white and mestizo 
Concepceños and San Javiereños but, above all, from large landowners and 
individuals involved in logging companies. They perceived the claim to be against 
their interests as it affected an area they thought to be of economic value (CGTI-MV 
et al., 2006a: 6).31 They founded the Committee for the Defence of the Pueblo of 
Concepción, and its President, Juan Armando Antelo, presented a document to the 
Bolivian President, which rejected the claim and declared ownership rights over the 
area. While the document remained unanswered they resorted to other tactics. They 
                                                 
28
 The delimitation that was established was as follows: In the North the border was the start of the 
Los Rios Blanco and Negro reserve. In the East, it was ten kilometres from the path from Santa Rosa 
de la Roca to Piso Firme, which the centrales agreed with the Organisation MINGA, so as not to 
overstep the limits into the Velasco Province. In the West, the centrales agreed the border with the 
Guarayo Pueblo. Finally, in the South, in the zone of San Javier, the border was irregular, stretching 
from Turux Napex running parallel to the street from San Javier to San Ignacio to the comunidad 
Palmarito de la Fronterra (Flores, 2007b: n/p). 
29
 The claim (similar to other claims developed at the time) is based on Article 171 of the Bolivian 
Constitution, the 169 ILO Convention, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
International Pact for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The space was also justified through the 
argument that it considered the population increase of the claimant comunidades by year 2024 (Flores, 
2007b: n/p; Lacroix, 2005: 49). 
30
 The leaders who led the negotiations were José Bailaba (CICC Presidente), Miguel García (CICOL 
Vice-President), Ignacio Macoñó (CIP-SJ Secretary of Land and Territory) and Luis Poquiviqui 
(Flores, 2007b: n/p). 
31
 It should be noted that since the end of the 1980s, virtually all the lands in the Bolivian East have 
owners or people who are claiming their ownership rights. While many of the cultivated lands and 
pastures in Santa Cruz have legitimate owners, a minority, generally attributed to large properties and 
haciendas, have documents which the state granted in ‘less than clear circumstances’ (Urioste and 
Kay, 2005: 43). However, Urioste and Kay note that this does not impede a very dynamic land 
market, with the principal investors being above all Brazilians. Consequently, in the Santa Cruz 
department (as well as other lowland departments) large landowners or land speculators confront 
lowland indigenous people and colonisers from the Andean region in a struggle over land (2005: 43-
45). 
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threatened and intimidated Chiquitano comunarios and leaders, and promoted land 
take-overs by businesses and individuals. They cleared large areas for cattle ranching 
and initiated intense logging, especially around the comunidad of Turux Napex.  
As an immediate reaction, the centrales put up control posts at the entry 
points to the territory (Flores, 2007b: n/p). However, Monte Verde reflected problems 
faced by other lowland peoples in similar situations. In 1996, the CIDOB together 
with Campesino and Coloniser Organisations organised the ‘March for Territory, 
Natural Resources, and Popular Sovereignty’ to protest against the ongoing conflicts 
in other lowland areas and to advance different territorial claims. The Bolivian 
government reacted by promulgating the INRA Law and recognising sixteen 
territorial claims, including that of Monte Verde. Initially, INRA carried out the 
study ‘Preliminary Characterisation of the Communal Lands of Monte Verde’, which 
established the size of the TCO at 865,000 hectares. A year later, INRA completed 
the mapping and Study of Spatial Necessities and re-calculated the size of the 
territory at 1,059.964.269 hectares (CGTI-MV et al., 2006a: 6; Flores, 2006: 3; 
Martínez Montaño, 1998: 12). 
The Phase of ‘Immobilisation’ and ‘Indemnification’: Ongoing Land Invasions 
On 19 July 1997, INRA handed over the ‘Resolution of Immobilisation’ of the 
sixteen territorial claims which was meant to ‘immobilise’ ongoing land-entitlement 
procedures, take-overs and logging (Flores, 2006: 3). However, terceros kept up 
invasions and even managed to consolidate more land rights, with the complicity of 
INRA and other government institutions.32 In May 1998, parliamentarian Juan del 
Granado visited Monte Verde in response to complaints the centrales made to 
parliament. He found that within a year the initial 21 private plots with a size of 
20,000 hectares had multiplied to 159 plots with a size of 700,000 hectares (Flores, 
2006: 4-6). 
INRA did not initiate the saneamiento phase until the end of 1998, which 
provided more scope for land take-overs and conflict between Chiquitanos and their 
                                                 
32
 One example of this was when, on 1 August 1997, the Superintendencia Forestal violated the 
consultation rules established by the ILO Convention 169 as well as the Resolution of 
‘Immobilisation’, by handing over around 120,000 hectares of TCO Monte Verde land to the forest 
concessions La Chonta, CIMAL and Cronembold-La Junta (CGTI-MV et al., 2006a: 6; Flores, 2006: 
3). 
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allies on the one side, and on the other the terceros, with supporters among state 
authorities (such as the sub-prefect and the INRA Departmental directive).33 In 
reaction, from late 1997, the Chiquitano authorities exercised an increased vigilance 
over the territory. They carried out inspections and took over logging machinery as a 
means of pressure, blocked the access roads to stop terceros from entering the area 
and staged several local marches because of which the centrales officially denounced 
ongoing invasions and illegal logging. As Justo Seoane, Mayor of Concepción and 
Chiquitano activist, remembered: 
[They voiced] death threats against the dirigentes [leaders]… it was totally severe. 
We were all young people in this period; this gave us the strength… By foot we 
went to the comunidades to inform them about everything that was going on… we 
did a very large mobilisation and blocked the roads for the [land]owners so that they 
could not enter the territory any more, and could not split it up in one or the other 
way.34 
Further, they denounced the cases of continued INRA-condoned logging operations 
by La Chonta, CIMAL and Cronembold-La Junta to the ILO and the Bolivian 
Supreme Court of Justice. Both authorities ruled in favour of the centrales (CGTI-
MV et al., 2006a: 6; Flores, 2006: 4).  
Towards the end of 1998, the indemnification (SAN-TCO) phase began 
amidst a truce that the centrales had agreed with terceros (CGTI-MV et al., 2006a: 6; 
Flores, 2006: 5). An INRA team measured the existing properties and verified if they 
fulfilled the ‘social and economic function’ required for legal consolidation. The 
centrales applied a new occupation strategy which involved establishing settlements 
to prevent terceros from recovering disputed areas (CGTI-MV et al., 2006a: 6; 
Flores, 2006: 6). While legal processes were ongoing, on 28 July 2000, the CPESC 
and Chiquitano leaders led the ‘March for Land, Territory and Natural Resources’ 
                                                 
33
 In July 1998, Justo Seoane commented on the continued lack of support from the side of the sub–
prefect: ‘...he is facilitating [the fact] that they [can] keep trading land in Monte Verde. At the moment 
the sub–prefect does not support us, this is very clear’ (my translation, quoted in Flores, 2006: 5). 
34
 ‘En contra de los dirigentes, amenazas de muerte. Fue totalmente grave. Puros jóvenes en esa 
época es era la gran garantía que nos daban el esfuerzo sobre todos... y como les decía a pies le 
tirábamos a las comunidades para informarles de que todo iba… tales que así que hicimos una 
movilización bien grande y los bloqueamos a los propietario para que no ingresen mas al territorio 
de manera repartirse de una y otra manera.’. Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007. 
 281 
from Riberalta to Santa Cruz. It protested the cutbacks of the claimed territory that 
the indemnification process had entailed (see Flores, 2006: 6). 35 
In 2001, various terceros instigated trials before the Tribunal Agrario 
Nacional (TAN – National Agrarian Tribunal) with the intention of getting legal 
rights to their properties. One of these properties was the La Unidad Cooperative 
(Cooperativa La Unidad).36 With the goal of consolidating 15,000 hectares, its 
proprietors caused large fires and cleared 450 hectares of forest (CGTI-MV et al., 
2006a: 6; Flores, 2006: 6). The case is noteworthy, as it led to significant physical 
violence between the different parties, including the kidnap and beating up of 
Leonardo Tamburini, a CEJIS legal assessor (now its Director) at the hands of 
members of the Cattle Ranchers Associations of San Javier and Concepción (see 
CEJIS, 2002; CGTI-MV et al., 2006a: 6; Flores, 2006: 6). On 24 May 2003, 
Chiquitano leader Manuel Dosapey stated:  
The compañero Carlos Cuasase, president of the Chiquitano indigenous 
Organisation, has recently received death threats, together with the compañero Juan 
Pinto, President of the CICC. When they left the Office of the OICH, a person had 
been waiting … to threaten Don Carlos with death, telling him, to stop denouncing 
him to the relevant authorities. If they would not stop the denunciations, they would 
kill him and would blow up the office of the OICH … Gabriel Bernales Burrneo, 
who is one of the functionaries of the Cooperative La Unidad … is threatening [him] 
because they have not let him enter with a thousand head of cattle to his illegal 
property, this 15,000 hectares of the Cooperative La Unidad (my translation, quoted 
in Flores, 2006: 6). 
The case also involved allegations of corruption against certain Chiquitano leaders, 
which provoked the division and weakening of the centrales (Flores, 2006: 6). The 
case bore special significance for the centrales as the owners of the Cooperative were 
leading the alliance of terceros within the TCO. Losing the battle against the 
Cooperative would have most probably meant opening the territory to settlement by 
other terceros (Flores, 2006: 7).  
                                                 
35
 It also protested against the fact that SAN-TCO sought to exempt from the evaluation those 
properties with surfaces smaller than 500 hectares, and the intention of ‘certifying’ lands for 
commercial logging without previous indemnification. The march achieved its objectives and 
additionally managed to change the procedure for the identification of spatial necessities. The study 
could no longer be used to reduce claimed areas, that could only be done through SAN-TCO (see 
Balza Alarcón, 2001: 56). 
36
 For more information on the Cooperative La Unidad conflicts prior to 2001, see Tamburini (2006: 
252-253).  
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The Final Resolutions of ‘Indemnification’ 
In July 2003, INRA declared the existing land title of the Cooperative La Unidad 
invalid as it did not fulfil its ‘economic and social function’. However, in February 
2004, the TAN annulled this resolution and passed a decree favouring the proprietors 
of La Unidad. The CIP-SJ responded by occupying the heavily guarded property and 
recovered 15,000 hectares of the territory (CGTI-MV et al., 2006a: 7; Flores, 2006: 
7; Tamburini, 2006: 251). To increase the pressure, a march by indigenous, 
campesino and landless movements departed from San Javier to Puerto Pailas, 
demanding movements in the consolidation process of the TCO Monte Verde and 
highlighting the agrarian claims of the other mobilised groups (Tamburini, 2006: 
242, 252).37 What followed was a series of rulings and counter-rulings. From 
November, INRA finally completed the re-settlements and ejections of the identified 
illegal tercero properties. By the end of May 2006, the only cases pending were that 
of La Unidad and El Refugio (Flores, 2006: 7).38  
On 3 June 2006, after more than eleven years of struggle, the centrales and 
the claimant comunidades managed to consolidate 88 percent (over 947,440.8320 
hectares) of their original claim through the Endowment and Titling of Monte Verde 
(Resolución de Dotación y Titulación de Monte Verde), which President Evo 
Morales handed over in Santa Cruz.39 However, the owners of the forestry 
concessions La Chonta, Cronembold-La Junta, CIMAL-IMR reacted by contesting 
the decision before the TAN, which further delayed the handover of the Executive 
Title until February 2007, when the TAN passed judgement favourable to the 
Chiquitano claimants (Flores, 2007a: n/p).40 On 3 July 2007, the three claimant 
centrales and comunidades received the legal title for the TCO Monte Verde from 
the hands of Evo Morales during a ceremony in San Javier (see photo 36). However, 
even at that point there were still some issues outstanding. INRA promised that 
                                                 
37
 The ‘March for Popular Sovereignty, Territory and Natural Resources’ had been staged in May 
2002. Lowland indigenous, campesino organisations and the Movimiento Sin Tierra (MST – the 
Landless Movement) demanded a Constituent Assembly. However, neither the march nor the change 
in government in December 2002, changed the situation regarding the conflicts surrounding the TCO 
Monte Verde (see Lacroix, 2005: 51).  
38
 The case of El Refugio was similarly as contentious and long-lasting as that of the Cooperative La 
Unidad. In 2006, the TAN ruled again in favour of the two tercero (third-party) claimants (see 
Tamburini, 2006: 256-258). 
39
 The Administrative Resolution RADT-ST Nr 208/2006 from 26 May 2006 established 947,440.832 
hectares in favour of the claimants (Flores, 2007a: n/p). 
40
 La Chonta, Cronembold-La Junta, CIMAL-IMR together claimed around 120,000 hectares (CGTI-
MV et al., 2006a: 8; Flores, 2006: 7; Tamburini, 2006: 261). 
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approximately 800 hectares of fiscal land would be titled in favour of the TCO 
retrospectively together with the land (about 27,000 hectares) that they hoped to 
recover from La Unidad, El Refugio, 8 de December, La Locura, La Penca and La 
Florestas. (Flores, 2007a: n/p). 
Photo 36: Evo Morales at TCO Monte Verde Ceremony 
 
Evo Morales hands the legal title the TCO Monte Verde to Chiquitano central 
leaders at a ceremony in San Javier, 3 July 2007. 
Territorial Management and Planning 
Through their territorial struggle, the Chiquitano Organisations have increasingly 
centralised decision-making power and have become more professionalised, 
paralleling the developments Steven Rubenstein (2001) has described for the Shuar 
in Ecuador and Rosengreen (2003) for the Matsigenka of Peru. Chiquitano 
organisations have taken on a ‘taproot’ model of organisations (see Chapter II).41 
They are the main entity dealing with NGOs, state officials and lawyers on behalf of 
                                                 
41
 Another reason is the aforementioned political participation, in and cooperation with, the municipal 
sphere (see Chapter VII). 
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the comunidades. They were, for instance, responsible in taking forward the legal 
battle, in calling for marches and organising the defence of the territory. The central 
has consolidated itself as a body that not only assists comunidades, but that can also 
take decisions on their behalf. Paradoxically, in the name of defending the territory, 
the centrales have also become part of the state project of making society more 
legible (Scott, 1998). In addition to the legal battle around the TCO, from 2000, the 
three organisations put an increasing emphasis on gestión territorial (territorial 
management). This was part of a broader development in the lowland indigenous 
movement. It had grown out of a debate among NGOs, who supported indigenous 
organisations in the late 1990s, about the ‘management’ or ‘administration’ (gestión 
territorial) of the claimed territories. Issues under consideration included 
‘autogobierno’ (self-governance) and its practicalities (see CPESC, 2003). NGOs 
such as CEJIS generally viewed territorial management as a  
… participatory process through which Chiquitano comunarios would define how 
they want to live in the territory and would reflect on how to construct and exercise 
governance, conserve and use the natural resources, generate production and 
strengthen the Chiquitano identity (my translation, Flores, 2006: 7-8).  
SNV’s reasoning to push for territorial management in Ñuflo de Chávez province 
was that the three organisations ‘lacked the practical skills necessary to assume the 
challenge of autonomous territorial management’; and furthermore, ‘there were no 
other, similar experiences in the region that could serve as reference models of TCO 
Monte Verde’ (Tapia and del Pilar Valencia, 2007: 2). 
The NGOs’ vision of how Chiquitano should live in their territories 
seemingly coincided with the Bolivian government’s definitions and vision 
expressed in the INRA Law. While they claimed that through ‘participation’ 
Chiquitano leaders and comunarios would define how they wanted to live in the 
territories, the dictates were that this should entail the use and conservation of the 
natural resources, generate production and strengthen their ‘identity’. This points to 
what William Fisher calls a ‘paradoxical attempt to generate participation through a 
top down-down process of planning an organisation’ (1997: 455).42 SNV’s vision 
was especially paradoxical: if Chiquitano should get territories in which they would 
live according to their ‘own forms of economic, social and cultural organisation’, 
how could they lack the practical skills to do so? This is a clear example of how 
                                                 
42
 See also Chambers (1995).  
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NGOs are involved in facilitating the state ‘legibility project’, as well as perpetuating 
the indio permitido logic of making land and social organisations functional to the 
neo-liberal economic system (cf. Hale, 2002, 2004; Scott, 1998), also recruiting 
indigenous people to become part of the process.  
NGO aid focused on two aspects: firstly, the consolidation of the 
organisational structures responsible for the TCO, and secondly, conducting studies 
on the characteristics and economic potential of natural resources within it. SNV was 
involved in the first aspect and from 2001 aided in ‘capacity development’: 
‘strengthening the organisational capacities for territorial management of the TCO 
Monte Verde’ through ‘organisational development’ and advisory services (Tapia 
and del Pilar Valencia, 2007: 2).43 The belief of NGOs and the three centrales was 
that there was a lack of coordination between them, regarding policies towards the 
territory and the comunidades (CPESC, 2003: 31). Through ‘organisational 
strengthening’, they hoped to resolve the situation. The territorial management 
process also included workshops in which different indigenous lowland organisations 
exchanged experiences in organising, political participation and territorial 
management.44  
In terms of the production of studies, SNV aided in conducting ‘preliminary 
base-line studies’ regarding the ‘physical and environmental characteristics and the 
economic development potential’ of the TCO. These were conducted by external 
consultants together with Chiquitano technicians. The NGO posited that with the 
generated information the centrales could take ‘informed’ decisions regarding 
appropriate land uses and the management of the TCO (Tapia and del Pilar Valencia, 
2007: 9). For this purpose they produced the ‘Diagnostic: The Socio-economic and 
Productive Situation in the Settlements and Comunidades inside and outside the TCO 
Monte Verde’ (2004). A study carried out with another NGO concerned 
‘environmental planning’, an initial evaluation of the biodiversity of the claimed 
                                                 
43
 The SNV Project with the CICC, CIDOB and CIP–SJ ran from 2001–2006. See Tapia and del Pilar 
Valencia (2007). 
44
 For example the CPESC organised an exchange of experiences between the OICH, the CICC, the 
CIPSJ, the CICOL and the Central de Pueblos Étnicos Mojeños del Beni (CEPEM-B – Organisation 
of Ethnic Mojeño People of the Beni). This was part of an OXFAM America financed and supported 
Project, ‘Exchange of Experiences in Organisation, Citizen Participation and Territorial Management 
of Original Community Territories (TCOs) of Peoples from the Beni and Santa Cruz,’ carried out in 
April and May 2003 (see CPESC, 2003). With the results, they hoped to ‘propose strategic guidelines 
which direct the management and the administration of the TCO Monte Verde’ (CPESC, 2003: 31). 
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area. It classified the territory according to six ‘categories of use’ according to type 
of soil and landscape (see RUMBOL, 2004). 
Most NGOs were generally concerned with making the territory legible, and 
with this information they would define its sustainable uses. Their agenda was in line 
with the INRA Law, which sought to define the resources and their values in each 
territory and then aimed to introduce different techniques to exploit them sustainably. 
NGOs aimed to assist Chiquitanos to structure their lives accordingly. In turn, NGOs 
recruited the centrales to assist them in defining the available resources and then 
‘teach’ comunarios how to use these resources properly.  
While NGOs, in their function as facilitators of these processes, are not as 
‘non-governmental’ as they might claim, they may do so unwittingly. Postero 
suggests for the case of CEADES that such NGOs may act as ‘agents of government’ 
because ‘what runs through the trajectory of the NGOs is an overriding faith in 
democracy and participation’ (2007: 176). They reproduce ‘the discourse and 
practices of neo-liberal multiculturalism’ because ‘NGO workers are both agents and 
the subjects of the current regime of citizenship – they are constituted by the lived 
experiences of being citizens, and then they have a role in constituting what 
citizenship means’ (2007: 176).45 They may also do so because they bow to pressures 
put upon them by the international funders to follow what these see as the 
appropriate path for ‘development’. NGO personnel may feel this more directly or 
more subliminally, as they take on funders’ ‘good ideas’ and/or try to fit into the 
required funding criteria. The interest in ‘indigenous territories’ from international 
and national funders stems from the fact that they offer a range of possibilities for 
NGO-created projects – they are a ‘hot topic’ in the international funding arena in the 
light of the Western drive to ‘protect rain forest areas’, especially since the growing 
prominence of the campaign against climate change. In line with this, funders and 
NGOs were keen to get involved or undertake development projects in the TCO 
                                                 
45
 An analysis of the agendas of such NGOs as ALAS, CEJIS and APCOB, and their relation to 
international funders such as OXFAM Great Britain and OXFAM America is pending, and would 
surely be beneficial to understand the way in which they are influencing agendas, practices and 
discourses of Chiquitano organisations and comunarios. As Fisher notes, NGOs should be seen as a 
‘fluid web of relations’ and the micropolitics of NGOs should be unpacked and placed in a larger 
context, ‘understanding them not as local wholes subsumed within larger national and global political 
contexts but as fragmented sites that have multiple connections nationally and transnationally’ (1997: 
450).  
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Monte Verde. To illustrate this, we can consider a meeting between employees from 
the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and the central in late February 2007.  
The WWF planned to implement a sustainable communal forestry project 
funded by the European Union with some comunidades in the TCO. APCOB was 
their national NGO of choice to implement the project. The meeting was tense as 
central leaders used it to vent anger at APCOB. Among the issues was that APCOB 
was accused of not letting comunarios travel in their cars and had not consulted 
leaders about the project earlier. This was one of the occasional central-NGO bust-
ups mentioned in Chapter III, which often ensued due to resource management issues 
and when central leaders felt that NGOs were cashing in on their name. 
Nevertheless, the WWF employees managed to demonstrate their ‘hyperreal Indian’ 
logic (Ramos, 1998), partly to appease and flatter the leaders and comunarios present 
at the meeting. According to the WWF spokesperson, the Chiquitano were chosen 
for the project as they knew how to live in harmony with the forest and protect it. 
However, they still needed to be taught one or two things about logging, as their own 
techniques damaged the forest and lowered the quality of the wood. Probably feeling 
that their project was in jeopardy, they put more urgency into the matter: ‘TCOs are 
large areas, how can you justify them? [Through] forestry management, selling 
oxygen, conservation of the biodiversity and even tourism. One can get many 
projects to preserve this territory’.46  
The outcome of the meeting was inconclusive. However, NGO workers had 
already approached separate comunidades about the project, making it likely that 
they would deal directly with them, if the central refused. This incident provides 
insights into the force (international) NGOs might use to implement their projects 
and the lengths they may go to, to follow (and spread) their own vision of 
development and how people should live. It also shows how indigenous territories 
are increasingly becoming the focal point for international projects, as they are seen 
as crucial ‘last reserves’ for rescuing the climate and biodiversity of the planet.47 As 
will be addressed below, in the fight for these spaces inhabitants and claimants have 
to ‘justify’ that they are worthy of the space and will guarantee its protection.  
                                                 
46
 Field notes: Concepción, 27 February 2007. 
47
 This, of course, leads to the debate of how ‘first world’ governments are investing in such projects, 
as this is a more conflict-free route to be seen to be doing something about the perceived global 
climate threat, than actually driving change in their own countries. The in’s and out’s of the debate are 
beyond the scope of this text. . 
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The Role of the CGTI-MV 
As part of the territorial management process, in 2001, the three Chiquitano 
organisations created a separate directory and technical support team to deal with the 
queries and problems of the comunidades within the territory. In 2004 they named 
the new structure Comité de Gestión del Territorio Indígena de Monte Verde (CGTI-
MV – Management Committee of the Indigenous Territory of Monte Verde). It was 
made up of representatives chosen by each central and the technical assistance 
personnel that the CGTI-MV directory hired (Flores, 2006: 8).48 The CGTI-MV 
received no decision-making power but was to administer activities to do with 
territorial planning, manage projects and economic resources, oversee the process of 
re-settlement and expulsion of illegal settlers, convoke the Great Assembly of 
comunidades, and interact with NGOs that supported the territorial management 
processes (CGTI-MV et al., 2006a: 31). This also involved the initiation of studies 
(diagnósticos) about biodiversity, economics and the establishment of norms for the 
use of the natural resources within the territory (Flores, 2006: 8).49 Thus, the CGTI-
MV was also the latest ‘legibility’-facilitator. 
However, the CGTI-MV and the three centrales admitted that the creation of 
this additional administrative body was problematic. While the three centrales 
expected the CGTI-MV to administer and execute projects in the territory, CGTI-
MV staff maintained that its role was restricted to the ‘administration’ of projects. 
The CGTI-MV staff felt that they could not overrule the decisions of the centrales 
until its role extended to decision-making. CGTI-MV and the three centrales 
frequently noted that the lack of coordination between the centrales, and between the 
centrales and CGTI-MV had to be resolved. They suggested that the problems 
stemmed from the fact that the centrales had not appropriated the ‘new organ’ CGTI-
MV sufficiently and that there was ‘a lack of involvement and appropriation of the 
information gathered in diagnostics’ (CPESC, 2003: 32). 
                                                 
48
 OXFAM Great Britain supported the organisations through the project ‘Strengthening the CGTI’, 
and by organising workshops, providing organisational support and financing the purchase of training 
materials. 
49
 The CGTI-MV et al. states that ‘the norms are agreements established in a consensus, by all those 
that live in the TCO Monte Verde. These rules allow us to live in harmony, conduct a better 
management and control of all that we have in the TCO, especially the Natural resources. … [and] 
also to avoid conflict between our comunidades’ (2006b: 67). Some of these norms are: ‘to defend the 
territory, to attend meetings, participate in communal work … not to bewitch people, not to steal, not 
to cut trees during full moon, not to hunt during Easter week, not to hunt indiscriminately’ (CGTI-MV 
et al., 2006b: 73).  
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That the centrales did not coordinate their activities sufficiently with the 
CGTI-MV is not surprising, considering that they struggled to coordinate their 
activities among themselves already before its establishment. This was partly due to 
the fact that they were constantly busy carrying out various NGO-financed projects 
or liaising with other state actors, from municipal government to umbrella 
organisations like OICH, CPESC and CIDOB. Additionally, comunarios expected 
more than ‘a mere administration’ of projects from the CGTI-MV, leading to 
frustrations with its performance (see CGTI-MV et al., 2006a: 31-32). When CGTI-
MV leaders came to the comunidades, comunarios probably expected them to 
engage in similar project and service delivery activities as most of their other state 
visitors.  
At times, the centrales and the CGTI-MV also found that ‘there were not 
enough resources to carry out the work in a more participatory manner’ (CPESC, 
2003: 32). NGOs, their funders and the centrales face similar problems when they 
plan and carry out many studies and projects. After all, consulting most of the 
comunidades is time-consuming and expensive. Projects have very strict deadlines 
and budgets and they rarely consider logistical problems (from weather influences to 
petrol shortages) that might impede their execution. Facing time constraints, those 
who carry out such studies and projects must cut corners.50 
‘Ordenando nuestro territorio’ 
In 2005, the CGTI-MV started the OXFAM financed project ‘Ordenando nuestro 
territorio’ (‘Putting Our Territory in Order’), which was supposed to plan the 
establishment of settlements within the territory and to ‘organise’ the territory by, for 
example, predicting population growth and establishing the exact amount of land that 
each comunidad could use. This involved the setting up of communal management 
plans and statutes for ‘indigenous territorial governance’.51 The project also aimed at 
ordering the territory according to ‘zones of use’, by establishing conservation zones 
and zones for sustainable forestry. According to the CGTI-MV it serves as ‘orienting 
instrument, to take decisions over the adequate use and occupation of the territory’ to 
                                                 
50
 Similar constraints were faced during the research phase of the CEJIS Governance Project. See 
Chapter III.  
51
 See CGTI-MV et al. (2006a: 32-33). 
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‘guarantee the sustainability of the way of life of the current and future generations’ 
(my translation, 2006a: 11-12).52 
As part of this effort, in 2006, the CGTI-MV finished formulating a ‘plan de 
gestión territorial’ (‘territorial management plan’). It defined ‘territory’ as follows: 
[It] constitutes the historical and spiritual space, the large house of the indigenous 
Chiquitano people of Monte Verde, were they live grouped together in comunidades, 
reproducing their cultural identity, with their own forms of organisation, which are 
in charge of regulating their collective life based on consensus, and administrating 
justice … (my translation, 2006a: 11). 
This definition implies the concept of ‘self-determination’, and that what is at stake 
is ensuring ‘continuity’ of Chiquitano life. It points to the very reason why 
Chiquitano comunarios and leaders originally felt that they needed to have access to 
more land, namely to be able to plant crops, hunt and fish, and to be able to subsist 
and live as comunidades with their own practices and authorities. Nevertheless, 
despite this statement, the document itself undermines this notion. Not only does it 
aim at increasing the ‘legibility’ of the space, but it also contains the idea that 
Chiquitano comunarios must be taught how to use land and resources ‘sustainably’.  
The CGTI-MV and the three centrales formulated the document as part of a 
strategy to declare the different possible and feasible ‘uses’ of the territory in the 
light of the need to ‘justify’ ownership of such a vast stretch of land. As indicated 
above, this is a powerful and pervasive notion spread by state agencies, employed by 
national and international NGO workers and taken on by Chiquitano leaders. During 
the central-WWF meeting, the CICC President at the time, Manuel Peña pointed out 
that INRA functionaries also put much emphasis on the notion of ‘justification’. He 
went on to state that without such justification the INRA would ask: ‘for what do 
these Paicos, the Indios need that much land?’ He added that ‘using the resources 
within the territory’ meant ‘giving work to our comunidades’.53 
                                                 
52
 Drawing on a definition by CEDIB (2005), the CGTI-MV defined ‘ordenamiento territorial’ as: 
‘…the process of use and occupation of the territory, in terms of its biophysical, socio–economic, 
cultural and political-institutional characteristics. … [In order to] achieve the adequate use of the soil, 
according to its potentials and limitations, as well as the appropriate occupation of the territory, 
optimising the distribution of human settlements, the access to health services, education and basic 
services, the localisation of transport infrastructure and support for production’ (my translation, 
2006a: 11). 
53
 Field notes, Concepción, 27 February 2007. 
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Like Manuel Peña, others pointed to the importance of territorial 
management. Elmar Massai (CGTI-MV technician) stressed that with the finances 
from OXFAM America, the CGTI-MV had produced reports and defined the 
objectives of territorial management:  
We started to implement a strategy of communication and diffusion through a radio 
programme. Through a local radio station, it reaches all the demanding comunidades 
[and] spreads the vision that the Organisations have in terms of the consolidation of 
the territory, the organic structure and the administration of the TCO Monte Verde. 
This was supported in the General Assembly where all the delegates of the claimant 
organisations participated, this strengthened us to carry out the projects which 
benefit the territorial management of the TCOs (my translation, in CPESC, 2003: 
33). 
He sees territorial management as important for ‘consolidating the demand’, which is 
an issue that other Chiquitano leaders and NGO workers also often stress. 
As Elmar Massai’s statement indicates, the centrales, CGTI-MV and NGOs 
have taken care to involve comunarios in the territorial management process, by 
drawing on their opinions regarding the territory and its uses and keeping them 
informed of the process through workshops. The CGTI-MV and the centrales 
produced (in a ‘participatory manner’ and with NGO support) three booklets that 
they distributed among the comunidades in the TCO Monte Verde. One concerned 
Chiquitano communal justice and another established norms for the use of natural 
resources in the TCO.54 A third concerned territorial management itself. It explained 
the territorial management process and stated the ‘principles’ of territorial 
management as ‘The foundations of our casa grande [big house] over which we are 
going to build our vision for the future, recovering our historical past and taking our 
present one into consideration’ (2006b: 15). The principles are: 
… autonomy: which is to take our own decisions; participation, [which is] to have 
opinions, negotiate and decide with everybody; equity in the distribution of benefits 
means that not just a few can take advantage; transparency, which is the use of our 
resources in an honest way; sustainability, which means taking advantage of the 
natural resources thinking in the future of our children and children’s children, etc.; 
cultural identity, which is to feel proud of our culture and to be Chiquitanos and 
Chiquitanas (my translation, CGTI-MV et al., 2006b: 17). 
                                                 
54
 The first booklet was titled: ‘Justicia comunitaria pueblo indígena Chiquitano’ (2005); and the 
second: ‘Normas de uso y aprovechamiento de los recursos naturales en la TCO Monte Verde’ 
(2006c).  
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Chiquitano also express such notions when they talk about what it means to be 
comunario and Chiquitano (Chapter V). The booklet simply attaches ‘development’ 
terminology to these notions. It stated that the territory serves as a ‘reserve’, a 
‘source of economic income for the collective benefit of the TCO’, a ‘source of work 
for the Chiquitano families’ (CGTI-MV et al., 2006b: 21). Further, it is:  
… a place where we can work, fish, hunt, recollect, and in this way we have a place 
were we can all live freely; To elect our authorities according to our usos y 
costumbres; … [to] strengthen our cultural identity; and additionally implement our 
economic, environmental, social and cultural development (my translation, CGTI-
MV et al., 2006b: 57). 
The booklet also states that ultimately this will help to ‘strengthen our cultural 
identity’ (2006b: 57). Some of these notions are taken from the domestic 
multicultural rights framework and international conventions, but it remains unclear 
what this means in terms of Chiquitano everyday lives.  
Lastly, the booklet expresses a future vision: 
We are going have an autonomous government, elected by men and women, take 
decisions about how we are going to control and administer our territory, respect and 
strengthen our culture, apply our norms and rescue our knowledge (my translation, 
CGTI-MV et al., 2006b: 43).  
This points to substantial changes, namely the introduction of an ‘autonomous’ 
government through which joint decisions over the territory will be taken, and the 
adherence to a universal set of norms within the territory. These norms are to be 
applied, while at the same time ‘culture’ is to be strengthened. The paradox is that 
comunidades have their own norms and decision-making systems (see Chapter V and 
VII). These might not always be written down, as they often take the form of 
‘behavioural principles’ rather than expressed norms (see Cohen, 1985a: 16).  
Questions also arise regarding the idea of a central governmental structure. 
While the centrales do fulfil certain functions with respect to the comunidades (for 
example as the legal body that carried the territorial claims, and as project 
coordinator and facilitator), much decision-making power regarding their everyday 
lives lies with comunidades. It remains to be seen what shape such a central 
‘government’ for the territory will take and how much it will affect the comunidades. 
However, this makes clear how much the CEJIS governance project is actually part 
of the state legibility project. All this contradicts the initial idea of why comunarios 
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demanded the territory in the first place, namely to assure the continuity of their 
lives. 
Pointing to the Paradoxes: Critical Chiquitano Voices 
Some Chiquitano leaders saw territorial management in an outright critical light. 
Former central leader and Chiquitano representative to the Constituent Assembly 
José Bailaba Parapaino argued that what NGOs promoted as ‘new’ to Chiquitano 
organisations and comunidades was not so alien to them after all. He stated: 
For me territorial management is not what they are doing in Guarayos or Lomerío, 
plans to extract wood, which led to social problems. If this is territorial management, 
then excuse me, I do not agree, because it is generating social problems and not 
helping to strengthen our organisations, but rather only create divisions (my 
translation, in CPESC, 2003: 29). 
The tension and problems concern resources and what they should be used for: 
economic gain or social reproduction. CICOL Chiquitano facilitator Anacleto Peña 
was another Chiquitano who voiced similar objections: 
We are talking of territorial management of the TCO, according to the dictionary 
this is synonymous with administration. We talk of indigenous territorial 
management, which we perceive to be different and it has another conceptual 
meaning. For us the concept of territory, in the vision of the indigenous people, is to 
say where one is born, one grows, one reproduces, one lives … And territorial 
management as we the indigenous peoples see it, we have realised the administration 
of our territories since time memorable, of the natural riches, the fauna, the flora, we 
have lived from fishing, hunting, and recollection. In Lomerío, they have 
implemented projects of forestry extraction … but the experience gained in all this 
process, created discontent among the comunidades … and they forced the closure 
of the sawmill (my translation, quoted in CPESC, 2003: 33). 
José Bailaba and Anacleto Peña highlight two aspects; firstly, that they see it as 
paradoxical to ‘re-educate’ Chiquitano comunidades on how to manage their 
territories, and secondly, that there is a problem with the emphasis on productive and 
‘development’ activities, such as forestry management and agricultural activities. 
Don José added that he was worried that ‘the government will want to implement 
territorial management in all the TCOs and this will be a grave problem for the 
indigenous peoples’ (my translation, in CPESC, 2003: 33). These leaders point to the 
paradox of implementing ‘territorial management’, which they see as a system that 
perpetuates the productive interests of the Bolivian state bureaucracy.  
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The issue here is not that no income should be generated, but one of scale. As 
noted, comunarios supplement their subsistence activities with an extra cash income 
if they require it. Such projects as cattle ranching or possibly sustainable forestry 
management may provide such an extra income in times of need, so heads of families 
do not need to leave the area and work on the bosses’ lands, as Carlos Leigue pointed 
out above. However, the ‘current way of life’ is not guaranteed if this entails a switch 
from subsistence activities to ‘sustainable’ economic activities, or, in other words, a 
shift from ‘work’ to ‘production’ (Sider, 2003: 12).55 As José Bailaba and Anacleto 
Peña point out, productive projects have often failed or created conflicts in the past, 
for example, in the case of Lomerío (also see McDaniel, 2003). Examples from 
several comunidades show that communally managed productive projects often lead 
to conflict and corruption within comunidades.56 In addition, other considerations 
complicate the picture. Some leaders and comunarios noted that carrying out at least 
some work to generate cash is necessary so that they can stop their dependence on 
NGO handouts and possibly the dependence on different state bureaucracies for 
resources. For example, Lorenzo Pasabare pointed out that moving away from NGO 
handouts was important because:  
From the moment that I’m begging somebody to give me [something] and 
submitting to their guidelines … I am not practising my own autonomy, I am 
submitting to norms. I am submitting to obligations and rights that others give me.57 
These issues will preoccupy comunarios and leaders for some time to come. 
However, despite critical voices, the centrales are heavily influenced by the notions 
of their allies and INRA and prime actors in increasing the legibility of land and 
population.  
                                                 
55
 Sider explains the difference between ‘work and ‘production’ as follows: ‘By work I mean the 
actual labour of fashioning something necessary or desired in the continuation of social life. … 
Production refers to the larger system in (and against) which work takes its shape and its pace, a 
system that includes both the work to produce goods and the cultural, social, political, and economic 
relations through which surpluses are formed, transferred out of the control of the people who did the 
work, and transformed’ (2003: 12). 
56
 For example, Lorenzo Pasabare, told me one day, that a forestry management project ran for six 
years in Santa Monica while the money it generated ‘simply disappeared’. Nobody knew where it 
went; no comunario had significantly altered their living standards. He suspected somebody had 
squandered it on a good time in town. Fieldnotes: Concepción, 15 May 2007.  
57
 ‘…desde el momento que yo este de pordiosero pidiendo a alguien que me de y sometiéndome yo a 
su lineamiento … no estoy eh practicando mi propia autonomía, me estoy sometiendo a normas. Me 
estoy sometiendo a obligaciones y a derechos que otros me están dando.’ Interview: Concepción, 1 
June 2007.  
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Chiquitano Constructions of Territory and Monte Verde 
To a certain extent, such notions as ‘sustainability’ and ‘sustainable exploitation of 
the territories’ resources’ have also found their way into how comunarios talk about 
the territory. For example, when asked what the comunarios planned to do with their 
territory in the future, a comunario from La Embocada expressed: ‘there we are 
going to manage it well, so that what is within the territory does not run out. Well, 
that we do not fell in large quantities and only use what we need’.58 Also several 
comunarios from San Miguelito Sur expressed such notions during a focus group 
that CEJIS colleagues Lorenzo Pasabare, David Rivero and I carried out in San 
Miguelito Sur. One comunario pointed more explicitly to the idea of ‘sustainability’: 
I think that is also to know how to exploit the wood and making sustainable 
management of each comunidad, also to make new comunidades or new settlements 
within our territory, because the wood belongs to one.59 
Another comunario added:  
…also in the territory there is much to hunt, one has to protect them from the fire 
because they can disappear, if us or our children go to the territory it is for them and 
this is why we have to look after it, we already have families there.60 
When asked what he thought a ‘territory’ was, a third comunario was more 
concerned with the fact that ‘in Monte Verde there are also natural medicines and 
one has to look after them, they can disappear when one burns the woods’.61 When 
responding to the same question, Don Miguel from Candelaria somewhat moved 
away from the idea of ‘sustainability’ and protecting nature. He noted:  
Well, in my understanding, as you say what a territory is, well, [according to my 
understanding] a territory is where plants, animals exist, all that exists in the earth, 
                                                 
58
 ‘Allá vamos a darle un manejo bien para no acabar lo que hay dentro del territorio, bueno que 
nosotros no desmontamos en cantidad solo utilizamos lo necesario’. Focus group: La Embocada, 8 
March 2007. 
59
 ‘Yo creo que es también saber aprovechar la madera que tienen haciendo un manejo sostenible de 
cada comunidad también hacer nuevas comunidades o nuevos asentamiento dentro de nuestro 
territorio porque el monte es de uno’. Focus group 2: San Miguelito Sur, 9 March 2007. 
60
 ‘También hay en territorio harto para cazar hay que cuidarlos del fuego por se pueden 
desaparecer, si nosotros o nuestros hijos se van al territorio eso es para ellos y por eso hay que 
cuidarlo como ya tenemos familias allá’. Focus group 2: San Miguelito Sur, 9 March 2007. 
61
 ‘Hay también en Monte Verde tenemos medicinas naturales y hay que cuidarlas puede desaparecer 
cuando se quema el monte’. Focus group 2: San Miguelito Sur, 9 March 2007. 
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water, wind, where there are humans, too, thus this is what I understand a territory to 
be.62 
He shared this understanding with many others who highlighted similar elements 
(generally plants, animals and people). Again others saw these elements more in the 
sense of resources that they could use ‘as a necessity’. For example Don Eduardo 
from the same comunidad added to Don Miguel’s statement: 
Yes for me too, as they have already mentioned, a territory is where land, plants 
exist, all that, more than anything there is wood, traditional medicines, wood that is 
useful for the men, where the animals are, also sometimes one uses them as 
necessity and it is an immense quantity of land.63 
Mostly leaders and a few comunarios also noted that a territory included the natural 
resources underneath the earth, i.e. minerals and hydrocarbons. Don Víctor noted in 
the same workshop session: 
The same, no? I think a territory is a large space where everything is, the wood, the 
minerals, and also the hydrocarbons, that might be underneath the earth, because the 
land is only on top, and a territory is everything, including what is underneath the 
earth, it is where animals are and much forestry, much wood.64 
It can be assumed that this notion is partly influenced by the debate on indigenous 
territories, and resource ownership in the context of the Constituent Assembly. 
However, the meanings Chiquitano attach to the space of Monte Verde are 
also shaped by other factors. They are influenced by Chiquitano memory of land 
loss, combined with the threat that this poses to Chiquitano livelihoods (see Chapter 
IV and V). Chiquitano leaders and comunarios often emphasised that the claim to the 
Monte Verde territory is valid because this was ancestral land, in the sense that their 
                                                 
62
 ‘Ya bueno, yo a mi modo de entender, como dice que es un territorio, bueno lo que yo entiendo, un 
territorio es donde existen las plantas, los animales, todo lo que existe en la tierra, el agua, el viento, 
donde hay humano también, entonces eso es lo que entiendo lo que es un territorio’. Workshop: 
Candelaria, 11 May 2007. 
63
 ‘Sí también para mí un territorio es donde, como ya le habían mencionao todo, donde existe tierra, 
plantas, todo no, más que todo hay maderas medicinales, hay maderas que es útil para el hombre, 
donde están los animales también que a veces uno lo utiliza como necesidad, y es una inmensa 
cantidad de terreno’. Workshop: Candelaria, 11 May 2007. 
64
 ‘Lo mismo no, yo pienso que un territorio es un espacio más grande donde esta todo pues, las 
maderas, los minerales y también los hidrocarburos que puede haber debajo de la tierra, porque la 
tierra es encima nomás, y un territorio es todo hasta lo que hay debajo de la tierra, es donde hay 
animales y mucha forestación y maderables’ . Workshop: Candelaria, 11 May 2007. 
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ancestors moved through it on the way to the gomales (rubber areas) in the Beni.65 
As one comunario interviewed by Elba Flores noted: 
The old people said that there is a path that leads to the rubber areas, and we want to 
commemorate this path, so we have to demand this place. … There are good and bad 
memories attached to this path but it is our history, so the grandparents wanted to 
remember their passage, this is the reason that they demand these places. To this 
variable comes the natural resources, hunting, fishing, recollection, wood, and that 
we can preserve the fertility of the land (my translation, in Flores, 2007b: n/p). 
The path was both a scene of suffering and an area of refuge. One night when we 
were driving back from Palestina to Concepción, Chiquitano colleagues told me that 
we were driving on a section of the old rubber path. The pick-up lights were broken 
and we stopped to fix them. Standing in the dark with all the noises of the rainforest 
around us, my colleagues took the opportunity to tell me that many comunarios 
(including themselves) had heard voices, screams and the sound of chains on the path 
at night from those that died along the path.66 Comunarios remember the suffering of 
their ancestors who were deported to the rubber areas. Many died on the way due to 
illness, age, exhaustion, or because they were killed. 
However, it was an area of refuge for those ancestors who managed to flee to 
the forest. For example, former CICC leader Facundo Rivero stressed the element of 
freedom over the suffering and subordination: ‘one saw the necessity to have a space 
where our parents have taught us to be free. And we have [somewhere] where we can 
have our productive, educational and health activities’.67 Through the path, history is 
inscribed in the landscape. We could also add other elements, or land marks, to this 
that act similarly: the mission settlements, the locations of former ranchos and 
current comunidades, the massive areas cleared for cattle ranching and the small 
amount of land that surrounds comunidades. This shows what authors have also 
noted for other cases, how ‘landscape … expresses, simultaneously, both the 
                                                 
65
 The rubber boom is, of course, a theme that recurs in many Amazonian societies that experienced 
this economic transformation, because it was a time of ‘abrupt, violent change forced upon indigenous 
peoples from outside and above’ (Hill, 1988a: 7; also see Reeve, 1988). That this is especially 
remembered, is, as Jonathan Hill points out, linked to the fact that historical consciousness of 
indigenous South American societies ‘is understood in relation to a few “peaks”, or critical periods of 
rapid change’ (1988a: 7). 
66
 Field notes: Concepción, 19 May 2007. 
67
 ‘Por se vio la necesidad de tener un espacio donde nuestros padres nos enseñaron hacer libres. Y 
tengamos donde hacer nuestras actividades productiva educación y salud’. Interview: Santa Mónica, 
26 January 2007. 
 298 
imposed histories of changing systems of production and the claimed histories of 
daily life and work in families and communities’ (Sider, 2003: 7).68  
While the territory itself is linked to the history of land loss, the struggle for 
land is to guarantee the continuity of Chiquitano life. As a comunario explained to 
my Chiquitano colleagues and me during a focus group session one evening in San 
Miguelito Sur:  
I believe that the territory since we were born has always existed … here. The truth 
is that the land is like it was our mother and we use it to sow, to sustain our families. 
Our parents have always worked these lands and we follow the line, we are always 
going to work until we die, because we live here.69 
Inscribed in Monte Verde are also visions for the future. Comunarios often stress that 
Monte Verde is ‘where one lives, sows the things to eat and above all, for the 
animals and for us,’70 where one can hunt, fish, recollect and have one’s fields. These 
are all aspects that allow Chiquitano comunarios to live in the way that their parents 
lived, and having access to the space guarantees that these practices can be carried on 
by future generations – i.e. that it is a space to produce comunario social and cultural 
beings (cf. Conklin and Morgan, 1996). Another example is the statement by Don 
Miguel from San Miguelito Sur who said: 
                                                 
68
 Landscape has recently become important in the context of the debate on how (literate and non-
literate) societies remember (see Santos-Granero, 2005). For example, Joanne Rappaport finds in her 
study on the Nasa (or Paéz) people from Colombia’s south-eastern highlands that ‘Nasa locate their 
historical record in scared sites dispersed throughout the area, which serve as mnemonic devices for 
remembering history’ (2005: 159). On similar lines, Burkhard Schwarz found that in San Antonio de 
Lomerío, Chiquitano have linked referents for ‘space’ and ‘time’. For example, ‘yabaicürr’ – 
‘yabaitucürr’ corresponds to the time-space until shortly before the start of the Chaco War (1933–36) 
– ‘a time characterised by the free access to an ample space’ (1994: 53). ‘Chiyabaiturrüp’ is 
associated with the following period, marked by the invasion of landowners, the disarticulation of 
Chiquitano political organisation, and land and resource scarcity. Within these periods Chiquitano 
identify different sub-periods: for example, the time of slavery (in the rubber plantations) and the time 
of the agrarian reform (1994: 53). It would be a matter for future research to establish whether this is a 
similar case for Chiquitano in Ñuflo de Chávez Province.  
69
 ‘Y creo que el territorio desde que nacimos siempre ha existido en esta tierra aquí. La verdad que 
la tierra es como si fuera nuestra madre y la utilizamos para sembrar, para sustentar a nuestra 
familias. Nuestros padres siempre han trabajado estas tierras y nosotros mismo seguimos las cadenas 
siempre vamos a trabajar hasta que muramos porque aquí vivimos’. Focus group 2: San Miguelito 
Sur, 9 March 2007. 
70
 ‘Donde uno vive, siembra las cosas pa’ comer y sobre todo pa’ los animales y pa’ nosotros’. 
Workshop: Comunaria from Rosario, Young Peoples’ Group, Las Abras, 16 April 2007. Other 
examples: Focus group 1: San Miguelito Sur, 9 March 2007; Focus group: La Embocada, 8 March 
2007; Workshop: Candelaria, 11 May 2007. 
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[The Monte Verde territory] is a very fertile land for cultivation. Here in our 
comunidad the land is very little and will not be enough for our children and this is 
why we have the territory and this is why we have to fight until we have the title.71  
Many comunarios stressed explicitly, that Monte Verde is a ‘reserve for future 
generations’. For instance, a young comunario from Rosario mentioned during a 
workshop in Las Abras comunidad, San Javier Municipality: 
… it is a place … which is reserved for the generations that come in future, for our 
children who are growing, we see for example, that here in our comunidad the land 
does not provide for all the comunarios, and they are fighting for a territory in 
Monte Verde so that our children have somewhere to live.72  
The statement by a comunario from San Miguelito Sur provides another example: 
In two parts we think about or territory, here where we live and the territory of 
Montverde. Analysing it, here where we live the land does not provide, there is a big 
reserve for our children and the children of our children, they will be the 
beneficiaries of Monte Verde, and thus we have to defend it.73 
These two comunarios, like many others, associate the territory with the ongoing 
struggle that Chiquitano leaders and comunarios have wrought over the space. In 
their statements, comunarios often combined the elements of ‘space for the future 
generations’ with ‘fighting for the space’ and the need to protect it. The statement of 
Don Nicolás during a workshop in Candelaria sums up several of these themes:  
I think that a territory is what we really fight for, a land, this land which we call 
territory, is a land of large extension where we all struggle, not only for those that 
we are now, but also for the one that come alter, for the children, for the 
grandchildren. Territory, we are going to say, [is] where there is a reserve of 
woodland for afterwards, where the riches are…. Where the wood is, where the river 
is, where maybe mines are. A territory is where not only Candelaria will fight for it, 
but together, all that is the region of the Chiquitano area, to say Concepción, all its 
surrounding comunidades … and united we are going to defend this territory, 
because afterwards it will run out and where are we going to go? Territory is above 
all, to defend land in which the mother of the human is, because if there is no land, 
                                                 
71
 ‘Es un terreno muy fértil para el cultivo. Aquí en nuestra comunidad la tierra es muy poca y no va 
alcanzar para nuestros hijos y es por eso que tenemos el territorio y es por eso que tenemos que 
luchar hasta tener el titulo’. Focus group 1: San Miguelito Sur, 9 March 2007. Also see Interview: 
Hugo Hurtado (CICC Health and Communication Secretary), Alta Mira, 23 January 2007. 
72
 ‘… es un lugar que está reservado para las generaciones que vienen en el futuro, para nuestros 
hijos que están creciendo, vemos por ejemplo que aquí en nuestra comunidad ya no abastece la tierra 
para todos los comunarios, y se está peleando un territorio en Monteverde par que nuestros hijos 
tengan donde vivir’. Workshop: Las Abras, 16 April 2007. Also Workshop: Comunario from Rosario 
Las Abras, 16 April 2007; Focus group 2: San Miguelito Sur, 9 March 2007. 
73
 ‘En dos parte pensamos en nuestro territorio, aquí donde vivimos y en el territorio de monte verde. 
Analizándolo bien aquí donde vivimos la tierra no abastece allá es una reserva para nuestro hijos y 
para los hijos de nuestro hijos ellos serán los beneficiado del allá de monte verde así que eso hay 
defenderlo’. Focus group 2: comunidad San Miguelito Sur, 9 March 2007. 
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where are we going to live? How are we going to cultivate to live? This is what it is 
for.74  
In sum, the meanings that Chiquitano comunarios attach to the territory overlaps and 
at times competes with other notions of and visions for the territory’s ‘use’ and 
future. As the statements of various Chiquitano leaders and comunarios who live in 
and outside the TCO demonstrate, the way that they perceive the territory is 
influenced by their historical experience of land loss, the struggle for the territory 
and the effects of the struggle. The territory is a space to continue Chiquitano life. As 
some Chiquitano explained, what they needed to ‘live happily’ and tranquilo 
(‘peacefully’) was the territory and the territorial title.  
Conclusion 
When it comes to the territory of Monte Verde – and arguably virtually all lands 
claimed or recognised as TCOs in Bolivia – several processes of making ‘places’ into 
‘spaces’ compete with each other and inform each other. To sum up briefly and in 
basic terms the notions of different agents, the Bolivian government sees the territory 
as a demarcated space for ‘a people’ that fit certain ideas of ‘authenticity’ and over 
whose natural resource it wants to keep control. Local cattle ranchers, loggers and 
other international and local economic players see it as an area of land, forest and 
other resources that should be economically exploited. This latter point is especially 
worrying considering the fate of territories and lands, and of the people that live in 
them who are subjected to international economic interests elsewhere, especially 
those linked to oil extraction and mining (see Ciccantell, 1999; Sawyer, 2001). 
The way that Chiquitano comunarios and leaders construct the territory, 
points to pressure to conform to the government’s legal criteria, in order to be 
recognised as legitimate claimants of an ‘indigenous territory’ (and later, a TCO). 
                                                 
74
 ‘Yo pienso de que un territorio es lo que realmente luchamos por una tierra, esa tierra que nosotros 
le decimos territorio, es una tierra de gran extensión donde todos luchamos no solamente pa’ los que 
estamos ahora, sino también para que sirva para los posteriores, así para los hijos, así para los 
nietos. Territorio vamos a decir donde hay una reserva de montes para después, donde están las 
riquezas queremos decir, donde esta la madera, a donde esta el río, donde hay quizás minas. un 
territorio es donde no solamente Candelaria lo va a pelear, sino conjuntamente toda la que es la 
región de la parte chiquitana, como decir Concepción, todas sus comunidades de alrededores …y 
todos unidos vamos a defender ese territorio, porque después se nos va acabar ¿y donde vamos a ir?, 
territorio es defender tierras más que todo, en lo cual es la madre del humano, porque si no hay 
tierra, ¿donde vamos a vivir?, ¿como vamos a cultivar pa’ vivir?, para es eso’. Workshop: 
Candelaria, 11 May 2007. 
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Supporting NGOs and some central leaders have stressed the need for territorial 
management in order to justify and defend the claim and, paradoxically, to 
counteract local and departmental economic interests. This has entailed stressing the 
importance of a market logic when it comes to defining the uses of the territories’ 
natural resources and moving towards a construction of a more rigid governance 
structure in the territory. Thus again this shows how central leaders and NGO 
personnel may be perpetuating the state’s neo-liberal multicultural framework.  
The way many Chiquitano comunarios construct their territory overlaps and 
competes with such visions for the territory. Interestingly, comunarios resident 
within the TCO Monte Verde territory and those outside did not attach vastly 
different notions to the territory. Neither was the border itself of much relevance. 
Most Chiquitano see Monte Verde as their territory, where their children can have a 
future, even if they themselves may never have travelled there and may never move 
there.  
Paradoxically, in order to ‘keep’ the territory and justify the claim, 
Chiquitano leaders and comunarios have to construct it in a way that state actors 
accept it. This contradiction might yet result in tensions over the uses to which the 
territory and the resources within may be put. Such tensions are perceivable in some 
Chiquitano leaders’ comments on and mistrust of productive projects, which other 
leaders and comunidades embrace. This concurs with reports of authors writing on 
indigenous territories in other South American countries, that ‘modern resource 
management schemes’ might actually distort indigenous peoples ‘territorial vision’ 
that might be based in ‘relational spaces’ rather than a space ‘divided into zones of 
utility’ (García Hierro and Surrallés, 2005: 10-11). It can be expected that such 
tensions will be high on the agenda of the indigenous movements as these territories 
become recognised as ‘autonomous’. Another aspect that needs further attention is 
the fact that the territory will only be a temporary solution to the Chiquitanos’ 
problems; the Chiquitano population will continue to grow. Consequently, the 
question arises how much access to such spaces is a sufficient strategy to solve 
indigenous peoples’ struggle to secure the continuity of their lives and sociality.  
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Chapter VII 
Chiquitano in the Municipal Sphere 
The previous chapter addressed the struggle for Monte Verde and the different 
meanings protagonists attach to the space. This chapter considers how the 
decentralisation reforms implemented by the Sánchez de Lozada (1993–1997) 
government in the 1990s have impacted on the Chiquitano central and comunidades 
in Concepción municipality. The Central Indígena de Comunidades de Concepción 
(CICC - Indigenous Organisation of Communities of Concepción) initially 
participated in local municipal elections because they saw this as an opportunity to 
advance their territorial claims. Laurent Lacroix stresses the success of this double 
strategy in achieving ‘effective participation in the local scene’ (2005: 64-75; 2006: 
110).1 Indeed, in 2004, the CICC achieved the election of Chiquitano activist Justo 
Seoane as Mayor, a significant achievement in the face of fierce Concepceño elite 
opposition. Nevertheless, obstacles remained which obstructed the efforts of the 
Chiquitano administration. These partly resulted from the limitations inherent in the 
multicultural neo-liberal reforms themselves (McNeish, 2006, 2008; Postero, 2007; 
see Chapter II), and from ongoing local opposition to the Chiquitano political 
project.  
The Bolivian decentralisation reforms and especially the participatory 
component, have received ample and ongoing scholarly attention (e.g. Calla, 2000; 
Cameron, 2009; Gray Molina, 2002; Kohl, 2002, 2003a, 2003b; Lema et al., 2001; 
Van Cott, 2000). Most commentators highlight that the potential success and failures 
of the law depend heavily on local conditions. Often mentioned are: the relevance of 
size and location of the municipality, levels of corruption among council and mayor, 
attitudes of mayors and other local political figures, ethnic composition and 
involvement of the local population (see Faguet, 2003; Grootaert and Narayan, 2001; 
Hiskey and Seligson, 2003; Licha, 2002; Rowland, 2001).2  
                                                 
1
 While Lacroix notes that such a double strategy is used by some actors in Peru, the CICC and 
CICOL are the only organisations to employ it in Bolivia (2005: 3, 75). For the Peruvian case, see 
Chirif et al. (1991). 
2
 Further, Seeman holds that not just local actors’ attitudes play a role in determining outcomes, as 
municipalities are to a degree dependent on central government decisions (2003: 23). 
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The first part of this chapter addresses the Chiquitano manoeuvrings in the 
local political sphere and Justo Seoane’s rise to power. Along with other popular 
actors in Bolivia, over time the leaders began seeing participation in the municipality 
as their right ‘as Bolivian citizens’ (see Postero, 2007). While in the Chiquitano case 
the strategy of presenting Chiquitano candidates with Movimineto al Socialismo 
(MAS - Movement towards Socialism) affiliation has been initially successful, I 
maintain that Chiquitano municipal functionaries have partly adopted the Bolivian 
neo-liberal multicultural rhetoric: the ‘marginal’ Chiquitano communities need to ‘be 
developed’ and, if possible, turned into market producers. The chapter also highlights 
a further paradox inherent in the multicultural policies: that to take part in the local 
municipal structure Chiquitano and other indigenous people had to ally themselves 
with an existing political party to be able to compete in elections. Chiquitano chose 
the MAS party, which, in turn, provided Concepceño elites with ammunition to 
discredit the Chiquitano political project. 
The third part addresses the developments the Law of Popular Participation 
(LPP) sparked within Chiquitano comunidades. As a consequence of the LPP, 
Chiquitano comunidades became recognised as Organización Territorial de Base 
(OTBs - Territorial Base Organisations) and the CICC as an umbrella association of 
OTBs. While comunidades introduced the new structures partly due to pressures 
from political parties and Church members, this has not had the disrupting or 
homogenizing effects on the comunidades that authors have recorded for other areas 
in Bolivia (for example, Behrendt, 2000: 15; Calla, 2000; Lema et al., 2001). OTBs 
were generally introduced alongside the existing authorities of the comunidad 
(‘autoridades comunales’); they serve not only to interact with the municipal 
government and other outside actors, but also to fulfil an important internal 
administrative role. In fact, their introduction has had certain levelling effects in 
terms of communal power relations. 
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Political Manoeuvrings: the 1995, 1999 and 2004 Municipal 
Elections 
The 1995 and 1999 Municipal Elections 
The two pieces of legislation aimed at substantially altering the country’s 
administrative and political structure were Law 1551, the Ley de Participación 
Popular (LPP - Popular Participation Law), passed in 1994, and Law 1654, the Ley 
de Descentralización Administrativa (LDA - Administrative Decentralisation Law), 
passed one year later (Behrendt, 2000: 4; O'Neill, 2005: 125; Postero, 2007: 5). The 
Bolivian decentralisation reforms involved delegation of responsibilities to each of 
the nine departments through establishing prefecturas (prefecture administrations), 
and to new municipal structures.3 Municipal governments were installed, complete 
with councils with deliberative and oversight responsibilities (their number depended 
on the number of inhabitants in each municipality) and a publicly elected mayor 
(Calla, 2000: 80). The LPP assigned the municipal governments’ decision-making 
power in such areas as the promotion of rural development and the provision of 
health, education, culture, sports, local roads and irrigation facilities. They were also 
granted power to manage their own resources allocated to them based on the number 
of inhabitants (Calla, 2000: 79; Faguet, 2001: 4; Grootaert and Narayan, 2001: 7; 
Seemann, 2003: 16). 
The participatory element lay especially in the creation of Comités de 
Vigilancia (CVs - Oversight Committees), civil society organs which would channel 
citizens’ demands and have the power to monitor the municipal government’s 
performance and financial dealings. For leverage, they could also ‘freeze’ municipal 
funds (Calla, 2000: 80; Faguet, 2001: 4; Grootaert and Narayan, 2001: 7). The OTBs 
instituted through the LPP were a further vehicle to institutionalise state-civil society 
relations. Together with the CVs and other state organisations working in the 
municipality, they were to be engaged in a process of defining the needs of its 
inhabitants. This took the form of a participatory planning process in which the actors 
would define a five-year strategic plan upon which municipal expenditures should be 
based, the Plan de Desarrollo Municipal (PDM - Municipal Development Plan). To 
                                                 
3
 Prefectures’ responsibilities included formulating and designing departmental development plans, 
programmes and projects in coordination with the municipalities and national executive (see 
Seemann, 2004: 8). 
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this end, each municipality would develop an Annual Operations Plan (POA - Plan 
de Operaciones Anual), which detailed the objectives, activities, time scale, financial 
resources and persons responsible for the planned activities (Behrendt, 2000: 4-6; 
Gray Molina, 2002: 8). 
Lastly, the LPP granted indigenous peoples the right to form Districtos 
Municipales Indígenas (DMIs - Indigenous Municipal Districts). DMIs were 
municipal administrative units (subalcaldías), in which indigenous people could 
nominate a subalcalde (a ‘mayor’ subordinate to the municipal mayor) according to 
their ‘usos y costumbres’ (Calla, 2000: 84; Lacroix, 2005: 10). They received part of 
the co-participation fund of the municipality and ‘freely’ administered them (2005: 
10).4  
The LPP also inspired Chiquitano activists in Concepción to use the newly 
emerging formal political channels to advance their own agendas and, above all, to 
advance their territorial claim. As Justo Seoane described the Chiquitano rationale in 
standing for elections: 
…and we saw in one or another way that the mayor from here was the one who was 
invading the territory. So we said to ‘yes or yes’ occupy this municipal power, 
because there is no other way, because it is there where they define the politics, 
where the discrimination in education is, the discrimination in health [care]. Apart 
from that they are taking over our natural resources. [Because of] the issue of 
territory … we initiated an election in these months… in this time Paticú [presented 
himself] as Mayor. … I am talking about 1995, 1996, thereabout. So there we did 
not win the majority… but we tried, no?5  
The CICCs political tactics were shaped by the local socio-political environment, and 
especially the municipalities’ demographic profile. As noted, with 34.9 per cent, 
Chiquitano are in the minority in Concepción municipality (Instituto Nacional de 
                                                 
4
 Lacroix sustains that, the introduction of DMIs were supposed to be a response to Article 171 of the 
Constitution that recognised the right to indigenous autonomy in their own territory (2005: 10). He 
adds that theoretically ‘the system of mancomunidad of the indigenous districts offers the possibility 
to maintain the traditional organisation beyond the diverse territorial administrations created by 
municipalisation’ (Lacroix, 2005: 10). 
5
 ‘…que vimos que de una y otra manera como el alcalde de aquí, era el que estaba avasallando el 
territorio. Entonces nosotros dijimos si o si de ocupar ese poder del municipio, por que no hay otra 
manera por que es ahí que se define de las políticas, que hay discriminación educativa, 
discriminación salud, a parte de eso se están adueñando de los recursos naturales. El tema de los 
territorio entonces es tales así que se inicia una elección en esos meses… como alcalde era todavía en 
aquella época el Paticú y eso les hablo del 1995 o 1996, por ahí. Entonces no pues ahí no logramos 
la mayoría, pero ya intentamos nosotros ¿no?’. Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007. 
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Estadística, 2001).6 Subsequently, the CICC’s strategy centred on putting forward 
their own candidates for municipal elections and concentrated on ‘political 
consciousness-raising’ (concientización política) among comunarios to gain votes 
(2005: 65). They would also have to rely on coalitions with other parties to secure a 
majority position.  
This differs from areas where one ethnic group, or those allied through a 
common agenda, hold the majority. An example of the former is neighbouring 
Lomerío, where 99 per cent of the population identify themselves as Chiquitano and 
indigenous (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 2001). The leaders claimed DMI status 
for the municipal district, which they gained in 1999 (see Lacroix, 2005). An 
example of the latter can be found in the Bolivian Chapare, where Quechua and 
Aymara were united through their coca growers’ unions and political agenda (see 
Albro, 2005, also see Chapter II and V). This helped create the critical mass to tip the 
balance of power and capture local political positions. Another situation faces 
indigenous or originario citizens who live in urban areas, where collectivities (for 
example in the form of neighbourhoods) may have little chance to get their own 
candidate elected. Citizens often have to take other routes to get their demands met. 
As Lazar describes in the case of the Rosas Pampa neighbourhood of El Alto, locals 
counteract their neighbourhood being ignored by the respective municipal 
administrations by establishing personalised clientelist relations with party 
candidates. This ‘coexists with a desire to gain collective benefit from the patrons 
and constitute the zone itself as client’ (2008: 91-92). Lazar notes that ‘the vecinos of 
Rosas Pampa practice their citizenship as much if not more through their preelection 
participation in clientelist politics as through infrequent, though the meticulous act of 
voting’ (Lazar, 2008: 116). 
As Justo Seoane indicated, in the case of Concepción, the CICC’s success in 
the 1995 elections was minor; however, it represented the start of regular Chiquitano 
participation in municipal elections. The CICC was convinced that intervention in 
the local decision-making process was the way to advance their territorial demand. 
The central developed two key strategies. The first was based on training potential 
indigenous political leaders in a school the CICC had founded with the help of the 
                                                 
6
 This percentage is based on counts of the population that identified themselves as Chiquitano in 
Concepción and San Pedro canton in the 2001 Census, excluding the DMI of Zapocó. See Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística (2001). 
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NGO Asesoría Legal y Asistencia Social (ALAS - Legal Consultancy and Social 
Assistance) in 1993 in Concepción. Here they prepared Chiquitano leaders to occupy 
posts in municipal government (Lacroix, 2005: 53-54).7  
The second strategy comprised the formation of a political commission 
within the CICC. The commission was composed of five people who were 
responsible for proposing one candidate, who then had to gain approval of the 
assembly of comunidades.8 It also developed an electoral strategy, presented a 
political programme and produced information material for the comunidades 
(Lacroix, 2005: 54).9 Municipal Head of Human Development and Chiquitano 
activist Ignacio Faldín explained that the CICC formed the commission in order to 
avoid breaking its regulations (reglamento):  
What happens is that organisations like the CICC that are more or less civic, historic 
and have a concrete platform, are not for taking power. We have to create another 
organisation to participate and to take the power, that can discuss, that can debate 
with other political parties. There are various reasons for this. It cannot be that the 
organisation is constructed for somebody. … this organisation is respected by all the 
political and partisan civic institutions … because their demands are social and 
cultural (my translation, quoted in Lacroix, 2005: 54). 
Perhaps this reflects a discomfort with hierarchical modes of organisation (Clastres, 
1989) and taking part in the state power structure. However, being perceived as 
‘political’ rather than ‘social’ or ‘cultural’ certainly carried the danger that people 
would associate the organisation with one political tendency, which could 
compromise support from Chiquitano who identified with other political preferences. 
Further, being explicitly non-political signified that the local elites perceive the 
organisation as less of a danger to the socio-political and economic status quo.  
For the 1999 municipal election campaign, the CICC chose Justo Seoane 
Parapaino, a thirty-two year old Chiquitano with much local, national, and 
                                                 
7
 Lacroix describes that sixty candidates are regularly selected to be educated in the school. The 
students take intensive courses in law, history, sciences and bésiro (Chiquitano language). At the end 
of the education, forty candidates are elected to dedicate themselves to political careers in municipal 
elections in the whole of the Chiquitanía (2005: 53-54). 
8
 Interview: Ignacio Faldín, Concepción, 17 July 2007. 
9
 Additionally, the central followed another strategy: to gain presence in the national parliament in 
order to achieve national publicity for the territorial demand. Vicente Pessoa participated in the 
national elections with MBL affiliation and gained a parliamentary seat. While Seoane Parapaino 
(former Mayor of Concepción) notes that they did not ‘get to have a say’ in parliament, they managed 
to successfully use the national media to ‘publish our demands to the entire Bolivian country’. 
Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007. 
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international experience, to run as their candidate.10 The theme of the campaign was 
‘credibilidad social’ (‘social credibility’), and the fifteen-page programme the 
commission produced contained three main goals: the equitable distribution of 
popular participation resources and thus an end to their centralisation in the 
municipal seat; the promotion of citizen participation in local decision-making 
combined with an orientation of municipal policies towards rural problems and those 
of the comunidades; and finally, a strengthening of Chiquitano presence in the 
municipal council and the Oversight Committee (Lacroix, 2005: 55). 
Like indigenous organisations elsewhere in Bolivia, the CICC had to ally 
itself with a political party to be able to participate (see Behrendt, 2000: 14; McKee, 
1999: 5).11 It chose the newly-founded MAS party. Justo Seoane provided the 
following reasons: 
We went to speak with Don Johnny Fernández, the owner of the legal personality 
[i.e. the party leader] of the UCS; we spoke to Don Juan Carlos Durán…who was the 
owner of the MNR. We also spoke to Mister Jaime Paz Zamora, with the MIR. But 
well, everybody said that their candidates were the Cattle Ranchers Association of 
Concepción, their candidates were the President of the Civic Committee … In the 
end, we conversed with Don Hugo Slavatierra and in an office with Evo Morales … 
Don José Bailaba, too, and we decided to run … with MAS political affiliation.12 
Lacroix adds that further incentives were that the MAS departmental leader was 
director of ALAS, an NGO that already worked closely with the CICC, and that the 
functionaries did not attach conditions to lending their affiliation to CICC candidates 
(2005: 55-56).13 This was important. As other cases indicate, the fact that indigenous 
candidates ran as affiliates of diverse parties often meant that they felt pressured to 
follow the party line rather than presenting the agenda of the people they represented. 
                                                 
10
 Seoane explained during our interview that he left his post in the Ministry for Indigenous Affairs, 
which he had assumed during the presidency of Carlos Mesa in order to take up the candidacy. He 
added that another reason was that Carlos Mesa was about to be ousted from his presidency in any 
case. Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007. 
11
 Kathleen O’Neill describes the procedure of municipal elections as follows: ‘If one party wins a 
majority of the votes for its list of municipal council candidates, the top candidate on that list 
automatically becomes mayor. If an absolute majority is not achieved by any party, then the municipal 
council chooses the mayor from among its members’ (2005: 125). 
12
 ‘… fuimos a hablar con don Johnny Fernández el dueño de la personería jurídica de la UCS, 
hablamos con Don Juan Carlos Duran…que era dueño del MNR, hablamos con el Señor Jaime Paz 
Zamora también con el del MIR. Pero bueno, todo mundo dijeron de que los candidatos eran 
Asociación de Ganaderos de Concepción, los candidatos eran el presidente del comité cívico …y tales 
así que conversamos con Don Hugo Salvatierra en una oficina con Evo Morales… Don José Bailaba 
también y definimos candidatear… con la personaría jurídica del MAS’. Interview: Concepción, 17 
July 2007. 
13
 Interview: Justo Seoane, Concepción, 17 July 2007. 
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Nancy Postero provides the example of originario candidate Don Faustino, who tried 
to capture a local seat in a small constituency in Potosi department. He noted: ‘we 
were conditioned … by our need to prestar consignas [borrow party insignias]. We 
had to vote for the interest of the party’ (in Postero, 2007: 144). Also the study of 
Ana María Lema et al. (2001) of Urubichá and Gutiérrez in Santa Cruz department 
and Villa Montes in Chuquisaca department revealed that local partisans maintained 
their authoritarian and paternalistic style, marginalising indigenous candidates and 
their programmes. Like the Chiquitano candidates, many of those who were not 
dissuaded thereafter decided to run with MAS affiliations for local and national 
elections – boosting the party’s strength.  
Still, in the Chiquitano case, other obstacles remained. Among these were 
that Chiquitano leaders did not agree on the MAS affiliation, and some saw it as an 
‘extremist party’ (also Lacroix, 2005: 55-56). As Seoane explained, people were 
reluctant to vote for the party as ‘to be MASist was to be kolla [derogatory term for 
people from the highlands]’.14 This is reflected in the fact that some Chiquitano also 
took up the kolla/camba rhetoric (addressed in Chapter V and below), which forms 
part of the cruceñidad ‘nationalist’ discourse and is generally wielded by the 
Cruceño elite. Seoane summarised some further obstacles that the central faced in 
the 1999 Municipal elections:  
… some did not have an identity card, nor birth certificate, or if they have the card or 
if they have the birth certificate, there are administrative errors due to a lack of 
oficialia [coll. inefficiency] of the civil register, that there is a letter missing, so the 
electoral court generally purges [them]. So many of our brothers were removed, but 
we got one councillor in that year. In 2000, we assumed the post of President of the 
Municipal Council.15  
All over Bolivia, indigenous groups and individuals encountered similar situations. 
Consequently, voter absenteeism in rural areas was between 40 and 60 per cent 
(compared with 35 per cent of the national total) (see Albó, 1996: 20; McKee, 1999: 
6). Further, Seoane mentioned that the Chiquitano population continued to vote for 
‘traditional’ parties (i.e. well established parties) instead of the CICC-MAS alliance. 
                                                 
14
 Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007. 
15
 ‘…que algunos no tiene carnet de identidad ni certificado de nacimiento, o si tiene carnet o si 
tienen certificado de nacimiento tienen errores administrativos por falta de oficialia de registro civil 
que le falta una letra entonces ya eso se depura mayormente la corte electora. Entonces hubieron 
muchos depurados de nuestros hermanos pero sacamos una concejalía en ese año. En el 2000 
asumimos como presidente del concejo municipal’. Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007. 
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In Concepción, the election results of 12 December 1999 showed the 
following outcome: two council seats went to ADN, one to MNR one to MIR and 
one to MAS. MNR, MIR and MAS formed a three-party treaty based on an 
agreement to rotate occupation of the position of Mayor, President of the Municipal 
Council and Secretary of the Municipal Council (Lacroix, 2005: 56-57). Following 
these manoeuvres, Justo Seoane came to be President of the Municipal Council and 
Ignacio Paticú, a former President of the CICC, directed the CV. For nearly two 
years there was good co-operation between the Mayor, the central and the CV 
(Lacroix, 2005: 57-58). However, when it became Seoane’s turn to assume the 
mayoralty in 2002, the opposition launched a vote of censure against MNR mayor 
Carlos Peña (Lacroix, 2005: 59).16 Subsequently, the MIR, ADN and MNR 
councillors joined in coalition and these shenanigans left the MAS in opposition. 
Commenting on these events, Lacroix notes that one reason for this outcome was that 
the mayor had received threats from the side of the ‘dominant groups’, who judged 
municipal policies to be too favourable to the indigenous groups (2005: 59).17 
Former President of the Municipal Council Pablo Mencarí put this move down to 
blatant racism: 
… they said that it was an insult to life that one of us was in the municipal 
government, because it is embarrassing for a municipality, because the municipality 
is stained by the paicos. Thus, ‘the municipality smelled bad’. They want to preserve 
the power between themselves and for themselves (my translation, quoted in 
Lacroix, 2005: 59-60).  
This episode demonstrated the ability and willingness of local elites to stop 
Chiquitano initiatives and to out-manoeuvre them in the municipal government. 
The 2004 Municipal Elections 
For the 2004 elections, the comunidades again supported Seoane’s candidacy. 
Ignacio Faldín summarised the centrals’ reasoning for participating:  
                                                 
16
 Lacroix argues that this was linked to developments at departmental level, where the MIR and ADN 
were preparing the ground as the next national elections were approaching (2005: 59). He adds that 
while Carlos Peña was suspended and the court case was ongoing, municipal funds were 
‘miraculously reduced’ by about 300,000 Bolivianos (about $40,000) (Lacroix, 2005: 59). Such 
situations were not uncommon in Bolivian municipalities. A World Bank report found that the voto 
constructivo was used to replace 30 per cent of the country’s mayors in 1997 and 25 per cent in 1998 
(Hiskey and Seligson, 2003: 71). 
17
 Lacroix notes that most of the terceros in Monte Verde were MNR supporters (2005: 59). 
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For one, because of the right, because we felt Bolivian, and it is stipulated through a 
law that we all have the right to organise, [to represent] our way of thinking, our 
projections [for the future]. And we have to exercise this right in accordance with the 
legislation. … The other [reason] is … that [we were] downtrodden, right? Because 
we did not get the information, so they did not take us into consideration in the 
projections of the participation [the participatory planning process]. So, we came to 
think that we could exercise [a public function], that we could be more open, more 
participative in all the decisions. So we fought again so that we could be the 
protagonists in running an institution, to demonstrate that we are also capable to 
exercise [a public function] like any other person. 18  
This indicates a shift in emphasis from primarily focusing on territory and services to 
demanding participation as a right, as Faldín noted: ‘we want participation, we want 
that they respect us’, a right ‘the parents’ had not enjoyed.19 This resonates with the 
discourse of other Bolivian local actors previously excluded from equal access to the 
political sphere and citizenship rights. Postero described how some of her Guaraní 
informants from villages close to Santa Cruz de la Sierra ‘began to feel entitled to 
exercise the political rights that the reform offered’ (Postero, 2007: 140-141). As her 
Guaraní friend, Pablo, noted: ‘We have rights now … They can’t steal from us like 
before’ (quoted in Postero, 2007: 140). 
Driven by this vision, the central and Seoane launched their ‘Plan Político 
2004’ (2004 Political Plan). Their strategy was that the forty indigenous 
comunidades would name ten leaders each to form a Comisión Política Indígena 
Comunal (CPIC - Communal Indigenous Political Commission). The CPIC would 
then assume the function of the CICC’s Political Commission. Every representative 
would secure the support of ten people in his or her comunidad so creating a support 
base of 4,000 voters for the CICC candidate. Part of the CICC’s strategy was also to 
attain backing from the urban areas.20 To this end Juana Herrera Mendéz, a non-
                                                 
18
 ‘…uno por derecho porque nos sentimos bolivianos ya y esta estipulado a través de una ley de que 
todos tenemos un derecho de organizarnos de poder emitir nuestro criterio, nuestro pensamiento, 
nuestras proyecciones entonces y ese derecho obviamente pues tenemos que ejercerlo en función a lo 
que dice la legalidad. Entonces nos hemos propuesto a organizarnos y estamos ya ahora en función 
como estado. El otro es…por una necesidad de que ya nosotros sentíamos fuera de esos derechos y 
vamos a decir también pisoteado ¿no? Porque nosotros no alcanzábamos las informaciones entonces 
no nos tomaban en cuenta en las proyecciones en la participación. Entonces nos llega pues a pensar 
que ejercemos nosotros, que podamos nosotros ser mas abierto, mas participativos y todas las 
decisiones. Entonces donde hemos luchado otra vez por poder ser nosotros los protagonista de llevar 
una institución demostrar también que nosotros también somos capaces de ejercer como cualquier 
otras personas’. Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007. 
19
 ‘Por eso queremos participación, queremos que nos respeten…’. Interview: Concepción, 17 July 
2007. 
20
 Interview: Justo Seoane: Concepción, 17 July 2007; Interview: Ignacio Faldín, Concepción, 17 July 
2007. 
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Chiquitano from Concepción, with no prior political experience, was invited to run 
for Councillor. 
While that year social associations had also been permitted to register and 
present candidates for election, the central candidates were already inscribed through 
the MAS. Seoane and Faldín pointed out that therefore the problems remained in that 
many comunarios continued to support other parties they were set on. Faldín 
explained the problem:  
… this debilitates us in participating with our own identity as indigenous people... 
Because as you know, [in] our comunidades there are different ideologies and 
interests, where a brother of mine can be from another party, it could be my very 
wife [who] is from another party, apart from that we are one family, no? And this is 
where the weakness is, so I have to convince and convince that this is a project for 
our good, so this is a lot of work. This is now our weakness. 21 
He stressed that the matter was not to separate from MAS, but from any political 
party. Like Seoane, he hoped that the OICH could replace parties. Seoane noted that 
it was hard to convince comunarios that despite the MAS affiliation the candidates 
were actually participating ‘with our own identity as an indigenous pueblo’ (in other 
words, they were not promoting the MAS political agenda, but had their own 
‘Chiquitano’ agenda).22 This raises the questions as to why lowland indigenous 
groups had not earlier set up a MAS equivalent for local political participation. 
While this question deserves further attention, it is likely that this is linked to the fact 
that lowland indigenous groups have been generally more suspicious of political 
parties, perceive their structures as alien to their own more egalitarian way of 
organising (see Chapter V), and that this vehicle for formal political participation is 
of little use to lowland indigenous people who are in the minority in many 
municipalities. On the contrary they would have tried to gain DMI status, 
reminiscent of what the Chiquitano of Lomerío had done.  
Again, many Chiquitano votes were declared invalid after the ballot, but 
despite the problems, the central achieved the election of three candidates: Justo 
                                                 
21
 ‘…eso es que nos debilita nosotros participar con nuestra propia identidad como pueblo indígena… 
Por que usted sabe de que nuestras comunidades hay diferente ideología e intereses donde un 
hermano mío puede ser de otro partido puede ser mi mujer mismo de otro partido pese que somos de 
una familia no, ahí esta la debilidad entonces yo tengo que conversar y convencer de que este es un 
proyecto para bien de nosotros entonces es un trabajo amplió entonces donde eso nuestra debilidad 
ahora’. Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007. 
22
 ‘…con nuestra propia identidad como pueblo indígena…’. Interview: Justo Seoane: Concepción, 17 
July 2007.  
 313 
Seoane, Juana Herrera Mendéz and Benita Machicado, a comunaria from Altamira. 
Because they won with a narrow majority of eight votes, they had to enter into 
coalition with the MIR, so that Seoane could assume the post of Mayor on 10 
January 2005.23 Subsequently seventeen members of the CICC occupied positions in 
different areas of the municipal government administration.24 
Photo 37: Mayor Justo Seoane 
 
Justo Seoane, Mayor of Concepción, in his office in Concepción, 17 July 2007.  
During an interview that my colleague Margoth Céspedes and I conducted with him 
on 17 July 2007, Seoane indicated that the MIR had broken this coalition during the 
presentation of the first quarterly report of the 2007 administration period (which 
                                                 
23
 The elections resulted in the appointment of two MAS, one MIR, one ADN and one MNR 
councillor (Gobierno Municipal de Concepción, 2007b: 207). 
24
 Justo Seoane explained that they occupied positions in the health division, as building supervisors, 
and as technicians in the cadastral, urban and rural infrastructure and forestry divisions. Interview: 
Concepción, 17 July 2007. Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007. 
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took place between 13-15 July 2007).25 He also mentioned that this would make 
decision-making in the municipality difficult. He was still optimistic and noted that 
‘his fellow brothers’ had given him ‘legitimacy’, which signified that he had to look 
for avenues to overcome this obstacle.26 However, he did not surmount the 
difficulties and in early September 2007 he was ‘censured’ by the opposition and 
replaced by Widen Manuel Barbery, despite the protest of CICC, OICH and the 
OTBs who occupied the municipality for three days.27 Once again the elite had 
demonstrated their political leverage and ability to oust Chiquitano politicians from 
power. 
Workings of the 2004–2007 Administration 
Under Chiquitano control, the municipal administration created a management plan 
with the input of the comunidades to which the municipal government added another 
five points. The plan addressed the issues of health, education, production, 
infrastructure and ‘the right to identity’. They distributed copies to each comunidad 
and based on this, the comunarios together with other citizens could evaluate the 
municipal governments’ performance. Ignacio Faldín explained that the comunidades 
also defined the priorities for the POA and ‘play a part in the oversight over their 
own demands, works or projects’.28 Juana Herrera Mendéz specified that ‘oversight’ 
involves writing the minutes on how the money is spent, recording what they did and 
evaluating the work undertaken.29 Thus, this again demonstrates how the LPP draws 
comunarios into state administrative structures and promotes indio permitido-style 
(Hale, 2002, 2004) self-management and self-evaluation among the comunidades. 
Apart from the comunidades, the municipal government also interacts with a 
host of other actors that operate within municipal boundaries, through ‘diverse 
formal and informal mechanisms’ (Gobierno Municipal de Concepción, 2007b: 207-
                                                 
25
 In this meeting all the OTBs of Concepción and members of the municipal council and Oversight 
Committee were present. I also attended the meeting, but did not realise that there was a rupture 
between the MAS and MIR councillors. However, I felt a heightened tension between councillors and 
OTBs. After the meeting I was told that the ADN, MIR and MNR councillors were suspicious of my 
presence. Field notes: Concepción, 15 June 2007. 
26
 Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007. 
27
 El Deber (6 September 2007) and El Deber (7 September 2007).  
28
 ‘…, porque ellos mismos son parte de fiscalización donde de sus mismas demandas, obras o 
proyectos’ Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007. 
29
 Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007. Articles 7 and 8 of the LPP extensively outline the rights and 
responsibilities of the OTBs.  
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208). Indicative of the way such actors are tied into the everyday running of the 
municipality is the fact that already the PDM (and the Adjustment of the PDM) is 
elaborated: 
… with the participation of all the representatives of the indigenous central of 
Concepción CICC, rural communities and the urban sector of the municipality, in 
coordination with the Oversight Committee, health [and] education sectors, public 
and private institutions and, primarily, the municipal government of Concepción 
(Gobierno Municipal de Concepción, 2007a: iii). 
Most governmental and non-governmental actors that interact with the municipality 
provide support in the form of finance or training. For example, the municipality 
receives financial resources from the national government for school breakfasts and 
lunches, from the Prefecture for infrastructure (such as their new sports arena), from 
the Spanish Government for promoting tourism, from the NGO APCOB for 
improving agricultural production, and from the North American NGO Plan 
International for the promotion of children’s rights and improving healthcare and 
infrastructure.30  
NGOs comprise an integral part of municipal government activities all over 
Bolivia especially in rural areas. For instance, Behrendt and Gray Molina point to the 
importance of NGOs in providing support to indigenous groups so that they can fulfil 
the ‘participatory’ components of the LPP (2000: 1; 2002: 8).31 As state agencies 
have limited funding and capacities, NGOs embarked on the task of training citizens 
to take up their role in local administration processes. As Postero notes: ‘the process 
of moulding new citizens is complex… and involves many actors’ (2007: 139). She 
notes that in the case of the Guaraní of the Zona Cruz, Colectivo de Estudios 
Aplicados al Desarrollo Social (CEADES - Collective of Applied Studies on Social 
Development) took up this role (Postero, 2007: 140). In turn, in Concepción CEJIS 
was one of the NGOs that helped Chiquitano organise as OTBs and ‘educated’ them 
with regards to their rights as citizens (see below).32 Significantly, this again points 
                                                 
30
 Interview: Ignacio Faldín, Concepción, 17 July 2007. For a list of public institutions that operate 
within the municipality, see Gobierno Municipal de Concepción (2007b: 209-218), for private 
institutions such as NGOs, see Gobierno Municipal de Concepción (2007b: 218-222).  
31
 Behrendt adds that on the other hand ‘it is interesting to note that, while many critics of neo-liberal 
policies see decentralisation or other state reforms as leading to abrogation of state responsibility or to 
a dependence on NGOs for service delivery, to some extent decentralisation in Bolivia has meant the 
arrival of government orientated towards service delivery, and in many cases the displacement of 
NGOs in certain areas’ (2000: 5). 
32
 Interview: Lorenzo Pasabare (CEJIS), Concepción, 1 June 2007. 
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to the blurring between local governmental mechanisms and those of NGOs: they are 
effectively both involved in the same activities, forming citizens able to fulfil the 
requirements of the LPP. This is testimony to the narrow way that state actors 
defined citizenship. As Postero points out, participation in indigenous organisations, 
communities or trade unions was discounted even by NGO members ‘who had 
worked with this sort of protagonism for years’ (2007: 140).  
The municipal government also interacts with the CICC and the OICH. It is 
the role of the CICC (as Association of OTBs) to organise meetings between the 
OTBs.33 Secondly, the municipality becomes involved when the central (or any other 
‘social organisation’) cooperates with any other development institution, NGO or 
‘state’ administrative level. The aim is to coordinate activities and avoid duplication 
(see Gobierno Municipal de Concepción, 2007b: 207-208). During Justo Seoane’s 
time as mayor, the CICC and municipal government also cooperated on issues 
related to the TCO Monte Verde. For example, Herrera Mendéz explained that at 
times they carried out inspections of Monte Verde together, for example, to find 
illegal tercero settlements.34 Lastly, Benita Machicado noted that the CICC and 
OICH supported Chiquitano office-holders morally by encouraging them to ‘carry on 
working’, as well as providing ideas and advice.35 
Seoane clarified that Chiquitano politicians operating within the municipal 
government were in charge of looking after the management of public resources, 
while the central performs the political function: 
The role of the Organisation is… to be a non-profit organisation…it has a legal 
personality (personería juridica) that we obtained in 1993, of course. That and 
mainly…the role of the organisation is the following…how to modify the norms that 
exist in our country, how to modify them that is the issue, that is it, and they mainly 
carry on this process.36 
This is an interesting statement, considering that other central leaders stressed its 
‘social’ character and see participation in the municipality as the ‘political’ route. 
Perhaps this statement reflects Seoane’s realisation that in reality participation in the 
                                                 
33
 Interview: Juana Herrera Mendéz, Concepción, 17 July 2007. 
34
 Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007. 
35
 Interview: Concepción, 16 July 2007. 
36
 ‘Los roles de la organización es… ser una organización sin fines de lucro…tiene personería 
jurídica la conseguimos en le 1993 por supuesto. Entonces eso y mayormente…el rol de la 
organización lo siguiente…de como modificar las normas que existe en nuestro país, como 
modificarlas ese es el tema, eso es y lo siguen como el proceso mayormente…’. Interview: 
Concepción, 17 July 2007. 
 317 
local government enables you to influence the distribution of resources, while there 
are no mechanisms to change the broader political and juridical order of the country. 
After all, it is the central leaders and comunarios that participate in marches, interact 
with umbrella organisations and travel to Sucre to exert pressure on members of the 
Constituent Assembly to insert proposals emanating from the lowland indigenous 
movement. 
The Municipal Programme and the Production versus Continuity Paradox 
In line with the stipulation of the LPP, during Seoanes’ time as mayor the PDM and 
the POAs generally planned improvements in infrastructure and social and economic 
development initiatives. Deemed most pressing were infrastructural improvements, 
such as the maintenance of streets, bridges, schoolrooms, providing technical 
assistance in agricultural production, health services and providing clean drinking 
water for urban and rural areas.37 In terms of education, Faldín explained that they 
had founded a ‘Normal’ in Concepción, a training institute for teachers who would 
work in the community schools. They would also teach lessons in the Chiquitano 
languages.38 Justo Seoane explained why education had a special priority: 
… of course in this village of Concepción, many comunidades were founded in 
private properties. Many property owners made their own schools; the landowner 
did it mainly as compadre, so that he could put free work in his bag and not pay 
them [the empadronados]... above all in the education there is total discrimination, 
no?39 
Another policy initiative of the municipality was to improve its communications 
network, i.e. using local television channels and radio stations to inform citizens 
‘directly and personally’ about its activities. Ignacio Faldín stressed the importance 
of this for publicising and legitimising the council’s work.40 Benita Machicado also 
opined that improved communication would help so that the grassroots could ‘see the 
positive and not only the negative aspects, and get motivated’.41 Considering the 
                                                 
37
 Interview: Juana Herrera Mendéz, Concepción, 17 July 2007; Interview: Justo Seonae, Concepción, 
17 July 2007; Interview: Ignacio Faldín, Concepción, 17 July 2007. 
38
 Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007. 
39
 ‘…por su puesto en este pueblo de concepción, muchas comunidades se fundaron en propiedades 
privadas. Muchos propietarios hacían sus colegios y bueno pues ¿no? mayormente se lo hacia como 
compadre el propietario para poder meter ala bolsa su trabajo gratuito y no pagarle... sobre todo en 
la parte educativa hay una discriminación total ¿no?’. Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007. 
40
 Interview: Ignacio Faldín, Concepción, 17 July 2007. 
41
 ‘... que vean lo positivo y no lo negativo para que ellos se animen’. Interview: Concepción, 16 July 
2007. 
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remoteness of some comunidades and their lack of electricity, radio communication 
was particularly important (still, most comunidades have at least one battery-
powered radio).42  
‘Gender’ formed Benita Machicado’s main concern. She explained that they 
had founded a Women’s Commission in the municipality ‘that helps women, above 
all in the rural areas, in the comunidades’.43 She added that in 2006, the municipal 
government supported an artisan project for women to produce weavings and 
embroidery with the help of the NGO Plan International. They had also launched a 
project in cooperation with the CICC which involved hosting workshops on 
empowerment issues and leadership training, as well as computing and artisanal 
production.44 
Further, the PDM contained the following ‘vision for development’: 
Concepción constitutes one of the most important touristic municipalities of the 
Chiquitanía. It enjoys basic sanitation and takes advantage of its potential for cattle 
ranching, forestry, and agriculture. This generates a larger amount of economic 
activity, which improves the quality of life of the population, within a framework of 
sustainable human development (Gobierno Municipal de Concepción, 2007c: 271).45 
Mayor Seoanes’ vision was to combine economic development with the promotion 
of Chiquitano artisanal products and music.46 He explained that Concepción had 
been declared the seat of the National Network of Jesuit Missions in the Gran 
Chiquitanía. In this context, the municipal government had promoted the sale of ‘our 
Chiquitano shirt’, which Seoane noted had the ‘value of eighty Bolivianos’ (about ten 
dollars).47 The municipal government cooperated with the CICC in this initiative, and 
the central organised training courses for the manufacture of artisan products.  
Ignacio Faldín explained that it was one of the municipal government’s next 
projects to expand the benefits of tourism to the comunidades. So far, only the urban 
areas had profited, because they had the appropriate infrastructure (electricity, water 
                                                 
42
 Interview: Ignacio Faldín, Concepción, 17 July 2007. 
43
 ‘… que ayuda a las mujeres mas que todo del área rural que son de las comunidades’. Interview: 
Concepción, 16 July 2007.  
44
 Interview: Concepción, 16 July 2007. 
45
 This statement supposedly summarises the ‘vision of development’ realised in workshops held for 
the citizens of Concepción in order to ‘validate’ the PDM (Gobierno Municipal de Concepción, 
2007c: 271).  
46
 Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007. 
47
 Every member of the municipal government has a Chiquitano shirt with the same design, which 
they often wear to work. It is their work uniform. The CICC leaders also have such a shirt, which they 
often wear.  
 319 
and transportation). The aim was that comunidades would take advantage of their 
‘touristic features’, such as their ‘natural surroundings’ or ‘abundance of orchids’.48 
He thought that promoting tourism was closely related to ‘developing culture’ and 
hoped that the promotion of Chiquitano culture would lead to its appreciation by 
‘whites and mestizos’ as well as Chiquitanos themselves:  
…because in the comunidades we are still preserving the culture and it is important 
to demonstrate this and we have done this as Municipal Government recently 
through a world-wide launch, as an opening to demonstrate our culture, our customs, 
our music, and above all, the preservation of our forests…and in truth this benefits 
all, let’s say in the municipality.49 
In other words, they involved comunarios in exploiting their own traditions and 
‘cultural resources’ in a commercial way. The question is whether the comunidades 
benefit from this. There are indications that such projects may lead to conflict in 
comunidades, as the CEJIS team found out during a workshop in the comunidad El 
Carmen. El Carmen is one of the bigger comunidades in Concepción municipalities, 
with several adobe-built school and communal multi-function buildings. It had 
benefitted from Plan International projects which had resulted in the installation of a 
system of water pipes, leading water to taps and sinks around the communal 
buildings in the centre of the comunidad. Plan had also sponsored a library. During 
the workshop it transpired that there was some discontent among comunarios with 
regards to a tourist attraction close to their comunidad: an area of forest with large 
rocks covered in orchids. Comunarios told us that some tourists had come to visit. 
The comunarios wanted to charge them, but the tourists refused and argued that they 
had already paid a fee in the tourist office of the municipal government. The 
comunarios were unhappy about this. There had also been other problems: for 
instance, tourists had come to the comunidad and paid one comunario who did not 
want to share the proceeds, to the disgruntlement of the others.50  
                                                 
48
 Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007. A whole discussion exists about the potential costs and 
benefits of tourism, for which there is no scope here.  
49
 ‘…por que nosotros todavía como comunidades preservamos la cultura y eso es lo importante de 
demostrar y lo hemos hecho ya nosotros como gobierno municipal a través de lo que es un 
lanzamiento mundial que se lo ha hecho recientemente ya como una puerta de mostrar a nuestra 
cultura nuestra costumbres nuestras música y mas que todo nuestra preservación de nuestros bosques 
que le damos no, entonces donde se le ha dao eso donde la verdad de que beneficia a todos digamos 
en municipio’. Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007.  
50
 Workshop: El Carmen, 10 May 2007. 
 320 
With regards to this specific issue it remains to be seen how these ‘tourism 
projects’ get organised in the future and what the consequences may be. However, 
there are few indications that comunarios are actually benefiting from the 
commercialisation of ‘traditional’ products and environmental features, compared to 
the white and mestizo shop owners in Concepción, who profit from high mark ups. 
Further, the multicultural premise of valuing the country’s diverse cultures is turned 
into an economic project. Such projects face little opposition, especially if they 
provide local elites with economic gains. This resembles the indigenista project of 
valuing and promoting aspects of indigenous traditions of continuities that can be 
economically exploited, discussed by other authors in relation to Mexico (e.g. 
Brading, 1988; Mattiace, 2009). 
Photo 38: Workshop in El Carmen 
 
Facilitator William Roca and comunario with Plan International hat.  
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Photo 39: Orchids in El Carmen 
 
One of the Orchid-covered rocks near El Carmen. Unfortunately not in bloom at the time. 
Not only the municipal employees, but as indicated in the previous chapter and the 
‘Interlude’, also NGO and Church activists followed the logic that comunarios 
needed to be ‘developed’ through ‘productive projects’. Faldín acknowledges that 
there is a problem with this notion:  
Also in the area of production, we know very well that… we are not large-scale 
producers; we are just producers for the benefits of our family consumption. So this 
is what we have worked traditionally, our comunidades. However, the municipality 
takes a support strategy more in the direction of support for production, to look for 
alternatives, let’s say, improvement of the grazing areas, because the comunidades 
now have cooperatives, but they are not looking after them, they are not supporting 
them. We can also talk about projects to do with milk, meat, so there are these 
projects and we are supporting them in that, so the municipal government is 
prioritising these needs to produce more. Also, not to forget, the traditional plots: 
improving the seed for them, giving them the maize, rice, bean seeds. We have the 
professionals that can provide the follow-up, but it is very hard, because our 
comunidades are not used to negotiating … to cultivating and selling. They are not 
negotiators, they are …. from a culture of survival. However, we are working in this 
respect, so that in this last prioritisation in the POA they see … that there is an 
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interest in improving the production above all to being able to sell, because it is 
about selling and having resources for the family.51 
While admitting to problems with the municipalities’ emphasis on increasing 
production, he maintained that the solution is to ‘try harder’ to convince the 
comunarios that they should improve production, to sell produce in order to have 
additional family resources. Also Benita Machicado thought that the problem was 
that comunarios produce ‘a bit for subsistence and this is why our people hardly ever 
grow, they do not advance because they really have nothing [so that they can] keep 
studying, i.e. they could not send their children to pursue advanced studies’.52 Again, 
this is testimony to the pervasive nature of the neo-liberal multicultural discourse and 
the ‘menace’ that resides in its reductive nature (Hale, 2002): ‘Citizenship’ is 
participating in local level deliberation over the distribution of resources with the aim 
of economic advancement – neoliberal citizens can thus engage in their own 
development and become functional to the state’s economic paradigm (Hale, 2002, 
2004; McNeish, 2006, 2008; Postero, 2007).  
Achievements and Obstacles: ‘We are in government but do not have the power’ 
Chiquitano municipal government officials pointed to some major achievements 
during Justo Seoanes’ legislative period. They stressed improvements in the areas of 
healthcare, education, assistance in agricultural production inside the comunidades, 
                                                 
51
 ‘También en la parte productiva sabemos muy bien de que…nosotros no somos productores en 
grandes, solamente somos productores para beneficio de la familia, el consumo. Entonces eso es lo 
que tradicionalmente se trabaja, nuestras comunidades. Pero el municipio agarra un estrategia de 
poder apoyar mas en cuanto al apoyo a la producción, de buscar alternativas digamos, mejoramiento 
de potrero por que las comunidades ahorita tiene cooperativas pero no se les esta dando seguimiento 
no, no se le esta apoyando. También se puede hablar proyectos como por decir leche, carne tambien 
entonces hay ese proyecto que se esta apoyando en eso, entonces el gobierno municipal esta 
priorizando esas necesidades para poder producir mas. Tambien no olvidando lo que es el cultivo 
tradicional mejorarles la semilla darles la semilla de maíz, arroz, fríjol tambien. Entonces tenemos la 
parte técnica que le puede dar seguimiento pero esta costando por que por que nuestras comunidades 
no están acostumbrado a negociar, cultivar y vender, digamos. No son negociante son nomás de 
culturas de sobrevivencia, digamos. Pero eso estamos trabajando al respecto de eso, entonces en esta 
ultima priorización dentro del POA ya se esta viendo, digamos, de que tienen interés de poder 
mejorar la producción mas que todo para poder comercializar, por que de eso se trata de que 
vendamos y tener recursos para la familia’. Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007. 
52
 ‘…chaquear y sembrar ¿no? y dar lo poco para el sustento y es por eso que nuestra gente casi no 
surge, no sale adelante porque realmente no tienen para seguir estudiando’. Interview: Concepción, 
16 July 2007. 
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and an increase in citizen participation.53 However, they also pointed to problems. 
Justo Seoane explained that he felt a ‘dilemma’ when he occupied the mayorship:  
…it is really hard when you do not have the majority and when [you are] an 
indigenous authority. … When [one] enters as indigenous mayor, let’s say, one is 
not simply mayor of the indigenous, no? But one is Mayor of the private investment, 
mayor of the public investment and is mayor, let’s say, of the collective investment, 
no? … [I am the] mayor of the Chiquitanos, of the Aymaras, of the Quechuas, of the 
cattle ranchers, of the Cambas, right? The important thing is that in one or the other 
way one always tends towards the social wellbeing of the people who most need it, 
right?54 
Ignacio Faldín noted that it was hard to balance the demands and needs of the urban 
and rural areas, especially given the deep economic, social and ethnic rifts that 
accompany division.55 
Apart from municipal governmental shortcomings due to internal 
administrative difficulties, there were problems with citizen oversight.56 One reason 
advanced to explain this state of affairs is that the system had not actually been 
implemented in Concepción until 2003, resulting in a lack of experience. Faldín 
explained that civil society in a large part of the municipality was not composed of 
‘professionals’ and had minimal experience in financial auditing.57 Herrera Mendéz 
also noted that ‘the citizens do not know much about politics’, which according to 
her, also included the newly elected OTBs.58 This situation mirrors that of other 
municipalities in the Bolivian lowlands. According to Behrendt, the missing 
knowledge concerning the law and politics in general, combined with a general lack 
of education, posed obstacles to the working of the system in most indigenous areas. 
                                                 
53
 Interview: Ignacio Faldín, Concepción, 17 July 2007; Interview: Benita Machicado, Concepción, 16 
July 2007; Interview: Juana Herrera Mendéz, Concepción, 17 July 2007. 
54
 ‘…cuesta realmente cuando no tenés la mayoría y cuando una autoridad indígena. … Cuando entra 
como un alcalde indígena, digamos, ya pues no es alcalde simplemente de los indígenas ¿no?, por eso 
es alcalde de la inversión privada, es alcalde de la inversión publica y es alcalde, digamos, de la 
inversión colectiva ¿no? … Soy el alcalde de los chiquitanos de los aymaras, de los quechuas, de los 
ganaderos, de los cambas ¿no es verdad? Entonces lo importante de que de una y otra manera 
siempre uno tira por el bien social de la gente que más necesita ¿no?’. Interview: Concepción, 17 
July 2007. 
55
 ‘…como zona indígena de tener nuestra propia cultura, con nuestro propia demanda. Mala suerte 
pues que estamos con la zona urbana que no la diferencia que tenemos diferentes ideologías’. 
Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007.  
56
 Some of these were internal operational problems. For example, Benita Machicado complained that 
there is a lack of coordination between councillors and the mayor and sometimes between councillors. 
This, she noted, was restricted to formal appointments with the mayor, while in the past the 
relationship was closer friendship-facilitated coordination. Interview: Concepción, 16 July 2007. 
57
 Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007.  
58
 Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007. 
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It led to a lack of understanding of the functioning of the political system and how to 
use it to advance their position. Behrendt found in her study that most public and 
elected officials also lacked such knowledge (2000: 17; also see Lema et al., 2001).  
Faldín and Machicado pointed to another obstacle: the lack of municipal 
resources. This meant the municipal council could not train people to fulfil the 
functions the LPP required.59 Furthermore, comunarios lacked the resources to travel 
to the municipal seat to actually exercise their oversight function. For similar 
reasons, members of the municipal government could not visit the comunidades 
frequently to keep them informed about current matters in the municipal politics.60 
Further, Benita Machicado perceived a widespread lack of interest in the workings of 
the municipal government and a lack of support towards the councillors from the side 
of the public.61 While authors writing on other localities have equally pointed to the 
unwillingness of citizens to use the newly available channels (e.g. Albó, 1996; 
Faguet, 2003), it is not clear where to draw the line between ‘unwillingness’, 
‘inability’ (for example due to a lack of resources for travel), or a ‘lack of knowledge 
regarding the system’. With regard to Chiquitano comunidades, the case is probably 
a mixture of these factors, combined with a general perception that it is the 
responsibility of the OTB to deal with the municipal government (see below). The 
solution Herrera Mendéz provides is more training and workshops to OTBs and other 
citizens; ‘so that they can represent themselves as they should, knowing the law’.62 
The lack of resources also meant that the municipality experienced delays in 
project delivery. This is likely to be due to its relatively small size. Rowland found 
that smaller municipalities in Bolivia face severe resource constraints under 
decentralisation due to limited local sources of finance ‘because resource 
endowments especially taxable property and activities are unequally distributed 
across space’ and rural areas and smaller municipalities are at a disadvantage (2001: 
1376). Juana Herrera Mendéz complained, for example, that the municipality only 
owns one tractor.63 While seemingly a minor point, it should be remembered that this 
tractor is employed to re-pave streets and paths to the comunidades after the rainy 
                                                 
59
 Faguet provides a good summary of the skills that need to be present in civil society for oversight to 
function (see 2003: 24-26). 
60
 Interviews: Ignacio Faldín, Concepción, 17 July 2007; Benita Machicado, Concepción, 16 July 
2007. 
61
 Interview: Benita Machicado, Concepción, 16 July 2007. 
62
 Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007. 
63
 Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007. 
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season, one of the main annual demands on the municipal government from the 
comunidades. Accordingly, the problems in service delivery comprised one of the 
biggest complaints against the municipality. While the town hall was supposed to 
(or, in the eyes of the comunarios, ‘had agreed to’) assist the comunidad in 
maintaining paths, in building schools or classrooms and in paying for teachers, in 
many comunidades these initiatives had not materialised, i.e. the municipality did 
‘not do as it promised’.64 Some comunarios acknowledged that the reason might be a 
lack of resources: ‘the Mayor has no money’.65 Other comunarios were more 
optimistic and hoped that the municipal government would still deliver.66  
Lastly, some comunarios were more critical about the whole LPP process. 
For example, Lorenzo Pasabare noted:  
Nothing happens, because we carry on asking for favours. They make a POA, they 
reformulate a POA, but we carry on like before in an enormous bureaucracy in 
which one has to wait years to do a few things. [For example] in the maintenance of 
the paths of one comunidad another comunidad has to keep on waiting … it was 
only to hurry [us along to adopt the OTB system] … [but] after twelve, thirteen 
years, we just carry on, nearly nothing has changed.67 
He concluded: ‘We are in government, but we do not have the power.’68 This 
demonstrates Lorenzo’s feeling that participation in the local state bureaucracy had 
not actually brought any political changes. The municipal government simply 
distributed resources when comunarios defined their needs and ‘asked for them’. 
This sums up the situation in many Bolivian localities, and points to the inherently 
flawed nature of the Bolivian decentralisation reforms and the LPP – they did not 
sufficiently alter prevalent structural inequalities in the municipalities and country as 
a whole and provided for very narrowly defined citizenship practices: deliberation 
over local resources. As noted, this was one of the key factors that led popular actors 
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 Workshop: Santa Ana, 1st group, 20 April 2007; Workshop: Don Miguel, Candelaria, 11 May 2007. 
65
 Workshop: Santa Ana, 20 April 2007. 
66
 ‘…no creo que nos dejen de lado pues, porque ya en otras comunidades están lanzado su ayuda’ 
Workshop: Santa Ana, 20 April 2007. 
67
 ‘No pasa naranjas, por que seguimos pidiéndole favores, pidiéndole. Se hace un POA se reformula 
un POA, pero igual seguís en una burocracia enorme que uno tiene que esperar años todavía para 
hacer una poco cosa, por decir los mantenimientos de caminos una comunidad otra comunidad tiene 
que seguir esperando, cuando llegara la maquina, el otro dice también lo quiere, pero es ahí donde 
nos quedamos pensando, entonces…fue nomás como un apuro, fue nomás como un alboroto nomás, 
que después de doce, trece años seguimos casi nomás, casi nada a cambiado’. Interview: Concepción, 
1 June 2007. 
68
 ‘Estamos en gobierno pero no tenemos el poder’. Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007. 
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to increasingly question the narrow channels from 2000 onwards and to demand 
Constituent Reform. 
Concepceño Opposition to Chiquitano in the Political Sphere (or: the ‘Indígenas 
del Evo’) 
Lorenzo’s remarks also points to perhaps the largest obstacle to Chiquitano-led 
administration in Concepción, namely that those used to wielding local power saw 
their own position threatened by the indigenous leaders. Again, this resonates with 
the situation in other municipalities. Behrendt found that especially in the more 
heterogeneous lowland areas, outright discrimination and marginalisation of elected 
indigenous people comprised a severe problem (2000: 15).69 Benita Machicado 
explained the situation for Concepción municipality: 
Above all urban people, councillors from the other side say that the indigenous are 
incapable of managing, that the Mayor should not be, [and] should rather give his 
post to another. … there is a lot of criticism … regrettably the urban zone will 
always see us as the negative part in administering the Municipal Government and 
they will always see us as if we were from the villages, the comunidades we do not 
have the capacity to advance. .... I have confronted the people… those from the 
council on the side of the opposition and I have told them… that we did not need to 
be professionals to work and lead a Municipal Government … and that it is all the 
other way round because we have an indigenous mayor who is not a professional but 
he is a very good mayor, or rather, he works for his people. And well, when they 
were Mayor and one heard that they were practically thieves …70 
                                                 
69
 Behrendt refers to a study carried out in a study of eighty different Municipal Governments with 
campesino-indígena representatives. The representatives identified four major problems: 53 per cent 
felt that they had too little preparation for their new role; 34 per cent named internal and party 
conflicts, 27 per cent stated that they felt marginalised as indigenous representatives, and 21 per cent 
felt that they lacked sufficient resources to be more effective (2000: 15). Behrendt adds that 
operational constraints were not limited to indigenous and peasant candidates only and notes that the 
lack of a professional civil service at municipal level was a general problem. He details that there is a 
clear lack of experience in directing meetings, organising discussions and reaching a consensus, and 
notes that these are skills that need to be developed but that training and capacity building processes 
were extremely time consuming. He found that there was therefore little continuity in policies and 
follow-up (2000: 15). 
70
 ‘…mas que todos gentes urbanas, concejales del otro la(d)o dicen que los indígenas son incapaces 
de manejar que el alcalde no debería estar debería mas bien dar el puesto a otro…hay un montón de 
criticas…lamentablemente esta aquí hoy, que es la zona urbana y siempre nos van a ver pues a 
nosotros, y siempre nos van a ver como la parte negativa para manejar un gobierno municipal y 
siempre nos van a ver como que nosotros somos de los pueblos, las comunidades no tenemos la 
capacidad para seguir adelante. …me confrontado con las personas mas que todos aquí con los del 
concejo de la parte opositora…le dicho de que no necesitábamos ser profesionales para trabajar y 
llevar un gobierno municipal… y eso es todo lo contrario porque tenemos a un alcalde indígena que 
no es profesional pero es una alcalde muy bueno ósea trabaja por su pueblo y este como ellos ha sido 
alcalde y que prácticamente este se ha escuchado que solamente han sido…de ladrones…’. Interview: 
Concepción, 16 July 2007. 
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According to Faldín, while the non-Chiquitano members of the Municipal 
Government formally accepted the indigenous authorities, they still had a disregard 
for them:  
Because we are in office and they take us into consideration in invitations and in 
participation, and to be part also of the execution of a plan, a treaty…but as such in 
valuing us as authority, let’s say, they still feel it as a disturbance, they still do not 
take us seriously… because ‘I am not going to be ordered around by a simple worker 
who has not been a professional who has not been to university, an intellectual’.71 
Lacroix found that elite attitudes often translated into diverse accusations against 
central leaders and the NGOs that support them (with ‘a lot of money’), as 
demonstrated by remarks from the former Sub prefect Suárez Flores (ADN):  
This organisation is more political than anything else. It is not a social organisation, 
but a purely political organisation, which is looking for any excuse to enter into 
conflict with whomever. The politicisation is such that it provokes a situation of 
chaos. They are always looking for shit [trouble] (my translation, quoted in Lacroix, 
2005: 48-49). 
Through their political manoeuvrings against Seoane in 2007, the elite acted on their 
discontent with the political status quo. Their actions may also have partly been 
linked to a perceived lack of experience of Chiquitano functionaries, and to the 
increase of budget expenditure in favour of rural areas and away from the municipal 
seat. However, as Justo Seoane indicated, he attempted to cater for all sorts of 
interests in the locality – the municipal budget was certainly not entirely spent on 
Chiquitano interests.  
Instead, several political differences with high stakes had heightened 
Concepceño dissatisfaction with Chiquitano engagement in politics. These were 
generally linked to developments in the wider political sphere, where the Constituent 
Assembly was continuing. Firstly, the CICC, along with other local indigenous 
centrales, had campaigned for the proposal for indigenous autonomies to be included 
in the new constitution. Instead, the Concepceño elite along with media luna political 
leaders and the Civic Committees supported departmental autonomies and saw 
indigenous autonomies as a direct challenge to their own plans (also see Chapter III). 
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 ‘…por el hecho de que uno esta en función y lo toman en cuenta en lo que es invitaciones y 
participar y ser parte también de una ejecución de un plan o de un convenio… pero en si en darles 
valor como autoridad, digamos, todavía lo sienten como un estorbo, no lo toman como en serio 
todavía… por el hecho de que “yo no me voy a dejar mandar por un simplemente un trabajador, que 
no ha sido un profesional, que no ha sido un universitario un intelectual”’. Interview: Concepción, 17 
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Secondly, Concepceño elite opposed a MAS Mayor – be he Chiquitano or not. In 
line with the departmental leaders, they had opposed the MAS-led initiative for the 
Assembly from the outset and tensions regarding the Assembly were also played out 
in Concepción. Because of their MAS affiliation, the elites increasingly connected 
the Chiquitano indigenous political project to that of the MAS and Evo Morales in 
the national sphere. The elites were deeply suspicious of MAS’s anti-capitalist 
indigeneity discourse (Albro, 2005, 2006; Canessa, 2007b). The following episode 
serves to highlight Concepceño and Cruceño attitudes regarding MAS. 
In late July 2007 I took the bus from Concepción to travel to a CEJIS meeting 
in Santa Cruz. Once I was in the bus, two women started to argue over a seat. One 
woman was from Santa Cruz and one from Concepción. The women from Santa 
Cruz insulted the Concepceña by saying that she sounded like a ‘gaucho’ (a person 
from the Bolivian Chaco region or Argentina). To this the other woman replied, ‘I 
am Concepcióneña and proud of it and I am going to die as Concepcióneña, 
Concepcióneña Chiquitana.’ The other women retorted, ‘Of course! You are an 
originario from the MAS’. She continued to bicker and inform other passengers that 
the woman was ‘indígena’, ‘Indio del Evo’ and just ‘del Evo’ and ‘in cahoots with 
the Alteños’ (people from El Alto). The fight nearly turned violent: both women saw 
these terms as clear insults.72 Thus, indígenas are ‘del Evo’. Worse, in Concepción 
this seemed directly confirmed by the Chiquitano-MAS alliance.  
This episode also has to be seen in the light of the construction of the Camba 
regional identity and the departmental and local elites’ own version of identity 
politics as described in Chapter V. Notably, the discourse draws strength from 
portraying the kolla (the cambas ‘other’) i.e. Quechua, Aymara and mestizo 
highlanders, as troublesome and threatening ‘invaders’. Andean migration to Santa 
Cruz accelerated post-1960 due to the state-sponsored resettlement plans. Over 25 
per cent of the department’s two million inhabitants are now of Andean origin 
(Gustafson, 2006: 355, 361). Perceiving the immigrants as a ‘threat’, Cruceños 
portray them as ‘trapped in a culturally conservative irrational collectivism derived 
from pre-Colombian and Spanish religious and bureaucratic centralism’ (Gustafson, 
2006: 357; also Plata Quispe, 2008: 104). In my conversations with Concepceños 
and Cruceños, kollas were often portrayed as left-wing Indians who wanted to turn 
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 Field notes: Santa Cruz, 20 July 2007. 
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the country into ‘Cuba’ – an accusation heightened by the arrival of Cuban doctors in 
the country’s rural areas, including Concepción, as part of a recent governmental 
treaty with the Cuban leadership. Further, because of their perceived centralist stance 
Cruceños blamed them for blocking their own claim to departmental autonomy.  
For Chiquitano, the MAS affiliation is another area where engagement with 
the state and adopting state-sanctioned forms of organisations (i.e. as party affiliates) 
leads to antagonisms. To participate in the local elections, Chiquitano had to ally 
themselves with a political party. None would accept their political agenda but the 
MAS. This alliance now provides further ammunition to delegitimize the Chiquitano 
political project in the eyes of the local elite. The overlap between lowland and 
highland demands during the constituent assembly, most notably on the issue of 
indigenous autonomies, provided further ammunition. They aligned the Chiquitano 
indigenous project with the MAS political agenda – an image Chiquitano activists 
had been trying to keenly avoid. Another indicator of the Concepceños reasoning 
was that they often stressed that lowland political mobilisations were sponsored by 
the MAS party and its foreign NGO allies – in contrast to their own ‘authentic’ pro 
departmental autonomy rallies. Paradoxically, the very success of the MAS project at 
the national level, serves to mute Chiquitano claims at the local level.  
Chiquitano Comunidades and the LPP 
Promoting OTBs as Communal Authority Structures 
At communal level, the most notable changes instituted by the LPP were the 
Organizaciones Territoriales de Base (OTBs - Territorial Base Organisations). The 
OTB was introduced alongside other autoridades comunales, i.e. the cabildo and the 
corregidor. It replaced the alcalde político, a post introduced with the 1953 Agrarian 
Reform in its function of representing the comunidad before the state.73 While the 
introduction of the new organisation structure led to tension and conflicts between 
the new and already existing authorities in some highland and lowland communities 
(Calla, 2000; Lacroix, 2005: 38), in Concepción implementation of OTBs went 
largely uncontested. 
                                                 
73
 ‘El todo representaba, todo el solucionaba, educación, salud, caminos’. Interview: Concepción, 1 
June 2007. 
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Still, my CEJIS colleague and former central leader Lorenzo Pasabare 
underlined that comunidades would not have needed to introduce OTBs, as the 
legislation recognised ‘the existing authorities in an indigenous pueblo or peasant 
community’. He said that comunidades formed OTBs despite attempts from central 
leaders and their CEJIS advisers to ‘educate’ the comunarios in the wordings of the 
LPP, which would have accepted participation through existing organisational 
structures.74 He added that the comunarios organised OTBs mainly due to outside 
pressures and manipulation: 
What happened here in the zone, in all our jurisdiction of Concepción, is that the 
parish priest was also confounding the comunidad, [by] saying: ‘Form your OTBs 
because if you don’t you will not get resources from Popular Participation’ … ‘The 
municipality will not help you to build your paths. The municipality will not help 
you in productive development. The municipality will not give you this or that.’75 
He explained that apart from the Catholic Church, the ‘traditional’ political parties, 
such as MNR and ADN (Lorenzo calls them ‘viruses’) were influential in the zone. 
He added that the parties questioned ‘the truthfulness and legality of the explanations 
that we [the central] were giving in the comunidades and promoted the introduction 
of OTBs.’76 The likely reason that comunarios listened to the Church and party 
activists was that they had close relations with many of the comunidades (which 
Lorenzo compared with ‘viruses’). Certain parties had a permanent following among 
the comunarios because they provided them with benefits.77 Similarly, as mentioned 
in the ‘interlude’, the Catholic Church financed the construction of damns or wells 
and communal building, and had assisted some comunidades in gaining land titles 
(see Chapter IV).  
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 Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007. Grey Molina pointed out, that the group-level recognition via 
OTBs was ‘meant to provide an inclusive category of existing community organisations, rather than 
create new ones’ (2002: 6). However, not just in the Chiquitanía, but also other areas of the country 
this caused ‘confusion’. According to Grey Molina ‘Campesino sindicatos and indigenous ayllus were 
not entirely sure whether this meant creating a new organisation of having their own recognised under 
a new name. The confusion was augmented by the generalised perception that the MNR might use this 
opportunity to expand its sphere of political influence through OTB recognition’ (2002: 6). 
75
 ‘Que paso acá en nuestra zona, en toda nuestra jurisdicción de Concepción, es que desde el 
párroco fue también confundiendo a la comunidad, diciendo, formen sus OTBs por que si no van a 
poder tener los recursos de la Participación Popular,… el municipio no los va a atender para hacer 
sus caminos, el municipio no le va a ayudar para que hagan desarrollo productivo, el municipio no le 
a dar que uno que lo otro digamos por decir’. Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007. 
76
 ‘… le hicieron frente ya a la legitimidad y a la legalidad de la explicación que íbamos haciendo en 
las comunidades…’. Interview: Lorenzo Pasabare (CEJIS), Concepción, 1 June 2007. 
77
 Pedro Soliz Pinto (OTB of Santa Rita) described such a situation for Santa Rita. Interview: 
Concepción, 1 June 2007. 
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While it is not clear why the parish priest was interested in undermining the 
communal authorities, it was the intention of political parties to ‘capture’ the OTBs 
and expand their influence in the comunidades to enlarge their voter base. Again, this 
was a Bolivia-wide trend. The LPP devolved significant authority, political 
responsibility and, importantly, resources to rural areas, which the parties sought to 
gain control over (Calla, 2000: 87; Faguet, 2003: 20-21).78 But there was also 
another reason. OTBs are in charge of voting for the CV. Julio Antonio Suárez 
(former Sub-Prefect of Concepción) explained: 
… the politicisation of the OTBs is a conscious factor on the part of the parties. It is 
not innocent when an over-politicisation happens at this level, because this is there 
where the votes are. It is the base. If you dominate the OTBs, this permits the control 
of the Oversight Committee. And when I came to be president, I had no problem [27 
of 30 were ADN, his own party]. Now, the president is MNR and the president of 
the municipal council is MAS. This means that the majority of the OTBs are from 
the MNR (in Lacroix, 2005: 47). 
In other words, parties tried to prevent CV’s blocking their policies (‘gridlock’). 
Also, during Just Seoane’s period as Mayor, gridlock was avoided as OTBs were 
marginally dominated by MAS. Still, in the Chiquitano case, OTBs also fulfil many 
other functions in the comunidades, which suggests that party political tendencies of 
OTBs are of little relevance to their election and to the way that they perform their 
duties.  
Communal Authorities and OTBs 
In most comunidades, OTBs are composed basically of a president, vice-president 
and a secretary. Comunarios and central leaders generally refer to the President of 
the OTB simply as ‘OTB’. The OTB was the authority that in most comunidades 
commanded the highest personal respect and had decision-making power.79 As 
already indicated, it is the role of the OTB to interrelate with different ‘levels’ of the 
Bolivian state, but also with non-governmental institutions or businesses. The OTB is 
responsible for dealing with state entities when they come into the comunidad, as 
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 Faguet states that the prospect of benefiting from them pushed villagers and farmers into municipal 
politics and into the voting booth. In this way, the concerns and opinions of the rural 50 per cent of 
Bolivians were brought into the political mainstream. However, the amount of voter increase depends 
significantly on local conditions (2003: 20-21). See also Rowland (2001: 1381). 
79
 See Interview: Lorenzo Pasabare (CEJIS), Concepción, 1 June 2007. 
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well as occasionally travelling to Concepción or other comunidades to meet them.80 
As Lorenzo Pasabare noted, they did this ‘to search … [for] whatever development 
[as] it is its role to seek the wellbeing of the comunidad, to strive for the integral 
development of the comunidad’.81 More specifically, this interrelation with diverse 
state representatives aims at getting hold of assistance in the form of resources and 
projects. Further, through the OTBs, comunidades participate in the municipal 
planning process.  
Comunarios stressed that it is very important for comunidades to ‘be 
organised’ (‘estar organizado’).82 For example, Tomás Parachai, a comunario from 
San Juan stated:  
Well a comunidad is where there are various families and all the families get 
together and plan and choose their leaders and so like this they are recognised [by] 
the municipality, or [by] an organisation. Through the authorities, the very 
comunidad … represents itself, and so they say that ‘they are a comunidad that is 
organised’, or ‘it is organised so that we take [the comunidad] into consideration’.83 
This statement highlights something that many comunarios expressed, namely that 
through ‘being organised’ (i.e. getting together, planning and having authorities), 
state entities (including the municipality, NGOs and the Church) take them seriously, 
no matter how small the comunidad is, or how remote and far away from the 
municipal seat in Concepción. A comunidad that is legally registered and has 
communal authorities can get together, define its demands and then present them to 
NGOs or state institutions and lobby them for assistance, something that an 
individual can not do. Being structured in such a way, means that they are ‘legible’ to 
state actors. This recognition gives Chiquitano comunarios certain leverage and 
access to projects. As mentioned, this involves the comunidades having to 
coordinate, define their needs and demands and oversee the execution of projects. 
Moreover, without ‘being organised’ Chiquitano comunarios have little chance of 
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 Travel to other villages or even Santa Cruz happens very rarely, if at all, due to a lack of financial 
resources in the comunidades to pay for the fare. Travels to the San Javier municipality or Lomerío 
are more likely, as individuals might be able to get lifts on the pick-ups of the centrales, the Church, 
NGOs, or private enterprises.  
81
 ‘… bueno es su rol principal digamos velar por el bienestar de la comunidad, velar sobre el 
desarrollo mismo integral de la comunidad’. Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007. 
82
 For example, Workshop: Makanaté, 15 May 2007. 
83
 ‘Bueno, una comunidad es donde hay varias familias y dentro de todas las familias se reúnen y 
planifican y ponen su dirigentes para que así mismo sea reconocida, o sea al municipio, a una 
organización. Mediante las autoridades que la misma comunidad pone entonces la persona va y se 
presenta, entonces ya dicen que ellas ya son una comunidad que también se han organizado, o esta 
organizada entonces para tomarla en cuenta’. Workshop: Candelaria, 11 May 2007. 
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getting hold of land titles – which individual Chiquitano would be excluded from due 
to mere cost factors. The above statements also reflect the message of parties and the 
Church that without ‘being organised’ as OTBs, comunidades would not profit from 
popular participation resources.  
Nevertheless, OTBs also fulfilled an important internal organisational 
function, coordinating and administering the internal affairs of the comunidad.84 In 
most comunidades they carry such responsibilities alongside the corregidor and the 
cabildo. The corregidor acts as an assistant of the corregidor of the canton (hence in 
El Carmen and some other comunidades the official title used is ‘sub-corregidor’).85 
The departmental prefect appoints corregidores at canton level and these are 
responsible for settling disputes within their jurisdiction. The assistant corregidores 
in each comunidad are responsible for solving conflicts. Like the other authorities, 
they are elected in a community assembly.86 Pedro Pinto noted that in his comunidad 
Santa Rita, they called the corregidor in cases of theft, or to investigate unauthorised 
logging. He added that generally comunarios try to solve problems in the comunidad, 
through holding a communal assembly and persuading the culprit not to offend 
again. He gave me an example of how the comunidad had avoided further legal 
action through resolving a crime in the comunidad:  
In the case of my comunidad there has been a case of major robbery … A case of 
stealing sheep. This was not decided in a reunion, this was solved conversing with 
the person who was part of causing the problem, and so they have solved it 
peacefully … I knew that this had its punishment. And in this case the problem was 
caused by a woman, a woman who has a family, and this problem was severe … this 
involves … years of imprisonment. But we were capable of solving [the problem], as 
OTBs, Cabildo, Corregidor.87 
He added that if problems were unsolvable, they would call for the intervention of 
the cantonal corregidor or the police. 
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 See various workshops.  
85
 Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007. 
86
 This is the case in highland and lowland communities all over Bolivia. For a highland example, see 
Bigenho (1999: 963).  
87
 ‘En caso de mi comunidad ha habido un robo mayor ejemplo ¿no?, un caso de “ovejato” 
¿no?...Eso no se decidió en una reunión, eso se ha solucionado así conversando con la persona que 
fue la parte que hizo el problema, entonce se ha solucionado así pacíficamente… yo sabia que tiene 
su condena y en ese caso el problema que ha hecho una mujer pues no, una mujer que tiene familia, y 
eso problema fue son grave pues… son años de cárcel. Pero hubo la capacidad de solucionar tanto 
como OTBs, cabildo y corregidor’. Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007. 
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In many comunidades, the corregidor together with the OTB was also 
responsible for overseeing the use of communal resources (natural or other). For 
example, if a comunario needed wood to construct a house, he had to inform and get 
permission from the corregidor and OTB. Further, the corregidor played a role in 
overseeing communal works. Lorenzo noted that the corregidor ‘coordinates all 
these actions with the OTBs and together then, they work with the entire comunidad, 
no? Especially in communal works, in the benefit for all’.88 
The cabildo represents the third set of authorities. A cabildo can be composed 
of anything between two and twelve comunarios (depending on the total number of 
comunarios) who are often called ‘cacique’ (or ‘consejero’ [councillor]). These are 
elected by their fellow comunarios generally for a period between 3 and 5 years. It is 
the cabildo’s task to collaborate with OTBs and corregidor in organising the 
administration of the comunidad, such as managing communal works. Overall, the 
cabildo is the body that is most concerned with the everyday internal organisation of 
the comunidad, and they are generally the enforcer of rules, as Lorenzo Pasabare 
described in his comunidad Altamira: 
The cabildo is composed of two Caciques. He is the one who collaborates [with] the 
OTBs and the coregidor… in any case that exists [for example] like disobedience, 
[not coming] to the reunion, these Caciques go to the house of the compañero to see 
what is happening, right? Why is he not in the reunion, maybe he is ill or he is 
unreliable and does not want to come… Then they are like the police.89  
In many comunidades the cabildo is also in charge of upholding part of the justice 
system. In some comunidades the cabildo is especially responsible for religious 
affairs, i.e. organising communal fiestas, the weekly mass, etc.  
In sum, these authorities are at times involved in fulfilling tasks required for 
‘indio permitido’ style self-management required by the LPP, while on the other 
hand fulfilling internal organisational roles. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out 
that comunidades have also defined their needs and then lobbied state actors such as 
the Church, political parties, departmental development corporations and NGOs for 
                                                 
88
 ‘…coordina todas estas accionar de las OTBs y en conjunto entonces trabajan con toda la 
comunidad ¿no? especialmente en los trabajos comunales, en beneficio para todos’. Interview: 
Concepción, 1 June 2007. 
89
 ‘El cabildo es compuesto por dos Caciques. Es el cual los que colaboran al a la OTBs, al 
corregidor para cualquier caso que exista … como desobediencia a reunión, estos Caciques van a la 
casa del compañero a ver que esta pasando ¿no? Porque no esta en la reunión, por ahí esta enfermo 
y no asiste, o de repente esta caprichudo y no quiere venir también, entonces ya son ellos como 
policías casi así ¿no?’. Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007. 
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assistance and funds before the LPP (see Chapter IV). In the Chiquitano case, OTBs 
seem to have been integrated into communal life, rather than disrupting it as reported 
in other cases. They have replaced the alcaldes politicos as a tool for interacting with 
outsiders, while cooperating with other communal authorities in internally running 
communal affairs. They generally fulfil already existing authority functions; the 
process has been one of re-naming and re-arranging rather than one of 
‘displacement’.  
LPP: Incompatible with the ‘Indigenous Reality’? 
Among the criticisms levelled against the LPP is that it establishes an inherently 
Western, bureaucratic vertical system, which is incompatible with ‘indigenous 
reality’ (see Calla, 2000). Lacroix points out that the very fact that the law has not 
been translated into indigenous languages raises doubts about the ‘political will’ of 
the government to allow for a ‘true participation of the indigenous populations’ 
(2005: 74-75). In turn, Ricardo Calla denounces the Bolivian decentralisation law for 
ignoring the highland ayllu cargo system consisting of male and female couples even 
at the level of the DMI (2000: 84)90. There are also reports that in some Bolivian 
regions the introduction of the LPP has led to the displacement of local ‘traditional 
leaders’ due to the new demands it imposes on these authorities, for instance 
knowledge of the local administrative procedures, ability to read and write and know 
Spanish (see Behrendt, 2000: 15; Blanes, 1999b).  
While the LPP has presented challenges to many Chiquitano comunidades, 
they have nevertheless dealt with this in a creative and proactive manner. Pedro Solíz 
Pinto outlined challenges faced by OTB members of his small comunidad Santa Rita, 
about seven kilometres from the municipal seat Concepción:  
                                                 
90
 Further, he notes that new municipal jurisdictions have been demarcated according to the 
boundaries of the old provincial divisions. In the highlands, this meant that many ayllus found that 
their territorial discontinuity simply did not fit with the concept of territorial jurisdiction that 
characterises the municipal order. Calla notes that ‘it is probable, in fact, that due to the LPP some 
ayllus will eventually lose their territorial control’ (2000: 84). Calla argues that the ‘reductionist 
municipalista tendency’ tends to replicate Bolivia’s experience of municipalisation in the 19th 
century when the country went through a process of municipalisation. This saw the introduction of 
agentes municipales cantonales into rural areas that were to be the institutional link through which 
mayors of towns and cities could intervene in rural development. The outcome, he sustains, was the 
impositioning of a municipal form of organisation on indigenous groups that disregarded their 
interests. Instead, it boosted the political and economic position of sectors of local vecino-mestizo 
elites who were – directly or indirectly – associated with the hacienda regime (2000: 86). 
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They say that they are afraid, … ‘look, I do not know, I cannot talk how you talk 
with the mayor, like that’, eh…‘I do not have the ability to speak, you are better 
known’ …or above all it is the fear, the timidity to be able to speak with the people 
….They are more concerned with their chacos [fields], no? However, when you 
have to do a thing we have to do it, no? And in the comunidad you also have to hold 
reunions, right?91 
Consequently, Pedro described that comunarios often elected people who had 
attended more workshops, who were ‘well trained’ and ‘knew more’.92 While this 
seems to support the findings of authors that the LPP displaced ‘traditional’ leaders, 
it should be added that Chiquitano comunarios have generally tended to choose 
individuals as leaders who seemed to be the most eloquent talkers. These are 
probably the people that they send to workshops in the first place.93  
Further, authors mention that given the predominantly oral tradition of 
lowland peoples, there are particular problems with the emphasis ‘on all things 
written’ in these new procedures (Lacroix, 2005: 75; Lema et al., 2001). This did not 
necessarily present a problem in Chiquitano comunidades. Several comunidades 
made efforts not to exclude illiterates from authority positions. As Pedro Soliz Pinto 
described for his comunidad Santa Rita: 
They say ‘I cannot exercise because I cannot read’... [but] there have also been 
elections of authorities … who do not know how to read, but they always look for an 
accompaniment, their secretary should know [how to] write, so, this is also a way 
that exists in my comunidad…so that when he/she goes to a reunion, he/she is in 
charge of writing so that afterwards he/she can read it in the reunion, so it is a way 
we do it, and like that we manage it.94  
Furthermore, analysts point out that the insertion of OTBs and electoral structures 
into indigenous communities has in many cases led to a profound politicisation and 
engendered internal divisions (see Behrendt, 2000: 15; Blanes, 1999b; Lacroix, 2005: 
74; Lema et al., 2001). Behrendt finds that in many cases local authorities have 
                                                 
91
 ‘Ello dicen que temen… “mira yo no se, yo no puede hablar como voz habla con el alcalde así”, 
eh… “no tengo la facilidad de hablar, a voz que sos mas conocido” … o sea, mas que todo es el 
miedo, la timidez de poder hablar ejemplo con la gente ahora ¿no?, …mas se abocan a su chaco no, 
pero cuando hay que hacer una cosa, tenemos que hacer también ¿no?, y en la comunidad es también 
hacer reunión ¿no?…’. Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007. 
92
 Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007. 
93
 See Interview: Pedro Solíz Pinto, Concepción, 1 June 2007. 
94
 ‘Dicen, “yo no puedo ejercer por que no se leer” ¿no?… habido también elecciones de 
autoridades… que no saben leer, pero siempre busca su acompañante, su secretario alguien que sepa 
escribir, entonces ese también es un forma de que en mi comuna hay…para que cuando vaya a una 
reunión el se encargue de escribir para que luego lo lea en la reunión, entonce es una forma que 
nosotros también eso lo entendemos y así no manejamos’. Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007. 
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historically been co-opted by the political parties, noting that this tendency has 
increased among candidates for office as well as members of CVs (2000: 15). As 
noted, parties were partly responsible for the introduction of OTBs into comunidades 
and had a vision of capturing them. However, this is not a new phenomenon. 
Comunarios engaged in clientelist practices before the LPP was passed. As my 
CEJIS colleague Lorenzo Pasabare explained to me: 
Look, the people…in nearly all that is the lowlands, the people like preventa [trade-
off], give me something and I support you, they do not care whether it is for a little 
while or in the long run with what they give them… We are pre-sellers, we like it 
when they give us a hat in exchange for votes and how long does a vote last, how 
much is a vote worth? Millions of money that the corrupt ones take: this is what 
happens from the mayor’s office here to further up, like this is Bolivia. …this is 
what has happened and keeps happening. … what happens in our comunidad is that 
there are still these corazoncitos [little darlings]l who always support the patron, 
‘pucha, how would it be if my patron would always be good to me’, right? … This is 
what [it] is like… here and in [the comunidad] La Guardia and in all the 
municipalities of the hundred and something municipalities of our country, up to the 
central power it is like that, right? 95 
Juana Herrera Mendez states that the situation is changing:  
Look, it is improving a lot, because in the past, for the elections… they took the 
comunidades to a house and they told them ‘you are going to vote for this political 
colour’. Today it is not like that any more. They are the ones who decide, it is they 
who elect, they see what their programme is, the work plan of each political colour. 
They elect their representatives so that they can be candidates for councillor and 
mayor, so it has got a lot better, a thing that previous years they did not do, they 
simply named them.96 
                                                 
95
 ‘Mire, la gente…en todo lo que es tierra baja la gente le gusta la preventa: “dame algo yo te 
apoyo”. No le importa si es para un ratito o es para largo con tal que le den…que somos 
prevendalista no gusto que una gorrita no regalen a cambio de un voto y cuanto dura un voto, cuanto 
vale un voto millones de plata que se saquean lo corruptos eso es lo que pasa desde esta alcaldía de 
aquí hasta allá arriba, así nomás es Bolivia …‘…lo que pasa que dentro de nuestra comunidad aun 
hay esos corazoncitos que siempre apoyan al patrón, ‘¿pucha como será pues si mi patrón fue bueno 
siempre conmigo?, ¿no?, … así no nomás es…aquí y en La Guardia y en todos los municipios de 
nuestros ciento y tantos municipios de nuestro país hasta el poder central es así, ¿no?…’. Interview: 
Concepción, 1 June 2007. 
96
 ‘Mire, va mejorando bastante porque anteriormente inclusive para las elecciones... las 
comunidades se lo llevaban a una casa le decían bueno “van a votar por este color político”. Hoy en 
día ya no. Ellos son los que deciden ellos son los que eligen, ellos este ven este cual es el programa su 
plan de trabajo de cada color político. Ellos eligen a su representante para que puedan ser candidato 
a concejales y alcalde, entonces ha mejorado bastante, cosa que en años anteriores nos se lo hacia 
solamente se nombraba’. Interview: Concepción, 17 July 2007. 
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However, apart from this more optimistic view, it can be assumed that clientelist 
practices persist, as Lorenzo’s statement indicates.97 Lorenzo proved his point by 
noting that the departmental autonomy referendum had found support among 
Chiquitano comunarios. This was besides the fact that most comunarios at the time 
were generally not familiar with the term ‘autonomy’, nor its implications, as the 
statement of Doña Apolonía from Candelaria illustrates: ‘Well, I, at the moment, 
autonomy, I do not understand it either, because we do not know very well what the 
autonomy is.’98 
Lastly, rather than having a disrupting effect, the introduction of new 
structure in the comunidades seemed to have had a levelling effect with regards to 
communal power structures. Lorenzo Pasabare and Pedro Solíz Pinto revealed that 
after Chiquitano families left estancias and establecimientos, it was generally the 
founders of the new comunidades and their families who took over leadership roles 
and dictated party affiliation.99 As Pedro Solíz Pinto stated:  
… they said, let’s do this, and if the people did not want to, well they insisted, right? 
So they frightened them or something like that. ‘If you are not for one political 
party’, or … ‘If you do not go, or do not want to work with me here in this, then 
there will be no help for you’. So the people just complied.100  
Lorenzo added that this was at times to the detriment of others: ‘there are also 
families who govern in their comunidades only to take advantage of the 
comunidad.’101 He explained:  
Because he has influence or because he stands out … talks louder or because he 
thinks he has more initiative and the rest follow him and they name him authority … 
                                                 
97
 In line with the citizenship and state conceptualisations developed in Chapter II, I concur with Lazar 
(2008) and Auyero (2000) that such clientelism may form a (collective) citizenship practice, as state 
actors, in the form of politicians or their assistants personally travel to the comunidades, and present 
comunarios with gifts in the form of portions of rice or hats to gain their favour for the next elections.  
98
 ‘Bueno yo aurita de la autonomía no le entiendo también yo, porque nosotros no conocemos muy 
bien que es la autonomía’. Workshop: Candelaria, 11 May 2007. However, there was a growing 
awareness of what the term ‘departmental autonomy’ and ‘indigenous autonomy’ stood for, as they 
later turned into the main focus of the lowland indigenous movement’s political activity during the 
Constituent Assembly, and a key point of contention with the Departmental elite and their supporters. 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss this point further, and will be discussed elsewhere. 
99
 Interview: Lorenzo Pasabare, Concepción, 1 June 2007; Interview: Pedro Solíz Pinto, Concepción, 
1 June 2007. 
100
 ‘…decían hagamos este y si la gente no quería hacer caso, bueno ellos insistían, ¿no? Entonce le 
metían miedo algo así. “Si no va por un partido político” o … “si usted no van o que no quieren 
trabajar aquí conmigo en este trabajito entonce no va haber ayuda pa’ ustedes, entonce la gente pues 
hacían caso nomás’. Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007. 
101
 ‘… pero también hay familias que gobiernan dentro de las comunidades nomás para aprovecharse 
de la comunidad’. Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007. 
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And sometimes it comes from generations back … If the uncle is not elected, it is the 
cousin, if it is not the cousin, it is the grandfather… but now this is changing … 
because the people are different … now there are many young people, ‘awake’, let’s 
say.102 
Lorenzo noted that in his comunidad Altamira, the situation was changing because 
the founders of the comunidad were getting old. Younger people were taking up the 
posts and people from other families. Nevertheless, like in many other comunidades, 
the former authorities advised the younger ones: 
What is happening there is that there is always a consultation of the older person 
who has lead and who is still alive, and who knows the processes that have happened 
until they obtained a comunidad. From when they where slaves, until where they are 
now. And why is that? To not ignore what happened in the past and what is 
happening now and in the present and what will come in the future.103 
Lorenzo Pasabare and Pedro Solíz Pinto provided another reason for why the system 
changed. Authorities are now chosen by majority consensus, or through a ‘rotation 
system’. As Pedro Solíz Pinto stated:  
Now it does not exist any more, this power of family, or of certain groups. Instead, 
now there is a nearly majority consensus, to say if the corregidor, it is not family but 
is communal, now all elect him, ‘well this compañero we are going to elect as 
Corregidor…’104 
Doña Martha from Makanaté summed this up: ‘One looks at the person that is 
responsible and who is interested to respond to the base, then one elects them.’105 
However, a system that sought periodically to redistribute offices did not function in 
all comunidades. Some were too small to stop members from certain families from 
repeatedly filling leadership roles. Pedro Solíz Pinto explained while he was OTB of 
Santa Rita, his brother was cabildo mayor. He stressed that they did not manage their 
                                                 
102
 ‘Por lo que tiene influencia o por lo que sobresalen …por que habla un poco mas fuerte o por que 
cree tener la mejor iniciativa y el resto lo sigue no, y como es el que sobre sale o es la que sobresale 
en caso si es mujer el resto lo sigue y lo nombran autoridad pues no… a veces como que ya viene de 
generación ya no … si no es elegido el tío, es el primo, si no es el primo hermano es el abuelo, … 
pero esta cambiando…por que ya la gente son diferentes pues… ya hay muchos jóvenes ya, ya 
despiertos digamos.’. Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007. 
103
 ‘lo que esta pasando allá ,es que siempre hay alguna consulta a la persona mas mayor y que haya 
dirigido y que este en vida todavía, y que conoce los procesos que han pasado hasta conseguir una 
comunidad ,digamos ¿no? Desde que fueron esclavo, hasta donde están ahora, digamos ¿no?, ¿y eso 
es para qué? para no ignorar lo que paso en el pasado y lo que esta pasando ahora en el presente y 
que vendrá en el futuro…’ Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007. 
104
 ‘…ahora ya no hay ese poder de familia, ni de ciertos grupos. Sino que ahora ya hay un consenso 
casi mayoritaria, como decir si al corregidor, ya no es familiar sino es comunal ya todo lo eligen a él, 
bueno a este compañero lo vamos elegir de corregidor…’. Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007. 
105
 ‘… uno ve a la persona que es responsable y que tiene el interés de responder a las bases, 
entonces ya uno lo elige’. Workshop: Makanaté, 15 May 2007.  
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post to the benefit of the family, or ‘impose on the people, to demand work that they 
did not like…but if there is a decision we all do it together’.106 Thus, such a situation 
was acceptable as long as comunarios fulfilled their role properly and did not only 
work for the benefit of their own families.107  
Apart from rotating posts, another way to prevent one individual always 
influencing decision-making was through controlling people’s input in communal 
meetings, i.e. stopping a person from contributing too much, as Lorenzo Pasabare 
explained:  
… if he always wants to be, how we say vulgarly, the one who rules most, ‘no, one 
moment, here we all decide and with our authority that we have put we are going to 
decide what we are going to do’ no? Thus, that this stops a while, no? It is good to 
have a dynamic person…nobody says that this is bad, let’s say, no? But when we see 
that he/ she wants to…’here I rule and here I order’, nooo, one moment, no? Here 
nobody is a sheep to say…come here and where the shepherd indicates, that’s where 
we all will go, it is not like that, no?.108 
The change in the way that comunarios became authorities also had a gender 
dimension. Lorenzo Pasabare explained that in Altamira the OTB directive was 
composed of ‘a group of young women, of twenty-three, twenty-four and twenty-five 
years, let’s say. No? …the only man is the Corregidor…’. 109 He noted that the 
comunarios had encouraged women to occupy these positions. However, in most 
comunidades men still overwhelmingly occupied leadership roles. Pedro reported 
that also in Santa Rita women were now more involved in communal decision-
making. While in the past the corregidor was involved in all decisions taken in the 
comunidad, now the women’s group took decisions that concern them (albeit tasks 
                                                 
106
 ‘…si yo tengo familia, en mi caso tengo, yo aurita son presidente de la OTBs y mi hermano es 
cabildo digamos, es cabildo mayor pero no manejamos así este, a imponer a la gente a exigir un 
trabajo que no le gusta ejemplo no, sino que cuando hay una decisión todo lo hacemos en común 
¿no?’. Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007. 
107
 Workshop: Makanaté, 15 May 2007; Interview: Pedro Solíz Pinto, Concepción, 1 June 2007. 
108
 ‘… pero si es que el nomás quiere ser el, como decir nosotros vulgarmente el manda mas, “no, un 
ratito aquí entre todos decidimos y con nuestra autoridades que hemos puesto se va a decidir que se 
va hacer” ¿no?, entonces como que se para un rato eso también ¿no?, esta bien, digamos no una 
persona dinámica, que haiga todo eso esta bien, que nadie dice que esta mal, digamos, ¿no?. Pero 
cuando ya se lo ve también que ya, pucha, quiere mire “yo aquí domino y aquí mando” nooo, un 
ratito, ¿no? aquí nadie es ovejo para decir aquí se van acá y donde nos indique el pastor, nos vamos 
a ir todos, no es así entonces ¿no?’. Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007. 
109
 ‘…un grupo de señoras, que son jóvenes ¿no? de veintitrés, veinticuatro y veinticinco años, 
digamos, ¿no? son los que están dirigiendo la comunidad, digamos, ¿no? y la mayor parte son puras 
mujer, es, el único hombre ahí es el corregidor nomás’ ¿no?’. Interview: Lorenzo Pasabare (CEJIS), 
Concepción, 1 June 2007. 
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that need to be carried out are done communally and in coordination with the 
corregidor and the cabildo).110  
Finally, it is important to note that there are nevertheless some voices that see 
the introduction of OTBs into comunidades critically. Some comunarios hold that the 
communal authorities should revert back to what they were before OTBs.111 Lorenzo 
Pasabare believed comunidades should re-adopt the cabildo system. In comunidades 
where the cabildo and OTB coexisted, the cabildo should take over the functions of 
the OTB.112 Another example is the statement of Don Juan (from Makanaté):  
We want the name of the originario authority to [be] cacique not OTB, because this 
was what it was like before the Popular Participation arrived and changed it to OTB. 
But it is the same, the same function.113  
It can be concluded that while OTBs have a hierarchical structure in themselves, 
rather than introducing a more pronounced hierarchical power structures in the 
comunidad as a whole, they actually function in a way to make decision-making 
more egalitarian (or: ‘against the state’) (Clastres, 1989). The reports by Chiquitano 
informants strongly suggest that the OTB system has served to undermine the 
positions of ‘powerful families’ who had gained their predominant positions as 
founders of comunidades. The introduction of OTBs has seemingly led to the re-
distribution of communal authority functions, or the re-naming of existing posts, 
rather than an outright change or replacement. As the statements above demonstrate, 
even the critics are calling for a change in name rather than fundamental alteration of 
the authority functions themselves: they simply want the names changed back to 
their pre-OTB state. 
Conclusion 
While the election of the first Chiquitano mayor in the municipality of Concepción 
represented a major challenge to the local socio-political status quo, Chiquitano 
officials took their places in a system that was ‘narrow and fraught with limitations’ 
                                                 
110
 Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007. Here it should be added that the gender dimension of 
communal decision-making certainly deserves future exploration and analysis.  
111
 This development might be parallel to the move away from union structures in Andean communal 
organisation (see Calla, 2000: 91). 
112
 Interview: Concepción, 1 June 2007. 
113
 ‘…queremos que vuelva el nombre de la autoridad originario, que sea Cacique no OTB, por que 
así era antes hasta que llego la Participación Popular y lo cambio a OTB, pero es el mismo, la misma 
función’. Workshop: Makanaté, 15 May 2007. 
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(McNeish, 2008: 45). In line with a neo-liberal logic, strengthening of ‘identity’ and 
‘culture’ were primarily seen in the light of the economic development and 
‘improvement’ of the comunidades. In line with the argument of Charles Hale 
(2004), McNeish (2008), Postero (2007) and others, paradoxically, the very success 
of the decentralisation policy, and the central in gaining access to the state and 
advancing some of their social rights, means that Chiquitano leaders elected to the 
municipal government de facto become party to state interests.  
Some comunarios, like Lorenzo Pasabare, perceive the limits inherent in this 
form of participation. While Chiquitano could influence resource distribution, there 
were no actual political changes or alterations to the established socio-political order 
of the locality. Even when Chiquitano comunarios fulfilled their roles, defined their 
demands and presented them to the municipal government, resource constraints 
meant there were no guarantees it could deliver ‘as promised’. 
Despite adopting this rhetoric, Chiquitano officials faced discrimination from 
Concepceño elites who continued to view Chiquitano personnel with hostility. Thus, 
in contrast to findings by other authors who note that indigenous citizens have been 
able to make use of the newly institutionalised channels, not least to push beyond 
their restrictive and limited nature (Albro, 2005; Lazar, 2008; McNeish, 2008; 
Postero, 2007), in the Chiquitano case there has been a remarkable degree of 
continuity to previous patterns of Chiquitano state engagement. Their project largely 
continues to be subordinated to that of elite interest.  
Moreover, as Chiquitano leaders have had to run for political office with 
MAS affiliation, the advancement of the MAS political project in the national sphere 
has provided Concepceño elites further ammunition to discredit the Chiquitano 
political project. In an environment where Chiquitano interests are opposed to those 
of local elites on several fronts, the latter finally moved to oust the Chiquitano mayor 
of Concepción in a coup-style action, to replace him with a member of one of 
Concepción’s most powerful families in August 2007. There is little indication that 
Chiquitano in Concepción have managed to overcome the indio permitido.  
Still, contrary to the reports by authors from other areas of Bolivia, the 
adoption of OTBs into Chiquitano comunidades seems to have happened without any 
major disruptions to the existing authority system. The communal authority system 
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exerts governmentality (Foucault, 1991), while the OTB is additionally an 
intermediary that presents the demands of the comunidad to the local government 
and other official and non-governmental actors. It emerges that this supposed 
‘adoption’ of ‘western structures’ was not a one-way process. Instead, the 
comunarios shaped the functions of the OTB to fit the roles of the previous 
communal organisation. Additionally, Chiquitano sources report that the system has 
served to dismantle the hold on authority positions by ‘powerful families’ who 
generally gained predominant positions as founders of comunidades.  
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Chapter VIII 
Conclusion:  
Chiquitano, the State and Prospects for Future Engagement 
This thesis seeks to shed light on the relationship between the Chiquitano of 
Concepción Municipality in the Eastern Bolivian lowlands and the state. It 
conceptualises the state as a power structure as well as a process or on-going project 
(Abrams, 1988), which aims at expansion and making societies more ‘legible’ (Fried, 
1967, 1975; Scott, 1998). This process may also lead to the creation of new identities 
or organisational forms (Anderson, 1991; Fried, 1975; Nugent, 1994a; Sider, 1987).  
Along with other countries, the Bolivian government implemented 
multicultural reforms in the mid-1990s to ‘expand citizenship’ (including to the 
indigenous population). In many ways, this was a seductive project which succeeded 
in increasing legibility (Scott, 1998). That this project should prove so successful can 
be explained by drawing on Hale’s (2002; 2004) concept of ‘indio permitido’ as 
outlined in Chapter II. Hale and other authors have highlighted that such reforms 
have special coercive powers towards ethic groups, as they entail the 
acknowledgement of, ‘a substantive, if limited, version of indigenous cultural rights’ 
(Hale, 2002: 487; see also McNeish, 2008: 46), which seem to answer their demands 
for certain rights, resources, and access to political participation. Through neo-liberal 
multicultural legislation, ‘those who controlled access to resources and rights were 
able to bind oppressed groups more tightly to the state and to looking to state law as 
the site from which a non-discriminatory politics could proceed’ (Povinelli, 1998: 
598).  
Indigeneity has acquired powerful meanings, not only because it allows for 
national and international alliance building, but it has also developed into a label 
through which previously marginalised groups have gained access to privileged 
rights as indigenous Bolivian citizens. However, the state extends legibility not only 
through promoting state-sanctioned labels but also cultural and economic practices 
and organisational forms (Hale, 2002, 2004, 2005; Povinelli, 1998). The promotions 
of this label effectively ‘empowered states to prohibit and (de)certify cultural 
difference as a right – and resource – bearing identity’ (Povinelli, 1998: 582). The 
Chiquitano case shows, for example, how territorial titles are ultimately linked to the 
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premise of exploiting this land in a sustainable manner. In fact, the state-sanctioned 
economic forms under neo-liberal multiculturalism, not surprisingly, do not include 
self-subsistence practices. After all, the aim is to establish citizens as neo-liberal 
subjects who govern themselves ‘in accordance with the logic of globalised 
capitalism’ (Postero, 2007: 16). 
The treatment of the state as a power structure also reveals the significantly 
multi-sited nature of the state and draws attention to the different actors that may 
form part of it. This therefore problematises a dichotomous treatment of the state and 
civil society. In the Chiquitano case, actors as diverse as the Chiquitano centrales, 
NGOs and different state administrative agencies, such as INRA – may all constitute 
the state. They are all also involved at times in the process of making Chiquitano 
socio-political and economic practices – as well as the land they live on –more 
legible. Especially pertinent examples are the work of the CICC and its NGO allies 
in spreading the indigenous label among Chiquitano comunarios, addressed in 
Chapter V, as well as the CEJIS governance project described in Chapter IV, which 
aimed to document Chiquitano authority structures and decision-making processes, 
so that more efficient (and possibly centralised) structures could be defined in future.  
The groups or individuals who take advantage of the opportunities presented 
by state actors are often faced ‘with an unavoidable and irresolvable antagonism 
between their past and their present’ which emerges, for example, when the larger 
society ‘simultaneously insists both on the “otherness” of dominated peoples and on 
their compliance with a larger set of constantly changing standards, laws, and 
practices’ (Sider, 2003: 9, emphasis in original). Chapters V, VI and VII addressed 
different ways in which Chiquitano engage with the state, a well as areas where these 
antagonisms materialised. However, as these chapters also demonstrate (with the 
addition of Chapter IV), the maintenance of the social relations and the constant re-
emergence of comunidades comprise a subtle but effective Chiquitano resistance 
strategy. 
This concluding chapter presents the main findings of this thesis. These 
strongly suggest that while the Chiquitano oppose state impositions at the communal 
level, the indio permitido has not been overcome in Concepción municipality, as 
others have suggested by pointing to the vigour of indigenous politics in the national 
political sphere (McNeish, 2008; Postero, 2007). It also questions whether the indio 
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permitido syndrome can actually be overcome. Lastly, I propose some areas for 
future research, suggesting that the Bolivian autonomy debate is extremely relevant 
to indigenous-state relations, such as the recent debates around and recognitions of 
indigenous autonomies in the Bolivian legal framework. 
Chiquitano, the State and Indigeneity 
As Chapter V addressed, Chiquitano comunarios started to form the Concepción 
Chiquitano movement in the 1980s. It was initiated by individuals who had attended 
union leadership workshops in Cochabamba. Previously established communal and 
syndicate structures were also important for providing the necessary networks and 
associational space, as was the support from departmental development corporations, 
indigenous umbrella organisations and NGOs. These latter actors also provided 
necessary resources. Among the initial motives for organising were resistance to 
excessive labour tributes (prestación vial), ending landowner abuses and 
encroachment of loggers and cattle famers on Chiquitano land. The Chiquitano 
organisation of Concepción has since taken on a role in administrating projects and 
organising the service delivery, which comunarios require. In this respect, their role 
and practices do not differ significantly from other state actors.  
They not only provide similar services but, as mentioned above, strive to 
make the Chiquitano population more ‘legible’, through spreading state-sanctioned 
modes of identification.1 The neo-liberal multicultural reforms inspired the centrales 
to adopt the term ‘indigenous’ as part of their organisations’ name and they have 
promoted it for the purpose of self- and group identification among comunarios. 
While more recently Bolivians may choose to adopt this label to express their ‘newly 
found indigenous roots’ or to a display of support for the MAS political project (see 
Albro, 2005; Canessa, 2006; McNeish, 2008), the Chiquitano case reflects the 
pressures to adopt this label in order to access certain rights and socio-economic 
entitlements. The fact that the term has become so prominent reveals the power of 
transnational governance, not only to influence national policy-making, but also the 
choices of modes of identification available to people at the local level. 
                                                 
1
 Scholars researching social movements have pointed out that it is not surprising that they should 
become more ‘state-like’, because a) they are shaped in relation to the wider political and institutional 
context and b) they endeavour to ‘access’ rights and resources from state administrative levels 
(Foweraker, 1995: 63, 2001: 842). 
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However, the state is not the only agent of identification and categorisation 
that matters, albeit it is an important one (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000: 16; also see 
Hale, 2009: 323). This is demonstrated in the way that the Chiquitano attach multiple 
meanings to the term ‘indigenous’ and use it for different purposes (for making 
political claims, to establish an additional barrier to others, etc.) and at different 
times. On other occasions it can be deemed unacceptable for the purpose of self-
identification because it has the effect of muting the real issues at stake, namely their 
continued subordination to ‘white’ ideas, concepts and policies (cf. Suzman, 2003: 
399-400). In a way, they question the indio permitido itself. Lastly, the fact that the 
centrales and their allies face certain problems in spreading the label, demonstrates 
how difficult it is to create a movement or community of people that all adopt a 
collective identifier and additionally attribute the same, or any, meaning to it 
(Anderson, 1991; Latour, 2007: 34-37; Melucci, 1985: 792; Tilly, 1984: 305), and 
that creating a homogenous community boundary is difficult (Barth, 1969). 
It was not the scope of this thesis to further address the relationship between 
comunarios and the leaders of their organisation. This awaits further research to 
reveal the dynamic between the more ‘rhizomic’ communal organisation and the 
more individualistic and ‘taproot’ model of the Chiquitano central (Rosengren, 
2003). As Rosengreen (1987; 2003) describes for the Matsigenka in Peru, the liekly 
friction between the two is likely to cause accusations of corruption and 
disenchantment with the organisation. I found that, as Postero (2007) describes for 
Guarani communities of the Zona Cruz, local communities in the Chiquitanía often 
judged their leaders harshly and according to how well they managed to secure 
services for the comunidades. However, the Chiquitano also have a somewhat 
idealistic vision of what a good leader should do and they criticise excessively 
individualistic behaviour. It is likely that as Lazar (2004b; 2008) describes for the 
case of members of neighbourhood organisations in El Alto, accusations of 
corruption serve to curb leaders’ excessively individualistic behaviour. It seems that 
what comunarios most expect from their leaders is a personal relationship – which 
also entails being informed about the central and its activities. After all, creating a 
movement that the grassroots perceive themselves to be part of, requires a lot of 
effort – especially where there is a lack of communication technologies and face-to-
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face contact is crucial (Anderson, 1991; Latour, 2007: 34-37; Melucci, 1985: 792; 
Tilly, 1984: 305). 
The Right to Territory 
The Bolivian multicultural reform package also contained the right for indigenous 
people to have access to ‘their own space’ (Balza Alarcón, 2001: 33-35, as some 
authors like to put it, in the form of Tierras Comunitarias de Origen (TCO – Original 
Communal Lands) (Balza Alarcón, 2001: 33-35). Discursive (and at times physical) 
conflicts and negotiations with state actors have shaped the meanings Chiquitano 
people attached to the TCO Monte Verde. It seems that in this process, state actors 
were largely able to impose their meaning on the space, as well as on the natural 
resources within it. Consequently, while it is the vision of some Chiquitano that the 
territory will be a space where ‘Chiquitano identity’ can be reaffirmed (as it serves as 
a space for communal reproduction and a ‘space for the future generations’), other 
Chiquitano have come to stress the benefits of taking advantage of the natural 
resources within the territory (so that they can be ‘the agents of their own 
development’). This latter vision reflects that promoted by the INRA Law and state 
actors: while these spaces are reserved for ‘authentic indigenous people’, they are to 
be made legible, demarcated, assessed according to their economic potential and 
‘sustainably’ exploited for production. Authors have recorded similar attitudes of 
state agencies throughout Latin America (e.g. compare García Hierro and Surrallés, 
2005; Hale, 2005). Chiquitano leaders and their NGO allies participate in these latter 
tasks, thus becoming functional to the indio permitido project. It remains to be seen, 
however, if the meanings imposed on the territory and resources will actually 
permeate the comunidades or ‘fizzle out’ like so many other projects have done in 
the past. 
Chiquitano in the Municipal Sphere 
As part of the Bolivian multicultural reforms implemented in the 1990s, the Sánchez 
de Lozada government introduced decentralisation reforms through the Ley de 
Descentralización Administrativa (LDA – Administrative Decentralisation Law), 
with a participatory component (through the Popular Participation Law) (Behrendt, 
2000: 4; O'Neill, 2005: 125; Postero, 2007: 5). Chiquitano activists sought to take 
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advantage of the new political openings at the local level to advance their own 
political project. While Chiquitano activists have managed to capture municipal 
posts, including the position of Mayor in the 2004 municipal elections, this 
engagement with the state meant that they became functional to the Bolivian neo-
liberal multicultural project and indio permitido by replicating its logic and rhetoric, 
i.e. that ‘marginal’ Chiquitano communities need to ‘be developed’ and, if possible, 
turned into market producers. It can also be assumed that this is a response to 
pressures from the Concepceño elite who they are trying to appease. Consequently, 
while the Chiquitano central has achieved a historic victory in challenging the local 
status quo, indigenous organising has currently not overcome either elite hegemony 
or the indio permitido.2 
Among the criticisms levelled against the LPP is that it establishes an 
inherently Western, bureaucratic vertical system, which is incompatible with 
‘indigenous reality’, has a disrupting and homogenising effect in terms of communal 
authority structures and led to the replacement of traditional leaders (see Behrendt, 
2000: 15; Blanes, 1999b; Calla, 2000; Lema et al., 2001). However with regards to 
Chiquitano comunidades it cannot be argued that the implementation of the 
participatory component had such ‘disrupting’ or ‘homogenising’ effects. Instead, the 
newly introduced OTB structures of were incorporated in the comunidades and 
shaped in line with the roles of the previous communal organisation and made 
meaningful to everyday political practices. In fact, the comments by some 
Chiquitano comunarios suggest that the structures have successfully levelled out 
entrenched power structures and transform them from a more ‘taproot’ into 
‘rhizomic’ structures (Rosengren, 2003). Furthermore, there is not yet sufficient 
proof that the productive projects the municipality or NGOs promote have endured, 
if comunarios do not need them to supplement their subsistence lifestyle. 
Future Visions: Debates on Departmental and Indigenous Autonomies 
An area for future research, which would shed further light on the discussions in this 
thesis, are the debates regarding different forms of autonomy within the Bolivian 
                                                 
2
 Analysts commenting on problems with participatory reforms in other Latin American countries, 
interpret this as a problem of decentralisation reforms designed to create a ‘voice’ model of 
participation rather than ‘empowerment’. It aims to draw citizens into improving policy effectiveness 
and resource-distribution processes, rather than providing an actual space for political deliberation 
(Abers, 1998; Souza, 2001: 174; Thiel, 2003: 179).  
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state administrative structure. As indicated here, this was a highly contentious issue 
at the time of fieldwork and during the Bolivian Constituent Assembly held in 2006 
and 2007. On one side of the debate were lowland and highland indigenous 
movements and their NGO allies who demanded indigenous autonomies. On the 
other, were the civic autonomy movement of the so-called media luna (departments 
of Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando and Tarija), the departmental political class and central 
government agencies, who instead demanded departmental autonomies.  
On 14 December 2007, the MAS government celebrated the final draft of the 
new Bolivian Constitution, while tellingly, in Santa Cruz departmental elites 
celebrated their autonomous statutes (which, it should be added, had not gone 
through a public consultation process) (Plata Quispe, 2008: 155-157).3 Significantly, 
the ‘autonomous government’ was declared the sole administrator of natural 
resources (including forestry resources and hydrocarbons) and land ownership, in 
contrast with the Bolivian Constitution, which attributes this power to the national 
government (Plata Quispe, 2008: 159-160).4 
In turn, against the backdrop of the celebrations of the departmental 
autonomy statutes, on 31 May 2008, the Chiquitano, Ayoreo, Yuracaré-Mojeño, 
Guarayo, and Guaraní declared themselves and their TCOs ‘autonomous’, and began 
elaborating their own statutes and requested government resources. The CONAMAQ 
adopted a similar stance on 16 April 2008. They based this claim on the MAS 
constitutional project, the ILO Convention 169 and the declaration on rights of 
indigenous people that the UN adopted in September 2007. This declaration was 
confirmed law in Bolivia in October 2007.  
Throughout fieldwork, it was clear that the term of ‘autonomy’ was not new 
to many Chiquitano leaders (this is a different story with comunarios, many of which 
were unsure about the term’s meaning). This is not surprising as the autonomy 
debate is certainly not novel to Latin American indigenous movements (i.e. the cases 
of Mexico, Nicaragua and Colombia), while the departmental autonomy debate had 
                                                 
3
 Plata Quispe notes that the new statutes grant departments the status of ‘federal states’, with the 
prefect being elevated to ‘governor’, while the departmental legislative assembly acquires power to 
formulate and approve laws and determine the departmental budget (2008: 159). 
4
 Article 102 of the statue states in this respect: ‘right to land ownership, the regulation of rights, 
distribution, redistribution and administration of lands in the Department of Santa Cruz, is the 
responsibility of the Departmental Government and will be regulated through a Departmental Law 
approved by the Departmental Legislative Assembly’ (my translation, quoted in Plata Quispe, 2008: 
159). 
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gained much publicity since the autonomy referendum of July 2006. The different 
visions that circulated among the Chiquitano with regard to what such autonomies 
should entail, reflected the discourses in the wider political sphere.  
However, they also reflected their concern not to lose control over the Monte 
Verde territory that they had finally received a title for on 3 July 2007. They were 
determined to preserve the space from the grip of departmental elites and their 
supporters in Concepción. The Chiquitano leaders’ discourses around indigenous 
autonomy reflected those attached to the Monte Verde territory itself. On the one 
hand their discourse reflected the desire to achieve socio-cultural survival and 
securing livelihoods – a key struggle of so many indigenous groups (e.g. Conklin, 
1997; Conklin and Graham, 1995; Graham, 2002; Hale, 2005; Jackson, 1995, 2001; 
Warren and Jackson, 2002). They linked their own claim to autonomy to the fact that 
they had their own ‘principles’, ‘norms’, ‘authorities’ and ‘justice’. Others also 
added ‘culture’ or ‘identity’.5 For example, Ignacio Faldín noted ‘because we have 
our principles, culture and identity, how we respect our authorities, how we elect our 
authorities. We have our processes to make our own laws [and] we have our own 
justice’.6 Such attitudes indicate that for some leaders ‘autonomy’ is another name 
for ‘continuity’, or a way of legitimating the established Chiquitano way of living. 
Other leaders, however, saw it more directly linked to the control of and 
defence of resources, as well as the right to take advantage of resources that ‘belong 
to them’. As one informant noted: ‘they tell us that we are incapable [and ask] “what 
do they have territory for if they are going to grow mosquitos?”… But if we have a 
right to decide about our resources, we are going to exploit them, and we are going to 
take advantage of them’.7 Don Udalrico, a former CICC leader and comunario from 
Candelaria opined that: 
                                                 
5
 Interview: Mauro Cuasace, Concepción, 23 January 2007; Interview: Ignacio Faldín, Concepción, 17 
July 2007; Interview: Vicente Pessoa, Concepción, 24 January 2007; Interview: Justo Seoane 9 
(former Mayor Concepción), Concepción, 17 July 2007. 
6
 ‘…porque tenemos nuestro principio, nuestra cultura y nuestra propia identidad, como respetamos 
nosotros nuestras autoridad, como elegimos nuestra autoridad, tenemos nuestro proceso, como 
hacemos nuestra propia ley lo tenemos nosotros, nuestra propia justicia lo tenemos nosotros’. 
Interview: Ignacio Faldín, Concepción, 17th July 2007. 
7
‘[Dicen] que somos incapaces… “para que tiene territorio si van a criar mosquito… pero si tenemos 
un derecho de poder decidir de nuestro recursos vamos a explotar y vamos a aprovechar…’. 
Interview: Ignacio Faldín, Concepción, 17th July 2007. See also: Interview: Andrés Morobanchi, 
Primer de Augusto, 7th December 2006; Interview: Justo Seoane (former Mayor Concepción), 
Concepción, 17th July 2007. 
 352 
… because if we do departmental [autonomies] , then the prefect … will be a person 
that replaces the president. And this was the fight, that the autonomy has to come for 
all Chiquitanos, for all the most remote comunidades that there are, so that they 
know how to manage their affairs, what belongs to them. … It is because there are 
many riches. This is why they fight for the autonomy so much, because El Mutún 
will bring much money and they will grab it, while we poor here will not receive 
anything … They are already getting annoyed, they do not want autonomy for us.8 
Certainly, the struggle over autonomies is, above all, a struggle over resources. 
However, the above comments indicate that, among the Chiquitano, the struggle will 
consist of how they will define these resources and to what use they will put them. 
In January 2009, the Bolivians accepted their new Constitution via a 
referendum. It included four levels of autonomy: departmental, regional, municipal 
and indigenous. It recognised 36 distinct ‘nations’, elevated indigenous justice 
systems to the same level as the existing one, and established state control over ‘key 
natural resources’, such as gas.9 While a more comprehensive analysis of the 
constitutional text and corresponding laws is not in the scope of this thesis, a brief 
examination reveals that the text of the Autonomy and Decentralisation Law (Ley 
Marco de Autonomías y Descentralización) passed on 19 July 2010, places emphasis 
on ‘the sustainable exploitation of natural resources’ (for example, see Article 7.7).  
Consequently, there is no sign that the state’s legibility project is ceasing; on 
the contrary, it has accelerated. To gain autonomies, groups must develop statutes, 
define their authority structures, and show that they have viable governance and 
conflict resolution mechanisms in place. Anticipating this, CEJIS has advanced the 
‘governance’ project described in Chapter IV, in which I performed a research role – 
thus playing my own part as state actor. This also shows how allies of indigenous 
movements (like NGOs) may often unwittingly perpetuate the political culture of the 
indio permitido (Postero, 2007: 176). The process of territorial management is well 
under way and NGOs and some leaders continue promoting sustainable forestry 
management. Additionally, if the inhabitants of an ‘indigenous autonomous territory’ 
are planning to become financially independent of NGOs and different state 
                                                 
8
 ‘… si vamos hacer departamentales, entonces el prefecto ya… va a ser una persona que va a 
reemplazar al presidente. Y eso era la lucha pues que la autonomía tiene que salir para todo los 
chiquitanos, para todas las comunidades más lejanas que hay, que esos sepan manejar las cosas, que 
es lo que les toca a ellos pues. …es porque hay muchas riquezas, porque es que tanto luchan de 
autonomía, porque El Mutún va a dar harta plata y eso lo van a agarrar ellos y pa’ nosotros acá que 
somos pobre no vamos a recibir nada. … ya se enojan, no quieren que haya esa autonomía para 
nosotros’. Workshop: Candelaria, 11th May 2007. 
9
 See BBC News (26 January 2009b); BBC News (26 January 2009a). 
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institutions but still want access to infrastructure, they may need to carry out some 
productive projects. 
A closer examination of the autonomy legislation and the dynamics this has 
sparked among diverse now ‘autonomous’ groups will reveal how much this 
legislation perpetuates the indio permitido and to what extent Chiquitano comunarios 
resist it. While the introduction of autonomies served to re-define indigenous-state 
relations, a continuity seems to the that – like its predecessor laws – it denies the 
‘self-determination’ that indigenous groups hoped ‘indigenous autonomy’ would 
provide. 
This sheds a negative light on the prospects for postmulticultural citizenship 
(Postero, 2007) and overcoming the indio permitido. Hale suggests that ways to 
overcome this, include non-engagement, ‘sparks of utopian politics that change the 
subject; carrying on the cultural rights discussion in a language fundamentally at 
odds with the neo-liberal multicultural frame; strategies for rearticulating cultural 
rights with demands for political-economic resources from the start’ (2005: 13-14). 
However, none such currents are discernible among Chiquitano of Concepción 
municipality. The centrales with their taproot formation seem most efficient in 
perpetuating the indio permitido. Further, the contradiction between needing to 
engage with the state, in the face of domination and opposition, will not go away. No 
matter how much indigenous groups fight for a more inclusive or differentiated 
system, the state can only deal with legible populations. Consequently, indigenous 
groups who strive to perpetuate their liveways, will have to keep on negotiating and 
resisting through reproducing their socio-cultural selves. 
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Appendix 1 
List of Workshops, Focus Groups and Interviews 
CGTI-MV Project Workshops 
Location Municipality Participants from … Date Type 
Monte Verde Concepción Monte Verde 10-11 October 
2006 
Workshop 
Palestina Concepción Palestina 11-12 October 
2006 
Workshop 
Makanaté Concepción Makanaté 12-13 October 
2006 
Workshop 
Puerto San 
Pedro 
Concepción Puerto San Pedro 13-15 February 
2007 
Workshop 
Palestina Concepción Palestina 16-17 February 
2007 
Gathering 
additional data 
CEJIS Project: Workshops, Focus Groups, Interviews 
Focus Groups 
Location Municipality Participants from … Date Staff 
La Embocada Concepción La Embocada 8 March 2007 Lorenzo, David 
San 
Miguelito 
Sur (group 1) 
Concepción San Miguelito Sur 9 March 2007 Lorenzo, Katinka 
San 
Miguelito 
Sur (group 2) 
Concepción San Miguelito Sur 9 March 2007 David 
Workshops 
Location Municipality Participants from … Date Staff 
Las Abras San Javier Las Abras, Rosario 16-17 April 
2007 
David, Elba, Katinka, 
Lorenzo, Margarita, 
Margoth, Mercedes, 
Ninoska, Patricia, 
Pedro, William. 
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Location Municipality Participants from … Date Staff 
Turux Napez San Javier Tierras Nuevas, Turux 
Napez, Nueva 
Esperanza, San 
Francisco 
18-19 April 
2007 
David, Lorenzo, 
Margarita, Margoth, 
Katinka, Pedro, 
William. 
Santa Ana San Javier Santa Ana, Manantial 20-21 April 
2007 
David, Lorenzo, 
Margarita, Margoth, 
Katinka, Pedro, 
William. 
Coronación San Javier Coronación, La Senda, 
San Juan de Limones, 
Esperancita 
24-25 April 
2007 
David, Lorenzo, 
Margarita, Margoth, 
Pedro, William. 
El Carmen Concepción El Carmen, Panorama, 
Medio Monte, San 
Isidro, El Encanto 
8-9 May 2007 David, Jesús, Katinka, 
Lorenzo, Pedro, 
William. 
Candelaria Concepción Candelaria, San Pablo 
Sur, San Juan de la 
Roca, Santa Clara, 
Guadalupe 
10-11 May 
2007 
David, Jesús, Katinka, 
Lorenzo, Pedro, 
William. 
Las 
Mercedes de 
Guayaba 
Concepción Las Mercedes de 
Guayaba, Santa Rita, 
San Miguelito de la 
Cruz, San Lucas 
12-13 May 
2007 
David, Jesús, Lorenzo, 
Margoth, Patricia, 
Pedro, William. 
Makanaté Concepción Makanaté, Puerto San 
Pedro, Monte Verde 
15-16 May 
2007 
David, Jesús, Katinka, 
Lorenzo, Margoth, 
Patricia, Pedro, 
William. 
Palestina Concepción Palestina, San 
Miguelito. 
17-18 May 
2007 
David, Jesús, Katinka, 
Lorenzo, Patricia, 
Pedro, William. 
Palmira Lomerío Palmira, El Puquio, San 
Lorenzo, Monterito, 
Salina 
4-7 June 2007 David, Jesús, Katinka, 
Lorenzo, Margoth, 
Pedro. 
Other Workshops 
Location Municipality Participants from … Date Staff 
San Javier San Javier Women from different 
communities.  
31 May 2007 Lorenzo, David 
San Javier San Javier Young People from 
different communities, 
selected from Normal 
School in San Javier 
1 June 2007 Lorenzo, David 
Santa Rita 
(Translation 
Workshop) 
Concepción Santa Rita  22 June 2007 Katinka, Margoth, 
Pedro. 
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Short Structured Interviews 
Name Who/ Occupation Location Date Interviewer 
Dionisio Roda former CIP-SJ leader (Sport 
and Health ) 
San Javier  6 & 8 
December 2006 
David 
Andrés 
Morobanchi 
CIP-SJ Secretary of Land and 
Territory  
Primer de 
Augusto 
7 December 
2006 
David 
Ignacio Macoñó former CIP-SJ leader Del Rancho 7 December 
2006 
David 
José Paine  CIP-SJ technician San Javier 7 December 
2006 
David 
William Roca CIP-SJ technician 
(communication) 
San Javier 12 December 
2006 
David 
Lorenza 
Rodrigues 
CICC technician Candelaria 19 January 
2007 
David 
Guillermo 
Cuasace 
OTB Santa Monica Santa Mónica 22 January 
2007 
David 
Lorenzo Pasabare Former CICC and CIDOB 
Leader 
Altamira 22 January 
2007 
Lorenzo 
Agustín Supepi Former CICC Economics 
Secretary 
Guayaba 23 January 
2007 
Lorenzo 
Carlos Leigue CGTI Leader Concepción 23 January 
2007 
Lorenzo 
Maria Chacón CICC Vice-president Limoncito  23 January 
2007 
Lorenzo 
Mauro Cuasase CICC leader Concepción 23 January 
2007 
Lorenzo 
Isabel Pinto former CICC technician Concepción 23 January 
2007 
Lorenzo 
Hugo Hurtado CICC Communication and 
Health Secretary 
Alta Mira 23 January 
2007 
Lorenzo 
Pedro Mencarì CICC/ APCOB technician El Carmen 23 January 
2007 
David 
Dina Ramos former CICC technician Candelaria 24 January 
2007 
Lorenzo 
Vicente Pessoa 
Mendoza 
former CICC and CIDOB 
leader 
Concepción  24 January 
2007 
Lorenzo 
Francisco Pesoa former CICC leader Limoncito 24 January 
2007 
Lorenzo 
Patricio Hurtado former CICC leader, 1980-85, 
88 
Alta Mira 25 January 
2007 
Lorenzo 
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Name Who/ Occupation Location Date Interviewer 
Daniel Leigue former CICC leader Santa Mónica 26 January 
2007 
Lorenzo 
Pedro Pinto Former CICC leader Santa Rita 26 January 
2007 
David 
Facundo Rivero 
Leigues 
former CICC leader Santa Mónica 26 January 
2007 
Lorenzo 
Ana Pesoa 
Cuasase 
former CIP-SJ leader Monte Cristo 30 January 
2007 
David 
Angélica Tapia former CIP-SJ leader San 
Ramoncito 
31 January 
2007 
David 
Semi-and Unstructured Interviews (Formal) 
Name Who/ Occupation Location Date Interviewer 
Pedro Flores 
Flores 
President Tierra Nueva Turuz Napez 18 April 2007 Katinka 
Demetrio Ortiz 
Ayarde 
Founder Turux Napez Turuz Napez 18 April 2007 Katinka 
Udalrrico Vargas 
Jaldín 
comunario from Candelaria, 
CICC founding member 
Candelaria 10 May 2007 Katinka 
Nicolás Aguilar 
Faldín 
comunario from Candelaria, 
CICC founding member 
Candelaria 10 May 2007 Katinka 
Esteban Massai comunario from Palestina Palestina 17 May 2007 Katinka 
Antonio 
Justiniano 
comunario from Manantial, 
President Manantial 
Santa Ana 20 May 2007 Katinka 
Carlos Leigues CGTI leader Concepción 28 May 2007 Katinka 
Lucas Surubí comunario Monte Christo, 
founder of the CIP-SJ 
Monte Cristo 29 May 2007 Lorenzo, 
David 
Marcelo Surubí comunario from Altamira, 
former CICC technician 
Concepción 31 May 2007 Katinka 
Tomas Choré 
Parapaino 
President CGTI TCO-MV  Concepción 31 May 2007 Katinka 
Pedro Solíz Pinto OTB Santa Rita Concepción 1 June 2007 Katinka 
Lorenzo Pasabare comunario from Santa 
Mónica, CEJIS employee 
Concepción 1 June 2007 Katinka 
Ignacio (Nacho) 
Soqueré Tomicha 
CICOL General Cacique Palmira, 
Lomerío 
4 June 2007 Katinka 
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Name Who/ Occupation Location Date Interviewer 
Agustín Choré Former CICOL General 
Cacique 
Palmira, 
Lomerío 
4 June 2007 Lorenzo, 
David 
Mariano Choré Economics Cacique CICOL Palmira, 
Lomerío 
4 June 2007 Margoth 
Delsy Macoñó 
Añez 
Councillor San Javier 
Municipal Government 
San Javier 5 June 2007 Jesús 
Pedro Peña Comunario de Palmira Palmira, 
Lomerío 
5 June 2007 Katinka 
Esteban Choré Former CICOL leader San Lorenzo, 
Lomerío  
6 June 2007 Margoth  
Juan Soqueré 
Gomes 
Former CICOL leader San Lorenzo, 
Lomerío  
7 June 2007 Margoth, 
Katinka  
José Masaí Former CICOL Leader San Lorenzo, 
Lomerío 
7 June 2007 Margoth, 
Katinka 
Jesús Macoñó 
Añez 
Former CIP-SJ technician Palmira, 
Lomerío 
7 June 2007 Katinka 
Isidro Pasabare 
Castedo and 
Nicolás Yurrupi 
comunarios from Santa 
Mónica 
Concepción 19 June 2007 Katinka 
Ángela Durán Economics Cacique OICH Concepción 20 June 2007 Katinka 
Margarita 
Chuvirú 
CGTI TCO-MV Coordinator Concepción 1 July 2007 Katinka 
Vicente 
Fernández Télmo 
CICC Coordinator Concepción 2 July 2007 Katinka 
Pedro Mencarí 
Pessoa  
ETA Technical Coordinator, 
APCOB, CICC technician 
Concepción 16 July 2007 Katinka 
Benita 
Machicado 
Comunaria La Embocada, 
Municipal Councillor 
Concepción 
Concepción 16 July 2007 Margoth 
Justo Seoane 
Parapaino 
Mayor of Concepción Concepción 17 July 2007 Katinka 
Ignacio Faldín Official Mayor of Human 
Development 
Concepción 17 July 2007 Margoth 
Juana Herrera 
Mendéz 
Councillor Concepción 
Municipal Government  
Concepción 17 July 2007 Katinka 
Facundo Rivero 
Leigues 
President Vigilance 
Committee Concepción 
Concepción 17 July 2007 Katinka 
Eugenio Vicuña PLAN International Concepción 17 July 2007 Margoth 
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Name Who/ Occupation Location Date Interviewer 
Melanio Quiroz 
Ibarra 
Corregidor of Concepción Concepción 18 July 2007 Katinka 
Mario Antelo Municipal Forestry Unit  Concepción 18 July 2007 Margoth 
Semi-and Unstructured Interviews outside Projects (Formal and 
Informal) 
Name Who/ Occupation Location Date 
José Lamas  Administrative Assistant 
INRA, Villa Tunari 
Villa Tunari 6 June 2006 
Raúl Maydana FAM La Paz 6 June 2006 
Andrés Morobanchi CIP-SJ Land and Territory 
Secretary  
San Javier 8 June 2006 
Rodolfo López  OICH First Cacique Concepción 8 June 2006 
Petrona Bruno APG Camiri 10 June 2006 
Mario Gonzales GTZ Camiri 10 June 2006 
Eduardo Anchorez Nord Sud Cooperation Muyupamba 12 June 2006 
Janeth Carbollo Dávalos Mayor Villa Vaca Guzmán Muyupambpa 12 June 2006 
Filemón Iriarte GTZ/PADEP Llallagua 14 June 2006 
Raúl Maydana FAM Santa Cruz 9 September 
2006 
Carlos Leigues CGTI leader Concepción 26 October 
2006 
Juan Carlos Guerra comunidad Agrológica 
Pueblos Unidos, MST 
En route… 6 November 
2006 
Pedro Gonzalo Vargas CEPIB En route… 6 November 
2006 
Adolfo Chávez,  CIDOB President  Rn marcha 6 November 
2006 
Frederick Fromm Forestry Student, affiliated 
to forestry Institute IBIS 
Santa Cruz 11 November 
2006 
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Name Who/ Occupation Location Date 
Oscar Tonelli Historian, former 
CORDECRUZ Coordinator 
Concepción 5 February 2007 
David Rivero Former CIP-SJ leader, 
CEJIS researcher 
 6 February 2007 
Juan Lira CIP-SJ, technician CGTI 
TCO-MV 
Concepción 7 February 2007 
Minor Payne Peace Core Volunteer, 
Concepción 
Concepción 10 February 
2007 
Vicente Lopez Ramos comunario from Puerto San 
Pedro 
Puerto San 
Pedro 
13 February 
2007 
Kirsten Lattrich DED Worker, Concepción Concepción 13 February 
2007 
Esteban and Pedro Massaí comunarios from Palestina Palestina 2 March 2007 
Hilda Massaí and Profe 
Uribaldo 
comunarios from Palestina Palestina 2 March 2007 
Isabel Paz Patchurí comunaria from Palestina Palestina 3 March 2007 
Hilda Massaí comunaria from Palestina Palestina 4 March 2007 
Jose Bailaba Parapayne Member Consituent 
Assembly 
Sucre 16 March 2007 
Lorenzo Pasabare comunario from Santa 
Mónica, CEJIS employee 
Concepción 16 April 2007 
Don Luciano comunaria from El Carmen El Carmen 9 May 2007 
Jose Bailaba Parapayne Chiquitano Member 
Consituent Assembly 
Santa Cruz 19 May 2007 
Carlos Romero Member Consituent 
Assembly 
Santa Cruz 20 May 2007 
Lazaro Gonzalo CPESC Santa Cruz 20 May 2007 
Nélida Faldín Chiquitano Member 
Consituent Assembly 
Sucre 24 May 2007 
Diego Jaldín CPESC President Sucre 25 May 2007 
Hernán Ávila CEJIS, Bloque Oriente 
Support Team 
Concepción 15 June 2007 
Claudia Montaño CEJIS Santa Cruz Santa Cruz  28 June 2007 
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Name Who/ Occupation Location Date 
Elba Flores Gonzales CEJIS Santa Cruz Santa Cruz 28 June 2007 
Leonardo Tamburini CEJIS Director Santa Cruz 5 July 2007 
Deborah Díaz CEJIS Santa Cruz Santa Cruz 7 July 2007 
María Chacón  CICC Leader Sucre 12 July 2007 
CEJIS Project staff 
Elba Flores (Governance Project coordinator), Margoth Céspedes (CEJIS 
Concpeción Coordinator), David Rivero, Lorenzo Pasabare, Pedro Solís Pinto, Jesús 
Macoñó, William Roca, Mercedes Nosta (consultant), Patricia Leaplaza , Margarita 
Chuvirú (CGTI-MV Coordinator), Ninoska. 
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Appendix 2 
Methodological Matrix for Workshops in Chiquitano Comunidades 
“Construcción participativa del proceso de gobernanza TCO-MV” 
Objetivo Tema – Preguntas generadoras Técnica Procedimiento Tiempo Responsables Material 
I. Historia de la 
comunidad 
1. ¿Cuál es la historia de nuestra comunidad? 
- año de fundación 
- fundadores 
- numero de habitantes y de familias 
- acontecimientos importantes (creación de - 
organización, fundación de escuela, etc.) 
Trabajo de grupo 
por comunidad o 
entrevista 
personal 
Formar grupos por comunidad 
y asignarle a cada uno la 
pregunta 
 
-El grupo elige un relator y 
moderador. 
-El facilitador anota en su 
cuaderno toda la discusión 
-Los participantes escriben las 
respuestas en papelógrafos con 
ayuda del facilitador. 
1/2 hora David 
Lorenzo 
Pedro 
Willam 
Margoth 
Katinka* 
 
Papeló-
grafo 
Marcadores 
Masking 
Mapa 
II. La 
organización y 
gobernanza en la 
comunidad. 
¿Cómo manejamos la comunidad nosotros y 
nuestras autoridades? Identificar:  
¿Cuántas organizaciones existen en la comunidad 
y cuales son? 
¿Cuáles sus cargos, funciones y forma de elección 
de cada una? 
¿En que instancias de la organización comunal  se 
toman las  decisiones?, 
Trabajo de grupo 
por comunidad 
Preg. 1-3: trabajar con la 
matriz de organización. 
 
Preg. 4-9: entrevista colectiva 
al grupo. 
 
(e.g. ¿Cómo era la organización 
45 min –  
1 hora 
 
 “ 
“ 
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¿Como participan los comunarios en la toma de 
decisiones? 
¿Cómo se distribuye y ejecuta las funciones y 
actividades comunales? Pedir un ejemplo, tal ves 
de trabajo comunal u otro. 
¿Cómo se controla a los dirigentes?. 
¿Qué entienden por autoridad? ¿Por qué se 
cambia a las autoridades de la comunidad? 
¿Para que sirve nuestra organización comunal? 
en Lomerío y como es hoy?) 
II.a) Identificar 
los roles de la 
organización 
matriz, su 
coordinación y 
cuales las 
contradicciones 
del sistema de 
autoridades y su 
articulación 
externa. 
¿Cómo coordinamos con instituciones y 
organizaciones afuera de la comunidad 
(organización matriz, ONG, instituciones 
estatales)? 
¿Quiénes?´ 
¿Cómo coordinan (para que sirve)? 
Ventajas, desventajas 
¿Qué grado de coordinación existe con las 
instituciones? 
¿Cuál es el objetivo que deben cumplir las 
centrales? 
“ Preg. 1 - 4: Armar una matriz 
de doble entrada. 
Preg. 5: El grupo debe: 
-Identificar las principales 
instituciones en tarjetas. 
- En un papelógrafo con 4 
diagrama sobrepuestos de 
menor a mayor, ubicando la 
comunidad al medio, dejar que 
los participantes  ubiquen las 
demás fichas donde crean 
conveniente en base a una 
relación: débil, regular, fuerte; 
esto para ver el grado de 
coordinación que existe. 
45 min –  
1 hora 
“ “ 
III. Normas 
comunales y 
conflictos 
 Sociodrama Se elige a algunos comunarios y 
se les pide que ayuden en la 
dramatización de un problema 
20 min - 
1/2 hora 
“ Grabadora 
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mostrando como los resuelven. 
III a) Conocer 
formas de 
resolución de 
conflictos en las 
comunidades 
¿Cuales son los principales problemas entre las 
personas en la comunidad y el territorio? 
¿Cómo y ante que instancias/niveles son resueltos 
los problemas? 
¿Que experiencias positivas y negativas se tienen 
con esta manera de hacerlo? 
¿Cuales son las propuestas para resolver mejor los 
problemas? 
 
Trabajo de grupo 
diferenciado por 
género o 
comunidad 
Formar grupos por comunidad  
-El grupo elige un relator y 
moderador. 
-El facilitador anota en su 
cuaderno toda la discusión 
-Los participantes escriben las 
respuestas en papelógrafos con 
ayuda del facilitador. 
40 min “ “ 
III b) Conocer 
las normas de 
las 
comunidades 
¿Qué es una norma y para que sirve? 
¿Qué normas o estatutos existen en la comunidad? 
¿Qué conflictos normativiza y que sanciones hay 
para esos conflictos en sus estatutos? 
¿Qué normas deberían construirse o mejorarse en 
la comunidad? 
¿Existen algunas normas inter-comunales en la 
zona? ¿Qué aspectos contempla? 
 
“ “ 30 -40 
min 
“ “ 
IV Recoger las 
diversas visiones 
y perspectivas 
del territorio 
MV 
¿Qué es una comunidad para ustedes? 
¿Qué es el territorio para los Chiquitanos? 
¿Se sienten parte de la TCO Monte Verde? 
¿porque? (para comunidades de afuera) 
“ “ 1 hora “ “ 
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¿Cuál es la visión de futuro que tenemos los 
Chiquitanos de Monte Verde sobre nuestro 
territorio? 
¿Qué es autonomía para ustedes? (en lo político, 
territorial y personal-familiar) 
V. Recoger 
insumos para 
estatuto de 
gobierno. 
¿Quienes tienen derecho de ingresar y vivir en el 
Territorio? 
 
¿Quienes y cómo están administrando o 
manejando actualmente el territorio de Monte 
Verde y cómo se piensa administrar en el 
territorio en el futuro?  
¿Con que recursos financieros vamos administrar 
o manejar el territorio en el futuro? 
¿Con que recursos institucionales vamos 
administrar o manejar el territorio en el futuro? 
 
¿Qué normas existen en el territorio? 
¿Quienes aplican las normas en el territorio? 
¿A quienes se aplica la norma?  
¿Qué normas deberían construirse en el territorio? 
“ “ 1 hora “ “ 
VI. Propuesta 
del gobierno 
territorial 
indígena. 
¿Qué tipo de gobierno-sistemas de autoridad u 
organización territorial indígena, sueñan tener en 
el territorio de Monte Verde? 
- Forma de gobierno (valores, principios, etc.) 
Trabajo de grupo 
diferenciado por 
de mujeres, 
hombres, jóvenes 
y dirigentes o 
Formar grupo de mujeres, 
hombres, jóvenes y dirigentes. 
- El grupo elige un relator y un 
secretario. 
1 horas “ “ 
 366 
- Función del gobierno (para que?) 
- Forma de Elección (como se va elegir?) 
- Tiempo de gestión (cuanto va durar?) 
- Sanciones-normas (que derechos y obligaciones 
va tener? En caso de no cumplir o manejar mal los 
recursos, que sanciones aplicaremos?) 
comunidad 
- Exponer las conclusiones del 
grupo. 
Plenaria: se realizará solo de la parte de organizaciones (cuando hay confusión) y de la propuesta del gobierno de la TCO de la cual se debe debatir su viabilidad y formas 
en conjunto. 
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Objetivo II a), pregunta 5) 
 ¿Qué grado de coordinación existe con las instituciones? 
 
 
Diagrama de Venns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COM
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